



Modeling of a Speed Control System Using Event-B

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Abstract. The present paper presents our proposal of an EVENT-B model of a speed control system, a part of the case study provided in the ABZ2020 conference. The case study describes how the system regulates the current speed of a car according to a set criteria like the speed desired by the driver, the position of a possible preceding vehicle but also a given speed limit that the driver must not exceed. For that purpose, this controller reads different information from the available sensors (key state, desired speed, etc.) and takes the adequate actions by acting on the actuators of the car's speed according to the read information. To formally model this system, we adopt a stepwise refinement approach with the EVENT-B method. We consider most features of the case study, all proof obligations have been discharged using the Rodin provers. Our model has been validated using ProB by applying the different provided scenarios. This validation has permitted us to point out and correct some mistakes, ambiguities and oversights contained in the first versions of the case study.

Keywords: Speed control system · EVENT-B method · Refinement · Verification

1 Introduction

The case study, proposed in the context of the ABZ2020 conference, is composed of two parts: *Adaptive Exterior Light and Speed Control Systems*. Since the whole case study is quite lengthy/complex and the two parts are only loosely coupled as stated in the description document, we chose to handle each part in a separate paper. The present paper deals with the speed control system whereas a companion paper considers the adaptive exterior light system [7].

The goal of the speed control system is to regulate the current speed of a car according to a set of criteria like the speed desired by the driver, the position of

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a possible preceding vehicle but also a given speed limit that the driver must not exceed. The system can behave according to two options: the first one regulates the speed independently on the any preceding vehicle, the second component takes into account the position of a possible preceding vehicle by maintaining a safety distance. The driver has the possibility to choose which option to activate at a given moment. Like a controller, in both options, the system reads different informations from the available sensors (key state, desired speed, the preceding vehicle position, etc.) and takes the adequate actions by acting on the actuators of the car's speed according to the read information.

The present paper describes the formal modeling of the speed control system using the EVENT-B method and its refinement technique that permits to master the complexity of a system by gradually introducing its different elements/characteristics. Proposed by Abrial as a successor of the B method [1], the EVENT-B method [2] permits to model discrete systems using mathematical notations. An EVENT-B specification is made of two elements: *context* and *machine*. A context describes the static part of an EVENT-B specification; it consists of constants and sets (user-defined types) together with axioms that specify their properties. The dynamic part is included in a machine that defines variables and a set of events. The possible values that the variables can hold are specified by an invariant using a first-order formula on the state variables. The different machines composing an EVENT-B specification are related with a refinement relation whereas the contexts are linked with an extension link (extends). Each refinement adds new information to a model; these could be new state variables, new events or new properties. EVENT-B refinement allows for guard strengthening, nondeterminism reduction, and new events introduction. New events of a model M' that refines a model M are considered to refine a *skip* event of M , hence they cannot modify a variable of M . Therefore, all events that need to modify a variable v must be defined in the same model where v is first introduced. The correctness of an EVENT-B model is ensured by proof obligations that verify that the invariant is preserved by each event and that the refinement preserves the properties of the system.

The development of our EVENT-B models has been done under the Rodin platform [3] that provides editors, provers and several other plugins for various tasks like animation and model checking with PROB [5]. We use PROB in order to animate the built models with two purposes: exhibiting the problematic scenarios that violate the invariant prior to the hard/long proof phase, but also validating the specification by playing the provided scenarios in order to be sure that we have specified the right system.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our modelling strategy. Section 3 describes our model in more details. Section 4 describes the validation and verification of our model. Section 5 identifies the weaknesses of the requirements document provided for the case study, and the adequacy of the EVENT-B method for constructing a model of this case study. We conclude in Sect. 6.

2 Modelling Strategy

The speed control system subject of this paper can be seen as a control system that interacts with its environment through a set of sensors, which provide it with information about the state of the physical elements, and a set of actuators that are used to transmit the adequate orders to these elements. In this paper, we use the concepts described in [10]. A sensor measures the value of some environment elements m , called a *monitored* variable (*e.g.*, the state of the ignition key), and provides this measure (*e.g.*, whether the key is inserted or not) to the software controller as an *input* variable i . The software controller can influence the environment by sending commands, called *output* variable o to actuators. An actuator influences the value of some characteristics of the environment, call a *controlled* variable c . Variables m and c are called *environment variables*. Variables i and o are called *controller variables*. Finally, a controller has its own internal state variables to perform computations. In this case study, we use EVENT-B state variables to represent both environment and controller variables. We do not model sensor or actuator failures.

