# The E-Word (Emotions) in Military Ethics Education: Making Use of the Dual-Process Model of Moral Psychology

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According to Verweij (2016), military ethics education should be more than learning how to reason by using ethical theories.[1] Explicit attention should be paid to the 'e-word': emotions. Verweij uses the diminutive 'e-word' to indicate that considering emotions is uncomfortable for many people: "emotions determine the way we think and act, yet, at the same time there is a mistrust of emotions or at best an ambivalent attitude towards these so called 'irrational aspects', or 'blind forces' as they are often perceived, not only in a military setting, but by many philosophers as well" (Verweij, 2016, p. 28). Consequently, giving emotions a proper role in ethics education is challenging. Yet, it is a challenge that should be taken as "a good functioning of emotions and feelings is necessary for social and humane behavior" (Verweij, 2016, pp. 41–42). For it is through emotions that humans are able to experience values as meaningful: "when people have no emotions, when there is no sensitivity, or when people are dispassionate or numb, values will have no meaning to them and are perceived as unfamiliar words on paper that other people seem to fuss about. Obviously, this may have far-reaching and undesired consequences in military practice, for soldiers in these circumstances easily cross moral barriers. This is not only to the detriment of the people these soldiers are confronted with but often also affects the soldier himself, as studies on PTSD and 'moral injury' indicate" (Verweij, 2016, p. 28).

According to Verweij, the model of Haidt makes an important case for emphasizing the 'e-word' with regard to ethics education. Haidt is an important pioneer within moral psychology of the dual-process model for understanding moral judgment. In this model, moral emotions play an important role. Yet, throughout the model, Haidt attributes only a minuscule role to the act of reasoning. This clashes with Verweij's views on education, as she sees practice with reasoning aided by the

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[1] This chapter is an elaboration of a preliminary study, see Karssing (2021).

help of philosophical insights as a precondition for meaningful education. Otherwise, a conversation about moral issues does not get much further than "an exchange of opinions never leading to the vital reflection, necessary for adequate moral decision-making" (Verweij, 2016, p. 27).

This chapter will first discuss the dual-process model in a general sense. Then, the consequences linked to it by Haidt will be discussed. The dual-process model has been embraced by many and indeed provides tools for embracing the 'e-word' in ethics education in practical ways. However, it is first necessary to take some distance from specific elements of Haidt's views. This will be done by introducing the perspective of Musschenga, who does not reject Haidt's model, yet sees it as too one-sided. This will be followed by a discussion of Musschenga's criticism of the model. Finally, different methods to give the e-word a firm place in ethics education will be discussed.

## Haidt and the Dual-Process Model in Moral Psychology

Anyone concerned with ethics education, with strengthening the moral competence of professionals, knows that you cannot limit yourself to philosophy. Rather, you should also look closely at the behavioral sciences that study how people develop morally and how they (can) deal with moral issues. The behavioral sciences provide the empirical knowledge that is necessary to determine what works: the theory must fit the practice (cf. Flanagan, 2017).

During the last decades of the previous century, the theory of psychologist Kohlberg was dominant. According to his theory, people develop morally by passing through several stages. Each of these stages is characterized by a specific way of thinking about moral issues, and in the final stage, morally mature people are able to make moral judgments entirely independently. The description of this last stage fits well with philosophers such as Kant and Rawls, who emphasized reasoning, but had little use for emotions. Using Kohlberg's theory, it is possible to explain the importance, and effectiveness, of discussing practical examples with professionals in order to strengthen their thinking and reasoning skills. However, over the last twenty years, a small revolution has taken place. A 2001 article by psychologist Haidt is often pointed to as the start of this revolution as, throughout the article, Haidt fundamentally undermines Kohlberg's theories (Haidt, 2001, cf. Ellemers et al., 2019). Haidt emphasizes intuition and emotions as informing moral judgments, with reasoning only playing a small role. In particular, reason behaves like a lawyer who devises arguments after the fact to justify positions that have been taken based on intuition and emotions.

Haidt's theory fits within a broader research program in moral psychology focused on the nature of moral judgments. The words 'research program' are a deliberate choice: although there is a clear affinity between Haidt and his colleagues, they do not necessarily all subscribe to the same theory, neither do they conduct research in the same way, nor do they reach the same conclusions (cf. Brand, 2016). However, Haidt

and his colleagues do all make use of the dual-process model of moral judgment. The model itself has been adopted from the behavioral sciences and has become best known among the general public through the book *Thinking, fast and* slow by Nobel Prize winner Kahneman (2011). The basic model will now briefly be introduced before it is applied to moral judgment.

