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How Knowledge Triggers Obligation

A Dynamic Logic of Epistemic Conditional Obligation

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2021)

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Abstract

Obligations can be affected by knowledge. Several approaches exist to formalize knowledge-based obligations, but no formalism has been developed yet to capture the dynamic interaction between knowledge and obligations. We introduce the dynamic extension of an existing logic for knowledge-based obligations here. We motivate the logic by analyzing several scenarios and by showing how it can capture in an original manner several fundamental deontic notions such as absolute, prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. Finally, in the dynamic epistemic logic tradition, we provide reduction axioms for the dynamic operator of the new logic.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    If \(\chi \in \varPhi \) and there is no \(\chi ^\prime \in \varPhi \) such that \(\chi ^\prime \succ \chi \), let \(\varPhi _\chi =\varnothing \) and \(\bigvee \varPhi _\chi =\bot \). If \(\chi =\top \), \(\varPhi _\chi =\varPhi \).

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Correspondence to Xingchi Su .

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Grossi, D., Kooi, B., Su, X., Verbrugge, R. (2021). How Knowledge Triggers Obligation. In: Ghosh, S., Icard, T. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13039. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88708-7_17

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