A User Guide to HyTech

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ABSTRACT   HYTECH is a tool for the automated analysis of embedded systems. This document, designed for the first-time user of HYTECH, guides the reader through the underlying system model, and through the input language for describing and analyzing systems. The guide gives several examples of usage, and some hints for gaining maximal computational efficiency from the tool.

The version of HYTECH described in this guide was released in August 1995, and is available through anonymous ftp from ftp.cs.cornell.edu in the directory ˜pub/tah/HyTech, and through the World-Wide Web via HYTECH's home page http://www.cs.cornell.edu/Info/People/tah/hytech.html.

1   Introduction

The control of physical systems with embedded hardware and software is a growing application area for computerized systems. Since many embedded controllers occur in safety-critical situations, it is important to have reliable design methodologies that ensure that the controllers operate correctly. HYTECH aids in the design of embedded systems by not only checking systems requirements, but also performing parametric analysis. Given a parametric system description, HYTECH returns the exact conditions on the parameters for which the system satisfies its safety and timing requirements.

For completeness, we begin with a brief presentation of the underlying theoretical framework of *linear hybrid automata* [ACHH93, ACH+95], which we use to describe system specifications and requirement specifications. These automata model the continuous activities of analog variables (such as temperature, time, and distance), as well as discrete events (such as interrupts and output signals). Communication is modeled through event synchronization and shared variables. HYTECH's input consists of two

parts: a system description and analysis commands. The system-description language allows us to represent linear hybrid automata textually. The tool forms the parallel composition of a collection of automata, each describing a modular component of an embedded system. The analysis-command language allows us to write simple iterative programs for performing tasks such as reachability analysis and error-trace generation.

We illustrate the use of the tool on several examples taken from the literature, and provide hints for a verification engineer to gain the maximal possible efficiency from HyTech.

Outline Section 2 reviews linear hybrid automata, their semantics, parallel composition, and associated analysis techniques. A brief history of HyTech appears in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 describe the HyTech input language, first the system-description part, and then the analysis-command part. Section 6 illustrates the use of the tool on several examples. Section 7 is a short guide to designing specification requirements using HyTech's command language. Section 8 provides information on installing and running HyTech. Section 9 contains hints for the efficient use of HyTech.

A full version of this user guide, including the complete grammar for the input language and additional examples, appears as [HHWT95b].

2   Linear Hybrid Automata

We model systems as the parallel composition of a collection of linear hybrid automata [ACHH93, ACH+95]. Informally, a linear hybrid automaton consists of a finite set X of real-valued variables and a labeled multigraph. The vertices represent control modes, each with its own constraints on the slopes of variables in X. The edges represent discrete events and are labeled with guarded assignments to X. The state of the automaton changes either through the instantaneous action associated with an event or, while time elapses, through the continuous activity associated with a control mode. We also explicitly model *urgent* events, which must take place as soon as they are enabled (unless another instantaneous action disables them).

We use the linear hybrid automata that model a simple railroad crossing [LS85, AHH93] as a running example. The system consists of three components: a train, a gate, and a controller. The train is initially some distance — at least 2000 feet — away from the track intersection with the gate fully raised. As the train approaches, it triggers a sensor — 1000 feet ahead of the intersection — signaling its upcoming entry to the controller. The controller then sends a lower command to the gate, after a delay of up to α seconds. When the gate receives a lower command, it lowers at a rate of 9 degrees per second. After the train has exited the intersection and is 100 feet away, it sends an exit signal to the controller. The controller then

FIGURE 1. Train automaton

FIGURE 2. Gate automaton

commands the gate to be raised. The role of the controller is to ensure that the gate is always closed whenever the train is in the intersection, and that the gate is not closed unnecessarily long. The linear hybrid automata for the train, the gate, and the controller appear in Figures 1, 2 and 3.

2.1   Definition

We give an informal description of linear hybrid automata, and refer the reader to [AHH93, HHWT95a] for detailed definitions. A *linear hybrid automaton* consists of the following components.

Variables   The automaton uses a finite ordered set $X = \{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n\}$ of real-valued *variables* to model continuous activities. For example, the position of the train is determined by the value of the variable x, which represents the distance of the train from the intersection. The variable g models the angle of the gate. When $g = 90$, the gate is completely open;

FIGURE 3. Controller automaton

when $g = 0$, it is completely closed.

A *valuation* is a point $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n)$ in the n-dimensional real space $\mathbb{R}^n$, or equivalently, a function that maps each variable x_i to its value a_i. A *linear expression* over a set X of variables is a linear combination of variables in X with rational coefficients. A *linear inequality* is a non-strict[1] inequality between linear expressions. A *convex predicate* is a finite conjunction of linear inequalities, *e.g.* $x_1 \geq 3 \wedge 3x_2 \leq x_3 + 5/2$. A *predicate* is a finite disjunction of convex predicates, defining a set of valuations.

Locations   Control modes are modeled using a finite set of vertices called *locations*. For example, the gate automaton has the locations *open*, *raising*, *lowering*, and *closed*. A *state* (v, s) of the automaton A consists of a location v and a valuation s. We use the term *region* to refer to a set of states.

Initial condition   There is a designated initial location and an initial predicate ϕ_0 defining the set of initial values of the variables. For example, the gate is initially in location *open* with the value of g equal to 90. In the graphical representation, a small incoming arrow identifies the initial location, and is labeled with the predicate ϕ_0.

Invariant conditions   Each location v is labeled with a convex predicate $inv(v)$ over X, the *invariant* of v. The automaton control may reside in location v only while its invariant is true, so the invariants can be used to enforce progress in the automaton. For example, in the gate automaton, $inv(open) = (g = 90)$, $inv(lowering) = (g \geq 0)$, $inv(raising) = (g \leq 90)$, and $inv(closed) = (g = 0)$. The invariant at location *lowering* implies that the gate can only be lowered until it is fully closed, at which point control moves out to location *closed*. In the graphical representation, the invariant *true* is omitted.

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[1]The requirement that all inequalities be non-strict is not essential. Our current implementation inherits this restriction from the polyhedral manipulation library we use.

We are primarily interested in states (v, s) where the valuation s satisfies the location's invariant $inv(v)$. Such states are called *admissible*.

Transitions Discrete actions are modeled using edges between locations, which are called *transitions*. For example, the train automaton has three transitions; one from location *far* to location *near* for entering the region immediately surrounding the intersection, one from *near* to *past* for going through the intersection, and one from *past* to *far* for exiting the region around the intersection.