According to the dual-process model, a distinction can be made between two ways of making judgments: judgments based on intuition, and judgments based on deliberate thinking. Or, as coined by psychologists Stanovich and West and popularized by Kahneman, judgments based on System 1 and judgments based on System 2. It should be stressed that this is a way to paint a picture of the inner workings of our brain: these are metaphors, there are not actually two systems identifiable in our brain.

System 1 works intuitively. That is, implicitly, unconsciously and emotionally. It acts automatically, quickly, and with little or no effort. Consequently, it knows no doubt.

System 2 works through deliberate thinking. It works slowly, consciously, laboriously, explicitly, and logically. It consists of thoughtful deliberation and involves doubt.

Most of the choices made by humans are determined by System 1. System 2 is usually in a dormant state: people would rather be lazy than tired.

Thus, the model indicates that there are two different types of judging, intuitive judging and deliberate judging, that people apply. In the research program on moral judgments, this model is used as a framework from which to build other ideas. When it comes to System 1, moral intuitions, judgments that immediately impose themselves on us without further thought, are central. These intuitions indicate how a situation should be interpreted. They serve to answer questions such as: what is going on in this situation and what is my role in it, what is proper and what is improper, and what action is appropriate in this situation? In short, intuitions simultaneously point to a problem and a solution without the need for thought. Therefore, System 1 serves as a moral compass that leads the way when facing a moral question. Here, emotions play an important role. Intuitions are both cognitively and affectively charged, with feelings serving as a rule of thumb for arriving at quick moral judgments. Consequently, something is morally appropriate if, and because, it feels good. Similarly, something is inappropriate if, and because, it feels bad (Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010; Slovic et al., 2007). Conversely, the thinking and reasoning skills that are usually the focus during ethics education belong to System 2. Yet, in everyday life, judgments are more often made intuitively rather than well-considered.

Within the research program there is still a lot of discussion about definitions, about the interpretation of results, and about the way the research is conducted. Research often focuses on extreme examples that have little to do with everyday situations (cf. Brand, 2016; Sauer, 2019). Also, it has already been suggested that there may be a third system (Sauer, 2019). Additionally, there are different views on the relationship between the two systems: is there subordination (one system is more decisive in judging than the other), competition, or cooperation (cf. Brand, 2016; Liao, 2011; Sauer, 2019)?

Haidt is an important representative of the dual-process model and clearly outlines the role that intuitions, emotions, and moral reasoning play in moral judgments. His view is briefly summarized in the following prompts (cf. Brand, 2016; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Haidt, 2001, 2012; Musschenga, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; Sauer, 2019).

- Our intuitions and emotions (System 1) are partly innate and partly learned (Haidt provides different evolutionary explanations for humanity's innate intuitions and emotions).
- System 1 usually prevails over System 2. Following the philosopher Hume, reason is the slave of emotions (and therefore intuitions). Haidt qualifies this statement by emphasizing that this is usually the case: "intuitive primacy (but not dictatorship)" (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).
- In most cases, System 2 is set up as an advocate rather than the cool and critical thinker presupposed by ethical theories: System 2, as an advocate, provides post-hoc (i.e., after-the-fact) arguments for the judgment already determined by System 1. Therefore, reasoning hardly plays a role in making judgments. Instead, it is focused on justifying judgments that have already been made.
- System 2 can be used to think critically ('no dictatorship'), but this hardly ever happens. When it does happen, it is usually in complex situations when intuitions conflict. Critical thinking hardly motivates either: the motivation to act on judgments is informed by emotions, ergo System 1.
- For most people, System 2 will only play a critical role in a social setting. People are hardly capable of making critical and thoughtful judgments on their own; for that they need others to point out blind spots and new perspectives. Yet, also in a social setting, arguments will seldom affect moral judgments through the logic of system 2. Instead, arguments indirectly influence judgments by appealing to latent intuitions in System 1. In other words, because the other person knows how to press the right emotional buttons of System 1.
- Critical thinking in a social setting is 'biased'. People tend to conform to the views of their friends and are much more critical of arguments that are at odds with their intuitive judgments than of arguments that actually confirm what they already believe.

