On the Lai-Massey Scheme

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Abstract. Constructing a block cipher requires to define a random permutation, which is usually performed by the Feistel scheme and its variants. In this paper we investigate the Lai-Massey scheme which was used in IDEA. We show that we cannot use it "as is" in order to obtain results like Luby-Rackoff Theorem. This can however be done by introducing a simple function which has an orthomorphism property. We also show that this design offers nice decorrelation properties, and we propose a block cipher family called Walnut.

Designing a block cipher requires to build a random permutation from a random key. In most of block cipher constructions, we distinguish two approaches. First we use a fixed network with parallel permutations which are modified at their inputs or outputs by subkey values. This was used for instance in Safer [11] and Square [3]. Second we use the Feistel scheme [4] (or one of its variants) which starts from a random function (see Fig. 1). This was used for instance in DES [1] and Blowfish [14]. The literature gives an extra construction which is not in these categories and which was used in the IDEA cipher [9,8]. It uses a simple scheme which we illustrated on Fig. 2 and which we call the "Lai-Massey scheme" throughout the paper. As for the Feistel scheme, this structure relies on a group structure.



Fig. 1. The Feistel Scheme.

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

Fig. 2. The Lai-Massey Scheme.

For the Feistel scheme, Luby and Rackoff [10] proved that if the round functions are random, then a 3-round Feistel cipher will look random to any chosen plaintext attack when the number of chosen plaintexts d is negligible towards $2^{\frac{m}{4}}$ (where m is the block length). In this paper, we show a similar result for the Lai-Massey scheme if we add a simple function σ which has the orthomorphism property: it must be such that σ and $x \mapsto \sigma(x) - x$ are both permutations.

The Luby-Rackoff result however holds when the round functions are random. This has been extended by the decorrelation theory [18,19,20,21,22] when the round function have some decorrelation property. This was used to define the Peanut construction family in which the DFC cipher [2,5,6] is an example. We show that we can have similar results with the Lai-Massey scheme and propose a similar construction.

1 Notations

1.1 Feistel and Lai-Massey Schemes

Let $(G, +)$ be a group. Given r functions $F_1, \ldots, F_r$ on G we can define an r-round Feistel scheme which is a permutation on G^2 denoted $\Psi(F_1, \ldots, F_r)$. It is define by iterating the scheme on Fig. 1. If $r > 1$, we let

$$\Psi(F_1, \ldots, F_r)(x, y) = \Psi(F_2, \ldots, F_r)(y, x + F_1(y))$$

and

$$\Psi(F_1)(x, y) = (x + F_1(y), y).$$

(The last swap is omitted.)

Similarly, given a permutation σ on G, we define an r-round Lai-Massey scheme as a permutation $\Lambda^\sigma(F_1, \ldots, F_r)$ by

$$\Lambda^\sigma(F_1, \ldots, F_r)(x, y) = \Lambda^\sigma(F_2, \ldots, F_r)(\sigma(x + F(x - y)), y + F(x - y))$$

and

$$\Lambda^\sigma(F_1)(x,y) = (x + F(x-y), y + F(x-y))$$

in which the last σ is omitted.

For more convenience, if $x \in G^2$, we let x^l and x^r denote its two halves: $x = (x^l, x^r)$.

1.2 Advantage of Distinguishers and Best Advantage

A distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$ is a probabilistic Turing machine with unlimited computation power. It has access to an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ and can send it a limited number of queries. At the end, the distinguisher must output 0 or 1. We consider the advantage for distinguishing a random function F from a random function G defined by

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathcal{A}}(F,G) = \left|\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}=F} = 1\right] - \left|\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}=G} = 1\right]\right|\right|.$$

Given an integer d and a random function F from a given set $\mathcal{M}_1$ to a given set $\mathcal{M}_2$, we define the d-wise distribution matrix $[F]^d$ as a matrix in $\mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}_1^d \times \mathcal{M}_2^d}$ by

$$[F]^d_{(x_1,\ldots,x_d),(y_1,\ldots,y_d)} = \Pr[F(x_1) = y_1, \ldots, F(x_d) = y_d].$$

For a matrix A in $\mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}_1^d \times \mathcal{M}_2^d}$, we define

$$||A||_a = \max_{x_1} \sum_{y_1} \max_{x_2} \sum_{y_2} \cdots \max_{x_d} \sum_{y_d} |A_{(x_1,\ldots,x_d),(y_1,\ldots,y_d)}|.$$

It has been shown that $||.||_a$ is a matrix norm which can compute the best advantage. Namely we have

$$\max_{\substack{\mathcal{A} \text{ limited to } d \text{ queries} \\ \text{chosen plaintext attack}}} \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathcal{A}}(F,G) = \frac{1}{2}||[F]^d - [G]^d||_a. \tag{1}$$

(See [24].)