A well-known architecture of a control system is a control loop that reads all input variables at once, at a given moment, and then computes all output variables in the same iteration. But, it can be also viewed as a continuous system that can be interrupted by any change in the environment represented by a new value sent by a sensor. In this paper, we see the controller as a distributed system; each sub-system is associated to a given sensor. In that case, the system reacts to each single modification of the sensor. This approach can be seen as a more abstract approach, as it is common in the EVENT-B style of system modeling. We define one event for each input variable change, which allows for a more modular specification that is easier to prove. This is closer to an interrupt-driven control system. Our EVENT-B abstraction is also a reasonable abstraction for a control loop, considering that in most cases, a single input variable changes between two control loop iterations. The control loop can be derived from our specification by merging all events and defining priorities between events.

3 Model Details

This section briefly describes the main modeling elements that characterize our specification. The complete archive of the EVENT-B project is available in [6]. Let us note that the development of our model (EVENT-B components, proofs, animation, etc.) took about two months including the different exchanges with the authors of the case study. Our model contains 4 contexts and 4 machines/refinements. Table 1 relates the components of our model with the requirements listed in [4]. As one can remark, some requirements are modelled as invariants whereas others are dealt with in the adequate events. We chose to do not model some requirements as invariants because this would make the modeling and the proof activities more complex and difficult. Requirement SCS-41 for example: “...*the self-test of the radar system is restarted every 10 min*” is

modeled by a variable *nextTest* that is set to the current time plus 10 min in the events that represent the movement of the key and the progression of the time because the self-test of the radar system should be performed at the start (the key is in the ignition position) and then every 10 min. Modeling this requirement as an invariant would require the introduction of two extra variables to store the moments of two consecutive self-test activities, then we have to state that 10 min should be elapsed between these two moments.

Machine *M0* models the current speed of the studied car independently from any preceding vehicle and also without giving any condition on its evolution. This machine defines the following unique invariant:

$$currentSpeed \in rangeSpeed$$

where *rangeSpeed* denotes a constant defined in the context *C0* to set the range values for the speed ($rangeSpeed = 0..5000$). Machine *M0* defines a unique event *updateVehicleSpeed* to set the current speed of the car as follows:

```

Event updateVehicleSpeed  $\hat{=}$ 
  any
    val
  where
    grd1:  $val \in rangeSpeed$ 
  then
    act1:  $currentSpeed := val$ 
  end

```

Machine *M1* introduces the physical elements that are manipulated by the driver and that have an impact on the current speed of the car. These elements include gas/brake pedal, key, cruise control lever, etc. Machine *M1* describes how the position of each of these elements evolves depending on its current position. In this same machine, we also introduce the event **progress** that makes the current time keep progressing. Machine *M2* models the desired speed together with the activation of the normal/adaptive cruise control and also the traffic sign detection that has an impact on the value of the desired speed according to the requirements (SCS-36,SCS-39). It is worth noting that some events, like that related to the traffic sign detection, are introduced in *M1* even if this aspect is really dealt with in Machine *M2*. Indeed, these events need to modify some variables that are introduced in *M1* and, as noted before, a new event cannot modify a variable defined in a previous refinement level. Machine *M3* specifies the different aspects that depend on or impact the desired/current speed like speed-dependent safety distance that also depends on the speed of the preceding vehicle but also the faults that can happen on the radar system. The main elements of these EVENT-B components are described hereafter.

3.1 Machine M1: Physical Elements

This machine refines Machine *M0* by introducing the different elements that impact the current speed of the car. This includes the physical elements that

Table 1. Cross-reference between the components of our model and the requirements of [4]

