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Security of Blind Discrete Log Signatures against Interactive Attacks

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2229))

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Abstract

We present a novel parallel one-more signature forgery against blind Okamoto-Schnorr and blind Schnorr signatures in which an attacker interacts some l times with a legitimate signer and produces from these interactions l + 1 signatures. Security against the new attack requires that the following ROS-problem is intractable: find an overdetermined,s olvable system of linear equations modulo q withrandom inhomogenities (right sides).

There is an inherent weakness in the security result of Pointcheval and Stern. Theorem 26[PS00] does not cover attacks with 4 parallel interactions for elliptic curves of order 2200. That would require the intractability of the ROS-problem, a plausible but novel complexity assumption. Conversely, assuming the intractability of the ROS-problem, we show that Schnorr signatures are secure in the random oracle and generic group model against the one-more signature forgery.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fachbereiche Mathematik/Informatik, Universität Frankfurt, PSF 111932, D-60054, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Claus Peter Schnorr

Authors
  1. Claus Peter Schnorr
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology (ERCIST), Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, 100080, Beijing, China

    Sihan Qing

  2. NTT Labs, 1-1 Hikarinooka, 239-0847, Yokosuka-shi, Japan

    Tatsuaki Okamoto

  3. Oracle Corporation, 500 Oracle Parkway, 94065, Redwood Shores, CA, USA

    Jianying Zhou

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Schnorr, C.P. (2001). Security of Blind Discrete Log Signatures against Interactive Attacks. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42880-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45600-1

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