In conclusion, according to Haidt, reasoning hardly plays any role in moral judgments. Consequently, there is in ethics education little point to professionals discussing practical examples with each other, using insights from philosophy. According to Haidt, people mainly judge intuitively and emotionally: "sometimes these affective reactions are so strong and differentiated that they can be called moral emotions" (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). These moral emotions can be cultivated to a limited extent, but this is mainly done in social settings.

# Haidt Revisited

According to Verweij (2016), emotions need more emphasis in military ethics educa-tion, with the precondition that philosophical insights also receive attention. Haidt shows that emotions do indeed play an important role in moral judgments through System 1. However, he hardly leaves any room for reasoning. Let alone for the use of philosophical insights to reinforce moral judgments. Musschenga (2009, 2010, 2011) endorses Haidt's conclusion that people very often make intuitive judgments based on their feelings. Additionally, he advocates that this should be an important starting point in ethics education. However, Musschenga also has several criticisms on Haidt's work and certainly sees room for reasoning and philosophical insights. Briefly summarized, these criticisms amount to Haidt overestimating the role of System 1 and underestimating to role of System 2. According to Musschenga, because there is reason to be doubtful about the reliability of System 1, System 2 is needed to monitor, test, and correct System 1 where necessary. Essentially, although System 2 only rarely plays a leading role, the fact that System 1 can be unreliable means that System 2 must play a bigger and more important role than Haidt suggests.

## *An Increased Role for System 2*

Why does Haidt understate the role of moral reasoning, the activities of system 2? Firstly, it is true that people regularly act as advocates for their own views in a discussion. This is especially true when it comes to topics on which they have already taken a firm position. Yet, many conversations concerning moral issues are precisely about topics on which one does not yet have a clear opinion. In such cases, the exchange of arguments (System 2), will then either reinforce peoples' own preliminary judgment or cause them to arrive at a different judgment: "They are often willing to become convinced of the opposite of their initial intuition" (Musschenga, 2008, p. 135). Additionally, even if people partaking in the discussion behave like a lawyer, that does not mean that they only make up arguments after the fact. After all, the intuitive position they passionately defend may be the result of well-thought-out judgments made in the past. For example, if an individual who grew up in a family in which eating meat was normal made a conscious decision to stop eating meat, they would no longer have to think hard about buying meat every time they go to the supermarket.

Secondly, Musschenga is more optimistic than Haidt about the possibility of adjusting our judgment based on reflecting on new arguments. Most people have the experience of suddenly coming to an entirely different understanding as a result of new perspectives, new information, or new arguments. That thinking process is not being done justice if one claims that only already existing (latent) intuitions and emotions are at work in such a situation.

Thirdly, according to Haidt, System 2, conscious reasoning, is only used in complex situations or when intuitions conflict. However, Haidt appears to ignore new situations for which one has no intuitions to fall back on. Musschenga suspects that situations like this occur on a regular basis, meaning that the statement that System 2 is only rarely needed would not be correct.

Fourthly, although it is true that our reasoning has shortcomings, that people often behave like lawyers, and that they tend to conform to the views of their friends and weigh arguments in a biased way, it must be stated that this is not always possible. As indicated before: people do not always have (strong) intuitions. Additionally, even lawyers will adjust intuitive judgments "if there are too many reasons pleading against it" (Musschenga, 2008, p. 138).

Fifthly, Haidt believes that System 2 will rarely motivate people to behave according to its conclusions. His premise is that only people's emotions (affects) motivate them, and in his view, he allocates those emotions to System 1. Consequently, it follows automatically that System 2 will have little influence on our actions. Yet, even if one goes along with the idea that only our emotions can motivate us, which not everybody does, there are plenty of philosophers who reject such a strict separation between emotions and reasoning (cf. Roeser, 2010). In other words, emotions also play a role in System 2. Additionally, we know from research that people are very attached to their moral identity: they want to see themselves as moral beings and they also want to be known as such by others (cf. Ellemers et al., 2019). This desire is a strong motivator to apply all the resources for moral judgments one has at their disposal, including System 2.

Finally, moral judgment is not always an individual matter: there are many situations in which moral issues have to be dissolved within a group. One such common situation is at work. Different views may exist within a group, or a group may encounter situations with which they are not yet familiar. In such cases, the ability to reason, to provide strong arguments, and to justify certain positions is very valuable (Musschenga, 2009, p. 609). Additionally, transparency and the justification of choices are essential parts of professional life in today's world: professionals must be able to justify their decisions with words that others can understand. In such an environment, actions cannot be justified solely based on intuition. Doing so would be highly problematic because it makes it impossible for another person to judge a particular course of action.