Requirements [4]	Component	Invariant/event
SCS-1, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv4</i>
SCS-2, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv5</i>
SCS-3, SCS-12, SCS-13, SCS-16, SCS-17, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv6</i> and <i>inv7</i>
SCS-4, SCS-19, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv8</i>
SCS-5, SCS-19, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv9</i>
SCS-6, SCS-19, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv10</i> and <i>inv11</i>
SCS-7, SCS-19, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv12</i>
SCS-8, SCS-19, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv13</i>
SCS-9, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv14</i>
SCS-10, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv15</i>
SCS-11, SCS-31	M2	<i>inv16</i>
SCS-14		Not covered since no information is given on how the system reaches/ maintain the desired speed
SCS-15	M3	<i>inv13</i>
SCS-18	M3	<i>inv24</i> , <i>inv25</i> , <i>inv26</i>
SCS-20	M3	<i>inv12</i>
SCS-21		Not covered
SCS-22	M3	<i>inv11</i>
SCS-23	M3	<i>inv14</i> , <i>inv15</i> and <i>inv16</i>
SCS-24	M3	<i>inv17</i>
SCS-25	M3	<i>inv19</i>
SCS-26	M3	<i>inv20</i>
SCS-27-SCS-28		Not covered
SCS-29	M3	Event <code>moveSpeedLimiterSwitch</code>
SCS-30		Not covered since it is related to the interface appearance
SCS-32, SCS-33, SCS-34	M2	<i>inv21</i>
SCS-35	M2	<i>inv26</i> and <code>moveSpeedLimiterSwitch</code>
SCS-36, SCS-37, SCS-38, SCS-39	M2	<i>inv24</i>
SCS-40 and SCS-41	M2	Event <code>moveKey</code> and <code>progress</code>
SCS-42	M3	<i>inv13</i>
SCS-43		Not covered since the light system is not included

the driver manipulates, the radar system that gives the distance to the nearest obstacle but also the time progression since it makes some variables evolve like the desired speed. For that purpose, several variables/invariants are introduced to model how the position of the physical elements evolves depending on its

current position. In this paper, we give details about the radar the system, the time progression and also the cruise control lever.

The state of the radar system is modelled by a Boolean variable *rangeRadarState*. This variable is initialized to FALSE since the ignition is Off at the beginning then its state is updated each 10 min. Therefore, we define a variable *nextTest* to store the moment of the next radar system self-test. These variables are defined by the following invariants:

$$\begin{aligned} &keyState = KeyInIgnitionOnPosition \wedge \\ &keyStateP \neq KeyInIgnitionOnPosition \\ \implies \\ &nextTest = currentTime + 6000 \end{aligned}$$

where *KeyState* is a variable representing the position of the key ($\{NoKeyInserted, KeyInserted, KeyInIgnitionOnPosition\}$). This invariant expresses that the state of the radar system is checked 10 min after the state ($keyState = KeyInIgnitionOnPosition$). Let us remark the value of 6000 is equal to (10×600) since we choose a progression time step of a tenth of a second because some data in the case study are with 0.1 precision as depicted by the following **progress** event that models the time progression:

```
Event progress  $\hat{=}$ 
refines updateVehiculeSpeed
  any
    val
      radstate
  where
    grd1:  $keyState \neq KeyInIgnitionOnPosition \vee$ 
            $nextTest \neq currentTime + 1 \implies radstate = rangeRadarState$ 
    grd2:  $keyState = KeyInIgnitionOnPosition \wedge$ 
            $nextTest = currentTime + 1 \implies radstate \in BOOL$ 
    ...
  then
    act1:  $currentTime := currentTime + 1$ 
    act2:  $rangeRadarState := adstate$ 
    act3:  $nextTest := \{TRUE \mapsto 6000, FALSE \mapsto nextTest\}$ 
            $(\mathbf{bool}(keyState = KeyInIgnitionOnPosition \wedge$ 
               $nextTest = currentTime + 1))$ 
  end
  ...
```

Guard *grd1* specifies that when the time progresses to the next self-test moment ($nextTest = currentTime + 1$) and the stating of the system ($keyState = KeyInIgnitionOnPosition$), the state of the radar system is chosen randomly ($rdstate \in BOOL$) otherwise its state remains the same ($radstate = rangeRadarState$ in *grd2*).

Similarly, cruise control lever is modeled by the variable *SCSLeverUD* and its typing invariant: $SCSLeverUD \in SCSLeverPositions$ where *SCSLeverPositions* is a given set defined in Context *C1* seen by M_1 :

$partition(SCSLeverPositions, Upward, Downward,$
 $\quad \{Backward\}, \{Forward\}, \{Neutral\})$
 $partition(Upward, \{Upward5\}, \{Upward7\})$
 $partition(Downward, \{Downward5\}, \{Downward7\})$

For each of these elements, invariants are defined in Machine $M1$ to specify the authorized position changes together with the event that models them. The following invariant states that the cruise control level cannot directly move from an *Upward* position to a *Downward* position bypassing the *Neutral* position. As we can remark, the above invariant uses an extra variable *SCSLeverUDP* to model the previous position of the cruise control level. In the next section, we show that this kind of variables is also relevant for modeling some requirements that need to make reference to the current and previous states of the system.

