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The Complementarity Regime of the Rome Statute: An Analysis of Its Components

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The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court

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Abstract

This chapter presents a critical analysis of complementarity both in Article 17 and as envisioned in other provisions of the Rome Statute and proposes a mutually inclusive interpretation of complementarity. The complementarity components of ‘unwillingness’, ‘inability’, ‘genuinely’ and ‘gravity’ are scrutinised. Subsequently, the decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers of the ICC on admissibility challenges under Article 19, all of which favour mutual inclusivity, are also examined. Such an analysis, and the insight it reveals, are imperative for identifying the way forward for both the Court and state parties to the Rome Statute, and is particularly relevant in light of ongoing controversy and misunderstandings regarding the role of the ICC in serving the interests of justice for victims of international crimes. It is argued that the relationship between the Court and states which have had cases before it has often been antagonistic, whereas a mutually inclusive interpretation of complementarity best suits the aims of the Statute. Three models of complementarity are examined-passive, positive and proactive-, two of which have already been implemented to some degree but which have proven unsatisfactory. The last, the proactive complementarity model, is advocated as the most suitable model, as it mirrors the proposal for mutual inclusivity, and thereby would ensure that the ICC and national jurisdictions work in cooperation and collaboration rather than in either competition or isolation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Pre-Trial Chamber II decision in Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen ICC-02/04-01/05-377 10 March 2009 para 34. (Decision on the Admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) of the Statute). See also Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decision on the Practice of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing icc-01/04-01/06 8 November 2006 para 34 & 38 (describing complementarity as ‘one of the cornerstones of the Rome Statute’).

  2. 2.

    Kleffner (2009); 99–162, 309–310; Burke-White (2008b), pp. 53–108. (Burke-White ‘Proactive Complementarity’).

  3. 3.

    See for example Robinson (2012b), p. 165; Sriram and Brown (2012), pp. 219–244; Stahn and El-Zeidy (2011) (Stahn & ElZeidy Complementarity Theory to Practice); Ebobrah (2011), pp. 663–688; Robinson (2010), pp. 67–102 (Robinson, Mysterious Complementarity); Schabas (2008b), p. 5 (Schabas, Uncomplementary Thoughts).

  4. 4.

    Perrin (2006), pp. 301–326. (Perrin, ‘Making Sense of Complementarity’); Doherty and McCormack (1999), pp. 147–180. (Doherty & McCormack, ‘Complementarity as a Catalyst’).

  5. 5.

    Rome Statute, para 10 of the Preamble & art 1.

  6. 6.

    Burke-White (2008a), pp. 59–85 (Burke-White ‘Positive Complementarity’).

  7. 7.

    Hall (2011), p. 1017.

  8. 8.

    Collins English Dictionary 21st Century Edition (5th edn London Harper Collins Publishers 2001) 327; See also Ebobrah (2011), p. 666.

  9. 9.

    Bohr (1950), pp. 51, 54; Bohr (1958), p. 74; Englard (1995), pp. 191–192.

  10. 10.

    Levin (2001), pp. 249–260, 255.

  11. 11.

    Available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/complementarity (Accessed 2 February 2013). In Physics, complementarity is defined as the concept that two contrasted theories, such as the wave and particle theories of light, may be able to explain a set of phenomena, although each separately only accounts for some aspects.

  12. 12.

    Rome Statute, Article 17.

  13. 13.

    ElZeidy (2011), pp. 71–141 (ElZeidy, Genesis of complementarity). See also Holmes (1999), pp. 41–78, 41–42 (noting that many states argued that they are under an obligation to prosecute international crimes and thus an international court cannot enjoy a primary role in this regard).

  14. 14.

    ElZeidy (2011), pp. 72–73; See also ElZeidy (2008), pp. 1–5.

  15. 15.

    Schabas (2007), p. 175. (Schabas Intro to the ICC).

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Schabas (2008b), p. 6.

  18. 18.

    Robert Cryer (2011), pp. 1097–1119.

  19. 19.

    Tallgren (1998), pp. 107–137, 123.

  20. 20.

