Abstract
Jamaica had to secure another borrowing agreement with the International Monetary Fund. There was no question about that. The question was, would the IMF acquiesce given the circumstances surrounding the end of the historic 2010 agreement? And, if it did, what terror would a reconciliation wreak on the Jamaican people some of whom inadvertently contributed to the derailing of the 2010 SBA? What terms and conditions would the IMF require the Government of Jamaica to implement, over what timeline and with what other form of support in place to help to cushion the fallout from the crisis? When the new political administration arrived in Washington, D.C. to hold initial talks with IMF Staff it soon realized that its problems were even bigger than that—the manner in which the programme was derailed had eroded the credibility of the authorities and their ability to convince Staff that the programme would be implemented in full. Eventually, Jamaica would not only get the ears of the IMF but also its eyes and seal of approval through the inking of an Extended Fund Facility that had double the prior actions, less dollar-value support, and, a longer implementation period than the 2010 SBA. This chapter provides answers to the questions: how was this programme constituted and in what position did it leave the Jamaican society when completed?
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Clarke, C., Nelson, C. (2021). The Second Return: The Road to the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 2013. In: Jamaica’s Evolving Relationship with the IMF. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59204-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59204-2_2
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