Abstract
The Government of India in early April 2020, launched Aarogya Setu, a contact-tracing app aimed at tracking and controlling the spread of Covid-19. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi in his address to the nation made a request to all the citizens to download the app. It became the world's fastest-growing app, beating Pokemon Go and the most downloaded healthcare mobile app, with more than 100 million installs in just 40 days. While the government initially claimed that the use of Aarogya Setu would be purely voluntary, downloading the app was soon made mandatory for police personnel and employees of the government, in spite of not being backed by law. Further, the order stated that employers would be liable if employees are non-compliant and that could then attract criminal penalty. The Union Home Ministry then issued directives making it mandatory for those in containment zone and those arriving on domestic and international flights. Individuals and digital liberties groups opposed this; petitions were filed in the courts against mandating it. This paper analyses the Aarogya Setu Apps’ ecosystem—design, deployment, privacy policies and frameworks for data protection and concludes that a techno-solutionist approach is misplaced and yield very limited benefits on the ground in controlling the pandemic.
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Notes
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For further discussion and critique of AI and natural language processing, see Ullmann’s chapter.
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See Wang and Tian’s chapter for a discussion of the broadening scope of AI in justice decisions in China.
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Raghavendra, R.C. (2022). Controversial Covid-19 Contact-Tracing App in India: Digital Self-Defence, Governance and Surveillance. In: Hanemaayer, A. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Its Discontents. Social and Cultural Studies of Robots and AI. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88615-8_9
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