Abstract
This chapter deals with the potential activation of a State’s international responsibility during a sedition process. This is done from a general perspective and, more specifically, as regards the human rights violations arising thereof. To this end, the regime applicable to three different moments will be analysed: the initial stages of sedition; the situation of an entity undergoing sedition but which is not recognized by the parent State; and finally the scenario applicable to cases of secession which have been accepted.
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Notes
- 1.
High Commissioner on National Minorities, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: “Report by the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, to the 1270th Plenary meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council”, HCNM.GAL/3/20/Rev.2, 4 June 2020, pp. 11–13.
- 2.
López Martín (2017–2018), pp. 76–77.
- 3.
For a first approach concerning all of them, see López Martín (2019), pp. 277–281.
- 4.
There are multiple analyses that start from a concept of secession from visions that differ from those established in the current international legal framework, or that partially refer to it in order to construct alternative critical conceptions. For an example which also includes extensive references to similar work, see Laoutides (2015) especially the third chapter: “The Process of Secession as Emancipation”. Recently, other works conceptually consider secession as a kind of reaction to undesirable situations, and conclude that: “Focus on the forwarding of democracy and human rights in all states, for all peoples, of all territories is the best antidote to secession”. Abel (2020).
- 5.
López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018a), p. 95.
- 6.
Armas Pfirter and González Napolitano (2006), p. 375.
- 7.
Kohen (2006), p. 3.
- 8.
In this regard, see line of reasoning of professors López Martín and Perea Unceta, which I share: López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018a), pp. 81–86.
- 9.
See Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on succession of states in respect of state property, archives and debts. Similarly, see Article 3 of the International Law Commission Draft on the nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States (Res. A/55/153, of 30 January 2001).
- 10.
In light of Article 2.2: “The present Resolution applies only to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”.
- 11.
Reference to this, as well as to the Resolution and a series of updated comments, can be found in Kohen and Dumberry (2019). The citation is from page 27.
- 12.
“Draft article 5. Cases of succession of States covered by the present draft articles. The present draft articles apply only to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”.
- 13.
Thus, for example: “However, it is far from settled and one may even say it is rather doubtful that, in the situations occurring not in conformity with international law, it is possible to speak about the presence of the successor State at all. Indeed, as shown in the overview of the selected practice, the entities created in violation of international law were, on numerous occasions, declared illegal and null and void. 40. In this context, the rationale for the inclusion of a draft article modelled on article 6 of the 1978 Vienna Convention seems to be still extremely pertinent. …”. International Law Commission: “Second report on succession of States in respect of State responsibility”, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/719, 2018, paras. 39–40.
- 14.
It should be noted that in the works where the term secession is used to also include elements pertaining to the exercise of free will, the widespread conviction exists that, in short: “all secessions involving the violation of norms considered to be a peremptory character, that is, forming jus cogens, would be illegal”. Vid. Escudero Espinosa (2017), p. 46.
- 15.
López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018a), p. 92.
- 16.
“Consecuencias jurídicas de la secesión de entidades territoriales de un Estado con especial referencia a las implicaciones en materia de derechos humanos. Enseñanzas para España”. [“Legal consequences of the secession of territorial entities from a state with special reference to human rights implications. lessons for Spain”.]
- 17.
International Law Commission: “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.”, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, 2001.
- 18.
“These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.”
- 19.
Regarding more recently, see the report by United Nations Secretary-General: “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Compilation of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies”, U.N. Doc. A/71/80/Add.1, 2017, which includes the decisions taken from 2001 to 2016 and the references made to the Draft (in the case of the ECHR, in 47 of its resolved issues).
- 20.
Beyond what will be examined in the following sections on this matter, for an updated first impression of considerable interest in this regard, see: Garciandia (2020), pp. 177–187.
- 21.
As a recent example see Pellet (2017), pp. 230–251. Despite the time which has gone by, see interesting analysis carried out by the Study Group of the International Law Commission on this matter in: “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law”, U.N. Doc. A/CN4/L682, 2006.