    Ishiguro (1990) Cited in Tallgren Ibid, 124. (The story of the Butler was made famous by Ishiguro in his book).Why ‘Butler’? A butler is supposed to stay in the background and coordinate a scene just by his mere existence, to enter when it is necessary, to be around but not use any visible gestures of power. Never is a butler supposed to be too loud or draw extraordinary attention to himself. The allegiance of a butler to his master is unquestionable.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    Tallgren, ‘…And why “Master”? A master regards “others” as able servants and wishes to make them hardworking and loyal companions in achieving a greater goal. A master aims at sovereignty of decisions and control of the situation. A tolerant master may, however, let the little mice dance on the table in his absence, but only when it is he who chooses the music . . .’ cited in Tallgren.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Tallgren (2002), pp. 561–595, 568–569.

  26. 26.

    Mégret (2005).

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    ElZeidy (2011), pp. 71–78 (noting that complementarity is not a novel concept. Rather it dates back to the twentieth century, covering over a period of 79 years and ending with the Rome Statute); Bergsmo and Webb (2012), pp. 688, 691.

  31. 31.

    See 1994 ILC Draft Statute Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session 2 May to 22 July 1994 UN Doc A/49/10 43–44.

  32. 32.

    Doherty and McCormack (1999).

  33. 33.

    Rome Statute, para 10 of the Preamble and Article 1 (emphasis added).

  34. 34.

    Rome statute, para 6 of the Preamble.

  35. 35.

    Rome statute, para 4 of the Preamble.

  36. 36.

    Issues of concern include sovereignty, the scope of jurisdiction of the ICC and the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor. See Gaeta (2004), pp. 949–952, 950. (Noting that ‘it is well known that the Court was begotten by many but born against the will of some powerful countries…’).

  37. 37.

    Brownlie (2008), p. 289, Shaw (2008), pp. 487–490; Harris (2010), pp. 161–170.

  38. 38.

    Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 SC Res 827 UN Doc S/Res/827 (25 May 1993) (‘ICTY Statute’); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994 SC Res 1315 UN Doc 5/RES/955 (6 November 1994) (‘ICTR Statute’).

  39. 39.

    Jessberger and Geneuss (2012), pp. 1081–1094, 1085.

  40. 40.

    See Kittichaisaree (2001), p. 247.

  41. 41.

    Bekou (2011), pp. 830–852, 836.

  42. 42.

    Upon the submission of the final Draft Statute for the ICC by the ILC to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1994 and recommendations of the ad hoc Committee 1995, the UNGA created the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) on the Establishment of the ICC. In its primary responsibility to prepare a consolidated draft text for the establishment of the ICC the PrepCom held six sessions between 1996 and 1998.

  43. 43.

    Letter from Jesse Helms, Senator for North Carolina to Madeleine Albright Secretary of State dated 26th March 1998 cited in van der Vyver (2010), p. 163.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.

  45. 45.

    Williams and Schabas (2008), pp. 605–625, 606.

  46. 46.

    Holmes (2004), p. 260.

  47. 47.

    Yang (2005), pp. 121–132; Kim (2003), pp. 258–259.

  48. 48.

    See Broomhall (2003), p. 84; Ryngaert (2011), pp. 855–885. See also Pre-Trial Chamber II decision in Joseph Kony et al and Trial Chamber I decision in Lubanga (above note 1).

  49. 49.

    Lattanzi (2001), pp. 181–182; Easterday (2009).

  50. 50.

    Although not a state party to the Rome Statute, the situation in Darfur Sudan was referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005. Subsequently, Sudan purports to be able and willing to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators domestically.

  51. 51.

    See U.S. Dept of State, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Sudan’ (2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61594.htm. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur’ 1 (2006).

  52. 52.

    Jon Heller (2006), pp. 255–280 (Heller, Shadow Side of Complementarity).

  53. 53.

    Ibid, 256. See also Williams and Schabas (2008), p. 628. (Noting that complementarity may require an assessment of the quality of justice from the stand point of procedural and substantive fairness).

  54. 54.

    The governments of Uganda, the DRC, CAR and Mali referred situations in their states to the ICC in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2012 respectively. Available at the ICC website http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (Assessed 8 March 2013). See also Akhavan (2011), pp. 283–303, 287.

