

# Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions

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**Abstract.** In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are *hash-based* message authentication codes. We present *distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks* on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.

## 1 Introduction

Many cryptographic schemes use hash functions as a primitive. Various assumptions are made on the underlying hash function in order to prove the security of the scheme. For example, some proofs assume that the hash function behaves as a random oracle, while other proofs only assume collision resistance. With the continuing development in hash function research, especially several popular ones are no longer secure against collision attacks, a natural question is whether these attacks would have any impact on the security of existing *hash-based* cryptographic schemes.

In this paper, we focus our study on HMAC and NMAC, which are hash-based message authentication codes proposed by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [2]. HMAC has been implemented in widely used security protocols including SSL, TLS, SSH, and IPsec. NMAC, although less known in the practical world, is the theoretical foundation of HMAC — existing security proofs [2,1] were first given for NMAC and then extended to HMAC. It is commonly believed that the two schemes have identical security.

The constructions of HMAC and NMAC are based on a *keyed hash function*  $F_k(m) = F(k, m)$ , in which the IV of  $F$  is replaced with a secret key  $k$ . NMAC has the following nested structure:  $\text{NMAC}_{(k_1, k_2)}(m) = F_{k_1}(F_{k_2}(m))$ , where  $k = (k_1, k_2)$  is a pair of secret keys. HMAC is similar to NMAC, except that the key pair  $(k_1, k_2)$  is derived from a *single* secret key using the hash function. Hence, we can view HMAC as NMAC plus a key derivation function.

The security of HMAC and NMAC was carefully analyzed by its designers [2]. They showed that NMAC is a pseudorandom function family (PRF)

under the two assumptions that (A1) the keyed compression function  $f_k$  of the hash function is a PRF, and (A2) the keyed hash function  $F_k$  is *weakly collision resistant*<sup>1</sup>. The proof for NMAC was then lifted to HMAC by further assuming that (A3) the key derivation function in HMAC is a PRF. The provable security of HMAC, besides its efficiency and elegance, was an important factor for its wide deployment. However, recent collision attacks on hash functions [21,24] imply that assumption (A2) in the original proof no longer holds when considering concrete constructions such as HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1. To fix this problem, Bellare recently showed [1] that NMAC is a PRF under the sole assumption that the keyed compression function  $f_k$  is a PRF. This implies that the security of HMAC now depends only on assumptions (A1) and (A3). The main advantage of the new analysis is that the proof assumptions do not seem to be refuted by existing attacks on hash functions.

The new security proofs are quite satisfying, especially since they are based on relatively weak assumptions of the underlying hash function. On the other hand, they have also raised interesting questions as whether the proof assumptions indeed hold for popular hash functions. In particular, does any existing collision attack on a hash function compromise the PRF assumption? And if so, does it lead to possible attacks on HMAC and NMAC?

## 1.1 Summary of Main Results

In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC. We answer the aforementioned questions in the affirmative by constructing various attacks on HMAC and NMAC based upon weaknesses of the underlying hash function.

Our analysis is based upon existing analyses of hash functions, especially the attacks on MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1 presented in [25,9,10,7]. We first show that the *collision differential path* in these earlier attacks can be used to construct *distinguishing attacks* on the keyed compression function  $f_k$ . Hence, for MD4, MD5<sup>2</sup>, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1,  $f_k$  is *not* a PRF.

Building upon the above attacks, we show how to construct distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC when the underlying hash functions are MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. The complexity of our attacks is closely related to the total probability of the collision differential path, and in some cases it is less than the  $2^{n/2}$  generic bound for birthday-type attacks. A summary of our main results is given in Table 1. We remark that in our key recovery attack the adversary can retrieve the entire inner key  $k_2$ . This can greatly weaken the security of the scheme. In particular, when the *keyed* inner function is degraded to a hash function with a *known* IV, further attacks such as single-block forgeries become possible.

<sup>1</sup> Please refer to Section 3 for precise definitions of  $f_k$  and  $F_k$ . The notion of weakly collision resistant (WCR) was introduced in [2]. Roughly,  $F_k$  is WCR if it is computationally infeasible to find  $m \neq m'$  s.t.  $F_k(m) = F_k(m')$  for hidden  $k$ .

<sup>2</sup> In the case of MD5,  $f_k$  is not a PRF under *related-key attacks*.