- 22.
In relation to a comprehensive approach see Urioste Braga (2002), pp. 139–170.
- 23.
“Article 2. Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State. There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”.
- 24.
“Article 12. Existence of a breach of an international obligation. There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character”.
- 25.
On this, see, Villán Durán (2002), pp. 85–91.
- 26.
Protection must be understood from a broad perspective that, as we shall partially see, includes relevant aspects in this area such as the promotion and prevention of human rights violations. For a first approach to this matter, see complete work by Sicilianos (2001).
- 27.
Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 23–24.
- 28.
Austria vs. Italy, Application No. 788/60. In: European Yearbook of Human Rights, vol. 4, 1961, pp. 138–140.
- 29.
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 on The Effect of Reservations on The Entry Into Force of The American Convention on Human Rights, 24 September 1982, in Series A: Judgements and Advisory Opinions No. 2, para. 29.
- 30.
On this, see Pinto (1997).
- 31.
For an updated and broader approach: Burgorgue-Larsen (2015).
- 32.
Human Rights Committee: “General comment No. 26: Continuity of obligations”, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 200, 1997, para. 4.
- 33.
See, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, paras. 99–100.
- 34.
See example of, the judgements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as regards cases Caso Blake v. Guatemala, Excepciones Preliminares, sentence of 2 July of 1996, in Serie C: Resoluciones y Sentencias, No. 27, and Masacre Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala, sentence of 29 April 2004, in Serie C: Resoluciones y Sentencias, No. 105, which include the separate opinions of Judge Cançado Trindade on this issue.
- 35.
Ruiz Ruiz (2001), p. 58.
- 36.
Militarv and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 177.
- 37.
Fernández de Casadevante Romaní (2011), p. 67.
- 38.
Comisión Inter-American de Derechos Humanos: “Informe N.° 1/96, caso 10.559, Chumbivilcas, Perú”, 1 March 1996, Part V, section c.
- 39.
See Cançado Trindade et al. (2003), pp. 145–151.
- 40.
Boerefijn (2009), pp. 167–205.
- 41.
In that regard, Lavrysen (2016).
- 42.
O’Keeffe v. Ireland (GC), 35810/09, ECHR 2014, paras. 144–152.
- 43.
Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States of America), Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 25.
- 44.
See for example review by Nash Rojas (2004).
- 45.
Thus, for example, as stated by the ECHR:
The Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘effective’ in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State (…) 227. Given the fundamental importance of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, Article 13 requires, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the deprivation of life and infliction of treatment contrary to Article 3, including effective access for the complainant to the investigation procedure. The Court further recalls that the requirements of Article 13 are broader than a Contracting State’s obligation under Article 2 to conduct an effective investigation (Issaïeva v. Russia, 57950/00, ECHR 2005, paras. 226–227).
- 46.
As an example, see among others Economic and Social Council: “principles on the effective prevention and investigation of extralegal, arbitrary and summary executions ”, Resolution adopted later by the United Nations General Assembly under the heading “Human rights in the administration of justice”, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/162, 1989, principles 9, 11, 18 and 20; General Assembly: “Declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms”, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144, 1999, article 9; Human Rights Commission: “Updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity”, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 2005, principio 19.
- 47.
Fernández de Casadevante Romaní (2013).
- 48.
As is known, Article 1 of the ECHR only contains a general provision from which only these two obligations can be derived by a systematic interpretation of the whole Convention.
- 49.
- 50.
Šilih v. Slovenia (GC), 71463/01, ECHR 2009, para. 156.
- 51.
“Article 4. Conduct of organs of State. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State”.
- 52.
See, Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, N°. 7, p. 19.
- 53.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, I.C.J., Reports 1999, para. 62.
- 54.
Observation regarding Article 4, paragraph 5.
- 55.
On this see, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), I.C.J., Reports 2001, para. 81.
- 56.
As is known Article 7 of the ILC Draft contains a further general principle of attribution in the following terms: “Article 7. Excess of authority or contravention of instructions. The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions”.