  55. 55.

    Cote d’Ivoire became a party to the Rome Statute on 15 February 2013.

  56. 56.

    Turns (2004), pp. 337, 338.

  57. 57.

    Scheffer (1999), p. 12; Newton (2002), p. 35.

  58. 58.

    The Rome Statute was signed by the US President Bill Clinton on 31 December 2000 with the proviso that it will not be transmitted to Congress for ratification; the administration of President George W Bush subsequently withdrew the US signature and indicated the US intention not to become a party to the Statute: US Department of State Press Statement, 6 May 2001. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.

  59. 59.

    ‘The Protection of Human Rights through International Criminal Law: A Conversation with Madame Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (1999) 57 U Toronto Faculty of Law Rev 83 97.

  60. 60.

    Ellis (2003), pp. 215, 224–225.

  61. 61.

    Cassese (2006), pp. 434–441, 436; Cassese (2009), pp. 21–30, 25 (noting that by self-referrals states use the Court as a means of de-legitimizing and cornering their political and military opponents).

  62. 62.

    Jessberger and Geneuss (2012), pp. 1081–1094.

  63. 63.

    Rome Statute, Articles 5–8 stipulate the Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court.

  64. 64.

    Rome Statute, Article 11 refers to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute; which suggests that the Rome Statute cannot be applied retroactively.

  65. 65.

    Schabas (2007), p. 172.

  66. 66.

    Cote d’Ivoire and the Palestinian National Authority made such declarations in 2003 and 2009 respectively.

  67. 67.

    See Rome Statute, Article 13(b). The referrals of the situations in Darfur Sudan and Libya to the ICC in 2005 and 2011 respectively are examples.

  68. 68.

    Ryngaert (2011), p. 874.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Schabas (2007), p. 172.

  71. 71.

    Rome Statute Art 17 (1).

  72. 72.

    Robinson (2010).

  73. 73.

    Rome Statute, Article 17(1)(d).

  74. 74.

    The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ICC-01/04-01/06 10 February 2006, para 29.

  75. 75.

    Rome Statute, Article 17(1)(d).

  76. 76.

    Rome Statute, Articles 13(a) & 14. See Akhavan (2011).

  77. 77.

    Article 13(b).

  78. 78.

    Articles 13(c) & 15.

  79. 79.

    Notably, the Central African Republic (CAR) has referred situations to the ICC twice, first in December 2004 and second in May 2014. This has resulted in the situations being separated at the ICC by ‘Central Africa Republic’ representing the first referral and the ‘Central African Republic II’ as the second referral. This is inevitably so, as the situations related to different times, locations, as well as different crimes and alleged perpetrators.

  80. 80.

    See Article 53(1) for state and Security Council referrals and Article 53(3) for Proprio motu investigations.

  81. 81.

    Stigen (2011), pp. 503, 504.

  82. 82.

    Rome Statute, Article 53(1)(c).

  83. 83.

    Rule 104(1) RPE.

  84. 84.

    Rule 104(2).

  85. 85.

    Newton (2001), p. 67. See also Robinson Mysterious Complementarity (2010).

  86. 86.

    Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali ICC-01/09-02/11-274 30-08-2011 1/43 NM PT OA Available at http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223134.pdf (Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute). (‘Muthaura et al case’).

  87. 87.

    Ibid, para 36.

  88. 88.

    The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 24 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr.

  89. 89.

    Ibid, para 31.

  90. 90.

    See for example The Prosecutor v Mr Germain Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07-1497 OA 8 (Oral Decision of the Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) para 81-82; The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, ICC-02/05-01/07-1-Corr, para. 24; The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 6 July 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-262, para. 21; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09-2-Conf, para. 50 (public redacted version in ICC-02/05-01/09-3); and The Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 7 May 2009, ICC-02/05-02/09-l-Conf, para. 4 (public redacted version in ICC-02/05-02/09-12-Anxl), The same approach was taken by Pre-Trial Chamber II in The Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Decision on the Admissibility of the Case under Article 19(1) of the Statute, 10 March 2009, ICC-02/04-01/05-377, paras 17–18; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, 30 May 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, para. 54; The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, 30 May 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-96, para. 48; Pre-Trial Chamber III in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 10 June 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG (Translation notified 17 July 2006), para. 16.