Each transition is labeled with a guarded command of the form $\phi \rightarrow \alpha$, where the guard ϕ is either the special predicate ASAP (which is always satisfied) or a convex predicate, and α is a set of assignments. Each assignment maps a variable into either a single linear expression over X, or a closed interval, whose endpoints are either finite (given as linear expressions over X), or infinite (given as $-\infty$ or ∞). In the train automaton, the transition between locations *past* and *far* is labeled with the guarded command $x = 100 \rightarrow x := [2000, \infty)$. In the graphical representation, we omit the guard *true* and empty assignment sets.

In order for a transition to take place from the state (v, s) its guard must be satisfied in s. We describe how the set of assignments causes a change in the valuation from s to some s'. The lower and upper bound expressions of each assignment interval are evaluated at the valuation s, and each reassigned variable is nondeterministically given a value that lies in each interval to which it is assigned. If a variable cannot be assigned any value within the prescribed intervals, the transition cannot take place. Any variables for which there is no assignment in α remain unchanged. We define the binary *transition-step* relation, $\stackrel{\sigma}{\rightarrow}$, over admissible states such that $(v, s) \stackrel{\sigma}{\rightarrow} (v', s')$ iff the state (v', s') can be reached from the state (v, s) by taking a transition.

Each transition is optionally given a synchronization label. The synchronization labels are used to define the parallel composition of hybrid automata. For example, in the gate automaton, the transition from *open* to *lowering* has the synchronization label *lower*, and this synchronizes (*i.e.* must be taken simultaneously) with the transition labeled *lower* in the controller automaton.

A transition is *urgent* if its guard is ASAP. The full version [HHWT95b] of this guide illustrates the use of urgent transitions in the modeling of a distributed control system. There, a sensor waits to send a reading to the controller as soon as the controller is ready to receive the data.

Rate conditions We denote the rate of change of the variable $x \in X$ by $\dot{x}$, and we let $\dot{X}$ be the set $\{\dot{x}_1, \dot{x}_2, \ldots, \dot{x}_n\}$. Each control location v is labeled with a convex predicate $act(v)$ over $\dot{X}$, called the *rate condition* of v. For a given location, the rate condition restricts the rates of change of the variables. In the gate automaton, the rate condition for locations *open* and *closed* is $\dot{g} = 0$, for location *raising*, it is $\dot{g} = 9$, and for *lowering*, it is

$\dot{g} = -9$. There is a technical restriction on the rate conditions allowed. All predicates that define bounded sets over $\dot{X}$ are permitted, and all examples in this guide meet this condition[2].

A location v is urgent if there is an urgent transition originating from v. No time is allowed to pass in such a location. We define the *time-step* relation, $\overset{\tau}{\to}$, such that $(v, s) \overset{\tau}{\to} (v', s')$ iff $v = v'$, and there exists a real $\delta \geq 0$ such that $\delta > 0$ implies v is not urgent, and there is a function $f : [0, \delta] \to \mathbb{R}^n$ such that (1) $f(0) = s$, (2) $f(\delta) = s'$, (3) for all $t \in [0, \delta]$, $f(t)$ satisfies $inv(v)$, and (4) for all time $t \in (0, \delta)$ $(df_1(t)/dt, df_2(t)/dt, \dots, df_n(t)/dt)$ satisfies $act(v)$, where $f_i(t)$ denotes the value of variable x_i in the valuation $f(t)$.

2.2   Parallel composition

A hybrid system typically consists of several components which operate concurrently and communicate with each other. Each component is described as a separate linear hybrid automaton. The component automata coordinate through shared variables, and synchronization labels on the transitions are used to model message-type coordination. The linear hybrid automaton for the entire system is then obtained from the component automata using a product construction.

The control locations of the parallel composition of two automata A_1 and A_2 are pairs of locations, the first from A_1 and the second from A_2. The location (v_1, v_2) has the conjunction of v_1 and v_2's invariants as its invariant, and the conjunction of their rate conditions as its rate condition. A location is initial iff its components are initial in their respective automata. The initial convex predicate is the conjunction of the components' initial convex predicates. Transitions from the components are interleaved, unless they share the same synchronization label, in which case they are synchronized and executed simultaneously, if at all. In the train-gate controller example, the system is composed of the train, gate, and controller automata of Figures 1, 2 and 3. The controller communicates with the train by synchronizing on approach and exit events. It issues commands to the gate on the synchronized events *raise* and *lower*. The train's transition from location *near* to *far* is unlabeled, so it does not synchronize with any of the other components. In particular, this means the controller does not know the precise time at which the train enters the intersection.

We require a technical condition that the composition be well-formed: whenever two components synchronize on a label, if one transition has the guard ASAP then the other's guard must be either an ASAP guard or the

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[2]The precise condition for the rate condition ψ to be allowed is that the set of vectors $\{\dot{y} \mid$ there exists a real $k \geq 0$ and $\dot{x}$ satisfying ψ such that $\dot{y} = k\dot{x}\}$ is bounded. In theory, the condition we require is not essential: it results from our current implementation's restriction to non-strict inequalities.

predicate *true* (in which case the synchronized transition has guard ASAP), or the predicate *false* (in which case the synchronized transition has guard *false*).

2.3 Reachability and safety verification

At any time instant, the state of a hybrid automaton specifies a location and the values of all variables. If the automaton has the location set V and n variables, the state space is defined as $V \times \mathbb{R}^n$. We define the binary successor relation $\rightarrow_A$ over states as $\stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} \cup \stackrel{\sigma}{\rightarrow}$. For a region W, we define $post(W)$ to be the set of all successor states of W, *i.e.* all states reachable from a state in W via a single transition or time step. The region *forward reachable* from W is defined as the set of all states reachable from W after a finite number of steps, *i.e.* the infinite union $post^*(W) = \bigcup_{i \geq 0} post^i(W)$. Similarly, we define $pre(W)$ to be the set of all predecessor states of W, and we let the region *backward reachable* from W be the infinite union $pre^*(W) = \bigcup_{i \geq 0} pre^i(W)$.

In practice, many problems to be analyzed can be posed in a natural way as reachability problems. Often, the system is composed with a special monitor process that "watches" the system and enters a violation state whenever the execution violates a given safety requirement. Indeed all timed safety requirements [Hen92], including bounded-time response requirements, can be verified in this way. See Section 7. A state (v, s) is *initial* if v is the initial location, and s satisfies the initial predicate. A system with initial states I is correct with respect to violation states Y iff $post^*(I) \cap Y = \emptyset$, or equivalently iff $pre^*(Y) \cap I$ is empty.