- 57.
“Article 8. Conduct directed or controlled by a State. The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct”.
- 58.
In the following section we will return to this matter in a more detailed manner.
- 59.
“Article 16. Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State”.
- 60.
For an approach to this complex, and partly controversial concept, see García Roca (2010).
- 61.
More recently, see the Court decision in Forcadell i Lluís and others v. Spain, 75147/17, ECHR 2019. This decision, in turn, refers to previous ones made by the ECHR, and in short, to a consolidated jurisprudence in this respect.
- 62.
Crawford (2006), p. 418.
- 63.
As regards this, see Costas Trascasas (2008).
- 64.
Pérez González (1998).
- 65.
See for example ICJ Advisory Opinion ICJ on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory paras. 102–106; or its judgement of 19 December 2005 on the issue concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), paras. 216–221.
- 66.
“Article 13. International obligation in force for a State. An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs”.
- 67.
Verhoeven (2015), pp. 285–303.
- 68.
Paragraph 2 of the Commentary of the International Law Commission on Article 10.
- 69.
“This article is understood without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any conduct, however related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 4 to 9”.
- 70.
Dumberry (2005), pp. 448–449.
- 71.
Kohen and Dumberry (2019), pp. 102–105.
- 72.
Doc. cit., note 13.
- 73.
Draft Article 7.1 and its commentaries.
- 74.
Draft Article 7.3 and its commentaries.
- 75.
In this respect, see copious specific examples: López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018b), pp. 63–73. In parallel and more recent, see report cited in note 1.
- 76.
- 77.
Vid. supra note 32.
- 78.
Although it may not have specifically been expressed, it is the terminology, used by the ICJ:
Without prejudice as to whether or not the principle of ‘automatic succession’ applies in the case of certain types of international treaties or conventions, the Court does not consider it necessary, in order to decide J2 on its jurisdiction in this case, to make a determination on the legal issues concerning State succession in respect to treaties which have been raised by the Parties. Whether Bosnia and Herzegovina automatically became party to the Genocide Convention on the date of its accession to independence on 6 March 1992, or whether it became a party as a result –retroactive or not– of its Notice of Succession of 29 December 1992, at al1 events it was a party to it on the date of the filing of its Application on 20 March 1993. These matters might, at the most, possess a certain relevance with respect to the determination of the scope ratione temporis of the jurisdiction of the Court, a point which the Court will consider later… (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1996, para. 23).
- 79.
Beemelmans (1997), p. 75.
- 80.
See Opinion on the cited case in note 78. What is reproduced here is contained in pp. 63–64.
- 81.
For summary see, Ruiz Ruiz (2001), pp. 113–183.
- 82.
Specifically:
The Human Rights Committee has made clear, in the context of obligations arising from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that fundamental rights protected by international treaties ‘belong to the people living in the territory of the State party’ concerned. In particular, ‘once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State succession’ (General Comment No. 26: Continuity of obligations: 08/12/97, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 8/ Rev.1) (Bijelić v. Montenegro and Serbia, 11890/05, ECHR 2009, para. 58).
- 83.
Bijelić v. Montenegro and Serbia, 11890/05, ECHR 2009, para. 69. For more details, see following sections.
- 84.
Cyprus v. Turkey (GC), 25781/94, ECHR 2001, para. 80.
- 85.
Thus:
The acquired human rights doctrine does not provide support for holding rights established under the ECHR to be opposable to a de facto regime where there were no convention rights to ‘acquire’ at the point at which the regime established its independence (…). In order to recognize that the accession of a sovereign State to the European Convention on Human Rights has the consequence of subjecting a de facto regime on its territory to the obligations established under the Convention we would have to conclude that the territorial State had the capacity to accede to international law obligations in the area of human rights that were then opposable to the de facto regime (Cullen and Wheatley 2013, p. 726).
- 86.
López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018b), pp. 31–32.
- 87.
Perea Unceta (2020), pp. 35–53 and 55–56.