## A More Important Role for System 2

Before we move on, an intermediate conclusion is: the role of System 2 seems much bigger than Haidt claims and is also more important in certain situations than Haidt hints at (think about novel situations, group decisions, and disagreements). Additionally, Musschenga shows that System 1 is not always reliable, which is a good reason to ascribe a more substantial role to System 2.

As indicated earlier, our intuitions are partly innate and partly learned. Haidt extensively discusses the evolutionary origins of many intuitions, positing that they must be helpful to humanity as they have, among others, helped humanity get where it is today and have past the 'survival of the fittest' test.[2] However, it should be noted that humanity's evolution took place under very different conditions than the modern, complex society in which those intuitions act as our guide today (cf. Musschenga, 2010; Sauer, 2019). Important features of our innate intuitions include:

- We react primarily to dangers we can see, hear, smell or feel and are less likely to be frightened by dangers we cannot perceive with our own senses.
- The interests of family members outweigh those of strangers.
- Since survival took place on a daily basis, we are fairly short-sighted and have little regard for the future.
- We are strongly conformist: if someone fled it was better to follow them than to stand still.
- We are status sensitive because status is sexy (Giphart & Van Vugt, 2016, cf Flanagan, 2017).

The distinction between System 1 and System 2 has been adopted from the behavioral sciences. In its original context, the model is mainly used to identify different kinds of 'biases'. In essence, the model is used to show how intuitions function as rules of thumb that can systematically misguide individuals (cf Kahneman, 2011; Sunstein, 2005). Based on this, it would seem sensible to not canonize System 1 without question. Yet, this is partly an empirical question: how reliable are peoples' moral intuitions, to what extent is it wise for people to rely on their feelings? In the behavioral sciences, this is tested by determining if System 1 prescribes the best decision. This is done by testing if the same judgment would be reached if System 2 was used. However, when it comes to moral issues it is very difficult to conclude what 'the best decision' is because different ethical theories can justify different outcomes (cf. Brand, 2016; Sunstein, 2005). Therefore, Musschenga (2009) takes a different approach when questioning the reliability of System 1. He does not look at 'the best decision'. Rather, he poses the question whether there are good reasons to trust the wisdom of System 1. Are our intuitions epistemically justified? After all, "Epistemic justification does not require true beliefs. That is, one can have epistemically justified false beliefs" (Liao, 2011).

In order for the intuitions provided by System 1 to be epistemologically justified, System 1 would need to be impartial, i.e. not to make its own interests more important than the interests of others. This is a tall order. As Adam Smith already knew, and as has been confirmed by 'behavioral economics' in many ways, what is close (our own interests) always seems big, and what is far away (the interests of others) seems small. Smith wrote that "it is only by consulting this judge within [our conscience], that we can ever see what relates to ourselves in its proper shape and dimensions; or that we can ever make a proper comparison between our own interests and those

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[2] Additionally, evolution has also resulted in System 2. Hence, it is likely that this system is also helpful to humanity (cf. Slovic et al., 2007, p. 1347).

of other people" (Smith, 1759/2009, p. 157). Consequently, System 2 is required to play the role of conscience, of criticizing our intuitions, our moral emotions, and needs to correct them if necessary.

Additionally, System 1 is only reliable if it is not overwhelmed by emotions, something that can't always be ruled out. Although there may be wisdom in emotions, there is a reason why calling someone 'emotional' is generally not a positive qualification. Emotions can get in the way and actually be dysfunctional by functioning as a jammer.

Moreover, you would want System 1 to be insensitive to, for example, the words with which a situation is explained or the circumstances in which a decision must be made. Yet, a variety of studies show that this is not the case (Musschenga, 2009, pp. 604–605). These studies show that our judgment is partly determined by the choice of words or by the order in which options are presented to us. For example, research has been done on people's responses to a hypothetical situation in which they are given a choice between an option in which one person dies and an alternative in which five people die. The results show that whether emphasis was put on the negative outcome (people die) or the positive outcome (people are saved) had significant impact on both the choice people made and their degree of agreement. In a similar vein research has shown that subjects' decision making was different based on whether the decisions were made in a clean room or a dirty room. These factors should be irrelevant to the decision making process but they have been shown to have an impact.