HyTech computes the forward reachable region by finding the limit of the infinite sequence I, $post(I)$, $post^2(I)$, ... of regions. Analogously, the backward reachable region is found by iterating pre. These iteration schemes are semidecision procedures: there is no guarantee of termination. Nevertheless, we find that in practice, HyTech's reachability procedures terminate on most examples we have attempted. In addition, it has been shown that for a large class of systems [HKPV95], a linear hybrid automaton can be automatically preprocessed into an equivalent automaton over which the iterations converge.

2.4 Parametric analysis

A major strength of HyTech is its ability to perform parametric analysis. Often a system is described using parameters, and the system designer is interested in knowing which values of the parameters are required for correctness. Since the system is incorrect for parameter values for which there exists a state in the region $post^*(I) \cap Y$, we may obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for system correctness by performing reachability analysis followed by existential quantification [CH78].

Our study of the train-gate controller demonstrates this technique. The controller decides when to issue *lower* commands to the gate based on the amount of time since the train last passed the sensor located 1000 feet ahead of the intersection. We consider the problem of determining exactly how long the controller can wait before issuing commands, while maintaining the requirement that the gate be closed whenever the train is within 10 feet of the intersection. The parameter α corresponds to the latest possible moment the controller can wait. We then use HyTech to determine that the composed system includes violations whenever α is greater than or equal to 49/5. Thus we conclude that the system is correct for values of the parameter strictly less than 49/5.

3   A Brief History of HyTech

3.1   Implementation

There have been three generations of HyTech. The very earliest proto-type [AHH93] was written entirely in the symbolic computation tool Mathematica. Regions were represented as symbolic formulas. The evaluation of time-step successors used existential quantifications that are easily encoded in this language. While Mathematica offers powerful symbolic manipulation, and allows rapid development and experimentation with algorithms and heuristics, its operations over predicates turned out to be computationally inefficient. In particular, quantifier-elimination operations for computing time-step successors were expensive. HyTech [HH95b] was rewritten to avoid this bottleneck in Mathematica. The second version of the verifier used a Mathematica main program that called efficient C++ routines from Halbwachs' polyhedral manipulation library [Hal93, HRP94] for computing time-step successors. While this verifier achieved a total speed-up of roughly one order of magnitude, it required inefficient conversions between Mathematica expressions and C++ data structures. It still relied on Mathematica for computing transition-step successors by substitution.

The third generation HyTech described here avoids Mathematica altogether and is built entirely in C++. It is roughly two to three orders of magnitude faster again than the second generation verifier. In addition, the input automata now allow nondeterministic assignments to variables, simultaneous assignments, more general rate conditions, and urgent events.

3.2   A guide to HyTech-related papers

The following papers explain the theory behind linear hybrid automata in more detail, provide examples of their use, and discuss HyTech and related tools.

Theory of hybrid automata   Hybrid automata are based on timed automata [AD94] and were introduced in [ACHH93]. A related model appeared in the same volume [NOSY93]. Analysis methods included reachability and state-space minimization. The specification language Integrator Computation Tree Logic (ICTL) and a model-checking algorithm were introduced in [AHH93]. Approximations and abstract interpretation strategies for the algorithmic analysis of hybrid automata are discussed in the papers [HRP94, OSY94, HH95c]. The paper [ACH+95] provides an overview of the analysis techniques, including approximations. The analysis of nonlinear automata by translations to linear automata is described in [HH95a, HWT95a]. Decidability results appear in [Cer92, ACH93, KPSY93, AD94, MV94, PV94, BER94a, BER94b, BR95, MPS95, Hen95, HHK95, HKPV95]. In particular, [HKPV95] shows that the reachability problem is decidable, and HyTech's analysis terminates, on the class of *rectangular automata*, where all convex predicates are of the form $a \leq x \leq b$ $(a \leq \dot{x} \leq b)$.

HYTECH   The earliest version of HyTech is mentioned in [AHH93], and performs full model-checking of ICTL formulas. The second generation of HyTech is discussed in [HH95b]. The thesis [Ho95] describes the first two generations of HyTech in more detail, as well as summarizing much of the theory of hybrid automata. The current version of HyTech is described in [HHWT95a]. The full version of this guide appears in [HHWT95b].

Case studies   Numerous examples have been analyzed using linear hybrid automata. We mention only the first appearances of examples in the hybrid automata literature. A gas burner is studied in [ACHH93], together with a simple water monitor. The trajectories of a billiard ball, and the temperature of a reactor core are modeled in [NOSY93]. Fischer's timing-based mutual exclusion protocol is considered in [AHH93]. The paper [HH95b] includes a parametric analysis. A simple train-gate controller and a scheduler appear in [AHH93]. A manufacturing robot system and Corbett's distributed control system are also discussed in [HH95b]. The paper [HWT95b] describes the verification (see also [HH95b]) and error analysis of an audio control protocol. The benchmark generic railroad crossing example and an active structure controller are considered in [HHWT95a]. A nonlinear temperature controller appears in [HH95a], and a predator-prey system in [HWT95a].

Related Tools   The analysis of linear hybrid automata supported by HyTech is based on symbolic region manipulation techniques first presented for real-time systems [HNSY94]. For the restricted case of real-time systems, these techniques have also been implemented in the tools KRONOS [NSY92, DOY94, ACH+95, DY95] and UPPAAL [LPY95]. Polka [Hal93, HRP94] is a tool for analyzing hybrid systems that concentrates on abstract interpretation strategies.

```
define(raise_rate,9)
define(lower_rate,-9)

automaton gate
synclabs: raise, lower;
initially open & g=90;
loc up: while g<=90 wait {g'=raise_rate}  -- gate is being raised
        -- gate is fully raised
        when g=90 goto open;
        -- selfloops for input enabledness
        when True sync raise goto up;
        when True sync lower goto down ;
loc open: while True wait {g'=0}           -- wait for command
        when True sync raise goto open;
        when True sync lower goto down;
loc down: while g>=0 wait {g'=lower_rate} -- gate is being lowered
        -- gate is fully down
        when g=0 goto closed;
        when True sync lower goto down;
        when True sync raise goto up;
loc closed: while True wait {g'=0}         -- wait for command
        when True sync raise goto up;
        when True sync lower goto closed;
end -- gate
```

FIGURE 4. HYTECH input for the gate automaton

4   Input Language: System Description

HYTECH's input consists of a text file containing a system description and a list of iterative analysis commands. The language is case-sensitive.

The system description language is a straightforward textual representation of linear hybrid automata. The user describes a system as the composition of a collection of components. Each component is given as a linear hybrid automaton. The system analyzed is taken as the product of all components given.

HYTECH first passes its input through the macro preprocessor m4, allowing clear definition of constants in the system[3]. For example, we may declare and use the constant *raise_rate* in the gate automaton of Figure 2, as shown in the sample HYTECH input appearing in Figure 4. Whitespace (blank spaces, tabs, new lines) between tokens is ignored. The syntax is described in more detail below. The complete grammar appears in [HHWT95b].

