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The Second Nuclear Age (1992–Present)

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Nuclear Security

Abstract

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 marked the start of the Second Nuclear Age. Gorbachev’s “Glasnost” policy of openness led to a rise in Russian nationalism and ascension of Yeltsin to the Presidency of Russia. The START II treaty was signed in 1993 and reduced the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia by two-thirds below the pre-START levels. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was established to address the threat of proliferation from the former Soviet states. Regional proliferation concerns, including Iraq, North Korea, Libya, India versus Pakistan, and Iran, garnered increased attention, and policies shifted toward counterproliferation. South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina became examples of countries that started but then aborted their nuclear programs. As the United States adhered to the Comprehensives Test Ban Treaty (without ever ratifying it), there emerged the need for a science-based stockpile stewardship program and continued improvement of treaty monitoring capabilities. Technical portions of the chapter present the requirements and challenges of stockpile stewardship, including through primary hydrodynamics, high-energy-density physics, and plutonium metallurgy. The role of Life Extension Programs, alterations, and modifications of weapons in the stockpile is reviewed, as is the application of quantification of uncertainty. Examples of integrated hydrodynamic testing and focused high-energy-density experiments are provided with an overview of shock physics, equations of state, and experimental methods. Other topics discussed include the role of actinide chemistry, nuclear science, and advanced computer simulations in stockpile stewardship.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A definitive and encyclopedic account of these complex events may be found in Jack Matlock’s Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995).

  2. 2.

    All members of the GKChP were charged with treason. However, in February 1994, the State Duma declared amnesty for all its members and accomplices.

  3. 3.

    Jim Trebes and Tony Lavietes. “Monitoring a Nuclear Weapon from the Inside,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, (July/August 2008).

  4. 4.

    Richard Lugar, ‘Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 10, (2009), pp. 183–189.

  5. 5.

    Kazakhstan was a special case. Project Sapphire was a successful covert operation conducted in 1994 by the US government in cooperation with the Kazakhstan government. The aim of the operation was to remove nuclear material as part of the CTR program. Kazakhstan had enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) left over from a Soviet submarine project to fuel 24 nuclear weapons. A group of 29 men and 2 women embarked on the covert mission from October 14 to November 11, 1994, packing up over 1000 containers and then repacking them into almost 450 shipping containers that were later flown back to Delaware on a C-5 cargo plane.

  6. 6.

    Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with the Republic of Belarus’/Republic of Kazakhstan’s/Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, December 5, 1994, Budapest, Hungary.

  7. 7.

    Scott Ritter, “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, (The Arms Control Association, June 2000).

  8. 8.

    Martin Indyk. “The Iraq War did not force Gadaffi’s Hand,” (Brookings Institution, March 9, 2004).

  9. 9.

    Norman Cigar, “Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament: Lessons and Implications for Nuclear Proliferation,” (Marine Corps University, 2012). See also Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, “Who Won Libya?” International Security, (Winter 2005/06), pp. 47–86.

  10. 10.

    Robert Joseph, Countering WMD: The Libyan Experience, (National Institute Press, 2009).

  11. 11.

    Joshua Pollack, “The Secret Treachery of A. Q. Khan,” Playboy, (January/February 2012).

  12. 12.

    SIPRI 2018 Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

  13. 13.

    An experience on the part of one of the authors is instructive in this regard. In 1988, he was invited to speak at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, the most prestigious defense-related think-tank in New Delhi. The Institute was founded by K. Subrahmanyam, a leading Indian nuclear strategist. After my presentation, Dr. Subrahmanyam approached him (as a representative of the “West”) to say, “You prevented us from reaching the industrial revolution, but you will not prevent us from reaching the nuclear revolution.” This experience highlighted how the power of Indian nationalism far exceeded concerns about the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation.

  14. 14.