Consequently, we have good reasons not to trust System 1 blindly. System 2 too should be used to critically examine and, if necessary, correct the outcome of System 1. However, the question then becomes how to make the role and importance of System 2 bigger, or whether there may be other ways to enhance the power of System 1.

## Methods for Ethics Education

As discussed earlier, System 1, and with it our intuitions and emotions, plays an important role in moral judgments. Yet, System 1 is not unquestionably reliable: System 2 is needed to monitor, test, and, if necessary, correct System 1. Sadly, System 2 is not always reliable either. Fortunately, there are several ways to strengthen trust in both systems.

### Strengthening System 2

Classical ethics education focuses on System 2, with a particular emphasis on reasoning using philosophical insights. Although this remains important, Haidt has shown that people primarily think critically in social settings and that the process is prone to developing biases. Consequently, Musschenga looks at de-bias strategies

used to enhance the quality of decision making processes and thus use the power of the group to make the individual aware of blind spots and new perspectives (cf. Liao, 2011). Building on Haidt, Mlodinow acknowledges that the mind sometimes behaves like a lawyer but believes that the mind can also behave like a scientist: "Scientists gather evidence, look for regularities, form theories explaining their observations, and test them. Attorneys begin with a conclusion they want to convince others of and then seek evidence that supports it, while also attempting to discredit evidence that doesn't" (Mlodinov, 2013, p. 200). According to Mlodinov, our mind, System 2, is capable of playing both roles: "both a conscious seeker of objective truth and an unconscious, impassioned advocate for what we *want* to believe … As it turns out, the brain is a decent scientist but an absolutely *outstanding* laywer" (Mlodinov, 2013, pp. 200–201). Hence, one way of improving System 2 is putting the scientist to work. This is a metaphor that can be elaborated on using knowledge on the scientific process and the ways scientists operate. A scientist always tries to look at counterarguments, at the arguments that undermine his/her positions. Subsequently, they are willing to revise their position based on the strength of the arguments. Since nothing is foreign to scientists, this is hard work. Therefore, the strength of science lies not in the individual, but in the collective as scientists keep each other on the ball: "It is not so much the critical attitude that individual scientists have taken with respect to their own ideas that has given science the success it has enjoyed as a method for making new discoveries, but more the fact that individual scientists have been highly motivated to demonstrate that hypotheses that are held by some other scientist(s) are false" (Nickerson, 1998, p. 194). Essentially, this view could be used to make a strong argument for the organization of peer review so professionals could discuss moral issues in a systematic way. Practice in moral consultation could be made part of ethics education.

Verweij (2016) also emphasizes the importance of moral case deliberation (MCD) and refers to an "Aristotelian method for MCD that specifically focuses on the reflection on emotions, or rather on the 'rightness' (i.e. the adequateness) of the expression and the reliability of an experienced emotion in a particular situation". Additionally, Verweij reports positive effects on participants as a result of the implementation of MCD: "Participants of MCD sessions in which emotions are addressed report that the quality and the thoroughness of moral inquiry was increased and that they experienced a deeper and more personal learning process" (Verweij, 2016, p. 39). Through the MCD process the reflective skills of System 2 are explicitly used to explore and test the intuitions and emotions of System 1. This does not have to be limited to classroom sessions with power point presentations and instruction cards for real life dilemmas. Such a scenario has the risks "turning dilemmas into 'can-do' challenges that can be solved with a checklist" (Molendijk, 2019, p. 190). Instead, as Molendijk (2019, p. 190) points out, the learning experience is likely to be enhanced by integrating ethics education into field exercises to allow realistic, experience-oriented training.

Another situation in which discussion could be invaluable, is when studying how exemplary figures deal with their emotions. In the Aristotelian tradition, observing others is a valid strategy in critically reflecting on one's own intuitions and emotions:

"If one wants to gain a greater understanding of what a healthy professional life is supposed to look like, one can inquire with those people who he/she intuitively perceives to be knowledgeable" (Sanderse & Kole, 2018, p. 184; our translation). However, to not blindly copy the behavior of role models, one needs to master the art of 'critical and conscious copying'. This is where a conversation with the role model, if possible, could be very valuable because mere observation does not reveal everything. Conversations with role models might provide deeper understanding of why they do what they do.