Comments The rest of an input line after two adjacent dashes (--) is taken as a comment.

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[3]For details of the Unix command m4, type man m4.

Variables   All variables in the system are declared at the top of the description, in a single declaration. Variables may be of the following types: discrete, clock, stopwatch, parameter, analog. The type declarations allow more readable descriptions and enable simple static checking by the parser. A clock variable always has rate 1, and a discrete variable always has rate 0. The rate of a stopwatch must be either 0 or 1. Parameters have rate 0 in all locations, and may never be assigned values. Analog variables have no syntactic restrictions. Variables of type discrete, clock and parameter are said to be *fixed rate* variables, since their rate intervals are fixed by their type, namely 0, 1 and 0 respectively. Constraints on their rates are automatically added to the rate conditions for each location; indeed, it is illegal for the user to constrain explicitly the rate of a fixed rate variable. For example, the variables for the train-gate controller example are declared as

```
var  x,              -- distance from intersection
     g: analog;       -- angle of gate
     t: stopwatch;    -- controller's timer
                      -- cutoff point for controller
     alpha: parameter; -- to issue commands
```

Linear terms, expressions and constraints   A linear term is either (a) a variable multiplied by a rational coefficient, or (b) a rational number. A linear expression is an additive combination of linear terms. A linear constraint is a non-strict inequality (<=, >=) or equality (=) between linear expressions. Note that rational coefficients must either (a) be an integer, (b) have an integer as numerator and a nonzero integer as denominator, or (c) be omitted, in which case it is understood to be 1. For example, 1/2x - 24/5y <= z + 5t -6 + y is a syntactically legal linear constraint.

Automaton components   Each automaton is given a name which may be used later in the specification. Its synchronization labels are declared. Its initial location and the initial condition on its variables must also be provided. For example, the header for the train automaton is as follows:

```
automaton train
synclabs : app,      -- approach signal
           exit;     -- signal that train is leaving
initially far & x>=2000;
```

Each automaton component includes a list of locations, described below, terminated by the keyword end.

Locations   Each location is named and labeled with its invariant. Rate conditions may also be provided. The syntax g' in [10,20] is shorthand for g' >= 10 & g' <= 20. For example, loc far: while x>=100 wait {x' in [-50,-40]} is the header for the location *far* with invariant $x \geq 100$, and rate condition $-50 \leq \dot{x} \leq -40$.

Invariants may be conjunctions of linear constraints, such as `x>=1/2 &`
`y<=2/3+x`, but must *not* be disjunctions[4]. Conjunctive rate conditions are
separated by commas, as in `wait {x'=z', y' in [2,4]}`.

Each location is associated with a list of transitions originating from it.

Transitions   Each transition lists a guard on enablement and the suc-
cessor location. Both the synchronization label and the assignments are
optional. Infinite bounds are expressed as either `-inf` or `inf`. For example,
the following are legal transitions.

```
when True goto far;
when x=1 & y<=2 do {} goto far;
when x=0 do {x:=[1,2],g := (-inf,x+3]} sync exit goto far;
when asap sync exit do {y:=[5,inf)} goto far;
```

Again, notice that guards may be conjunctions of linear constraints, but
not disjunctions (use multiple transitions). Also, the order of the synchro-
nization information and the assignments is interchangeable, if they appear
at all, but the guard must appear first and the successor location last. The
ASAP guard on the last transition listed indicates it is an urgent transition
which must take place as soon as possible. Recall that there is a syntactic
restriction that non-trivial guards are not permitted on urgent transitions
or any transitions in other components with the same synchronization label
as an urgent transition.

Composition   It is assumed that the system being described is the parallel
composition of all listed components.

5   Input Language: Analysis Commands

The analysis section of the input consists of two parts: declaration of vari-
ables for regions, and a sequence of iterative command statements. Analysis
commands provide a means of manipulating and outputting regions. Com-
mands are built using objects of two basic types: *region expressions* for
describing regions of interest, and *boolean expressions* used in the control
of command statements. Regions may be stored in variables, provided the
region variables are declared via a statement such as

```
var
    init_reg, final_reg: region;
```

which declares two region variables called *init_reg* and *final_reg*. HYTECH
provides a number of operations for manipulating regions, including com-
puting the reachable set, successor operations, existential quantification,
convex hull, and basic boolean operations.

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[4]In order to model a disjunctive invariant, split the location into several locations,
one for each disjunct [AHH93].

```
var
   final_reg, init_reg : region;

init_reg :=   loc[train] = far & x>=2000 & loc[controller] = idle
           & loc[gate] = open & g=90;
final_reg :=    loc[gate] = up & x<=10 | loc[gate]=open & x<=10
              |  loc[gate] = down & x<=10;
print omit all locations
       hide non_parameters in
             reach forward from init_reg endreach & final_reg
       endhide;
```

FIGURE 5. Analysis commands for train-gate controller

For example, the specification commands in Figure 5 are for analyzing the train-gate controller. Their overall effect is to determine the critical bound on the parameter α. First, the two regions *final_reg* and *init_reg* are declared. The first two statements assign values to these regions using direct constraints on the states. Notice that disjunctions may be used. The third statement outputs the constraint on the parameter α under which the system is not correct. This printing command is given by the prefix print omit all locations, which tells HyTECH to output the region enclosed between the words hide and endhide, but only after hiding all information about locations. We choose to omit all location information since for any particular value of α the specific final location reached is irrelevant. HyTECH evaluates the region expression between the hide keywords by first performing reachability analysis from the initial region specified by *init_reg*, intersecting the reachable states with the final region (*final_reg*), and then existentially quantifying out all variables that are not declared as parameters. After 1.72 seconds computation on a Sparcstation 20, HyTECH produces the following output, showing that the system is correct whenever $\alpha < 49/5$.

```
5alpha >= 49
```

5.1   Region expressions

Region expressions are built from linear inequalities, constraints on locations, and region names, by existential quantification, *pre*, *post*, and convex hull operations, reachability, conjunction, and disjunction. Each region expression defines a region. The symbol ⟨*reg_exp*⟩ denotes an arbitrary region expression.

Linear inequalities   The most basic region expression is a linear inequality. For example, x <= 100 is a region expression, defining the set of all states where the variable x has value no greater than 100.

Location constraints   loc[⟨*aut_name*⟩] = ⟨*loc_name*⟩.
The location name ⟨*loc_name*⟩ must be the name of a location in the

automaton $\langle aut\_name \rangle$. For example, the region expression `loc[gate]` = open defines the set of all states where the location component corresponding to the gate is *open*.