$$\begin{aligned}
 &SCSLeverUDP \neq Neutral \implies \\
 &\quad SCSLeverUD = SCSLeverUDP \\
 &\quad \vee \\
 &\quad (SCSLeverUDP \in Upward \wedge SCSLeverUD \in Upward) \\
 &\quad \vee \\
 &\quad (SCSLeverUDP \in Downward \wedge SCSLeverUD \in Downward) \\
 &\quad \vee \\
 &\quad SCSLeverUD = Neutral
 \end{aligned}$$

Machine $M1$ defines event `moveSCSLeverUD` that models the cruise control level movements where *grd2* permits to make the invariant preserved after the observation of this event:

```

Event moveSCSLeverUD  $\hat{=}$ 
  any
    valSCS
  where
    grd1:  $valSCS \in Upward \cup Downward \cup \{Neutral\}$ 
    grd2:  $SCSLeverUD \neq Neutral \implies$ 
       $(SCSLeverUD \in Upward \wedge valSCS \in Upward)$ 
       $\vee$ 
       $(SCSLeverUD \in Downward \wedge valSCS \in Downward)$ 
       $\vee$ 
       $(valSCS = Neutral)$ 
    then
      act1:  $SCSLeverUD := valSCS$ 
      act2:  $SCSLeverUDP := SCSLeverUD$ 
      ...
  end

```

3.2 Machine M2: Desired Speed

This machine describes how the desired speed evolves according to the requirements (SCS-1 to SCS-12) by moving the cruise control level into different positions. We also model the activation of the normal/adaptive cruise control as

described in the document. In addition, we specify the speed limit requirements (SCS-29 to SCS-34) because the calculation of the current speed must respect such a limit.

Mainly, this machine introduces some additional variables to model the desired speed (*desiredSpeed*) and the normal/adaptive cruise control (*normContr* and *adapContr*) with their associated variables to represent their previous values. For instance, the following invariant defines the activation of the normal cruise control:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & normContr = TRUE \\
 & \Leftrightarrow \\
 & ((SCSLeverFB = Forward \wedge SCSLeverFBP \neq Forward \wedge \\
 & \quad (currentSpeed \geq 2000 \vee desiredSpeed \neq 0)) \\
 & \quad \vee \\
 & \quad (normContrP = TRUE \wedge SCSLeverFB \neq Backward)) \wedge \\
 & \quad cruiseControlMode = 1 \wedge brakePedal = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

The invariant states that, if the normal mode is selected for the cruise control and the brake pedal is not activated, the normal cruise control is activated the first time when the cruise control level moves to the forward position while the current speed is greater than 200 km/h and or the desired speed is not null and remains activated as long as the cruise control level is not put in the Backward position.

To model the desired speed whose evolution depends on the time, we store the last time (*lastTimeSCSLeverUD*) when the cruise control level has been in the Up/down positions. Thus requirements SCS-4 and SCS-7 are modeled as follows. Requirement SCS-4 specifies that, while the cruise control is activated, the desired speed increases by 1 the first time the cruise control level is put in position *Upward5* whereas Requirement SCS-7 states that the desired speed continues to increase by 1 by each second as long as the cruise control level stays in that position for more than 2 s. Variable *lastdesiredSpeed* represents the desired speed when the lever has been moved into a given position.

$$\begin{aligned}
 & SCSLeverUDP \neq Upward5 \wedge SCSLeverUD = Upward5 \\
 & \quad \wedge \\
 & \quad (adapContrP = TRUE \vee normContrP = TRUE) \\
 & \quad \Rightarrow \\
 & \quad desiredSpeed = \min(\{200, desiredSpeedP + 1\})
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (normContr = TRUE \vee adapContr = TRUE) \wedge SCSLeverUD = Upward5 \\
 & \quad \wedge \\
 & \quad currentTime - lastTimeSCSLeverUD \geq 20 \\
 & \quad \Rightarrow \\
 & \quad desiredSpeed = \\
 & \quad \min(\{200, lastdesiredSpeed + (currentTime - lastTimeSCSLeverUD - 10) \div 10\})
 \end{aligned}$$

