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Migration and Inequality in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire corridor

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Introduction

Burkina Faso is a landlocked Sahelian country with low income and limited natural resources. With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020 of USD 16.1 billion for a population of more than 20 million inhabitants growing at a rate of 2.9% per year (RGPH, 2019), Burkina Faso falls into the category of least developed countries (LDCs). It has a GDP/capita of around USD 768.8 compared to an average of USD 1,566.3 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

International migrants leaving Burkina Faso in 2019 chose several destinations, mainly in Africa, and particularly West Africa, which indicates that migration to the ECOWAS countries is the most important. By contrast, Europe receives only 2.6% of Burkina Faso’s migrants (see also Setrana and Yaro, this volume). Most migratory movements outside the country are directed to Côte d’Ivoire, which accounted for 61.1% of migrants in 2019 (RGPH, 2019). The eight West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries alone account for more than 75% of recent migrants leaving Burkina Faso. The two other essential destinations after Côte d’Ivoire

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are Mali and Ghana, respectively, 12.5 and 8.6% (RGPH, 2019). The observation that can be made is that while the Burkinabè migrate internationally, most settle in neighbouring countries.

Indeed, migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire constitutes one of the largest migration flows in the world. In the 2019 census, it was found that 6 out of 10 residents have already migrated outside the country (RGPH5, 2019). People from the poorest rural areas of Burkina Faso migrate to Côte d'Ivoire for work, a journey that is facilitated by free movement and low costs. Child labour and trafficking are also common, especially in the cocoa plantations.

Despite the various disruptions observed in the Burkinabe migration space—associated with the internal mining boom within Burkina Faso and political and economic crises in Côte d'Ivoire—this major migration trend persists, even if some premises of change are emerging. Migration movements out of the country over the last five years preceding the 2019 census (RGPH, 2019) are male-dominated, with 85% of men compared to 15% of women, i.e., five times more men than women. As for migrants to Burkina Faso, in 2019, 90% of them were Burkinabè. Most of these migrants come from Côte d'Ivoire (86%), with the rest coming mainly from countries bordering Burkina Faso (RGPH, 2006, 2019). Only 10% of immigrants are non-Burkinabé. Thus, international migration (in and out) is dominated by Burkinabè.

This chapter discusses the inequalities associated with migration in the Burkina Faso–Côte d'Ivoire corridor based on a literature review and data from a survey conducted in 2020 as part of research undertaken by the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub.¹ The chapter begins by explaining the historical context of Burkinabè migration to Côte d'Ivoire, as well as specific characteristics of this migration, such as the main reasons, types and forms. It then discusses the different inequalities linked to this migration in both countries including those associated with gender and childhood.

¹ The Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub unpacks the complex and multi-dimensional relationships between migration and inequality in the context of the Global South. More at www.mideq.org

Historical Background of Migration Between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire

Numerous factors have been put forward—including historical, social, demographic and economic factors—to explain the migration of Burkinabè. Historically, colonisation was a critical factor in triggering international migration, especially the numerical importance of the phenomenon and its orientation towards Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly, 1978; Piché et al., 1981, 1996). The magnitude of the migration of Burkinabè to Côte d'Ivoire is closely tied to the establishment of a system that, from the beginning of colonisation, tied Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) to Côte d'Ivoire.

The literature on Burkinabè emigration shows that colonisation was the main factor that triggered the major international migration flows to Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly, 1986; Cordell et al., 1996; Deniel, 1968; Fynn Bruy and Crawley, this volume). This process has three main phases, each triggering a different flow type. The first was a period of conquest and pacification, the establishment of a colonial administration and the development of some local infrastructure, including roads and administrative buildings. To achieve this, the colonisers instituted a system of forced labour and taxes. The population's reaction was to “flee” before the invader (Suret-Canale, 1964; Piché et al., 1981), and these movements generally took place over short distances into the country's interior areas that were inaccessible to the colonisers. Some of these movements were also made in Ghana, with the dual objective of escaping the invader and avoiding the sums demanded by the administration.

The second phase began in 1921 with the law's adoption of the colonies' development. Indeed, in the logic of the vast colonial project, the colonies formed a whole where each one should play a role according to its natural potential. In French West Africa (AOF), “the Mossi Plateau (Upper Volta) is the most densely populated area, and according to the division of labour assigned to each colony, this country was designated as a provider of labour for work in the other colonies, particularly Côte d'Ivoire” (Coulibaly & Vaugelade, 1981, 84). It should be noted that the colony of Upper Volta, created in 1919, was abolished in 1932, and a large part of it was attached to Côte d'Ivoire. The purpose of this abolition and the attachment of a large part of the former Upper Volta to Côte d'Ivoire was to direct the migration of Burkinabè towards the Ivorian plantations. In contrast, traditionally, the Voltaic people migrated towards the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) (Deniel, 1968). Thus, from the first years of the inter-war period, the Voltaics constituted the majority of agricultural workers on the plantations of the Lower Côte d'Ivoire.