Boolean combinations $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$ & $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$, $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$ | $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$
The disjunction of region expressions, written using the operator |, is a region expression (representing the union of its operands), as is the conjunction of region expressions (representing the intersection of its operands), written with the operator &. The & operator has precedence, so that an expression without parentheses is considered to be a disjunction of conjunctions. In addition, the boolean *constants* True and False have the expected meaning.

Parentheses   Expressions not in conjunctive normal form may be given using parentheses. For example, x<=4 & (y<=5 | y>=5) is equivalent to x<=4.

Region name   A region expression may be any declared region variable. There is no automatic check that the region variable has been assigned a value. The value of the expression is the region most recently assigned to the variable.

Existential quantification   hide $\langle var\_list \rangle$ in $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$ endhide
The hide expression evaluates to the region obtained by existentially quantifying a list of variables. For example, the command print hide x in x<=1 & x=y endhide outputs the region where $y \leq 1$. In general, quantified variables may be listed, separated by commas, as in print hide x, z in x<=1 & y<=x+3 & z = y-x endhide. Alternatively, the list $\langle var\_list \rangle$ may be replaced by the keywords all (for all variables) or non_parameters (for all variables not declared as parameters).

Pre/Post   pre($\langle reg\_exp \rangle$), post($\langle reg\_exp \rangle$)
The pre and post expressions evaluate to the regions obtained by applying *pre* and *post* respectively to their arguments.

Convex hull   hull($\langle reg\_exp \rangle$)
The expression hull($\langle reg\_exp \rangle$) returns the region where each location v is associated with the convex hull of all valuations s for which (v, s) is in the region defined by $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$. For example,

```
loc1 := loc[P1]=loc_a & loc[P2]=loc_b_1;
loc2 := loc[P1]=loc_a & loc[P2]=loc_b_2;
approx := hull(loc1 & x=0 | loc1 & x=1 | loc2 & x=1);
```

assigns approx the region represented by loc1&0<=x&x<=1 | loc2&x=1.

Reachability   reach forward from $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$ endreach
                    reach backward from $\langle reg\_exp \rangle$ endreach
There are two specialized expressions for returning the set of states reachable from any arbitrary region: one for forward reachability and one for

backward reachability. For example, the expression `reach forward from init_reg endreach` appearing in the analysis commands in Figure 5 evaluates to the region reachable from *init_reg* by iterating *post*. The backward reachability expression iterates *pre* until convergence.

5.2 Boolean expressions

Boolean expressions are built from region comparisons and region emptiness checks using boolean operators. Boolean expressions are used in conditional statements and while loops. The symbol ⟨*bool_exp*⟩ denotes an arbitrary boolean expression.

Comparison between regions   ⟨*reg_exp*⟩ ⟨*relop*⟩ ⟨*reg_exp*⟩
The relational operator ⟨*relop*⟩ is one of the symbols <, <=, =, >=, and >, representing the binary set comparison operators ⊂, ⊆, =, ⊇, and ⊃ respectively. For example, the following are legal boolean expressions.

```
init_reg = final_reg
init_reg >= loc1 & x <= 5
```

Emptiness   `empty(⟨reg_exp⟩)`
The unary predicate `empty` applied to a region expression evaluates to true iff its argument contains no states. For example, the following code could be used to determine whether the system satisfies its safety requirement.

```
reached := reach forward from init_reg endreach;
if empty(reached & final_reg)
   then prints "System verified";
   else prints "System contains violations";
endif;
```

Boolean combinations   ⟨*bool_exp*⟩ and ⟨*bool_exp*⟩, ⟨*bool_exp*⟩ or ⟨*bool_exp*⟩
                            not ⟨*bool_exp*⟩
Boolean expressions may be combined to yield boolean expressions. The negation of a boolean expression is a boolean expression. For example, `not empty(reached)` is a boolean expression. The conjunction and disjunction of boolean expressions is a boolean expression, with the natural meaning, written using the keywords and and or. Note that region expressions use the symbols & and |. Negation has highest priority and conjunctions bind more tightly than disjunctions.

5.3 Command statements

There are commands to perform common tasks such as error-trace generation and parametric analysis. Command statements are built from primitives for printing and assigning regions. Command statements may also occur within conditional statements and while statements. Each command is terminated by a semicolon.

Printing   There are four basic commands for outputting information. All
output appears on stdout.

print ⟨reg_exp⟩ The basic print command outputs the states in the region
     defined by its region expression argument. For example, the command
     print init_reg (see Figure 5) would produce the output

```
Location: far.idle.open
g = 90 & x >= 2000
```

The valuations *associated with* a location v within a region W are
the valuations s such that $(v, s) \in W$. The print command prints out
a list of locations and predicates defining the states associated with
them. Non-convex predicates are output as disjunctions of convex
predicates. Locations for which there are no associated valuations in
the region do not appear in the output. The string far.idle.open
indicates that the valuations satisfying the convex predicate $g = 90 \wedge$
$x \geq 2000$ are associated with the control location where the train
component is far from the intersection, the controller component is
in its idle location, and the gate component in its open location.
Note that location information is printed with periods separating the
locations for each component, and that components are listed in the
order in which they are declared.

print omit ⟨loc_list⟩ locations ⟨reg_exp⟩ This command generalizes the
     basic print command by first eliminating information about the loca-
     tions of all components listed after the omit keyword. For example,
     if *strange_reg* is first assigned to

```
init_reg | loc[gate]=closed & 1000<=x & loc[train]=far
```

then print omit gate, controller locations strange_reg pro-
duces the output

```
Location: far..
x >= 1000
```

indicating that the region given includes only locations in the product
automaton for which the train component is in its far location, and
that all valuations for which the value of x is greater than or equal to
1000 appear in some such location. The absence of a location name for
the second and third component automata indicates that information
for these components' locations has been existentially quantified.

As shorthand, the keyword all may appear in place of a list of au-
tomata names, in which case all location information is quantified
out, as in Figure 5.

prints ⟨*string*⟩ This command prints strings, enclosed in double quotes, directly to `stdout`. For example, the statement `prints "Hi there"` outputs the string "Hi there" followed by a carriage return.

printsize ⟨*reg_name*⟩ This command prints information about the "size" of the region stored in the region variable given as an argument. Information output includes the number of product locations for which the associated predicate is nonempty and the total number of convex predicates used in representing the region.

Assignment   ⟨*reg_name*⟩ := ⟨*reg_exp*⟩
Any region expression may be assigned to any region name. For example, we may initialize the final region with the statement

```
final_reg := x<=10 & (  loc[gate] = up
                      | loc[gate] = open
                      | loc[gate] = down);
```

which is equivalent to the assignment appearing in Figure 5.