Similarly, we recursively define the $||.||_s$ norm by

$$||A||_s = \max\left(\max_{x_1} \sum_{y_1} \pi_{x_1,y_1}(A), \max_{y_1} \sum_{x_1} \pi_{x_1,y_1}(A)\right)$$

(the norm of a matrix reduced to one entry being its absolute value) where $\pi_{x_1,y_1}(A)$ denotes the matrix in $\mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}_1^{d-1} \times \mathcal{M}_2^{d-1}}$ such that

$$(\pi_{x_1,y_1}(A))_{(x_2,\ldots,x_d),(y_2,\ldots,y_d)} = A_{(x_1,\ldots,x_d),(y_1,\ldots,y_d)}.$$

Then we have

$$\max_{\substack{\mathcal{A} \text{ limited to } d \text{ queries} \\ \text{chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack}}} \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathcal{A}}(F,G) = \frac{1}{2}||[F]^d - [G]^d||_s. \tag{2}$$

(See [24].)

1.3 Decorrelation Biases

We also use the decorrelation bias of order d of a function in the sense of a given norm $||.||$ defined by

$$\mathrm{DecF}^d_{||.||}(F) = ||[F]^d - [F^*]^d||$$

where F^* is a random function uniformly distributed, and the decorrelation bias of order d of a permutation defined by

$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||.||}(C) = ||[C]^d - [C^*]^d||$$

where C^* is a random permutation uniformly distributed. (See [18,20,23,24].)

2 On the Need for Orthomorphisms

Let us first consider the Λ^σ construction when σ is the identity function. Obviously if $(z,t) = \Lambda^\sigma(F_1,\ldots,F_r)(x,y)$ we have $z - t = x - y$. Thus, for any random round functions, $\Lambda^\sigma(F_1,\ldots,F_r)$ is fairly easily distinguishable with only one known plaintext. This is why we have to introduce the σ permutation.

Let us consider a one-round Lai-Massey scheme with σ:

$$(z,t) = (\sigma(x + F(x-y)), y + F(x-y)).$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} z - t &= (\sigma(x + F(x-y)) - (x + F(x-y))) + (x-y) \\ &= \sigma'(x + F(x-y)) + x - y \end{aligned}$$

where $\sigma'(u) = \sigma(u) - u$. Thus, if F is uniformly distributed and σ' is a permutation, then $z - t$ is uniformly distributed. Ideally we thus require that σ and σ' are permutations, which means that σ is an orthomorphism of the group.

Unfortunately, the existence of orthomorphisms is not guaranteed for arbitrary groups. Actually, Hall-Paige Theorem [7] states that an Abelian finite group has an orthomorphism if and only if its order is odd or $\mathbf{Z}_2^2$ is isomorphic to one of its subgroups. In particular, $\mathbf{Z}_{2^m}$ has no orthomorphism. In odd-ordered groups G, with multiplicative notations, the square $\sigma(x) = x^2$ is an orthomorphism since σ' is the identity permutation and σ is a permutation (its inverse is the $\frac{1+\#G}{2}$-power function). In $\mathbf{Z}_2^m$ with $m > 1$, Schnorr and Vaudenay [15,16] exhibited

$$\sigma(x) = (x \text{ AND } c) \text{ XOR } \mathrm{ROTL}^i(x)$$

which is an orthomorphism when the AND of all $\mathrm{ROTL}^{ij}(c)$ values is zero and the OR is $\mathtt{11\ldots1}$.[1] For instance, $i = 1$ and $c = \mathtt{00\ldots01}$ leads to an orthomorphism. Stern and Vaudenay used a similar construction in CS-Cipher [17].

We thus relax the orthomorphism properties by adopting the following notion of α-almost orthomorphism.

[1] Throughout this paper OR, AND and XOR denote the usual bit-wise boolean operators on bitstrings of equal length, and ROTL^i denotes the left circular rotation by i positions.

Definition 1. *In a given group G of order g, a permutation σ is called an α-almost orthomorphism if the function $\sigma'(x) = \sigma(x) - x$ is such that there are at most α elements in G with no preimage by σ'.*

This definition fits to Patarin's notion of "spreading" [12,13]. We prefer here to emphasis on the approximation of orthomorphism properties.