The third phase began in 1947. After the abolition of forced labour in 1946 and the reconstitution of Upper Volta in 1947 within its current borders, the migration movement became voluntary and increased as a result of the establishment by the Ivorian planters of the *Syndicat Interprofessionnel pour l'Acheminement de la Main-d'œuvre* (SIAMO), a private structure for the recruitment of Burkinabe workers. According to Raymond Deniel (1968), from the 1950s onwards, approximately 20,000 people from Burkina Faso entered Côte d'Ivoire each year through these structures.

Data from the 1960/61 demographic survey indicate how Côte d'Ivoire, which was not initially the top country of emigration, gradually replaced Ghana as the source of labour. These statistics show that during the suppression of the Upper Volta, the reversal of flows took place to the detriment of Ghana (Fig. 11.1).

It can be seen from Fig. 11.1 that before 1932, migration to Côte d'Ivoire was very marginal. From 1947 onwards, Côte d'Ivoire became the leading destination for Burkinabe migrants. It was between 1932 and 1947 that the reversal occurred. It was precisely then that the Upper Volta was suppressed and that a large part of the country—notably the Mossi Plateau—was attached to Côte d'Ivoire. On the eve of independence, Voltaic emigration was exclusively to Côte d'Ivoire. Stopping the migration of Voltaic people to Ghana and redirecting them to Côte d'Ivoire was a constant concern of the colonial authorities. The dislocation of the colony of Upper Volta in 1932 and the attachment of its most populous part (the Mossi Plateau) to Côte d'Ivoire were part of this strategy (Coulibaly, 1986; Deniel, 1968).




Fig. 11.1 Evolution of international migration from Upper Volta, 1919–1960

It should be noted that during the colonial period, Burkinabe migration to Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was essentially a forced movement, especially in the period between 1919 and 1946. Indeed, during the colonial period, migration to Côte d'Ivoire involved the deportation of Burkinabè workers to Ivorian plantations (Suret-Canale, 1964). Even those who went to Ghana were essentially fugitives from the colonial invasion. Forced labour, the system of exploitation of the significant concessions held by private companies in Côte d'Ivoire, the major infrastructure works undertaken by the coloniser, conscription into the army, especially during the world wars, the “voluntary” system, and the forced recruitment of workers led to a massive emigration of Burkinabe to neighbouring countries, mainly Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (Coulilaly, 1986; Songré, 1972). The abolition of forced labour recruitment in 1946 (Babacar Fall, 1993) ended the forced migration of Burkinabè workers to Côte d'Ivoire and opened up an era of voluntary migration (Piché & Cordell, 2015).

Factors and Characteristics of Burkinabe Migration After Independence

If colonisation is one of the primary contexts that has driven the migration dynamics towards Côte d'Ivoire, other economic, social, demographic and even political factors contribute towards maintaining, perpetuating and amplifying this migration.

After independence, Ivorian migration policy was, for a long time, very liberal, and the president of the period, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, pronounced on several occasions that foreign migrants were welcome. In addition to this favourable predisposition of the Ivorian authorities to migration, the underdevelopment situation of Burkina Faso must be emphasised. With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.452 and ranked 182nd out of 189 countries (UNDP, 2020), Burkina Faso is considered one of the poorest countries in the West African sub-region. As noted above, Burkina Faso is a landlocked Sahelian country, where nearly 90% of the population lives from agriculture (PNDES, 2016). However, this agriculture is dependent on the vagaries of rainfall. It cannot meet the population's needs, forcing it to migrate as part of a livelihood strategy.

Moreover, agriculture as the main, if not exclusive, activity in rural Burkina Faso, is also a subsistence activity that occupies farmers for only five to six months of the year (when the rainy season lasts). Thus, the sole recourse to agriculture to ensure the substance of household members is increasingly

risky: not only is there very high variability in rural household incomes from one year to the next, but there are also fluctuations in market prices over which the farmers have no control (Marchal, 1985). This situation is identified in the literature as the main reason for the migration of Burkinabè to Côte d'Ivoire.

Drought periods, which lead to a deficit in cereal production, are also associated with outward migration. Boutillier et al. (1977) and Vaugelade (1991) establish a positive correlation between drought years and high migration periods. The authors show that intense emigration movements follow years of poor harvests. However, other authors (Coulibaly, 1980), based on a national survey conducted in 1980, believe that while the drought factor must be considered, its effects are localised and not generalised. In other words, while droughts and poor harvests are specific causes of emigration, their effects are not systematic and depend on the locality.