Let us give more explanation about the last invariant. Expression $(currentTime - lastTimeSCSLeverUD - 10)$ permits to update the desired speed immediately after 2 s, this is why we subtract 10 units of time and not 20. As stated before, as we chose a progression step of tenth of a second, we must divide by 10 each data related to the time. To make these invariants preserved, we have refined the `moveSCSLeverUD` event according to Requirement SCS-4 but also the `progress` event with respect to Requirement SCS-7. Event `progress` for instance is refined by adding the following guard that calculates the new desired speed:

$$\begin{aligned}
& (normContr = TRUE \vee adapContr = TRUE) \wedge SCSLeverUD \neq Neutral \\
\implies & \\
despeed = & \\
& \{TRUE \mapsto \\
& \quad \{TRUE \mapsto \\
& \quad \quad \{TRUE \mapsto \min(\{200, lastdesiredSpeed + \\
& \quad \quad \quad ((currentTime + 1 - lastTimeSCSLeverUD - 10) \div 10)\}), //(*case 2*) \\
& \quad \quad \quad FALSE \mapsto \min(\{200, lastdesiredSpeed + \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad ((currentTime + 1 - lastTimeSCSLeverUD) \div 2)\}) //(*case 3*) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \} (\mathbf{bool}(SCSLeverUD = Upward5)), \\
& \quad \quad \quad FALSE \mapsto \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \{TRUE \mapsto \max(\{10, lastdesiredSpeed - \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad (currentTime + 1 - lastTimeSCSLeverUD - 10) \div 10\}), //(*case 4*) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad FALSE \mapsto \max(\{10, lastdesiredSpeed - \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad ((currentTime + 1 - lastTimeSCSLeverUD) \div 2)\}) //(*case 5*) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \} (\mathbf{bool}(SCSLeverUD = Downward5)) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \} (\mathbf{bool}(SCSLeverUD \in Upward)), \\
& \quad \quad \quad FALSE \mapsto desiredSpeed //(*case 1*) \\
& \quad \quad \} (\mathbf{bool}(currentTime + 1 - lastTimeSCSLeverUD \geq 20))
\end{aligned}$$

The above guard distinguishes different cases according to the position of the control lever and the time elapsed since its last position change $(currentTime + 1 - lastTimeSCSLeverUD \geq 20)$. The term $(currentTime + 1)$ denotes the after-value of $currentTime$ when Event `progress` is observed. The following cases have been distinguished:

1. if the time elapsed from the last movement of the lever is less than 2 s then, the desired speed does not change (case 1), otherwise
2. if the lever is at the *Upward5* position, the desired speed increases by 1 every second ($10 \times$ tenth of a second): SCS-7, case 2. otherwise the lever is in the *Upward7* position and the desired speed increases to the next ten's place after each 2 s: SCS-8, case 3.
3. if the lever is at the *Downward5* position, the desired speed decreases by 1 every second ($10 \times$ tenth of a second): SCS-9, case 4. otherwise the lever is in the *Upward7* position and the desired speed increases to the next ten's place after each 2 s: SCS-10, case 5.

Let us note that the EVENT-B method and its underlying language is not well-adapted to model the evolution of the speed vehicle according to its acceleration/speed and the time passing. Indeed, since the language does not support

real numbers, we model the current speed as an integer amount that evolves according to the usual equation ($V = \gamma \times t + V_p$) where the γ represents the acceleration/deceleration of the vehicle, ($t = 1$) the time progression and V_p the previous speed. As our time progression is by a tenth of a second, the progression of the speed is very small, that is, less than one kilometer. This progression can not be taken into account using the B language. To overcome such a limit, we proceed as follows. We do not include the increasing/decreasing of the current speed in the event that makes the time progress but we introduce a new event `setSpeed` that sets the current speed to a given value. This also permits to play and produce the scenarios provided in the case study. Another alternative to overcome the lack of reals in the EVENT-B language is to define or reuse an existing theory plugin that models them [11]. However, this will make the development and the proofs more complex since the interactive prover of Rodin does not adequately support such a concept, that it a proof that uses a theory can not be saved.