**Table 1.** Result summary: number of queries in our attacks on HMAC/NMAC

	hash function	distinguish & forgery attacks	key recovery attacks	comments
HMAC/NMAC	MD4	$2^{58}$	$2^{63}$	
NMAC	MD5	$2^{47}$	$2^{47}$	related-key attacks
HMAC/NMAC	SHA-0	$2^{84}$	$2^{84}$	
HMAC/NMAC	reduced SHA-1	$2^{34}$	$2^{34}$	inner function is 34 rounds

## 1.2 Use of Hash Collisions in Our Attacks

Our attacks on HMAC and NMAC are based on collisions of the keyed inner function  $F_{k_2}$ . The main reason that an adversary can observe such collisions is that in our scenario the outer function  $F_{k_1}$ , although hiding the output of the inner function, does not *hide* the occurrence of an inner collision.

In our key recovery attacks, each bit of collision information – whether or not a collision occurs from a set of properly chosen messages – roughly reveals one bit of the inner key. This is due to the fact that a collision holds information about the entire hash computation, and hence the secret key. Our techniques illustrate that collisions within a hash function can potentially be very dangerous to the security of the upper-layer cryptographic scheme.

## 1.3 Other Results

**General framework for analyzing HMAC and NMAC.** We extend the approach in our attacks to provide a general framework for analyzing HMAC and NMAC. This framework also points to possible directions for hash function attacks that most likely lead to further improved attacks on HMAC and NMAC.

**Attacks on key derivation in HMAC-MD5.** We study the key derivation function in HMAC-MD5, which is essentially the MD5 compression function keyed through the *message input*. We describe distinguishing and second preimage attacks on the function with complexity much less than the theoretical bound.

**New modification technique.** We develop a new message modification technique in our key recovery analysis. In contrast with Wang’s techniques [21,22], our method does not require full knowledge of the internal hash computation process. We believe that our new technique may have other applications.

## 1.4 Implications

In practice, HMAC is mostly implemented with MD5 or SHA-1. To a much lesser extent, there is some deployment of HMAC-MD4 (for example, see [12]). We are not aware of any deployment of NMAC. The attacks presented in this paper do not imply any immediate practical threat to implementations of HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1. However, our attacks on HMAC-MD4 may not be out of range of some adversaries, and therefore it should no longer be used in practice.

We emphasize that our results on HMAC complement, rather than contradict, the analysis in [2,1]. While the designers proved that HMAC is secure under certain assumptions on the underlying hash function, we show that attacks are possible when these assumptions do not hold.

### 1.5 Organization of the Paper

In Section 3, we provide brief descriptions of HMAC, NMAC and the MDx family. In Section 5, we present all three types of attacks on NMAC-MD5, which is based on the MD5 pseudo-collision (Section 4). The simplicity of the underlying differential path in this case facilitates our explanation, especially the technical details of our key recovery attack. For attacks on HMAC and NMAC using other underlying hash functions, the methods are similar and thus we just focus on what is different in each case in Section 6. In Section 7, we describe a general framework for analyzing HMAC and NMAC.

## 2 Related Work

Our analysis on HMAC and NMAC is closely related to various attacks on hash functions, especially those in the MDx family. In addition, our work is also related to the rich literature on message authentication codes. Many early heuristic designs for MACs were broken, sometimes in ways that allowed forgery and key recovery [17,18,19]. These early analyses were the driving force behind proposals with formal security proofs, namely HMAC and NMAC [2]. Since their publication, most of the security analysis was provided by the designers. Recently, Coron *et al.* [11] studied the security of HMAC and NMAC in the setting of constructing iterative hash functions. After our submission to Asiacrypt'06, we learned that Kim *et al.* [15] did independent work on distinguishing and forgery attacks on HMAC and NMAC when the underlying functions are MD4, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. They did not consider key recovery attacks.

Some of our attacks are in the related-key setting. Related-key attacks were introduced by Biham [5] and Knudsen [14] to analyze block ciphers. A theoretical treatment of related-key attacks was given by Bellare and Kohno [4]. The relevance of related-key cryptanalysis is debated in the cryptographic community. For example, some suggest that the attacks are only practical in poorly implemented protocols. On the other hand, cryptographic primitives that resist such attacks are certainly more robust, and vulnerabilities can sometimes indicate weaknesses in the design. See the introduction to [13] for example settings in which related-key attacks can be applied. We note that the designers of HMAC and NMAC did not consider the related key setting in their security analysis.