- 88.
As a first reference of direct interest, see Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) (GC), 15318/89, ECHR 1995, and its judgement on the background to the end of 1996.
- 89.
As regards the Special Rapporteur’s statement on United Nations extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, see Perea Unceta (2020), pp. 56–57. Regarding certain indirect pronouncements made by the ECHR, see pp. 50–53.
- 90.
“Article 1. Obligation to respect Human Rights. The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”.
- 91.
Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) (GC), 15318/89, ECHR 1995; Chipre c. Turquía (GC), 25781/94, ECHR 2001, especially in paras. 76–80.
- 92.
Ilaşcu and others v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 48787/99, ECHR 2004, paras. 311–313.
- 93.
Ibid., para. 333.
- 94.
Catan and others v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 43370/04, 8252/05 y 18454/06, ECHR 2012, para. 110.
- 95.
Specifically:
The Court does not have any evidence that since Mr. Ilaşcu’s release in May 2001 effective measures have been taken by the authorities to put an end to the continuing infringements of their Convention rights complained of by the other three applicants. At least, apart from Mr. Sturza’s evidence to the effect that the question of the applicants’ situation continues to be raised regularly by the Moldovan authorities in their dealing with the ‘MRT’ regime, the Court has no other information capable of justifying the conclusion that the Moldovan Government have been diligent with regard to the applicants. In their negotiations with the separatists, the Moldovan authorities have restricted themselves to raising the question of the applicants’ situation orally, without trying to reach an agreement guaranteeing respect for their Convention rights (…). Similarly, although the applicants have been deprived of their liberty for nearly twelve years, no overall plan for the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict brought to the Court’s attention deals with their situation, and the Moldovan Government did not claim that such a document existed or that negotiations on the subject were in progress. 349. Nor have the Moldovan authorities been any more attentive to the applicants’ fate in their bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. In the Court’s opinion, the fact that at the hearing on 6 July 2001 the Moldovan Government refrained from arguing that the Russian Federation was responsible for the alleged violations on account of the presence of its army in Transdniestria, so as not to hinder the process ‘aimed at ending… the detention of the… applicants’ (…), amounted to an admission on their part of the influence the Russian authorities might have over the Transdniestrian regime if they were to urge it to release the applicants. Contrary to the position prior to May 2001, when the Moldovan authorities raised the question of the applicants’ release with the Russian authorities, interventions to that end also seem to have ceased after that date. In any event, the Court has not been informed of any approach by the Moldovan authorities to the Russian authorities after May 2001 aimed at obtaining the remaining applicants’ release. 350. In short, the Court notes that the negotiations for a settlement of the situation in Transdniestria, in which the Russian Federation is acting as a guarantor State, have been ongoing since 2001 without any mention of the applicants and without any measure being taken or considered by the Moldovan authorities to secure to the applicants their Convention rights. 351. Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court considers that, even after Mr Mr. Ilaşcu’s release in May 2001, it was within the power of the Moldovan Government to take measures to secure to the applicants their rights under the Convention. 352. The Court accordingly concludes that Moldova’s responsibility could be engaged under the Convention on account of its failure to discharge its positive obligations with regard to the acts complained of which occurred after May 2001 (Ilaşcu and others v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 48787/99, ECHR 2004, paras. 348–352).
- 96.
In this case:
… the Court considers that the Moldovan Government have made considerable efforts to support the applicants. In particular, following the requisitioning of the schools’ former building by the ‘MRT’, the Moldovan Government have paid for the rent and refurbishment of new premises and have also paid for all equipment, staff salaries and transport costs, thereby enabling the schools to continue operating and the children to continue learning in Moldovan, albeit in far from ideal conditions (…). 148. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Republic of Moldova has fulfilled its positive obligations in respect of these applicants. It does not, therefore, find that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 by the Republic of Moldova (Catan and others v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 43370/04, 8252/05 y 18454/06, ECHR 2012, paras. 147–148).
- 97.
