Decision Process

Abstract

On 13 April 1975, an unidentified car opened fire at a church in the Christian suburb of Ain Rumanah killing four men, two of whom were members of al-Kata’ib, the militant Christian paramilitary organisation. In the evening of the same day, al-Kata’ib militia ambushed a bus full of Palestinians killing twenty-seven and wounding nineteen, not one of whom apparently was a guerrilla. Full-scale fighting involving mortar and heavy machine-gun fire immediately enveloped Beirut. The next day heavy clashes between Palestinians, joined by armed communists, Nasserists and Baathists on the one hand, and al-Kata’ib supported by ex-President Chamoun’s own militia on the other hand, spread from the capital to Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and other towns.¹ It was only after the hurried mediatory intervention of the Arab League’s Secretary-General, Mahmoud Riadh, that a cease-fire was concluded on 16 April, which led to the conflicting parties withdrawing their armed men from the streets and public buildings. While the cease-fire (the first in a long series) put a halt to the immediate fighting, the conflictual parties used the temporary lull to regroup, rearm and rekindle their eagerness for the future battles.