## *Strengthen System 1*

Although there are several methods to strengthening System 2's reflective skills and relating them to System 1's emotions and intuitions, Musschenga notes that there is not always time to apply System 2. Consequently, he advocates that it is also wise to strengthen the trust in our intuitions, in our feelings, by investing in the reliability of System 1. Since intuitions and emotions are partly learned and partly innate, the learning process in which our intuitions and emotions (partly) take shape is imperative. Here, learning through experience plays an important role. This requires that people get feedback immediately, and that they get feedback from the right people (i.e. not from immoral people or people who don't know their own craft). After all, lack of feedback or unreliable feedback may result in the wrong conclusions being drawn: "You cannot learn from feedback you do not receive and some feedback may simply act to increase confidence in erroneous beliefs" (Musschenga, 2009, p. 606).

Consequently, this is an argument for a structured approach to learning-by-doing. Musschenga refers to the model of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991, 2005) that indicates how professionals can become proficient step by step; from beginner, to advanced, to competent and proficient, and eventually to a moral expert:

> It seems that beginners make judgments using strict rules and features, but that with talent and a great deal of involved experience, the beginner develops into an expert who sees intuitively what to do without apply applying rules and making judgments at all. The intellectualist tradition has given an accurate description of the beginner and of the expert facing an unfamiliar situation, but normally an expert does not deliberate. He or she neither reasons nor acts deliberately. He or she simply spontaneously does what has normally worked and, naturally, it normally works. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005, p. 253)

However, Musschenga has difficulty calling someone a moral expert:

> According to the Dreyfuses, someone who had a normal, successful moral education is a moral expert. What they call moral experts can be better described as ordinary, morally competent persons. While individuals keep being confronted with new situations and new problems, moral development never really ends and needs to continue in adult life. (2009, p. 607)

Although this comment may be justified, the main point of the Dreyfuses still stands: by becoming competent, by learning-by-doing, one could have more confidence in

intuitions and emotions. Yet, there is a pitfall: arrogance, indifference and cowardice also come about as a result of practice. Therefore, professionals should preferably practice under the guidance of people with experience on appropriate emotional responses, and thus are able to provide targeted feedback (see above). Consequently, philosophical insight can also play a role: "they figure effectively in the acquisition, formation and maintenance (that is, the education) of subjects' moral intuitions, and make a psychologically real difference to people's moral beliefs. Effective moral reasoning requires nothing more than this" (Sauer, 2012, p. 263).

One way in which professionals could practice under guidance is through the master-apprentice relationship. Although this is a very old form of learning, it certainly is not old-fashioned (Brockmöller, 2008). A master is an expert who has mastered his craft, someone who has achieved superior performance. They have not only done so through knowledge and skills, but also through the values and standards that characterize good professional practice: the master does the right thing the right way. As part of the master-apprentice relationship, the master and the apprentice go to work together and subsequently learn from each other. Since the master is an expert, the apprentice learns from the master. However, since the apprentice asks questions about the practice, the master will become more aware of his own actions and gain new insights. Brockmöller has shown that this process can work, and be mutually beneficial, but the master-apprentice relationship requires a lot of attention. Therefore, she formulated a protocol how to model this relationship.

## Conclusion

According to Verweij, more attention should be paid to emotions, or the 'e-word', in military ethics education. Based on the dual-process model this conclusion is justified. Additionally, the model also provides insight on how this increased focus could take shape. Obviously, a change to an increased focus on emotions will not come easily to the military: "the masculine ideal of the warrior hero, and to be in emotional control, does not make it easy to engage in reflection as this could simply be interpreted as being weak or vulnerable" (Van Baarle, 2018, p. 122). Yet, clearly, there is a lot to be gained by doing so: "emotions – regardless of intensity – are inevitable in morally challenging interactions, and influence a serviceman's behavioral responses. Therefore the military would benefit from expanding its attention in the direction of affective processes" (De Graaff, 2016, p. 91). Possibly, semantics could play a role in changing the perspective on emotions. Based on the dual-process model it is clear that emotions and intuitions are closely related. Yet, where emotions are considered taboo, intuitions are associated with expertise: experts perform at a high level within their field based on their intuitions. Expertise is something that most people are willing to strive for. Yet, if people are to actually reach this level, it is a prerequisite that the education program of which they are part of has to have cultivated the means for them to do so. Therefore, emotions can be made part of military ethics education through their inextricable link to intuitions. By addressing intuitions into the learning process in a structured way, by making clear that people could grow from beginners to

experts by strengthening their intuitions through education, it is possible to entrench emotions as a component of military ethics education.

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