We notice that since $(\sigma^{-1})'(x) = -\sigma'(\sigma^{-1}(x))$, then σ^{-1} is also an α-almost orthomorphism when σ is an α-almost orthomorphism.

Here is an useful lemma.

Lemma 2. *If σ is an α-almost orthomorphism over the group G, then*

$$\forall \delta \in G \backslash \{0\} \quad \Pr_{(X,Y)\in_U G^2}[\sigma'(X) - \sigma'(Y) = \delta] \leq \max(\alpha, 1) g^{-1} \tag{3}$$

$$\forall \delta \in G \backslash \{0\} \quad \Pr_{X\in_U G}[\sigma'(X) = \sigma'(X+\delta)] \leq \alpha g^{-1} \tag{4}$$

$$\forall \delta \in G \quad \Pr_{X\in_U G}[\delta - \sigma'(X) \notin \sigma'(G)] \leq 2\alpha g^{-1}. \tag{5}$$

Proof. It is straightforward that for any set A, the number of preimages x such that $\sigma'(x) \in A$ is at most $\alpha + \#A$. Let n_y denote the number of preimages of y. We have

$$\Pr_{(X,Y)\in_U G^2}[\sigma'(X) - \sigma'(Y) = \delta] = g^{-2} \sum_u n_u n_{u+\delta}.$$

First, if $\alpha = 1$, for $\delta \neq 0$, the number of (x, y) pairs such that $\sigma'(x) - \sigma'(y) = \delta$ is at most g which is equal to αg.

Let us now consider $\alpha \geq 2$. If there exists one y such that $n_y = \alpha + 1$, then for all other ys we have $n_y \leq 1$. Hence

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{(X,Y)\in_U G^2}[\sigma'(X) - \sigma'(Y) = \delta] &\leq \frac{\alpha+1}{g^2} - g^{-2} + g^{-2} \sum_u n_{u+\delta} \\ &= \alpha g^{-2} + g^{-1} \\ &\leq \alpha g^{-1}.\end{aligned}$$

In the other cases, we have $n_y \leq \alpha$ hence

$$\Pr_{(X,Y)\in_U G^2}[\sigma'(X) - \sigma'(Y) = \delta] \leq g^{-2}\alpha \sum_u n_{u+\delta} = \alpha g^{-1}.$$

Therefore, in all cases this inequality holds.

We have

$$\Pr_{X\in_U G}[\sigma'(X) = \sigma'(X+\delta)] \leq \sum_{y; n_y \geq 2} n_y g^{-1} = 1 - g^{-1} \#\{y; n_y = 1\}.$$

The number of ys such that $n_y = 1$ is greater than $g - 2\alpha$, thus the probability is less than $2\alpha g^{-1}$.

The number of xs such that $\delta - \sigma'(x) \notin \sigma'(G)$ is at most $\alpha + g - \#\sigma'(G)$ which is at most 2α. □

As an example of almost orthomorphism in $\mathbf{Z}_{2^m}$ (which has no orthomorphism), we claim that the simple rotation ROTL is a 1-almost orthomorphism. Actually, it is a permutation, and $\mathrm{ROTL}'(x)$ is equal to $x + \mathrm{MSB}(x)$ where $\mathrm{MSB}(x)$ denotes the most significant bit of x. The 0 value is taken twice by this function (by $x = 0$ and $x = \mathtt{11\ldots1}$), the value $\mathtt{100\ldots0}$ is never taken, and all the other values are taken once.

3 Extending the Luby-Rackoff Theorem

In order to extend Luby-Rackoff Theorem to the Lai-Massey scheme, we need the following lemma, which corresponds to Patarin's "coefficient H technique" [12,13].