  91. 91.

    Muthaura et al case, para 31.

  92. 92.

    Ibid, paras 36, 40 & 41.

  93. 93.

    Ibid, para 41.

  94. 94.

    The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Hussein ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 31 May 2013. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf (Saif Al-Islam case).

  95. 95.

    Ibid, paras 73, 77.

  96. 96.

    Ibid paras 204, 205, 206, 215 & 216.

  97. 97.

    Easterday (2009).

  98. 98.

    The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, 6 July 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-4.

  99. 99.

    Katanga case, para 20.

  100. 100.

    Ibid, para 78.

  101. 101.

    See article 17(2)(a).

  102. 102.

    Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Case No ICC-01/04-01/07-123tENG (Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case under Art 19) 16 June 2009.

  103. 103.

    Politi (2011), pp. 142–149.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    Muthaura et al case, para 67.

  106. 106.

    Ibid, para 68.

  107. 107.

    Article 17(2)(b).

  108. 108.

    Infra (Text to notes 83–85 in Ch 4).

  109. 109.

    Cherif M Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2003) 518; see also Ellis (2003), p. 236 (‘A case will fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC because of the unwillingness of a State to prosecute or investigate when it is found that… the proceedings are not independent and impartial’.); Solera (2002), pp. 145, 166 (noting ‘…a State is unwilling to prosecute when the competent domestic court is not independent or impartial’).

  110. 110.

    Article 17(2)(c).

  111. 111.

    See the Chapeau of Article 17(2). ‘In order to determine unwillingness…the court shall consider, having regard to the principle of due process recognised by international law…’.

  112. 112.

    See Part 3 on General Principles of Criminal Law and Art 55 Rome Statute.

  113. 113.

    Carsten (2005), pp. 695, 713.

  114. 114.

    Informal Expert Paper: ‘The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’ ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA 30 March 2009 (‘Informal Expert Paper’) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.pdf (Accessed 2 March 2013). (Members of the Expert Group include Xabier Agirre, Antonio Cassese, Rolf Einar Fife, Hakan Friman, Christopher Hall, John Holmes, Jann Kleffner, Hector Olasolo, Norul Rashid, Darryl Robinson, Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Andreas Zimmermann).

  115. 115.

    Ibid, para 45.

  116. 116.

    Ibid. See also the self-referral by the Government of Uganda of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda to the ICC. Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations/nothern%20uganda.aspx (Assessed 26 February 2013).

  117. 117.

    Yang (2005).

  118. 118.

    Informal Expert Paper, (note 114) paras 49 & 50.

  119. 119.

    Saif al-Islam case (note 94).

  120. 120.

    Ibid, para 200.

  121. 121.

    Ibid, para 204.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    Ibid.

  124. 124.

    Ibid, para 205.

  125. 125.

    Rome Statute, Art 17 (3).

  126. 126.

    Ibid.

  127. 127.

    For example, Art 435 of the Libyan Code safeguards the accused right to review evidence presented against him and forced confessions are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Also, under Article 9 of the Code the accused has the right to be informed of his fights and duties and Article 4 of the Libyan Prisons Act requires the defendant to be held in prison prepared for that purpose.

  128. 128.

    Saif Al-Islam case paras 206, 207.

  129. 129.

    Ibid, para 209.

  130. 130.

    Ibid, paras 209, 211.

  131. 131.

    Ibid, para 213.

  132. 132.

    Ibid, para 214.

  133. 133.

    Robinson, Mysterious Complementarity (above note 3) 76 (noting that the word ‘inactivity’ is not used in Article 17 but the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case erroneously used it in interpreting when a case becomes admissible before the ICC. He agrees however, that a case is admissible where there is inaction on the part of a state in a particular case). See also El-zeidy The Genesis of Complementarity (above note 13) 137.

  134. 134.

    Williams and Schabas (2008), pp. 615–616.

  135. 135.

    Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga et al (note 102).

  136. 136.

    Ibid, para 37.

  137. 137.

    Williams and Schabas (2008).

  138. 138.