## 3 Preliminaries

### 3.1 Hash Functions and the MDx Family

A cryptographic hash function is a mathematical transformation that takes an input message of arbitrary length and produces an output of fixed length, called

the *hash value*. Formal treatment of cryptographic hash functions and their properties can be found in [20]. In practice, hash functions are constructed by iterating a *compression function*  $f(cv, x)$  which takes fixed length inputs: a chaining variable  $cv$  of  $n$  bits and a message block  $x$  of  $b$  bits. The hash function  $F$  is defined as follows: First divide the input message  $m$  into  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_s$  according to some preprocessing specification, where each  $x_i$  is of length  $b$ . Then set the first chaining variable  $cv_0$  as the fixed IV, and compute  $cv_i = f(cv_{i-1}, x_i)$  for  $i = 1, 2, \dots, s$ . The final output  $cv_s$  of the iteration is the value of  $F$ .

The MDx family of hash functions includes MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, and others with similar structure. Here we briefly describe the structure of MD5 and omit others. The compression function of MD5 takes a 128-bit chaining variable and a 512-bit message block. The chaining variable is split into four registers  $(A, B, C, D)$ , and the message block is split into 16 message words  $m_0, \dots, m_{15}$ . The compression function consists of 4 rounds of 16 steps each, for a total of 64 steps. In each step, the registers are updated according to one of the message words. The initial registers  $(A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0)$  are set to be some fixed IV. Each step  $t$  ( $0 \leq t < 64$ ) has the following general form<sup>3</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &\leftarrow (A_t + \phi(B_t, C_t, D_t) + w_t + K_t) \lll s_t \\ (A_{t+1}, B_{t+1}, C_{t+1}, D_{t+1}) &\leftarrow (D_t, X_t + B_t, B_t, C_t) \end{aligned}$$

In the above equation,  $\phi$  is a round-dependent Boolean function,  $K_t$  is a step-dependent constant, and  $s_t$  is a step-dependent rotation amount. In each round, all 16 message words are applied in a different order, and so  $w_t$  is one of the 16 message words. After the 64 steps, the final output is computed as  $(A_{64} + A_0, B_{64} + B_0, C_{64} + C_0, D_{64} + D_0)$ .

### 3.2 Message Authentication Codes, HMAC and NMAC

A message authentication code is a mathematical transformation that takes as inputs a message and a secret key and produces an output called *authentication tag*. The most common attack on MACs is a *forgery attack*, in which the adversary can produce a valid message/tag pair without knowing the secret key. For MACs that are based on *iterative* hash functions, there is a birthday-type forgery attack [17,3] that requires about  $2^{n/2}$  MAC queries, where  $n$  is the length of the authentication tag.

HMAC and NMAC are both hash-based MACs. Let  $F$  be the underlying hash function and  $f$  be the compression function. The basic design approach for NMAC is to replace the fixed IV in  $F$  with a secret key (aka keyed via the IV). Following the notation in [2], we use  $f_k(x) = f(k, x)$  to denote the keyed compression function and  $F_k(x) = F(k, x)$  the keyed hash function. Let  $(k_1, k_2)$  be a pair of independent keys. The NMAC function, on input message  $m$  and secret key  $(k_1, k_2)$ , is defined as:

$$\text{NMAC}_{(k_1, k_2)}(m) = F_{k_1}(F_{k_2}(m)).$$

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<sup>3</sup> We use a slightly different notation from previous work so that there is a unified description for all the steps.

The construction of HMAC was motivated by practical implementation needs. Since NMAC changes the fixed IV in  $F$  into a secret key, this requires a modification of existing implementations of the hash function. To avoid this problem, the designers introduced the fixed-IV variant HMAC. Let  $\text{const}_1$  and  $\text{const}_2$  be two fixed constants. The HMAC function, on input message  $m$  and a single secret key  $k$ , is defined as:

$$k_1 = f(IV, k \oplus \text{const}_1) \quad (1)$$

$$k_2 = f(IV, k \oplus \text{const}_2) \quad (2)$$

$$\text{HMAC}_k(m) = \text{NMAC}_{(k_1, k_2)}(m).$$

In the above description for HMAC, we can consider Equations (1) and (2) together as a key derivation function KDF which takes a single secret key  $k$  and outputs a pair of keys  $(k_1, k_2)$ . That is,  $(k_1, k_2) = \text{KDF}(k)$ . Hence, HMAC is essentially “KDF + NMAC”. We remark that the term “key derivation function” was not used in [2], but this view of the HMAC construction will be quite convenient for our later analysis.