Conditional   The `if-then` and `if-then-else` statements have the expected meaning. For example, the following are legal conditional statements.

```
if init_reg<=final_reg then prints "Hi"; print strange_reg; endif;
if init_reg=final_reg then prints "Equal";
   else prints "Not equal"; endif;
```

The boolean expression comparing regions is first evaluated, and then the appropriate list of statements (if any) is executed.

Iteration   The `while` statement has the expected meaning. For example,

```
reached := init_reg;
old := init_reg;
reached := post(old);
while not ( reached <= old ) do
   old := reached;
   reached := post(reached);
endwhile;
```

computes the set of reachable states from the initial states by iterating the *post* operation until a fixpoint is obtained.

Error trace generation   print trace to ⟨*reg_exp*⟩ using ⟨*reg_name*⟩
HYTECH provides a simple facility for generating error traces for faulty systems. One must first use the built-in reachability utility (see Subsection 5.1), which causes HYTECH to store internal information that can be used to generate traces. Second, the command to generate traces is issued, specifying both the target region of the traces, and the name of the region variable previously used to store the result of the reachability analysis. This is best illustrated by an example. Suppose we are using forward reachability

FIGURE 6. Automaton for the leaking gas burner

analysis to see whether any state in the violation region *final_reg* is reachable from the initial region *init_reg*. The following sequence of commands causes HyTech to generate an error trace, if one exists.

```
reached := reach forward from init_reg;
if empty(reached & final_reg)
  then prints "System verified";
  else prints "System contains violations";
       print trace to final_reg using reached;
endif;
```

The trace output consists of regions, *i.e.* sets of states, not individual states. Each region will be accessible from the previous via a time step allowing the continuous variables to evolve, followed by a transition step. The trace generated is minimal in length, and includes the synchronization labels, if any, for transitions between regions along the trace. Regardless of whether forward or backward reachability is used, the trace is always printed in an absolute forward direction.

Note: this command is rather fragile, and should be used with some care. The error trace generation command always assumes — without any automatic checks — that the region variable appearing after the keyword using (reached in the above example) has been assigned a reachable region using the built-in reach expression, and that no reach expression has since been evaluated.

6   Examples

Additional examples may be found in the directory examples of the software distribution. We discuss two of them here in more detail.

6.1   Gas burner

The "leaking gas burner" example has appeared in the early literature on formal methods applied to hybrid systems [CHR91, ACHH93]. We show how this simple system can be analyzed in HyTech. The gas burner is

```
-- leaking gas burner
var  x,              -- time spent in current location
     y: clock;       -- total elapsed time
     t: stopwatch;   -- leakage time

automaton gas_burner
synclabs:;
initially leaking & t = 0 & x = 0 & y=0;
loc leaking: while x>=0 & y>=0 & t>=0 & x <=1 wait {t'=1}
   when True do {x:=0} goto not_leaking;
loc not_leaking: while  x>=0 & y>=0 & t>=0  wait {t'=0}
   when x>=30 do {x:=0} goto leaking;
end

var init_reg, final_reg, b_reachable: region;

init_reg := loc[gas_burner] = leaking & x=0 & t=0 & y=0;
final_reg :=  y>=60 & t >= 1/20 y;
b_reachable := reach backward from final_reg endreach;
if empty( b_reachable & init_reg)
  then prints "Non-leaking duration requirement satisfied";
  else prints "Non-leaking duration requirement not satisfied";
endif;
```

FIGURE 7. Input file for the analysis of the gas burner

in one of two modes; it is either leaking or not leaking. Leakages are detected and stopped within 1 second. Furthermore, once a leakage has been stopped, the burner is guaranteed not to leak again until at least 30 seconds later. The system is initially leaking.

The linear hybrid automaton of Figure 6 models the gas burner. The clock x records the time elapsed since last entering the current location, and is sufficient for modeling the behavior of the system. However, in order to analyze the system, we need to add the auxiliary variables t and y. The stopwatch t measures the cumulative leakage time. It increases at rate 1 in the location *leaking*, and at rate 0 in location *non_leaking*. The clock y measures the total elapsed time. Using these auxiliary variables, we prove that if at least 60 seconds have passed, then the burner has been leaking for less than one twentieth of the total elapsed time. The requirement holds unless there is a state, forward reachable from the initial states, in which $y \geq 60$ and $t \geq y/20$. We compute the region backward reachable from all states satisfying $y \geq 60 \wedge t \geq y/20$. Since this region does not include any initial states, the requirement is satisfied. In fact, forward reachability for this system does not terminate. In general, it is not easy to determine ahead of time whether forward or backward reachability analysis is preferable.

The complete input file for this example appears in Figure 7. HyTech outputs the string "Non-leaking duration requirement satisfied". The com-

FIGURE 8. Automata for processes P_1 and P_2 in Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol

putation takes 0.62 seconds on a SparcStation 20, using a maximum of 0.73 MB of memory.

6.2   Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol

We demonstrate parametric analysis through a drifting clock version of the simple timing-based mutual-exclusion protocol due to Fischer [Lam87, AHH93]. The system consists of two processes, P_1 and P_2, each performing atomic read and write operations on a shared memory variable k. Each process P_i, for $i = 1, 2$, models the following algorithm:

>   **repeat**
>   **repeat**
>   **await** $k = 0$; $k := i$; **delay** b
>   **until** $k = i$
>   *Critical section*
> $k := 0$
>   **forever**

The instruction **delay** b delays a process for at least b time units as measured by its local clock. Each process uses its own local clock to measure the delay times. Process P_i is allowed to enter its critical section iff $k = i$. Furthermore, each process takes no more than a local time units to write a value into the variable k, *i.e.* the assignment $k := i$ occurs within a time units after the **await** statement completes. To complicate matters, the two processes use drifting clocks. Process P_1's clock is slow, and its rate may vary between 0.8 and 1, while that of P_2 is fast with rate between 1 and 1.1. The automata for the two processes appear in Figure 8. Each process is modeled using the private clocks x and y, respectively. Each process has

a critical section, represented by the location *4* in each automaton. The invariants at location *2* ensure the upper time bound on the write access to *k*, while the guards on the transitions from location *3* to location *4* model the lower time bound of the delay.