3.3 Machine M3: Other Elements

In this level, we model the different aspects that depend on or impact the desired/current speed, like speed-dependent safety distance and the speed of the preceding vehicle. Moreover, we model the faults that can happen on the radar system. Machine *M3* introduces two new events `turnHead` and `VehicHeadDetect` to model respectively the selection of a safety level by turning the cruise control lever head and the detection of a preceding vehicle by catching its speed that is relevant for determining the speed-dependent safety distance and also to make the system decelerates if it is necessary. Event `VehicHeadDetect` for instance is specified as follows:

Event `VehicHeadDetect` $\hat{=}$

any

val stv brk secdis speh

where

grd1: $val \in rangeRadarSensorValues$

grd2: $rangeRadarState = FALSE \Leftrightarrow val = 255$

grd3: $speh \in rangeSpeed$

grd4: $speh \leq 200 \wedge speedOfHead > speh \wedge speh \neq 0 \wedge$
 $adapContr = TRUE \wedge val \notin \{0, 255\}$

\Rightarrow

$secdis = 25 \times currentSpeed \div 360$

grd5: $speh = 0 \wedge currentSpeed = 0 \wedge adapContr = TRUE \wedge$
 $val \notin \{0, 255\}$

\Rightarrow

$secdis = 2$

grd6: $speedOfHead < speh \wedge speh \neq 0 \wedge speh \leq 200 \wedge$
 $adapContr = TRUE \wedge val \notin \{0, 255\}$

\Rightarrow

$secdis = 30 \times currentSpeed \div 360$

```

grd7:  $speh > 200 \wedge adapContr = TRUE \implies secdis = safetyDistance \times$   

 $currentSpeed \div 360$   

grd8: ...  

then  

  act1:  $rangeRadarSensor := val$   

  act2:  $speedOfHead := speh$   

  act3:  $securedistanceToHead := secdis$   

  act4: ...  

end

```

Event parameter *val* represents the distance between the studied car and a possible preceding vehicle as provided by the radar. Guard *grd2* states that such a value should be equal to 255 if the radar system is not ready. Guards *grd4-grd7* permit to calculate the new value for the speed-dependent safety distance according to the requirements SCS-23 and SCS-24 with the event parameter *speh* denoting the speed of the preceding vehicle.

Already existing events of *M2* are refined in *M3* in similar way by calculating the value of the different variables. For instance, the desired speed should be updated when a traffic sign is detected, the speed-dependent safety distance is updated when the current speed is modified or the speed of a preceding vehicle changes. More details can be found in [6].

4 Validation and Verification

To ensure the correctness and validate the built EVENT-B models, we have proceeded into three steps detailed hereafter.

4.1 Model Checking of the Specification

We used the PROB tool as a model checker in order to ensure that all the invariants of each machine are preserved after the observation of each event, that is, there is no sequence of events that makes an invariant not satisfied. Basically, when an invariant becomes violated, PROB exhibits such a sequence of events that, starting from a valid initial state of the machine, leading to a state that violates the related invariant. Such specification errors can be due to a guard/action missing, to an incorrect specification of the invariant but sometimes also to an incorrect property, that is the system really does not satisfy the property. Let us note that even if no invariant violation is found by the tool, there may still exist scenarios that violate the invariant that the tool cannot find due to their complexity or/and the timeout on the model checking process. This is why a proof phase should be performed to ensure that the specification is invariant-violation free.

4.2 Validation with Scenarios

This step aims at verifying that we have built the right model whose behaviors conform to the desired ones as described by the scenarios of the specification document. For that purpose, the animation capability of PROB is used to play the different scenarios provided in the case study. This step allows us to point out some flaws/ambiguities in the initial release of the description document. For instance, the initial examples provided to illustrate the requirements SCS-5-SCS-9 were incorrect with respect to the requirements. In addition, in some place like SCS-7-SCS-9, the term “target speed” is used instead of “desired speed”, etc. All these aspects have been discussed with the case study authors because we are not specialists of the domain. Let us note that we have faced some difficulties to play the provided scenarios since no information is provided on how the controller calculates the acceleration at each step. So, we have made our best to “simulate” these values without any representation about their suitability, reliability.

4.3 Proof of the Specification

This last phase aims at ensuring the correctness of the specification by discharging all the proof obligations generated by RODIN to prove that the invariants are preserved by each event, but also that the guard of each refined event is stronger than that of the abstract one. Figure 1 provides the proof statistics of the case study: 579 proof obligations have been generated, of which 60% (345) were automatically proved by the various provers. The remaining proof obligations were discharged interactively since they needed the use of external provers like the Mono Lemma prover that has shown to be very useful for arithmetic formulas even if we had to add some theorems on min/max operators (a min/max of a finite set is an element of the set, etc) but also on the transitivity property of the comparison operator (\geq , \leq , etc.).