    In July 2009, one of the authors had a personal experience with the PSI. A North Korean ship carrying nuclear weapons and/or missile components was detected by US intelligence in route to Burma (i.e., Myanmar), plausibly on the way to the Middle East. An inter-agency team was quickly formed to address the issue, with the aim being to avoid conflict should the ship be interdicted. The United States made contact with the ship and proposed boarding it to ascertain its cargo. The North Korean captain refused to comply and communicated back to Pyongyang for instructions. In the meantime, a senior US diplomat contacted senior officials within the Indian government and urged India to urge Myanmar to deny entry of the ship into the Port of Yangon. India acquiesced and conveyed the desired message to Myanmar. In turn, Myanmar transmitted the message to the North Korean ship. The ship sought guidance from Pyongyang, was refueled at sea, and then returned home. The threatened interdiction of the ship precluded the proliferation of WMD materials to the Middle East.

  15. 15.

    The use of offensive cyber weapons by both the United States and Israel to delay the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons program has not been officially acknowledged by the governments of the United States, Israel, or Iran. The best source on the matter, which is known as “Operation Olympic Games,” is David Sanger’s Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Random House, 2012). Cartwright was subsequently charged and pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about disclosing classified information concerning the operation to Sanger. Cartwright was found guilty, although he was pardoned by President Obama just before his term ended on January 17, 2017.

  16. 16.

    See David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” The New York Times, June 1, 2012.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Marc Ambinder, “Did America’s Cyber Attack on Iran Make Us More Vulnerable?” The Atlantic, June 5, 2012.

  19. 19.

    Cited by Thomas Schelling, in “The Nuclear Taboo,” Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2005.

  20. 20.

    See “South Africa’s Recent Developments and Current Status,” Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI), September 2015.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI), “Brazil,” July 2015.

  23. 23.

    A useful reference on these matters is Jose Goldemberg’s “The Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, May 2018. Goldemberg is a Brazilian physicist and a leading expert on nuclear energy.

  24. 24.

    See “Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows Continued Moratorium,” Arms Control Today, October 1999.

  25. 25.

    Jim Trebes and Tony Lavietes, July/August 2008.

  26. 26.

    “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered,” The White House, April 5, 2009.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Charlie Verdon. “Stockpile Stewardship at 20 Years,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, July/August 2015, pp. 6–14.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Raymond J. Jusaitis, Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship: An overview, (Los Alamos Science, November 28, 2003).

  31. 31.

    Victor Reis, Robert Hanrahan, and Kirk Levedahl, “The Big Science of Stockpile Stewardship,” AIP Conference Proceedings, 030003 (2017).

  32. 32.

    Sidney Drell, Chairman, JASONS, Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship, JSR 94 345, (MITRE Corporation, Nov 1994).

  33. 33.

    Madelyn Creedon, Princ. Dep. Admin., NNSA, US Nuclear Stewardship—NNSA Challenges Ahead: Meeting Nuclear Deterrent Requirements, Madelyn Creedon Principal Deputy Administrator (National Nuclear Security Administration, April 2015).

  34. 34.

    Warhead Activities, NNSA, April 2019, 2019-05-02-FACTSHEET.

  35. 35.

    Maintaining the Stockpile, NNSA, August 2020, 2020-08-03-FACTSHEET-Stockpile.pdf.

  36. 36.

    2020 Nuclear Matters Handbook, (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters), Chapter 1.

  37. 37.

    Hank O’Brien, “Extending the Life of an Aging Weapon,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, March 2012, pp. 6–13.

  38. 38.

    Ibid.

  39. 39.

    Warhead Activities, NNSA, April 2019, 2019-05-02-FACTSHEET.

  40. 40.

    Verdon, pp. 6–14.

  41. 41.

    Warhead Activities, NNSA, April 2019.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Brent Blue, “Energetic Laser Helps Test Weapon Survivability,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, May 2019.

  44. 44.

    Charles Verdon, “A Better Method for Certifying the Nuclear Stockpile,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, March 2004, pp. 19–21.

  45. 45.

    Evaluation of Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties: Methodology for Assessing and Certifying the Reliability of the Nuclear Stockpile, National Research Council, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2009. p. 7.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    Verdon, March 2004, pp. 19–21.

  50. 50.

    Evaluation of Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties.

  51. 51.

    Carol T. Alonso, “Keeping the Nuclear Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, August 1996.

  52. 52.

    Science Based Stockpile Stewardship, JSR 94 345 November 1994, Sidney Drell, Chairman, JASON, the MITRE Corporation.

  53. 53.

    Alonso.

  54. 54.

    Milt Grisson, “Site 300 Keeps High-Explosive Science on Target,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, March 1999.

