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Artificial Consciousness

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Perception-Action Cycle

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems ((SSCNS))

Abstract

“Artificial” or “machine” consciousness is the attempt to model and implement aspects of human cognition that are identified with the elusive and controversial phenomenon of consciousness. The chapter reviews the main trends and goals of artificial consciousness research, as environmental coupling, autonomy and resilience, phenomenal experience, semantics or intentionality of the first and second type, information integration, attention. The chapter also proposes a design for a general “consciousness oriented” architecture that addresses many of the discussed research goals. Comparisons with competing approaches are then presented.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Engineering, University of Palermo, Viale delle Scienze – Building 6, 90128, Palermo, Italy

    Antonio Chella

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  1. Antonio Chella
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  2. Riccardo Manzotti
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Correspondence to Antonio Chella .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, 02215, USA

    Vassilis Cutsuridis

  2. Dept. Computing Science, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, United Kingdom

    Amir Hussain

  3. King's College London, Dept. Mathematics, University of London, London, WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom

    John G. Taylor

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Chella, A., Manzotti, R. (2011). Artificial Consciousness. In: Cutsuridis, V., Hussain, A., Taylor, J. (eds) Perception-Action Cycle. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1452-1_20

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