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The Legacy of the Pinochet Regime in Chile

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Roots of Underdevelopment

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Abstract

Chile has experienced more than thirty years of democracy at the shadow of the seventeen-year dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). This chapter provides an overview of the dictatorial legacies with an emphasis on the distribution of economic and political power, as viewed from the most recent literature in economics. We also describe the waves of discontent which have attempted to suppress the most important legacies during the past twenty years. We end with a discussion of the current path of institutional change that could put Pinochet’s legacy to an end.

This version: August, 2021. Chapter prepared for the book “Roots of Underdevelopment: A New Economic (and Political) History of Latin America and the Caribbean” edited by Felipe Valencia. We would like to thank Felipe Aldunate, María Angélica Bautista, José Ignacio Cuesta, Francisco Gallego, Luis Martínez, Pablo Muñoz, Francisco Urzúa, and Felipe Vial for collaborations in related research. We also thank Francisco Eslava, Nicolás Lillo, Cristóbal Otero, Fernanda Rojas, and Felipe Valencia for comments and suggestions. Fondecyt (projects 11170258 and 1210239) and the Economic History Association provided generous financial support for this and related research.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The causes behind the 1973 coup are a matter of debate among scholars. Previous research has emphasized the role of the extreme left to radicalize Salvador Allende’s economic agenda (González and Vial 2021). Other explanations include the role of the US invisible blockade (Sigmund 1974; Aldunate et al. 2021).

  2. 2.

    In contrast, television stations and newspapers were controlled by the dictatorship almost during the entire period. This media control incentivized citizens to produce and consume relatively more unbiased information from radio stations and magazines, particularly after the protest wave of 1983–1984 (Leon-Dermota 2003).

  3. 3.

    Before the Pinochet years, tariffs and non-trade barriers were used to favor certain sectors of the economy, but this was eliminated to increase market competition and promote specialization (Lederman 2005).

  4. 4.

    The exact level of the top 1% t share depends on adjustments related to undistributed profits, capital gains, and tax evasion. See Fairfield and Jorratt De Luis (2016) and López et al. (2016) for details.

  5. 5.

    Funding still came from the central government, but local governments now received per-student payments based on enrollment and school attendance. Local governments were also now in charge of human resources and investments. The system has remained the same with small changes such as increases in the size of the voucher.

  6. 6.

    The new system aimed to solve increasing fiscal problems derived from aging population and decreasing contribution rates (Vial and Castro 1998). Citizens in the old system were given the option to remain there, but they had economic incentives to switch. Therefore, in practice, almost all workers switched to the new system.

  7. 7.

    For example, new policies guarantee a minimum pension for those without sufficient funds in their individual accounts, increase competition among PFAs, and decrease the fees paid by contributors.

  8. 8.

    Their 25% return over equity in 2006–2015 is five times larger than the predicted return derived from market risk (López 2016). According to audited annual reports submitted to Chile’s regulatory agency, in 2015 the average wage of board members in PFAs was $7500 monthly, with some members earning more than $15,000 monthly.

  9. 9.

    The contribution of government policies to the formation of new business groups is a relatively old hypothesis proposed by academics in Chile and other parts of the world such as China, Japan, Malaysia, and Russia (e.g. Morck and Nakamura 2007; Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Lefort 2010; Kandel et al. 2019).

  10. 10.

    We do not cover the persistence of political institutions such as the 1980 Constitution, among others. Albertus and Menaldo (2012, 2018) provide an excellent coverage of constitutional persistence from the political science literature.

  11. 11.

    Previous research has shown that corrupt privatizations have a negative effect on firm performance (Fisman and Wang 2014), that political reasons are usually behind the origins of these reforms (Boycko et al. 1994; López-de-Silanes et al. 1997), and that privatizations might be used as a tool to gain political support (Bel 2010).

  12. 12.

    A data collection effort enabled us to confirm the relative underpricing of the sales when the buyers were closely related to the Pinochet regime. Some of these controversial privatizations have been studied by Mönckeberg (2015).

  13. 13.

    Pyramids allow indirect control (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003), they are relatively common (La Porta et al. 1999), and they are associated with tunneling and expropriation of minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000).

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  1. Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom

    Felipe González

  2. Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance, Rome, Italy

    Mounu Prem

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  1. Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

    Felipe Valencia Caicedo

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González, F., Prem, M. (2023). The Legacy of the Pinochet Regime in Chile. In: Valencia Caicedo, F. (eds) Roots of Underdevelopment. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38723-4_13

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