We perform parametric analysis to determine the values for *a* and *b*, if any, for which mutual exclusion holds. The "unsafe" region is characterized by the region expression `loc[P1]=loc_4 & loc[P2]=loc_4`. As for the train-gate controller example, we are interested in the values of the parameters for which there exists a reachable unsafe state. These values are output using the `print omit all locations` analysis command, in conjunction with existential quantification of the non-parameter variables:

```
init_reg := loc[P1] = loc_1 & loc[P2] = loc_1 & k=0;
final_reg := loc[P1] = loc_4 & loc[P2] = loc_4 ;
print omit all locations hide non_parameters in
   reach forward from init_reg endreach & final_reg endhide;
```

HyTech's computation takes 3.79 seconds using 1.1 MB of memory, producing the following output, which indicates that the system is correct whenever $a < 8b/11$.

```
11a >= 8b & a >= 0
```

7   Designing Requirement Specifications

It is not always obvious how to specify requirements of systems. This section provides some hints to the verification engineer by outlining how to check for many common classes of requirements. All forms of specifications below rely on the use of reachability analysis.

7.1   Simple safety

A safety requirement intuitively asserts that "nothing bad ever happens". Many specifications are expressed naturally as safety requirements. A system is said to be correct iff its reachable states all satisfy an invariant ϕ, defining a set of safe states: the "bad thing" to happen is to reach a state that does not satisfy the invariant[5]. For example, Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol should guarantee that processes P_1 and P_2 are never in their critical sections at the same time. Also, the train-gate controller is required to ensure that the gate is always down whenever the train is within 10 feet.

As discussed above (Subsection 2.3), safety requirements can be verified in HyTech using the region $\neg\phi$. One method is to perform forward reachability analysis from the system's initial states, and then check whether

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[5]The reader familiar with temporal logics should observe that such requirements are expressed in the form $\forall\Box\phi$, meaning intuitively that ϕ is always true for all reachable states of the system.

the intersection with the violating states $\neg\phi$ is empty. Assuming the region *init_reg* has been assigned the set of initial states, and *viol* has been set to the region $\neg\phi$, the following HYTECH input checks the safety requirement, and generates an error trace if any exist.

```
f_reachable := reach forward from init_reg endreach;
reached_viol := f_reachable & viol;
if empty(reached_viol)
  then prints "System verified";
  else prints "System not verified";
       prints "The violating states reached are";
       print reached_viol;
       print trace to viol using f_reachable;
endif;
```

Alternatively, the analogous backward reachability analysis can be used.

```
b_reachable := reach backward from viol endreach;
init_reach_viol := b_reachable & init_reg;
if empty(init_reach_viol)
  then prints "System verified";
  else prints "System not verified";
       print trace to viol using b_reachable;
endif;
```

Strict equalities When the invariant ϕ involves non-strict inequalities, it may be impossible to express the violating states $\neg\phi$ using only non-strict inequalities. This problem can be overcome in two different ways. First, if the invariant ϕ itself can be expressed using non-strict inequalities only, HYTECH can check directly whether all reachable states satisfy the invariant using the containment operator.

```
if f_reachable <= phi
  then prints "System verified";
  else prints "System contains violations";
endif;
```

Alternatively, one may instead use the set closure $(\neg\phi)^c$ of $\neg\phi$ as the set of violating states, and then check that the only reachable states in $(\neg\phi)^c$ lie in ϕ, or equivalently, lie in the intersection of $(\neg\phi)^c$ and ϕ. For example, consider the task of verifying the gate is always down whenever the train is strictly less than 10 feet away. The invariant ϕ is given as $loc[gate] = down \vee x \geq 10$. Its negation $\neg\phi$ is $loc[gate] \neq down \wedge x < 10$, which is inexpressible using non-strict inequalities only. The following analysis can be used to verify this requirement.

```
cl_neg_phi :=  (loc[gate]=open | loc[gate]=closed | loc[gate]=up)
              & x<=10;
if f_reachable & cl_neg_phi <= x=10
  then prints "System verified";
  else prints "System not verified";
endif;
```

Despite being more complicated, this alternative is often faster than the first, since the <= operator can be expensive when applied to complex expressions.

7.2 Simple possibility

A simple possibility requirement asserts that "something good can always happen." If the notion of "something good" can be expressed as a region expression ϕ, then such requirements maintain that all states forward reachable from the initial states are backward reachable from a state in ϕ.[6] For example, we may wish to prove that for Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol, there is always a possibility that process P_1 will enter its critical section sometime in the future. The following HyTech code checks this assertion.

```
b_reachable := reach backward from loc[P1] = cs endreach;
f_reachable := reach forward from init_reg endreach;
if f_reachable <= b_reachable
   then prints "Requirement satisfied";
   else prints "Requirement not satisfied";
endif;
```

7.3 Simple real-time and duration requirements

Many simple real-time requirements can be specified by introducing clocks and stopwatches to measure delays between events, or the length of time a particular condition holds. In the gas burner example, we assert that as long as a minute or more has passed, the burner has been leaking no more than 5% of the time. In this case, we introduce a new variable for each time duration of interest. We need to know the total elapsed time and the time spent in location *leaking*. These quantities are measured by the clock y and stopwatch t respectively. The duration requirement we are interested in then becomes the safety requirement where the violating states are given by the predicate $y \geq 60 \wedge t \geq y/20$.

7.4 Additional requirements

By no means do all requirement specifications fall into the categories discussed above. However, a simple technique can be used to reduce many requirements to safety requirements. The idea is to build a separate monitor automaton for the requirement being checked [VW86]. The monitor typically contains special states which are only reachable by violating executions. The monitor must act strictly as an observer of the original system, without changing its behavior. Reachability analysis may then be performed on the parallel composition of the system and the monitor, with the

---

[6]These requirements are expressed in temporal logics in the form $\forall\Box\exists\Diamond\phi$.

FIGURE 9. Generic bounded-response monitor automaton

system correct iff no violating state in the monitor is reached. To illustrate the technique, we use the category of bounded response requirements.

Bounded response A bounded-response requirement asserts that if something (a trigger event, a say) happens, then a response, b say, occurs strictly within a certain time limit α.[7] For example, one may assert that every approach of the train is followed by a *raise* command within 10 seconds. To verify these requirements, it is often easiest to introduce a new stopwatch variable, t say, and build a monitor process with three locations: *idle*, *wait* and *viol*. Figure 9 depicts a generic automaton for bounded response requirements. Control is initially in the *idle* location. When a trigger event occurs in a non-violating location, control may pass to the *wait* location and the clock t is reset. Response events cause control to return to the *idle* location. The unlabeled transition from the *wait* location to *viol* is only enabled when $t \geq \alpha$, *i.e.* time for the response event has passed by. This automaton will reach its violation location iff it is possible for α time units to pass after an a event without a b event occurring. Therefore, the violation location is not reachable iff every a event is followed by a b event occurring less than α time units later.