5 Other Points

This section reports on some points about the choices made during the Event-B modeling of the speed control system.

5.1 Feedback on the Specification Document

The formal modeling of the specification document [4] lead us to question ourselves about the semantics of some requirement and identify a number of ambiguities and some contradictions with the test scenarios provided. Being not specialist of the domain, we have communicated these to the authors of the requirements document, and a number of revisions were produced, following our comments. Our discussion and exchange lead to the modification/revision of a set of requirements to make them clearer and consistent. A detailed list of these elements are described in the last version (*i.e.*, 1.17) of the requirements document:

Element Name	Total	Auto	Manual	Reviewed	Undischarged
SCS_012020	579	345	234	0	0
C0	0	0	0	0	0
C1	0	0	0	0	0
C2	18	15	3	0	0
C3	0	0	0	0	0
M0	2	2	0	0	0
M1	78	72	6	0	0
M2	215	104	111	0	0
M3	266	152	114	0	0

Fig. 1. RODIN proof statistics of the case study

1. Correction of the examples in SCS-7, SCS-8 and SCS-9 since the values do not respect the requirements.
2. Modification of signal description *setVehicleSpeed* to make its meaning clearer.
3. Replacing ‘target speed’ by ‘desired speed’ in requirements SCS-7 and SCS-8.
4. Adjusting of the maximum acceleration and deceleration values in SCS-20, SCS-22.
5. Stating that SCS-23 applies when the speed is 20 km/h or below.
6. Clarification of priority between adaptive cruise control and emergency braking assistant in case of brake activation in SCS-28
7. the signal *SCSLever* has been splitted into signals *SCSLeverForthBack* and *SCSLeverUpDown* with their corresponding positions (states) and the possible transitions between them.

As already well-known, the use of a formal method does not only permit to built a correct system but it also allows to make the requirement document clearer and precise by removing ambiguities and errors.

5.2 Modeling Temporal Properties

As stated before, a number of requirements refer to the current and previous state of an element. In order to be able to verify these requirements using a proof strategy, we modeled them as invariants by introducing two variables for each element to store their current and previous values. The obtained specification is quite cumbersome especially that we have to add for each event that does not modify a variable that its previous value is equal to its current value. We think that it would be interesting to investigate existing tools/approaches that could help us specify this kind of properties in a simpler manner. An example of such tools is the EVENT-B State machines plugin¹ that produces EVENT-B

¹ http://wiki.event-b.org/index.php/Event-B_Statemachines.

events from a state machine including their guards that specify the requirements modeled by the state machine but without producing the related invariants. This plugin makes difficult to trace and justify the usefulness of the generated guards.

6 Conclusion

This paper presents a formal modeling proposal of a speed control system using the EVENT-B method. We have modelled most of requirements that permits us to point out some ambiguities in the requirements that we have discussed and clarified with the case study authors by rephrasing them. These ambiguities have been discovered during during different development phases: formalization, proof and validation using the provided scenarios. This experience has affirmed that the formal modeling of a system helps the software users detect error in early development phase that makes its correction cheaper.

The main difficulty when modeling the speed control system is to determine the order in which elements should be introduced during the refinement especially that many elements are interdependent. Due to time constraints, we were unfortunately not able to explore the different decomposition plugins of RODIN that might produce smaller specification parts that would be easier to understand and maintain. We plan to explore some decomposition techniques as future work even if we really think that the EVENT-B method should include modularization clauses as native structuring mechanisms like those of the B method that permit to have a modular specification since the early development phases to make EVENT-B method more usable for the development of big and complex systems. Another point concerns the PROB plugin under Rodin that unfortunately does not permit to store an already played scenario, so we are obliged to manually replay each scenario; this is a very time-consuming for long traces.

The work presented in this paper can also be extended by considering the remaining requirements that need more clarifications. Requirement SCS-21 for instance needs more information on how the system can deduce that deceleration of 3 m/s^2 is insufficient to prevent a collision without having any information about the acceleration of the preceding vehicle. Also, we think that more information should be provided on the internal variables like *setVehicleSpeed* that represents the automatic acceleration of the system in order to able to build a more complete system. Finally through the different case studies proposed in the ABZ conference [8,9], we are now convinced of the need to improve the EVENT-B language to make it supports the real numbers as basic types. Its prover should be also extended to include more rules on arithmetic and set theories.

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