Abstract
This chapter looks more closely at how the Lausanne Syndrome manifests historically and under the AKP through discourses, narratives, perceptions, and beliefs. More specifically, it details the linkage of the AKP’s Lausanne Syndrome to the tradition of the disappointed conservative-Ottomanists of the 1920s during the twentieth century. The chapter presents speeches, writings, and interviews of officials belonging to the AKP and the broader political-Islamic movement associated with the AKP, as well as relevant public intellectuals or outlets. It focuses on the analysis of the unit-level variables of leader images and strategic culture(s) and ultimately navigates through the beliefs that these elites and their constituents hold or support regarding the Treaty of Lausanne (its geopolitics and history) and fleshes out the related geopolitical vision that they have. Lastly, the role of these intervening variables vis-à-vis the foreign policy outcome is expanded upon as the book moves on to the practical-policy aspect of the Lausanne Syndrome.
Our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart.
Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
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Notes
- 1.
See, Başer and Öztürk (2017), Öktem and Akkoyunlu (2018).
- 2.
Bakiner (2017).
- 3.
Cagaptay (2017), Bakıner, “How did we get here?”.
- 4.
Akkoyunlu (2017), p. 58.
- 5.
Ripsman (2009), 171.
- 6.
See the latest data at https://turkeypurge.com/.
- 7.
Taş (2018).
- 8.
Bechev (2016).
- 9.
eKathimerini (2016).
- 10.
Quoted in Hintz (2017), p. 117. See also, Akdoğan (2018), p. 71.
- 11.
Kinross, Atatürk, 362.
- 12.
Olson (1977): 233.
- 13.
Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan, 172.
- 14.
Danforth (2015): 101, Danforth (2021), 212. Kindle.
- 15.
Ongur (2015): 420.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
Hale (2013), 91–94.
- 18.
Olson, “Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1960,” 237–38.
- 19.
Zurcher, Turkey, 223, 17.
- 20.
Danforth, “The Menderes Metaphor,” 100.
- 21.
Sontag (2003).
- 22.
Turgut Özal served as Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and as President between 1989 and 1993.
- 23.
Öniş (2004).
- 24.
Ataman (2002).
- 25.
See, Karakas (2007), 120; Öniş, “Turgut Özal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective.”
- 26.
Quoted in, Yavuz (2020), 122.
- 27.
Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq,” 57.
- 28.
Ibid., 57–58; Abramowitz (2013); Çoşar and Demirci, “The Mosul Questıon And the Turkish Republic: Before and After the Frontıer Treaty, 1926,” 58–59; Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq.”
- 29.
Turgut Özal was also part of a Turkish political-Islamic tradition ‘that represented the revolt of Anatolia (the Asian portion of Turkey) against an elitist, Westward-looking establishment which tended to despise the values and traditions of Anatolia (which in fact derived its vitality from Islam).’ Yet he promoted a nuanced version of political Islam which tried to also encompass positive relations with Western states and institutions. See, Aral (2001): 72.
- 30.
Quoted in Yavuz (1998): 24.
- 31.
Quoted in Pipes (1994), 76.
- 32.
Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 124–25.
- 33.
Altan (2021).
- 34.
In order of establishment: National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), and the AKP. The SP is still in existence and considered the more traditionalist counterpart of the AKP. Both parties emerged from the dissolution of the FP.
- 35.
Çolak (2006): 595.
- 36.
Moudouros (2016): 323.
- 37.
Calabro (2017): 178.
- 38.
Hamid (2004): 114; see also, Robins (1997).
- 39.
Cornell (2018).
- 40.
Quoted in, Moudouros, “Between anti-Westernization and Islamism: Turkey’s ‘Islamic’ Vision in Cyprus,” 327.
- 41.
Ibid., 325.
- 42.
Teazis, The Second Political Changeover in Turkey, 48.
- 43.
The AKP’s historical and ideological relationship with Milli Görüs is well documented. See, Daği (2006), 90–94, Hale and Özbudun (2011), 103–05.
- 44.
Reynolds (2015).
- 45.
Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 326.
- 46.
İçduygu and Kaygusuz, “The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders,” 32.
- 47.
“Speech at the Commemoration of Atatürk”.
- 48.
Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth, 100.
- 49.
Ibid., 156–60.
- 50.
Ibid., 123.
- 51.
Ibid., 124–25.
- 52.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016e).
- 53.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016b).
- 54.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016g).
- 55.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016d).
- 56.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016c).
- 57.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016a).
- 58.
Hürriyet Daily News (2017).
- 59.
Kathimerini (2017).
- 60.
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2017c).
- 61.
Hürriyet Daily News (2018b).
- 62.
Metin Külünk, Twitter Account (@mkulnuk), 11 March 2021, https://twitter.com/mkulunk/status/1370074998803664896.
- 63.
See, Tziarras (2015), Coşkun (2020).
- 64.
Ekinci (2016).
- 65.
Karagül (2019).
- 66.
Kara (2016).
- 67.
Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 86.
- 68.
Ibid., 87.
- 69.
Meydan (2018).
- 70.
Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 87.
- 71.
Ibid., 88–89; Meydan, “Küfür sıçanından tezeğe”; Cornell, “Erbakan, Kisakürek, and the Mainstreaming of Extremism in Turkey”.
- 72.
Anadolu Agency (2014a).
- 73.
Maclean (2014), 48–49.
- 74.
Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 86–87; Maclean, Abdullah Gül & the Making of New Turkey, 49.
- 75.
Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 87–88.
- 76.
Duran (2001), 270–74.
- 77.
Heper, “Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” 143.
- 78.
Mısıroğlu (2014).
- 79.
Kara (2018).
- 80.
Habertürk (2019).
- 81.
Including individuals that belong or used to belong to Turkey’s foreign policy executive.
- 82.
FM Davutoğlu: Why are we referred to as neo-Ottomans? (2013).
- 83.
Ibid.
- 84.
Danforth, “The Menderes Metaphor,” 100.
- 85.
For the milestones of the gradual come-back of this marginalized societal strand see also, Yavuz (2021), 77–79.
- 86.
Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 67.
- 87.
Ibid.
- 88.
See, Kutluk (2018).
- 89.
Reynolds (2018); Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,” 119–40.
- 90.
ICG (2017), Barkey (2005).
- 91.
Habibi and Walker (2011).
- 92.
Erşen (2013).
- 93.
Colakoğlu (2019).
- 94.
Gurcan and Gisclon (2016): 13–15.
- 95.
Colakoğlu, “The Rise of Eurasianism in Turkish Foreign Policy”.
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Tziarras, Z. (2022). Discursive Manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome Since the Second Group, and the AKP’s Geopolitical Vision. In: Turkish Foreign Policy. SpringerBriefs in International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_4
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