Other cultural factors as drivers of migration are mentioned in the literature. These include production and power relations and mechanisms for achieving economic and residential independence within Burkinabe social units, particularly among the Mossi. For several authors (e.g., Deniel, 1968; Capron & Kohler, 1976; Boutillier, 1975), the hierarchical structure of Mossi society, characterised by the domination of the younger generation by the older, is one of the main causes of migration. Thus, "this predominantly authoritarian/autocratic society attributes political, ritual and social means to the older generation, and allows the younger generation to be held in long-term dependence" (Boutillier, 1975, 155). Moreover, the accession to independence of young people follows a long and complex process. It is during this long period of dependence that the young person chooses to migrate. Migration is the search for individual autonomy, the struggle of the individual to escape from a social system in which he feels exploited, or in any case in which he does not have direct and personal access to the fruits of his labour (Ancey, 1983; Boutillier et al., 1977, 1985). It is in response to these forms of domination that young people choose to migrate as a way of acquiring their autonomy.

It is also often mentioned in the literature on the causes of migration in Upper Volta that migration is considered by society or even used by society as a "rite of passage" (Coulibaly, 1980, 65). To migrate to Côte d'Ivoire is to show courage. Very often, the migrant is presented as someone who has braved the unknown and the dangers with which migration is associated. This image is partly due to the period of compulsory recruitment under colonisation and the flight to Ghana, where migrating was a courageous act. Thus, migration would be "a rite of passage" by which the young person affirms his

courage and bravery: one does not become an adult until one has made one's first migration (Deniel, 1968). People who have never migrated are often mocked by young people, especially young girls (Kohler, 1972).

It should be noted that at the domestic level, the policy of the Burkinabè authorities has been to encourage emigration, counting on remittances from migrants to boost the economy. Conventions on migration were signed with Côte d'Ivoire (March 9, 1960), Mali (September 30, 1969) and Gabon (August 13, 1973) to provide security for Burkinabè migrants and to organise their remittances to Burkina Faso. For example, in the convention with Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso was to provide quotas of migrants at the request of the Ivorian planters, and in return, a portion of the migrant's wages was to be paid directly to Burkina Faso into a fund created for this purpose.

Migration Strategies

The migration observed between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire after independence (1900–1975) was essentially circular (Cordell et al., 1996). Indeed, migrants who leave for Côte d'Ivoire do not aim to settle there: migration strategies are family-based, and migrants who go to Côte d'Ivoire aim to resolve their situation and help their household in Burkina Faso. In addition, the migratory movements between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire are back and forth: a migrant's project from the outset includes their return. However, as time goes by and more and more opportunities become available to migrants, some end up settling. This is especially true of successful migrants, those who have obtained large plantations or large and successful businesses. It is also the case of first-time migrants who have previously settled in western Côte d'Ivoire and who have seen their status change from sharecroppers or workers to owners of farms, which allows them to invest in their country of origin, a situation that allows them to maintain regular contact with Burkina Faso. Thus, while the circular aspect remains an important characteristic of Burkinabè international migration, it must be recognised that more and more migrants are settling abroad on a longer-term basis, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire since 1975 (Ouédraogo and Piché, 2007).

However, what marks the migration exchanges between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire today is the importance of return migration, particularly after the Tabou events in 1999.² Although the return movement began in the 1970s (Piché & Cordell, 2015), it gained momentum in the 1990s. Indeed,

² In November 1999, in Tabou, 400 km from Abidjan, a dispute between an indigenous planter and a Burkinabè national degenerated into a full-blown community conflict that led to the sudden departure of more than 10,000, mostly Burkinabè, to their country of origin.

the fairly recurrent clashes between Burkinabè migrants and Ivorians accelerated the return movement from the 1990s with the Tabou events of 1999, the 2002 rebellion and the 2010 post-election crisis. As Mandé points out (2015, 342), “having become the scapegoats of political crises, the Burkinabè suffer exactions, and for many, their salvation lies in returning to their country”.

Overview of Inequalities Linked to Burkinabè Migration

Traditionally, Burkinabè migrants leave the rural areas for Côte d’Ivoire (Dennis et al., 1996). Poverty, the search for an income, the degradation of agricultural land and the lack of prospects for salaried employment in rural areas have convinced Burkinabè to continue to look outside the country for ways to earn a living and support their families back home (Marchal, 1975). In other words, it is generally the poorest who migrate. However, migration has economic and social costs that are not affordable for everyone. Migration requires more effort to mobilise financial or human resources and to mobilise family social networks. The poorest often borrow money to finance their migration, forcing them to work during the first months of their migration to repay the loan. Those with a network (of relatives and friends) already established in Côte d’Ivoire have a definite advantage over those without.