Lemma 3. *Let F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^* be three independent random functions on a group G with uniform distribution, and let d be a positive integer. Let σ be an α-almost orthomorphism on G. For any family of G^2 elements $(x_1, \ldots, x_d, y_1, \ldots, y_d)$ such that the x_i values are pairwise different as well as the $y_i^l - y_i^r$ values, we have*

$$\frac{\Pr[\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*)(x_i) = y_i; i]}{\Pr[C^*(x_i) = y_i; i]} \geq 1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2}(g^{-1} + g^{-2}) - f(\alpha)$$

where g denotes the cardinality of G and C^* is a random permutation of G^2 uniformly distributed, provided that $d < g^2$, and $f(\alpha)$ is a function such that $f(0) = 0$ and

$$f(\alpha) = d\frac{d(\alpha-1) + 3\alpha - 1}{2g} \quad \text{for} \quad \alpha > 0.$$

Proof. We let U_i, V_i, W_i denote the values after the first, second and final round of $\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*)(x_i)$ respectively. For any value t in G^2, we let Δt denote $t^l - t^r$. The probabilistic event $[W_i = y_i]$ is equivalent to $[\Delta V_i = \Delta y_i$ and $W_i^l = y_i^l]$. Now we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta V_i &= \sigma'(U_i^l + F_2^*(\Delta U_i)) + \Delta U_i \\ W_i^l &= V_i^l + F_3^*(\Delta V_i). \end{aligned}$$

The $[W_i = y_i]$ event is thus equivalent to

$$e_i = [F_2^*(\Delta U_i) \in {\sigma'}^{-1}(\Delta y_i - \Delta U_i) - V_i^l \text{ and } F_3^*(\Delta y_i) = y_i^l - U_i^l].$$

When the ΔU_i are pairwise different, as well as the ΔV_i, it is thus easy to compute the probability that we have $W_i = y_i$ for all i because it relies on independent $F_2(\Delta U_i)$ and $F_3(\Delta V_i)$ uniformly distributed random variables. In addition we need all $\Delta y_i - \Delta U_i$ to have preimages by σ'.

We have

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr[W_i = y_i; i = 1, \ldots, d] \\ &= \Pr[e_i; i = 1, \ldots, d] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\geq \Pr[e_i, \Delta U_i \neq \Delta U_j, \Delta y_i - \Delta U_i \in \sigma'(G); i \neq j] \\
&= \Pr[e_i / \Delta U_i \neq \Delta U_j, \Delta y_i - \Delta U_i \in \sigma'(G); i \neq j] \times \\
&\quad \Pr[\Delta U_i \neq \Delta U_j, \Delta y_i - \Delta U_i \in \sigma'(G); i \neq j] \\
&= g^{-2d}(1 - \Pr[\exists i < j \quad \Delta U_i = \Delta U_j \quad \text{or} \quad \exists i \quad \Delta y_i - \Delta U_i \notin \sigma'(G))])
\end{aligned}$$

which is greater than g^{-2d} times

$$1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2} . \max_{i<j} \Pr[\Delta U_i = \Delta U_j] - d . \max_i \Pr[\Delta y_i - \Delta U_i \notin \sigma'(G)].$$

We notice that

$$\Delta U_i = \sigma'(x_i^l + F(\Delta x_i)) + \Delta x_i.$$

The probability of having collisions with σ' with two different uniformly distributed inputs is less than $\max(\alpha, 1)g^{-1}$ for $\Delta x_i \neq \Delta x_j$ from Equation (3). If we have $\Delta x_i = \Delta x_j$, then we will have $\Delta U_i = \Delta U_j$ with probability at most αg^{-1} from Equation (4) since $x_i \neq x_j$ and thus $x_i^l \neq x_j^l$. In addition, $\Pr[\Delta y_i - \Delta U_i \notin \sigma'(G)]$ is less than $2\alpha g^{-1}$ from Equation (5). Therefore $\Pr[W_i = y_i; i = 1, \ldots, d]$ is greater than

$$g^{-2d} \left(1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2} \max(\alpha, 1) g^{-1} - 2d\alpha g^{-1}\right).$$

We have

$$\Pr[C^*(x_i) = y_i; i = 1, \ldots, d] = \frac{1}{g^2(g^2-1)\ldots(g^2-d+1)}.$$

Since

$$\frac{g^2(g^2-1)\ldots(g^2-d+1)}{g^{2d}} \geq 1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2g^2}$$

when $g^2 > d$, we obtain the result. □

We can now state our result.

Theorem 4. *Let F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^* be three independent random functions on a group G with a uniform distribution. Let σ be an α-almost orthomorphism on G. For any distinguisher limited to d chosen plaintexts ($d < g^2$) between $\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*)$ and a random permutation C^* with a uniform distribution, we have*

$$\mathrm{Adv}(\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*), C^*) \leq d(d-1)\left(g^{-1} + g^{-2}\right) + f(\alpha)$$

where g is the cardinality of G and $f(\alpha)$ is defined as in Lemma 3.

Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that the distinguisher never request the same query twice. Let ω denote the random tape of the distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$, and A be the set of all (ω, y) entries which leads to the output 1. We have

$$p^{\mathcal{O}} = \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} = 1\right] = \sum_{(\omega,y)\in A} \Pr[\omega] \Pr[C(x_i) = y_i; i = 1, \ldots, d]$$

where $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_d)$ in which x_i depends on ω and $(y_1, \ldots, y_{i-1})$. We let $C = \Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*)$. Thus we have

$$p^C - p^{C^*} = \sum_{(\omega,y)\in A} \Pr[\omega](\Pr[C(x_i) = y_i; i] - \Pr[C^*(x_i) = y_i; i]).$$

We split the sum between the y entries for which the Δy_i are pairwise different, and the others. From the previous lemma we have

$$p^C - p^{C^*} \geq - \sum_{\substack{(\omega,y)\in A \\ \Delta y_i \neq \Delta y_j}} \Pr[\omega] p^* \epsilon - \Pr[\exists i < j \quad \Delta C^*(y_i) = \Delta C^*(y_j)]$$

where $\epsilon = \frac{d(d-1)}{2}(g^{-1} + g^{-2}) + f(\alpha)$ and p^* is the probability that $C^*(x_i) = y_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, d$. The first sum is less than ϵ, and the last probability is less than $\frac{d(d-1)}{2} g^{-1}$, thus

$$p^C - p^{C^*} \geq -\epsilon - \frac{d(d-1)}{2} g^{-1}.$$

We can then apply the same result to the symmetric distinguisher, and obtain the result. □

4 Inheritance of Decorrelation in the Lai-Massey Scheme

We can use the same proof as in [24] for proving that the decorrelation bias of the round functions of a Lai-Massey scheme is inherited by the whole structure. The following lemma is a straightforward application of a more general lemma from [24].

Lemma 5. *Let m be an integer, and $F_1, \ldots, F_r$ be r independent random functions on a group G. Let σ be a permutation on G. We have*

$$||[\Lambda^\sigma(F_1, \ldots, F_r)]^d - [\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, \ldots, F_r^*)]^d||_a \leq \sum_{i=1}^{r} \mathrm{DecF}^d_{||.||_a}(F_i)$$

where $F_1^*, \ldots, F_r^*$ are uniformly distributed random functions.

Following [24], this lemma and Lemma 3 enables to prove the following corollary.

Corollary 6. *If $F_1, \ldots, F_r$ are r (with $r \geq 3$) independent random functions on a group G of order g such that $\mathrm{DecF}^d_{||.||_a}(F_i) \leq \epsilon$ and if σ is an α-almost orthomorphism on G, we have*

$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||.||_a}(\Lambda^\sigma(F_1, \ldots, F_r)) \leq \left(3\epsilon + d(d-1)\left(2g^{-1} + g^{-2}\right) + 2f(\alpha)\right)^{\lfloor \frac{r}{3} \rfloor}$$

where $f(\alpha)$ is defined in Lemma 3.

5 On Super-Pseudorandomness

Super-pseudorandomness corresponds to cases where attacks can query chosen ciphertexts as well. We extend Lemma 3 in order to get results on the super-pseudorandomness.

Lemma 7. *Let $F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, F_4^*$ be four independent random functions on a group G with uniform distribution, and let d be an integer. Let σ be an α-almost orthomorphism on G. For any set of $x_1, \ldots, x_d, y_1, \ldots, y_d$ values in G^2 such that the x_i values are pairwise different, we have*

$$\frac{\Pr[\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, F_4^*)(x_i) = y_i; i]}{\Pr[C^*(x_i) = y_i; i]} \geq 1 - d(d-1)\left(g^{-1} + g^{-2}\right) - f'(\alpha)$$

where g denotes the cardinality of G and C^* is a random permutation of G^2 uniformly distributed, provided that $d < g^2$, and $f'(\alpha)$ is a function such that $f'(0) = 0$ and

$$f'(\alpha) = dg^{-1}(d(\alpha - 1) + \alpha - 1) \quad \text{for} \quad \alpha > 0.$$

Proof. $\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, F_4^*)(x_i) = y_i)$ is equivalent to

$$\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*)(x_i) = \Lambda^{\sigma^{-1}}(F_4^*)(y_i).$$

We can focus on the probability that all $\Delta\Lambda^{\sigma^{-1}}(F_4^*)(y_i)$ are pairwise different. Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 3, this holds but for a probability less than $\frac{d(d-1)}{2}\max(\alpha, 1)g^{-1}$. We can then apply Lemma 3 to complete the proof. □

This extends Theorem 4.