See Dissenting Opinion by judges Bratza, Rozakis, Hedigan, Thomassen and Panţîru.
- 98.
Perea Unceta (2020), p. 55.
- 99.
On the same matter, see Fernández de Casadevante Romaní (1996), pp. 222–223, 249–250.
- 100.
Verdross (1937), p. 189.
- 101.
- 102.
Citing the case Loizidou v. Turkey, see judgement of the Appeals Chamber of 15 July 1999 in Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, para. 128.
- 103.
Cyprus v. Turkey (GC), 25781/94, ECHR 2001, para. 77–78.
- 104.
Mozer v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 11128/10, ECHR 2016, para. 106.
- 105.
Chiragov and others v. Armenia (GC), 13216/05, ECHR 2015, para. 181–186.
- 106.
Specifically:
The first issue raised by this argument is whether it is possible in principle to attribute to a State conduct of persons —or groups of persons— who, while they do not have the legal status of State organs, in fact act under such strict control by the State that they must be treated as its organs for purposes of the necessary attribution leading to the State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act (…).according to the Court’s jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in ‘complete dependence’ on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument. In such a case, it is appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship between the person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached as to appear to be nothing more than its agent: any other solution would allow States to escape their international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose supposed independence would be purely fictitious. 393. However, so to equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have that status under internal law must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control over them, a relationship which the Court’s Judgment quoted above expressly described as ‘complete dependence’ (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, paras. 391–393).
- 107.
Mozer v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 11128/10, ECHR 2016, para. 102. Practically identical, Catan and others v. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 43370/04, 8252/05 y 18454/06, ECHR 2012, para. 115.
- 108.
Mozer c. Moldavia and Russia (GC), 11128/10, ECHR 2016, paras. 156–158.
- 109.
Kress (2001), p. 131.
- 110.
Álvarez Ortega (2015).
- 111.
Talmon (2009), pp. 20–22.
- 112.
Rooney (2015), pp. 422–427.
- 113.
As regards a study and evaluation of the dissenting opinions: Perea Unceta (2020), pp. 48–50.
- 114.
See section III.1 of this work.
- 115.
Vidmar (2013), p. 53.
- 116.
With abundant doctrinal references, as well as references to the practice specific to the main scope of this contribution: Ruiz Ruiz (2001), pp. 65–69 (especially footnote 85) and 72–75.
- 117.
To date the following are State parties: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Liberia, Montenegro, Morocco, Macedonia, Moldavia, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Ukraine.
- 118.
López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018b), pp. 74–75.
- 119.
- 120.
In Spanish, Ley 20/2017, de 8 de septiembre, de transitoriedad jurídica y fundacional de la República. Translation of articles 15 and 22 into English of the above law has been provided by the translator.
Similarly, the declaration of independence of 10 October of the same year included the affirmation that Catalonia “…has the unequivocal will to integrate as quickly as possible into the international community. The new State undertakes to respect the international obligations that currently apply to its territory and to continue to participate in international treaties in which the Kingdom of Spain is a party”. The English translation of the above text has been provided by the translator.
- 121.
Ruiz Ruiz (2001), p. 155.
- 122.
Details available, López Martín and Perea Unceta (2018a), pp. 261–265.
- 123.
“Human Rights Committee Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly”, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 vol. 1, 1994, para. 49.
- 124.
Flauss (1994).
- 125.
Kamminga (1996), p. 475.
- 126.
Bijelić v. Montenegro and Serbia, 11890/05, ECHR 2009, paras. 68–69.
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Acknowledgement
Study carried out as a part of the Research Project DER2016-76312: Legal consequences of the secession of territorial entities from a State, with particular reference to the human rights implications. Lessons for Spain, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, as part of the National Plan for Scientific and Technical Research and Innovation 2013–2016.
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Chinchón Álvarez, J. (2022). Secession, International Responsibility and Human Rights. In: Fernández de Casadevante Romani, C. (eds) Legal Implications of Territorial Secession in Spain . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04609-4_11
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