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Asymmetric Group Message Franking: Definitions and Constructions

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Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023 (EUROCRYPT 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14008))

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Abstract

As online group communication scenarios become more and more common these years, malicious or unpleasant messages are much easier to spread on the internet. Message franking is a crucial cryptographic mechanism designed for content moderation in online end-to-end messaging systems, allowing the receiver of a malicious message to report the message to the moderator. Unfortunately, the existing message franking schemes only consider 1-1 communication scenarios.

In this paper, we systematically explore message franking in group communication scenarios. We introduce the notion of asymmetric group message franking (AGMF), and formalize its security requirements. Then, we provide a framework of constructing AGMF from a new primitive, called . We also give a construction of based on the DDH assumption. Plugging the concrete scheme into our AGMF framework, we obtain a DDH-based AGMF scheme, which supports message franking in group communication scenarios.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Very recently, Issa et al. also consider a kind of AMF, called Hecate [28], but it is somewhat different from [36]. Firstly, [36] and this paper only focus on the intrinsic/fundamental security properties of A(G)MF, while Hecate [28] also considers others, e.g., forward/backward secrecy. Secondly, [36] only needs one round of communication and can generate the AMF signature on the fly, but Hecate [28] introduces an AMF with preprocessing model, resulting in one more preprocessing round with the moderator to get a “token” before generating the AMF signature. Hence, we follow the definition in [36], not considering Hecate [28] when talking about AMF.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to express our sincere appreciation to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions! Junzuo Lai was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. U2001205, Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation (Grant No. 2023B1515040020), Industrial project No. TC20200930001. Siu Ming Yiu was supported by HKU-SCF FinTech Academy and Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Macao Science and Technology Plan Project (Category C Project: SGDX20210823103537030). Xin Mu was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62106114). Jian Weng was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61825203 and U22B2028, Major Program of Guangdong Basic and Applied Research Project under Grant No. 2019B030302008, National Key Research and Development Plan of China under Grant No. 2020YFB1005600, Guangdong Provincial Science and Technology Project under Grant No. 2021A0505030033, Science and Technology Major Project of Tibetan Autonomous Region of China under Grant No. XZ202201ZD0006G, National Joint Engineering Research Center of Network Security Detection and Protection Technology, and Guangdong Key Laboratory of Data Security and Privacy Preserving.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Information Science and Technology, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China

    Junzuo Lai & Jian Weng

  2. Peng Cheng Laboratory, Shenzhen, China

    Gongxian Zeng, Zhengan Huang & Xin Mu

  3. The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

    Siu Ming Yiu

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  1. Junzuo Lai
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Correspondence to Gongxian Zeng or Jian Weng .

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  1. Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

    Carmit Hazay

  2. Simula UiB, Bergen, Norway

    Martijn Stam

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Lai, J., Zeng, G., Huang, Z., Yiu, S.M., Mu, X., Weng, J. (2023). Asymmetric Group Message Franking: Definitions and Constructions. In: Hazay, C., Stam, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023. EUROCRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14008. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_3

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