    Ibid, 616. See also Schabas (2008b), p. 6.

  139. 139.

    Ibid; Schabas (2008a), p. 29; Stahn and Sluiter (2009), p. 239.

  140. 140.

    Kress (2004), pp. 944–948. See also ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ ICC-OTP September 2003 1-9, 5. http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (Assessed 26 February 2013).

  141. 141.

    Holmes (1999), p. 49.

  142. 142.

    Ibid. See also Holmes Complementarity vs. National Courts (2004), p. 266.

  143. 143.

    Jon Heller (2006).

  144. 144.

    Jon Heller Ibid.

  145. 145.

    Muthaura et al case (note 86).

  146. 146.

    Ibid, para 53.

  147. 147.

    Ibid, para 68.

  148. 148.

    Schabas (2007), pp. 171–175; Williams and Schabas (2008), p. 613.

  149. 149.

    Rome Statute, para 4 of the Preamble.

  150. 150.

    Rome Statute, Articles 17 (1) (d), 53 (1) (b) and 53 (2) (b).

  151. 151.

    Luis Moreno-Ocampo OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Selection Criteria.

  152. 152.

    See Williams and Schabas (2008), pp. 621–622.

  153. 153.

    See ‘Letter of Prosecutor dated 9 February 2006’ (Iraq) http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_Febraury_2006.pdf (assessed 10 February 2009), 7–8. See also Gaja (2008), p. 45.

  154. 154.

    See ‘Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fourth Session of the Assembly of States Parties’ at The Hague 28 November to 3 December 2005. 2.

  155. 155.

    Robinson (2012a), pp. 177–178.

  156. 156.

    Articles 1, 18, 19, 20, 89(4), 90, 93(10), 94.

  157. 157.

    International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).

  158. 158.

    Broomhall (2003), p. 88.

  159. 159.

    Rome Statute, Article 20(1) & (2). The rule against double jeopardy.

  160. 160.

    Ibid.

  161. 161.

    Ibid, article 18(1).

  162. 162.

    Pursuant to its literal wording, Art 18 does not appear to apply when the Prosecutor opens an investigation as a result of a referral by the Security Council.

  163. 163.

    Muthaura et al case, (note 86) para 38.

  164. 164.

    Ibid.

  165. 165.

    Muthaura et al case, (note 86) para 38.

  166. 166.

    Rome Statute, Art 18 (2) & Rule 53 RPE. See also Muthaura et al case para 41 (Kenya failed to provide detailed information about the investigative steps it purported to have taken with respect to the suspects before the ICC).

  167. 167.

    Olasolo (2007), p. 157.

  168. 168.

    Ibid.

  169. 169.

    See Lubanga case.

  170. 170.

    See generally Article 18 Rome Statute and Rules 53–57 RPE.

  171. 171.

    Rome Statute, article 19 (2) (a), (b) & (c).

  172. 172.

    Rome Statute, article 19(5).

  173. 173.

    See Stigen (2011).

  174. 174.

    Rule 59 limits the opportunity of making representation to those victims or their legal representatives who have previously communicated to the Court in relation to the case before it.

  175. 175.

    Holmes (2004), p. 275.

  176. 176.

    Rome Statute, Art 20(1) & (2).

  177. 177.

    Bernard (2011), pp. 863–880.

  178. 178.

    Rome Statute, Article 20(3).

  179. 179.

    Rome Statute, Articles 17(2) and 20(3).

  180. 180.

    Broomhall (2003), p. 89.

  181. 181.

    ElZeidy (2011), pp. 77–78.

  182. 182.

    Ibid 80–83. (noting that under Articles 228–230 of the Treaty of Versailles 1919, Germany initially agreed to hand over suspected criminals to the Allies for trials, but subsequently asked permission to try alleged war criminals in its domestic court. The allies granted the request on condition of setting aside German courts’ judgement in case of unsatisfactory result).

  183. 183.

    ElZeidy (2011), p. 126.

  184. 184.

    Ibid.

  185. 185.

    Ibid, 136.

  186. 186.

    Ibid, 137.

  187. 187.

    ElZeidy (2008), pp. 212–214, 229.

  188. 188.