To make their emigration to Côte d’Ivoire possible, Burkina Faso migrants mainly mobilise their family and friend relationships. This social capital (family and friends) is crucial in migration. Consequently, those who do not have it will have more difficulty or less chance of migrating. This means that there are inequalities in the opportunity to migrate.

Gender Inequalities in Migration

If men’s migration is perceived as usual, even natural, this is not the case for women’s migration. Although the situation is beginning to change, reticence or pejorative apprehensions about women’s migration are still prevalent. Compared to men, the negative perception associated with women migrating alone reflects the social norms determining what a woman can or should do. According to the opinions collected during the field surveys of MIDEQ, women should not expose themselves to adventures like men. Indeed, in the eyes of Burkinabè society, it is inconceivable that a woman should migrate alone. The social justifications are that women are fragile and more vulnerable to the difficulties and vicissitudes of migration. Worse, it is thought that

women are weak enough to succumb to prostitution as a profession or as a last resort since they are not supposed to be able to do the hard physical work in the plantation fields, which is what constitutes the real financial manna of Burkinabè migrants in Côte d'Ivoire:

As for the migration of women, I find that it is not at all normal because the majority of them migrate to go and work as prostitutes. If a woman migrates, she has no strength. What kind of work will she do there? She cannot work on a plantation, or anything if it is not to sell herself, and that money is dirty. (Interview with a 45-year-old head of household, a farmer in the Southwest)

For a long time in Burkina Faso, female migrants were almost exclusively women who accompanied or joined their husbands in Côte d'Ivoire. The difficult migration conditions during the colonial period associated with forced migration, as outlined above, contributed to the marginalisation of women in migration.

Inequalities Related to Childhood

Differences in the treatment of children in Burkina Faso can be observed between the biological children of the household and those who are not, such as children whose parents have left for migration. These inequalities related to childhood are generally observed at the level of schooling. Studies conducted in Burkina Faso as part of the MIDEQ Hub show that left-behind children have a higher enrollment rate than children whose parents have not migrated. One inequality these left-behind children face is access and retention in school. On the other hand, the biological children of the household are enrolled in the best-quality schools. This may be because parents who migrate to Côte d'Ivoire and have more resources send money to send their children to school to stay in Burkina Faso, which host households must do. Nonetheless host households favour their biological children by sending them to the best schools.

Remittances and Skills Transfers of Burkinabè Migrants

An analysis by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography based on data from three series of surveys on household living conditions conducted in Burkina Faso shows that the higher the proportion of migrants in a household, the higher its standard of living and the higher its secondary school attendance rate. Thus, migration is a factor in reducing poverty.

These migrants who make money transfers to their households of origin allow the latter to improve their living conditions (BCEAO, 2011). As a result, the issue of cash transfers has become central to discussions on development and the reduction of poverty and inequality. According to the BCEAO (2011), in 2011, Burkina Faso received 96.5 billion CFA francs in remittances from migrants, 31% of which came from Côte d'Ivoire. According to data from the Harmonized Survey on Household Living Conditions (EHCVM, 2018) carried out in 2018 by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography, these remittances amounted to 81 billion CFA francs, 45% of which came from Côte d'Ivoire. Although this was a decrease compared to 2011, it is clear that remittances are significant in volume and mostly come from Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, remittance figures are generally thought to be underestimated because of the lack of control over remittance channels.

These cash transfers contribute to poverty reduction, particularly in rural areas, because, even if there is a tendency to use the transfers in productive sectors, a large part is destined for migrant households for current consumption (food, health, education) and certain expenses, sometimes of a prestigious nature (weddings, funerals, etc.). According to the 2014 Continuous Multisectoral Survey results, the main reason for transfers is family support (88.8%), which shows that transfers are mainly aimed at fighting poverty in rural households. In Sub-Saharan Africa, migrant transfers, by increasing the disposable income of recipient households, have an impact on reducing poverty and inequality, as the work of Gupta et al. (2007) has shown. Remittances thus reduce inequalities at the household level by allowing the poor households to reduce income gaps. Households that receive remittances are envied because they have a safety valve that allows them to cope with difficult situations. These households appear to be privileged, often living the lifestyle of city dwellers.

The preponderance of households with migratory experience to be able to borrow money in case of emergency can be explained by the household's negotiating capacity, but also and above all by the relational capital available

to households with migrant members. In addition, migrant households are slightly more likely to be able to find a loan in case of need compared to non-migrant households (Marc et al., 2022). This is because having someone who has migrated is a guarantee of financial capacity and repayment compared to other households.