## 4 Pseudo-collisions of MD5

In [9], den Boer and Bosselaers analyzed the compression function of MD5 and found pseudo-collisions of the form  $f(cv, m) = f(cv', m)$ , where  $cv$  and  $cv'$  are two different IVs. Such pseudo-collisions of MD5 are the basis for our related-key attacks on NMAC-MD5. In this section, we discuss some properties of the pseudo-collisions under the framework of differential cryptanalysis.

Differential cryptanalysis was introduced by Biham and Shamir [8] to analyze the security of DES. The idea also applies to the analysis of hash functions. In a hash collision attack, we consider input pairs with an appropriately defined difference and analyze how the differences in the chaining variables evolve during the hash computation. The intermediate differences collectively are called a *differential path*, and its probability is defined to be the probability that the path holds when averaged over all input pairs satisfying the given difference.

For the MD5 pseudo-collisions in [9], the messages are the same and the input difference is only in the chaining variables. The pair of initial chaining variables  $(cv, cv')$  as well as all the intermediate values satisfy the following difference:

$$cv \oplus cv' = ( 80000000 \ 80000000 \ 80000000 \ 80000000 ) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Delta^{\text{msb}}. \quad (3)$$

Putting in concrete terms, the differences are only in the most significant bit (MSB) of each register  $A_t, B_t, C_t, D_t$ . This simple pattern propagates through all 64 steps of MD5. Because of the extra addition operation at the end, the difference disappears, yielding a pseudo-collision.

The differential path requires the following conditions on the IV:

$$\text{MSB}(B_0) = \text{MSB}(C_0) = \text{MSB}(D_0) = b, \quad (4)$$

where  $b = 0$  or  $1$ . Moreover, the MSBs of the intermediate registers are the same for most of the first round. Namely, for  $1 \leq t < 15$ ,

$$\text{MSB}(A_t) = \text{MSB}(B_t) = \text{MSB}(C_t) = \text{MSB}(D_t) = b.$$

The total probability of the differential is  $2^{-46}$ .

## 5 Related-Key Attacks on NMAC-MD5

In this section, we present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on NMAC-MD5 in the related-key setting. In this setting, the goal of the adversary is to break the MAC by obtaining input/output pairs of two MAC oracles whose keys are different but with a known relation.

As described in Section 4, the differential path for the MD5 pseudo-collision holds with probability  $2^{-46}$ . Given the path, we can construct a related-key distinguishing attack on the keyed MD5 compression function that requires about  $2^{47}$  queries. This distinguishing attack is the basis for all three types of attacks on NMAC-MD5. Since the distinguishing attacks on the MD5 compression function and on NMAC-MD5 are nearly identical, we omit the details of the former.

Recall that in NMAC, the inner function  $F_{k_2}$  is keyed through the IV. Hence, in our related-key attacks, the difference in the *inner key*  $k_2$  is set according to the input IV difference given by Equation (3). More specifically, we have the following setting for our related-key attacks on NMAC-MD5:

- There are two oracles  $\text{NMAC}_{(k_1, k_2)}$  and  $\text{NMAC}_{(k'_1, k'_2)}$ . The relation between  $(k_1, k_2)$  and  $(k'_1, k'_2)$  is set as:

$$k_1 = k'_1 \quad \text{and} \quad k_2 \oplus k'_2 = \Delta^{\text{msb}}. \quad (5)$$

- The adversary queries each oracle on input messages of its choice and is given the corresponding authentication tag.

### 5.1 Related-Key Distinguishing and Forgery Attacks on NMAC-MD5

We first present a related-key distinguishing attack on NMAC-MD5, based upon the lack of pseudorandomness of the keyed MD5 compression function. In this attack, the adversary is given two oracles  $(O, O')$ , which can either be the two NMAC oracles as defined by Equation (5) or oracles for truly random functions. The adversary generates  $2^{46}$  random messages and queries both oracles. If a collision  $O(m) = O'(m)$  is observed for any message  $m$ , it identifies the oracles as NMAC; otherwise, it identifies them as a truly random function.