  55. 55.

    Drell.

  56. 56.

    Proton Radiography at LANL, https://science.osti.gov/np/Benefits-of-NP/Applications-of-Nuclear-Science/Archives/Proton-Radiography-at-LANL

  57. 57.

    Jeff Colvin and John Larson, Extreme Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2014., p. 2.

  58. 58.

    Jeff Colvin and Jon Larson, p. 2. “The binding energy of a typical di-atomic molecular bond is comparable to the binding energy of the valence electrons to the atoms… A typical covalent carbon‑carbon molecular bond, for example, has a binding energy of ~4 eV… in graphite, adjacent planes of carbon atoms on the material are bound together by a potential energy of only ~0.05 eV per carbon atoms. This energy E corresponds to a temperature T = E/k = 600 K, which is about twice room temperature.”

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Jeff Colvin and Jon Larson, p. 168.

  62. 62.

    Ya. B. Zel’dovich and Yu. P. Raizer, Ed. Wallace D. Hayes and Ronald F. Probstein, Physics of Shock Waves and High-Temperature Hydrodynamic Phenomena, Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, 2002, pp. 7–8.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Ibid, pp. 686–687.

  65. 65.

    Ibid.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Jeff Colvin and Jon Larson, p. 159.

  68. 68.

    Ibid, p. 91.

  69. 69.

    Verdon, March 2004.

  70. 70.

    Ya. B. Zel’dovich and Yu. P. Raizer.

  71. 71.

    Mark Martinez, “Shocking Plutonium to Reveal Its Secrets,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, June 2004.

  72. 72.

    Ed Hartouni, “Protons Reveal the Inside Story,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, November 2000, pp. 12–18.

  73. 73.

    Ibid.

  74. 74.

    Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan—Biennial Plan Summary, Report to Congress, (October 2018), p. 3–12.

  75. 75.

    Drell.

  76. 76.

    Frank Grazziani, Brad Beck, Mark Chadwick, Tom Mehlhorn, Paul Miller, and Maurice Sheppard, “The National Boost Initiative: What is it and what is it doing?” Defense Science Quarterly, December 2008.

  77. 77.

    O’Brien, pp. 6–13.

  78. 78.

    Graziani et al.

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    Lou Terminello, “Uncovering the Secrets of Actinides,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, June 2000, pp. 15–17

  81. 81.

    Richard Becker, “How Metals Fail”, LLNL Science & Technology Review, (July/August 2002).

  82. 82.

    Terminello, June 2000, pp. 15-17.

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    Pat Allen and Bob Maxwell, “Enhancing Confidence in the Nation’s Nuclear Stockpile,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, July/August 2010.

  85. 85.

    Terminello, (June 2000), pp. 15-17.

  86. 86.

    Verdon, (July/August 2015), pp. 6–14.

  87. 87.

    Pat Allen and Bob Maxwell.

  88. 88.

    D. P. McNabb. Nuclear Science for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, LLNL-ABS-664141, Nov 11, 2014.

  89. 89.

    Nuclear Data Needs and Capabilities for Applications USNDP Collaboration, Brookhaven National Laboratory, May 27–29, 2015, BNL- 108491-2015-IR., p. 17.

  90. 90.

    D. P. McNabb.

  91. 91.

    Marvin L. Adams and Sidney D. Drell, Technical Issues in Keeping the Nuclear Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Policy: Technical Issues Workshop, Washington, D.C. (2008), pp. 6-7.

  92. 92.

    Jim Trebes and Tony Lavietes.

  93. 93.

    James Tyler, “Annual Certification Takes a Snapshot of the Stockpile’s Health”, LLNL Science & Technology Review, (July/August) 2001.

  94. 94.

    Jim Trebes and Tony Lavietes.

  95. 95.

    Verdon, July/August 2015.

  96. 96.

    Pat Allen and Bob Maxwell.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    Ibid.

  99. 99.

    Ann Parker, “Taking the Pulse of the Stockpile,” LLNL Science & Technology Review, July/August 2015, pp. 22–25.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

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Nacht, M., Frank, M., Prussin, S. (2021). The Second Nuclear Age (1992–Present). In: Nuclear Security. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75085-5_5

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