It is important to note that migrants do not only transfer money: they also transfer skills acquired during migration, occasional or permanent returns to Burkina Faso. One idea developed in the literature is that return migrants are carriers of innovation in the rural areas to which they return after a stay in Côte d'Ivoire (Dabiré, 2017; OECD, 2017). Indeed, these migrants have acquired skills they use once they return to their country of origin. For example, research by the OECD (2017) in Burkina Faso showed that households with returning migrants are more likely to invest in agricultural assets than households without returning migrants. In addition, households with return migrants are more likely to manage a non-farm business than those without return migrants (OECD, 2017). Thus, thanks to their skills acquired in Côte d'Ivoire, migrants innovate and modernise rural work.

The study conducted by Dabiré (2017) confirms the hypothesis that migrants returning from Côte d'Ivoire are carriers of innovation. Returning migrants innovate by building on existing practices that were theirs before leaving for emigration, drawing on their experiences in Côte d'Ivoire. Even when they are in agricultural activities, migrants invest in types of crops specific to commercialisation (cashew, maize, etc.). In addition, they innovate by introducing tree farming, which was previously unknown in Burkina Faso. This study also notes that migrants are oriented towards the practice of cash crop production, while non-migrants focus on crops for consumption (Dabiré, 2017).

Inequalities Associated with Migration in Burkina Faso

Although migration is generally perceived as a positive process in terms of poverty reduction, it is clear that migration can also contribute to increased inequality in Burkina Faso by privileging some and not others. As Sidiki Coulibaly (2015) points out:

The data from the 2000 survey seem to show, on the contrary, that this eradication of poverty in Burkina Faso is not for tomorrow.....Certainly, the crumbs of development, collected here and there by a few "lucky" migrants, will give the illusion that migration is beneficial for the migrant, his or her family, or

even the entire nation and that it even allows for the social ascension of some. However, even the profitability of the migration funds transferred to Burkina Faso serves so little and so badly. The system is set up in such a way that this hard-earned money still favours the privileged and not the poor fringe of rural or urban areas. (Coulibaly, 2015, v)

One of the downsides of migration is the reduction in the supply of labour in rural areas, as highlighted in research by OECD (2017), which found that younger people (aged 15–44) represent 90% of current emigrants, a larger proportion than non-migrants (76%) and that about 60% of emigrants were employed in Burkina Faso (in agriculture-related activities and elementary trades) before they left the country. However, due to a lack of resources, these households cannot recruit agricultural labour and must compensate for the lack of human resources with additional effort from the remaining members. Migration from rural areas thus creates inequalities because households with migrants find themselves in a labour shortage situation and are thus more vulnerable.

The study conducted by the ISSP in 2020 as part of the MIDEQ Hub's research shows that households with migration experience with Côte d'Ivoire are poorer than households with no migration experience, a result that was entirely unexpected and suggests that Côte d'Ivoire. This survey is the most recent and has provided results that have never previously been observed. These results suggest that migration creates inequalities between households with migrants and households without migrants and that Côte d'Ivoire is not the El Dorado it was previously. More recently, Burkinabè migration has diversified to other countries, notably Italy, the United States, Canada and the Gulf States (General Population Census of Burkina Faso, 2019). Studies have shown that migrants to the North are more beneficial regarding economic benefits (De Vreyer et al., 2010).

This inequality between rich and poor in the face of migration is highlighted in several studies. In a study conducted in Donsin (a Mossi village located about 30 km from Ouagadougou), Smith (1977) observed that migration seems to be practised more by small, relatively well-off families and by larger families rather than by small, poor families. But once the poor overcome these obstacles and migrate, their contribution to the fight against poverty and inequality is undeniable because once in Côte d'Ivoire, the poor transfer more than the rich.

What, then can we conclude about the contribution of migration to Burkina Faso?

Migration's contribution to reducing poverty and inequality is ambivalent with outcomes perceived differently depending on the angle from which they

are viewed. In the case of Burkina Faso, migration has positive effects in certain aspects. For example, in opinion surveys, households' perception of migration is more nuanced, and migration is often considered positive even if it sometimes disrupts family life. However, analysis of the impact of migration on inequalities in Burkina Faso based on empirical studies shows that it is difficult to establish a general theory on the issue. The impact of migration on inequalities is a function of context, region, time, etc., and the theoretical antagonism in the conception is not reflected in the facts of migration.

Inequalities in Côte d'Ivoire

Evidence from research conducted as part of the MIDEQ Hub shows that migration produces certain inequalities in destination countries, including Côte d'Ivoire. This section highlights the different forms of inequality linked to migration.