Theorem 8. *Let $F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, F_4^*$ be four independent random functions on a group G with a uniform distribution. Let σ be an α-almost orthomorphism on G. For any distinguisher limited to d chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts ($d < g^2$) between $\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, F_4^*)$ and a random permutation C^* with a uniform distribution, we have*

$$\mathrm{Adv}(\Lambda^\sigma(F_1^*, F_2^*, F_3^*, F_4^*), C^*) \leq d(d-1)\left(g^{-1} + g^{-2}\right) + f'(\alpha)$$

where g denotes the cardinality of G and $f'(\alpha)$ is defined in Lemma 7.

The proof is the same as in Theorem 4, but with no consideration on the $\Delta y_i \neq \Delta y_j$ cases.

This shows that a 4-round random Lai-Massey scheme with an α-almost orthomorphism is a super-pseudorandom permutation when it is used less than $\sqrt{g/\max(\alpha, 1)}$ times. This also extends to the following decorrelation bias upper bound.

Corollary 9. *If $F_1, \ldots, F_r$ are r (with $r \geq 4$) independent random functions on a group G of order g such that $\mathrm{DecF}^d_{||.||_a}(F_i) \leq \epsilon$ and if σ is an α-almost orthomorphism on G, we have*

$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||.||_s}(\Lambda^\sigma(F_1, \ldots, F_r)) \leq \left(4\epsilon + d(d-1)\left(2g^{-1} + g^{-2}\right) + 2f'(\alpha)\right)^{\lfloor \frac{r}{4} \rfloor}$$

where $f'(\alpha)$ is defined in Lemma 7.

6 A New Family of Block Ciphers

In this section we construct a new family of block ciphers called Walnut (as for "Wonderful Algorithm with Light N-Universal Transformation") Walnut is a Lai-Massey scheme which depends on four parameters (m, r, d, q) where m is the message-block length (must be even), r is the number of rounds, d is the order of decorrelation and q is an integral prime power at least $2^{\frac{m}{2}}$. It is characterized by having round function F_i with the form

$$F_i(x) = \pi_i(r_i(K_{i,1}) + r_i(K_{i,2})r_i(x) + \ldots + r_i(K_{i,d})r_i(x)^{d-1})$$

where the $K_{i,j}$ are independent uniformly distributed bitstrings of length $m/2$, r_i is an injective mapping from $\{0,1\}^{\frac{m}{2}}$ to GF(q), and π_i is a surjective mapping from GF(q) to $\{0,1\}^{\frac{m}{2}}$. This is a straightforward extension of the Peanut construction. It has been shown in [24] that $\mathrm{DecF}^d(F_i)$ is less than

$$\epsilon = 2\left((1+\delta)^d - 1\right)$$

where $q = (1+\delta)2^{\frac{m}{2}}$. We use $\sigma =$ ROTL as a 1-almost orthomorphism. Therefore by approximating the upper bounds of Corollaries 6 and 9 we have

$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||\cdot||_a}(\mathrm{Walnut}(m,r,d,q)) \leq\sim \left(6d\delta + 2d^2 2^{-\frac{m}{2}}\right)^{\lfloor \frac{r}{3} \rfloor}$$
$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||\cdot||_s}(\mathrm{Walnut}(m,r,d,q)) \leq\sim \left(8d\delta + 2d^2 2^{-\frac{m}{2}}\right)^{\lfloor \frac{r}{4} \rfloor}.$$

With $m = 64$, $d = 2$ and $p = 2^{32} + 15$, we obtain

$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||\cdot||_a}(\mathrm{Walnut}(64,r,2,2^{32}+15)) \leq 2^{-24\lfloor \frac{r}{3} \rfloor}$$
$$\mathrm{DecP}^d_{||\cdot||_s}(\mathrm{Walnut}(64,r,2,2^{32}+15)) \leq 2^{-24\lfloor \frac{r}{4} \rfloor}.$$

This provides sufficient security against differential and linear attacks for $r \geq 12$.

7 Conclusion

We have shown that adding a simple orthomorphism (or almost orthomorphism) enables the Lai-Massey scheme to provide randomness on three rounds, and super-pseudorandomness on four rounds, like for the Feistel scheme. We have shown that we can get similar decorrelation upper bounds as well and propose a new block cipher family.

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