To assert that the response event may occur any time up to and including α time units after the trigger event, we may use the same monitor automaton as above, but checking that the violation location is only ever reached with the value of t being α.

Since bounded response requirements occur frequently, we demonstrate how strict bounded response requirements can be verified slightly more efficiently, *i.e.* the response event must occur before the response time — occurring when exactly α time units have passed is not acceptable. The monitor in Figure 10 is slightly more deterministic than that of Figure 9 and will generally lead to a less complex reachable region. Note that the selfloops on the violation location have been omitted. Although this affects the behavior of the system, it does so in a way that has no effect on its correctness, assuming we use forward reachability; once a violation has been

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[7]This assertion is denoted $\forall\Box(a \Rightarrow \forall\Diamond_{<\alpha} b)$.

FIGURE 10. Bounded-response monitor automaton — strict bound

FIGURE 11. Monitor automaton for minimal event-separation time

detected, which additional states are reachable is irrelevant.

Minimal event separation Monitor processes can be built to verify that events occur with some minimal separation time. For example, Figure 11 shows the automaton for verifying that no two instances of the event a occur within α time units of each other.

8   Installing and Running HYTECH

8.1   Installation

Currently the executable file is available for the Sun4 architecture only. We plan to have versions available for a variety of platforms, including DEC workstations and PC's. Most jobs we have run require less than 20MB, many less than 10MB. However, obviously, the more memory the better.

The version of HYTECH described here was released in August 1995, and is available through anonymous ftp via ftp.cs.cornell.edu in the directory ~pub/tah/HyTech, and through the World-Wide Web via HYTECH's home page http://www.cs.cornell.edu/Info/People/tah/hytech.html. Download the file hytech.tar.Z. It must be uncompressed to hytech.tar, and then expanded using the Unix tar command. The following sequence of commands will produce the directory HyTech.

```
uncompress hytech.tar.Z
tar -xf hytech.tar
```

The HyTech directory contains the subdirectories src, bin, user_guide, examples, and papers, containing the source code, executables, a more comprehensive version of this user guide, examples, and many papers on hybrid automata, respectively. The main directory also contains the files README and license. Please sign a copy of the license and follow the instructions given on the form. Licensed users will be assured of being informed about new releases of the software. We would also appreciate hearing about your experiences with HyTech and the applications you analyze with it.

8.2   Executing HyTech

You must have the files hytech and hytech.exe in your current directory. Assuming your input file is called a.hy, the basic command to run HyTech is hytech a.hy. The .hy suffix on the filename may be omitted. Output appears on stdout, so it is usually directed to a file via a command such as hytech a.hy > a.log. HyTech creates a temporary file by adding -temp.hy to the source filename, *e.g.* for the commands above, the file a.hy-temp.hy is temporarily created and then destroyed. Clearly, you should avoid using file names ending in -temp.hy.

Options Available options are displayed by executing HyTech with no input file. Options are given in the form -⟨*flag_type*⟩⟨*n*⟩, and must occur before the filename on the command line. The only options so far are for controlling the amount of output generated (-p0, -p1, and -p2, where the higher numbers indicate more verbose output), and the format of the output (-f0 for conjunctions output along a single line, and -f1 for conjuncts listed one per line).

Examples Numerous sample input files and their output logs can be found in the subdirectory examples. Examine these to familiarize yourself with the input description language. Some of them are discussed in the user guide and [HHWT95a].

Bugs, comments, suggestions Please report any bugs or installation and maintenance problems to hytech@cs.cornell.edu. We do not have the resources to provide commercial-level support, but we can probably help you. We also welcome comments and suggestions, since the experience of HyTech's users will help to improve future versions of the software.

9   Hints for the Efficient Use of HyTech

This section describes hints on how to make the most of HyTech's computational power. If HyTech does not terminate on your input file, and you cannot figure out why, trying these heuristics may well help. Sometimes a slightly modified description will make a tremendous difference. As a general principle, keep your model of the system as simple as possible at first. Once HyTech has successfully analyzed the system, slowly add more detail to your model.

Keep the system description small. Generally, the smaller the better, *i.e.* try to minimize the number of components, locations, and variables. For example, try to model only a small number of the system's components first. Share locations wherever possible, *e.g.* error locations can often be combined into one. Some locations may be eliminated if they are "intermediate" locations not involved in direct synchronization with other components, and time spent in these locations can be transferred to the immediately adjacent locations.

Encode discrete variables into locations. For a bounded discrete variable, it is generally more efficient to split each location into several locations, one for each value of the variable, than to declare the variable as a real-valued variable. However, the increased efficiency often carries the disadvantage of a less compact description.

Manually compose tightly coupled components. When taking the product of two automata, many product locations are irrelevant since they are unreachable. If two components are tightly coupled with synchronized events, the reachable product automaton can be substantially smaller than the complete product. It may be beneficial to input the reachable product of such automata, instead of their components, since this version of HyTech constructs complete products only.

Keep constants simple. Generally, the lower the lcm:gcd ratio of the constants in the system, the faster the reachability analysis. Indeed, lowering the ratio may be necessary for reachability to terminate. To achieve low lcm:gcd ratios, it is often possible to verify an abstracted system where lower bounds are rounded down to smaller constants, and upper bounds are rounded up.

Model urgent events explicitly. If an event is urgent, model this fact directly where possible by using the ASAP guard. This is more efficient than introducing an auxiliary clock.

Exploit "don't care" information. In many locations of an automaton, not all variable values are relevant. However, reachability analysis will record the exact values of such "don't care" variables. Thus to simplify the reachable region, it is helpful to make these variables completely unknown

wherever they are irrelevant. This can be achieved by explicitly assigning them into the interval $(-\infty, \infty)$ on all transitions into the appropriate locations. A tempting option is to set them to a particular fixed value while control remains in a given location. However, this strategy is not as beneficial as assigning them into $(-\infty, \infty)$, since there is a nontrivial relationship between them and any other variables as time passes.

Use strong invariants. Sometimes it is helpful to restrict reachability analysis as much as possible through the use of strong invariants. For instance, enforcing implicit invariants can be advantageous, particularly when performing backward reachability analysis. In the gas burner example, backward reachability is required, since forward reachability does not terminate. It would be easy (and natural) to model the system without using the invariants $x \geq 0$, $y \geq 0$, and $t \geq 0$ for the clock and stopwatch variables. These invariants would play no role in forward analysis. However, backward analysis is nonterminating without these invariants, whereas adding them causes termination in seven iterations.

Use the reachability facility provided. It is optimized for its task and faster than writing your own while loops. It also enables error traces to be generated.

Try forward and backward analysis. It is often not easy to predict which direction will terminate faster.

10   REFERENCES

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