Inequalities in Rights Linked to Citizenship and Employment

Inequalities in rights are at the centre of the concerns that emerged in the exchanges on the ground in Côte d'Ivoire regarding South–South migration. These take shape in the inequality of rights linked to citizenship and employment: on the one hand between the social construction of statelessness and the social construction of the concept of the foreigner; and on the other hand between barriers to entry into formal and construction of monopolies in informal jobs.

Concerning the inequalities of rights linked to citizenship, these are based on the social construction of statelessness and the social construction of the concept of the foreigner. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states, “Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor of the right to change nationality”. However, according to the data collected in the field, the question of the naturalisation of migrants and their children is creating a category of people who are effectively stateless. This category of actors is a victim of the rights inequalities attached to citizenship in the Burkina Faso–Côte d'Ivoire corridor. Burkinabè migrants are therefore weakened regarding their employment situation and socio-family sociability. This situation is the corollary of a double dynamic of precariousness and social weakening:

To become an Ivorian, you must be in Côte d'Ivoire before independence and have worked there. Some had it, and some did not. What do we do for them?" (U.J., 52, Burkinabe community leader in Soubré)

My big brother was born in Ivory Coast. He did everything here, got his diplomas, and when he started working. After six years of service, he was fired without paying his rights". (AT, 22 years old, is a young Burkinabè living in Mossikro)

Statelessness is created when the descendants of migrants are recognised neither as citizens of Burkina Faso nor as citizens of Côte d'Ivoire. This situation is a corollary of the construction of nationality. During the colonial period, it was necessary to be in Côte d'Ivoire before 1960, and to have worked in an Ivorian company or administration, justified by a work certificate or a residence certificate, to gain citizenship. After independence, another law stipulated that people born from January 1961 to January 1973 had Ivorian nationality.

The legal inequalities linked to citizenship provide a framework for analysing the notion of the foreigner. The concept of the foreigner is socially constructed from the socio-historical, contextual and biological foundations of structuring the relationships of an individual or a social group to a given space. In Côte d'Ivoire's context, those born there and claiming their social identity apply for naturalisation. They are perceived as foreigners because, most often, their request for naturalisation undergoes the effect of an administrative lethargy which consists in forcing them first to pay a stamp up to 75000fcfa and to undergo a morality investigation. This process is long and characterised by administrative complexity. This reflects an inequality of rights linked to citizenship and marks limited access to resources (education, employment, political participation, income):

We are subject to obstacles linked to our surname even if we are Ivorians. There is an instrumentalisation of nationality and the concept of the foreigner for political ends." (AT, 22-year-old young Burkinabè living in Mossikro)

In addition, Burkinabè migrants are socially constructed as Ivorians through mobilising ideological referents of land rights, seniority, heritage and heritage investments, cultural and historical traits and the activation of historical events of the participation of their parents in the construction of Côte d'Ivoire. The inequalities of rights attached to citizenship in the Burkina Faso–Côte d'Ivoire corridor constitute the basis of unequal relations in the migratory context, contributing to the poverty and vulnerability experienced

by migrants. They influence income poverty, poverty of life and living conditions and poverty associated with the absence of assets and material goods. Other forms of inequality arise from this inequality in access to rights and citizenship, including inequalities in access to education, employment and health.

The cross-sectional analysis of migration between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso shows that Burkinabè migrants face unequal access to employment once in the host areas. Employment-related inequalities are visible through institutional barriers to entry into formal jobs and the construction of monopolies in informal jobs. Priority is given to nationals for formal jobs through provisions likely discouraging employers from recruiting a non-national. Burkinabè migrants suffer a social downgrading in the competition for access to employment opportunities launched by political actors, social protection structures, public administration or individuals from municipalities despite obtaining a diploma. This process operates based on identity and by excluding migrants from access to local employment niches, in particular trades such as civil servants in the sub-prefecture or town hall. For example, in Méagui, migrants denounce social exclusion in the recruitment methods around local administrative services, in particular, the sub-prefecture and the town hall.

Some young people born here, after obtaining the baccalaureate, are forced to drop out of school to learn a trade and reintegrate because they cannot have a reserved national job. In Burkina, it is not very easy because you have to find accommodation to go to school, and some do not know any parents there. At Méagui town hall, if you are not Ivorian, you do not work there. (A consular delegate in Méagui)

Inequalities in Income, Gender and Access to Education in the Host Areas

There is evidence of inequalities in income, gender and access to education for Burkinabè in Côte d'Ivoire. Firstly, income inequalities between Burkinabè are constructed through institutional barriers to access formal jobs, as noted above. However, in rural areas, income inequality also occurs in the access to and management of land resources. Indeed, Burkinabè migrants from Côte d'Ivoire are constrained by socio-cultural norms. Specifically, because the land cannot be definitively sold, Burkinabè purchases land but then loses it:

They sell the land to the Burkinabè, and then they come and seize them. This is why the Burkinabè here in Korhogo are more involved in trade (PA, 59 years old, leader of the Burkinabè community of Korhogo)

However, income inequalities among Ivorians are built on the monopoly created by Burkinabè migrants in access to informal jobs. These forms of inequality are socially maintained by conflict and competition between migrants and institutional actors between migrants and Ivorians for access to these activities. Indeed, the circumvention of institutional barriers to entry into formal employment results in a massive insertion of Burkinabè migrants into the activities of the informal sector. The latter enter these activities by controlling the dissemination and marketing of the activity and the production of ideological references delegitimising the competence of Ivorians in this sector (flower growing, market gardening, sale of wood, sale of meat):

Ivorians are lazy; they do not like hard work; they like office work. These migrants construct themselves as courageous and legitimate for these activities". The "myth of courage and bravery" is put forward to prevent the host from carrying out the foreigner's activity. (RT, 35 years old, Ivoirian businessman in Abidjan-Yopougon)

Poverty is analysed through several dimensions of social reality. It highlights access to basic needs, including food, health, housing, security, education, etc. Beyond the poverty of income and the absence of assets and goods, we also note the poverty of living and living conditions.

In addition, gender inequalities are perceptible through the social exclusion of women in access to land resources. This translates into different access to land resources between men and women and between the youngest and the oldest. This type of inequality is found in the ability of these different categories of actors to appropriate the management and exploitation of land capital. In rural areas of Burkina Faso, the main activity is work fieldwork. The income of these social groups comes from the exploitation of the land and the sale of the various resources generated from this resource (vegetables, rice, maize sorghum, fonio, beans, etc.). Women and young children face socio-cultural pressures that prevent them from accessing and managing family land assets: local norms based on community land management make men and/or elders the legitimate and exclusive holders of the land so that they are the ones who are destined to exploit them on behalf of the whole family. As a result, the men and the elders hold the only income for the whole family. These burdens inhibit the desire to empower women and young people who

do not have income-generating activities. They limit household opportunities because they are linked to the income of the head of the household.

Finally, for this part, inequalities in access to education constitute a brake on higher education. This form of inequality between the children of migrants and Ivorians is analysed based on access to secondary education after CM2.³ Moreover, there are barriers to higher education after obtaining the Baccalaureate diploma. Although the majority of migrants who enter Côte d'Ivoire do not have a level of higher education, some of their children who were born in the country have been educated. In interviews conducted with some heads of households, there is a perception that the options available to Burkinabè children after obtaining their certificates of primary and elementary studies are unequal due to nationality. These children are often oriented towards private schools where the parents must finance their studies at 50%. By contrast, some Ivorian children are referred to schools whose support is almost 100% by the State.

From CM2, there is a problem...nationals, the State will direct them to a school where it supports 100%, while for foreigners, the child will be directed to a school where the parent takes charge at 50%. (Focus group participant in Mossikro)

Inequalities in Health and Access to Resources in Activities Involving Children

The management of health problems among migrants lifts the veil on the mobilisation of money and social capital as resources for creating inequalities. Respondents were critical of the functioning of the health system for migrants in Côte d'Ivoire. They argued that money and social connections are resources that structure care relationships between patients and physicians. According to our respondents, these two variables are factors in the creation of unequal treatment between individuals because those who have money or know certain people from medical personnel are more likely to receive health services than those who do not:

All the health structures work like this. If you do not have the money and you have not found the right person, you will be told that there is no bed when there is. (M.Z., 46 years old, housekeeper, Soubré)

³ CM2 is the last class in primary school for entry into college. This class is taken after the Certificate of Elementary Primary Studies. It is the first diploma of the primary school curriculum.

For example, in Korhogo in the North, migrants criticised the behaviour of specific social child protection structures. During discussions, some leaders said they were not in tune with the behaviour of some social services in dealing with Burkinabè cases. The consular delegate of Korhogo acknowledged that the social service of Korhogo is not sufficiently involved in the problems linked to child labour. These children often work in gold panning sites, where they consume drugs and use dangerous products for the treatment of gold which are harmful and damage their lungs. As soon as the state of health of these children deteriorates and they are taken to health centres, the community leaders note that the only activities of the social protection services are limited to questioning the Burkinabè community for cases of children abandoned in care settings. They provide no support, let alone help when these children get sick. Instead, they fall under the responsibility of their community leaders, who are then forced to mobilise community contributions to support them. These children thus remain under the responsibility of their structure throughout their transfer to Burkina Faso. This accentuates the vulnerability of associations because they are not subsidised by their supervisory structure, in particular, the consulate.