    Ibid.

  189. 189.

    Hall (2011), p. 1017.

  190. 190.

    Slaughter (2003), p. 34.

  191. 191.

    Hall, ibid.

  192. 192.

    Rome Statute, art 15.

  193. 193.

    See Self-Referrals (note 54).

  194. 194.

    International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor (2003) (OTP Policy Paper) available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/ocampoPolicy/Paper9=03.pdf.

  195. 195.

    Moreno-Ocampo (2003).

  196. 196.

    Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor to the Diplomatic Corps (12 February 2004) available at http://www.icc--cpi-.int/library/organs/otp/LOM_20040212_en.pdf.

  197. 197.

    ICC-Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy (2006). Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D673DD8C-D427-4547-BC69-2D363E07274B/143708/ProsecutorialStrategy20060914_English.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2013).

  198. 198.

    Burke-White (2008a).

  199. 199.

    In accordance with article 123 of the Rome Statute the first review conference was held in Kampala Uganda 31 May to 11 June 2010. The conference had about 4600 representatives of States parties, observers, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations participating. Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20release/review%20conference.org (Assessed 12 October 2010).

  200. 200.

    Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity Annex IV ICC-ASP/8/Res.9 adopted at the 10th plenary meeting, on 25 March 2010 para 4. (hereinafter ‘Stocktaking on Complementarity’) Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/ICC-ASP-8-Res.9-Annex.IV-ENG.pdf (Accessed 16 May 2012) (Stocktaking on Complementarity), para 16.

  201. 201.

    Ibid, para. 17.

  202. 202.

    Ibid, paras 19–26.

  203. 203.

    Ibid, paras 27–45.

  204. 204.

    Ibid, para. 4.

  205. 205.

    Ibid.

  206. 206.

    Stocktaking on Complementarity, para 4.

  207. 207.

    Burke-White (2008a), p. 71.

  208. 208.

    Burke-White (2008b), p. 57.

  209. 209.

    The OTP has defined positive complementarity as ‘a proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings.’ OTP, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012’ (1 February 2010) 5. Available at www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2013) (2009–2012 Prosecutorial Strategy).

  210. 210.

    See Broomhall (2003), pp. 84, 86 (noting that the ICC might act as ‘spur’ to national proceedings); Kleffner (2009), p. 309; Perrin (2006); Burke-White (2008b).

  211. 211.

    Kleffner, 309 (noting that the catalytic effect of the ICC would yield good result in which the ICC motivates national justice systems through the threat of international intervention).

  212. 212.

    Rome Statute, Art 18(1).

  213. 213.

    Kleffner, 314–315.

  214. 214.

    Ibid. See also the Decision of the PTCII in the admissibility Challenge in Katanga et al, (note 102).

  215. 215.

    Perrin (2006).

  216. 216.

    See Saif Al-Islam case (note 94) para 54; Muthaura et al case (n 86) para 61.

  217. 217.

    Benvenuti (1999), p. 21.

  218. 218.

    Benvenuti, 50.

  219. 219.

    Gioia (2011), pp. 807–828.

  220. 220.

    Gioia, 808.

  221. 221.

    Rome Statute, Art 93(10)(a).

  222. 222.

    Rome Statute, Art 93(10)(b); Rule 194 RPE.

  223. 223.

    Muthaura et al case, para 114.

  224. 224.

    Ibid, paras 115–116.

  225. 225.

    Gioia, Reverse Cooperation 815.

  226. 226.

    Stigen (2011), p. 507; Kress (2004), p. 948. See also FIDH (2011), pp. 1–32, 8.

  227. 227.

    Gioia, 817.

  228. 228.

    Burke-White ‘Proactive Complementarity’, 83; Bergsmo et al. (2011), pp. 1052–1070, 1063.

  229. 229.

    Stigen (2011), p. 507; Stahn (2008), pp. 87–113, 103.

  230. 230.

    Schabas (2011), pp. 493–509; Cassese (2006), pp. 434–441.

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    Ovo Catherine Imoedemhe

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Imoedemhe, O.C. (2017). The Complementarity Regime of the Rome Statute: An Analysis of Its Components. In: The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46780-1_2

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