Within the framework of inequalities in access to resources in activities involving children, these inequalities oscillate between inequality of struggle in sectors of activity institutionally recognised as a transmission belt for the exercise of child labour, inequality of access to resources to combat trafficking and child labour and inequalities linked to childhood in school reception in reception areas.

Firstly, it is clear that there is inequalities in policies relating to child trafficking and child labour. Several sectors are institutionally recognised as areas of trafficking and child labour activities: cocoa farming, craft trades, street trades and domestic trades. However, our research suggests that there is a concentration of efforts to fight against this phenomenon in cocoa farming to the detriment of other sectors. This results in less awareness in areas such as handicrafts, street trades and domestic work such that many parents continue to have their children work in these industries:

Some parents think that child labour is done in agriculture, in cocoa, they did not think that it is also done in trades. They put the children in motorcycle mechanics because the gentleman has a motorcycle, so putting his child in this job can help him solve his motorcycle breakdowns later. (P.O., 47 years old, Social welfare officer from San Pedro)

Because of the chocolatiers and the fact that the GDP is based on the marketing of cocoa, economic issues surround the marketing of cocoa. Suddenly, all efforts are concentrated on cocoa farming, so there is child labour

in urban areas, in the streets (F.L., 43 years old, expert at the National Agency for Rural Development (ANADER) at Soubré)

Secondly, the unequal access to resources to fight against child trafficking and child labour that emerges from the survey observations testifies that there are many actors in the fight against child trafficking and child labour. In the department of Soubré, for example, it is possible to observe NGOs, specialised reception centres, orphanages, state structures and funding bodies. Some reception centres recognise unequal access to the resources needed to care for their residents. These legally recognised centres are often downgraded when allocating donations, equipment, and financial resources for the protection or care of children in favour of centres that are more politically accustomed and endowed with relational social capital. This weakens the fight against child labour in this social space. An inequality revealed by this actor is the abandonment by the social centres of the child referred to the orphanage:

There is an inequality in the grants given to NGOs to deal with child trafficking and child labour as well as their care. The funds come for the children, but we do not receive them but see them in the reports that they have been shared. Officially recognised orphanages do not fall under their right to dispose of funds at the expense of certain organisations. (T.Y., 56 years old, head of the Soubré social welfare centre)

Finally, the inequalities related to childhood in school reception testify to the difficulties faced by Burkinabè children in the reception areas regarding schooling. This inequality is produced by the poverty of parents who cannot secure birth certificates and associated paperwork for their children due to parental illiteracy and religious constraints. This category of parents prefers to send their children to Koranic schools, which do not offer any opportunities at the national level in terms of recognition of diplomas and traditional professional integration.

Parental poverty is often the cause of dropping out of school (exclusion, self-exclusion): children go to school very early, and when they drop out at age 10, they no longer go to school, can no longer return to school and becomes idle, either they are in the welds, or they accompany their parents in the field (J.K., 29 years old, an employee at the specialised reception centre in Soubré)

Free education is not effective on the ground for communities. They say that the school is free, but it is the notebooks that we give, but the books are not free. (G.H., 36 years old, Secretary of the Soubré orphanage)

Conclusion

Even though colonisation was an essential factor that contributed to the increased migration of Burkinabè migrants towards Côte d'Ivoire, the end of colonisation did not slow down the process. On the contrary, migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire was maintained and amplified given the benefits that Côte d'Ivoire derived from this migration and the contribution that these migrants made to their families back in Burkina Faso.

On a macro level, the contribution of migration to the reduction of poverty and inequality in Burkina Faso is ambivalent. In some respects, migration has positive effects and provides invaluable support to poor households whose migrants are a safety valve, especially for food. In this regard, households have a positive perception of migration. However, migration creates inequalities in Burkina Faso because it is not possible for everyone to migrate; those with social networks, financial resources and relationships migrate more easily. The impact of remittances creates significant disparities between households that receive remittances and those that do not. Moreover, migration creates a deficit of workers in the country of departure, especially in rural areas.

Seen from Burkina Faso, the migrant in Côte d'Ivoire is perceived as someone who has succeeded and lives in pleasant conditions. The situation is quite different because Burkinabè migrants living in Côte d'Ivoire are victims of inequalities. The study conducted in Côte d'Ivoire within the framework of the MIDEQ Hub highlights the different forms of inequality linked to migration. These inequalities are mainly related to access to rights, exclusion and xenophobia. Once they arrive in Côte d'Ivoire, Burkinabè migrants face inequalities in access to work through institutional barriers to entry to formal employment opportunities. This barrier is manifested by the priority given to nationals in jobs.

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