The correctness of the attack is easy to see: After  $2^{46}$  messages, a collision of the inner function is expected. That is,  $F_{k_2}(m) = F_{k'_2}(m)$ . Since the outer key  $k_1$  is the same, the inner collision yields a collision for the two NMAC oracles. The complexity is  $2^{46}$  random queries to each oracle, for a total of  $2^{47}$  queries. The

attack succeeds if  $k_2$  satisfies the condition given by Equation (4). Hence, for two random NMAC key pairs which satisfy the relation given by Equation (5), the success probability of our distinguishing attack is  $1/4$ .

It is worth noticing that the outer function in NMAC, although making the output of the inner function hidden, does not *hide* the occurrence of an inner collision. This property is very useful for converting the distinguishing attack on the inner function (which is the keyed MD5 compression) to a distinguishing attack on NMAC. Such a conversion also applies to HMAC.

The attack can be extended to a forgery attack as follows [17,3]: Once a message  $m$  is found that causes a collision of the two NMAC oracles, the adversary queries the *first* oracle on  $m||e$  for any extension  $e$  and obtains  $tag = \text{NMAC}_{(k_1, k_2)}(m||e)$ . Then, it produces  $(m||e, tag)$  as a forgery for the *second* oracle. Since  $\text{NMAC}_{(k_1, k_2)}(m||e) = \text{NMAC}_{(k'_1, k'_2)}(m||e)$ , the forged authentication tag is valid. The complexity is  $2^{47}$  random queries plus one *chosen* query. Hence, the total number of queries is about  $2^{47}$  and the success probability is  $1/4$ .

## 5.2 Related-Key Key Recovery Attack on NMAC-MD5

We present a partial key recovery attack on NMAC-MD5, in which the adversary can retrieve the entire inner key  $k_2$  in NMAC. This is the most technical part of the paper, so we start with a high level description of the key recovery algorithm consisting of four phases:

- **Phase 1.** The attacker generates random messages until it obtains a message  $m$  that causes a collision of the two NMAC oracles.
- **Phase 2.** The attacker modifies certain bits of  $m$  to create new messages  $m^*$  and observes whether any  $m^*$  causes a new collision. This collision information allows the attacker to recover many bits in the intermediate registers  $S = (A_{14}, B_{14}, C_{14}, D_{14})$  in the computation of  $F_{k_2}(m)$ .
- **Phase 3.** Similar to Phase 2, the attacker recovers a few additional bits from other registers, and uses this information to determine more bits of  $S$  with a possible small additive error.
- **Phase 4.** The attacker guesses all remaining unknown bits of  $S$  and steps through the MD5 computation backwards to get  $(A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0)$  – a candidate for  $k_2$ . It verifies whether  $F_{k_2}(m) = F_{k'_2}(m)$ . If so, it outputs  $k_2$  as the inner key; Otherwise, go back to Phase 1.

Phase 1 and Phase 4 of the key recovery algorithm are fairly straightforward, and so for the rest of the section we focus on Phase 2 and Phase 3. We first explain the main idea and then present detailed analysis.

**Main idea.** For Phase 2 and Phase 3, the objective is to recover bits of some intermediate registers through collision information. To achieve this goal, we take a closer look at the collision differential paths and analyze what information can be derived from such paths. Let  $\text{DP}_m$  denote the differential path induced by  $m$ , i.e., all the intermediate differences in the computation of  $F_{k_2}(m)$  and  $F_{k'_2}(m)$ .



Since  $m$  yields a collision, we know that  $\text{DP}_m$  follows the differential path for the MD5 pseudo-collision. In particular, for the computation of  $F_{k_2}(m)$ , we have  $\text{MSB}(B_t) = b$  for  $1 \leq t < 15$ . WLOG, we assume  $b = 0$ .

For a given step  $t$  in the first round, we introduce a new message  $m^*$  that is defined based on message  $m$  as follows:

$$m_j^* = \begin{cases} m_j & \text{if } 0 \leq j < t \\ m_j + \Delta & \text{if } j = t \\ \text{random} & \text{if } t < j < 16 \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

We next consider the differential path  $\text{DP}_{m^*}$ , induced by  $m^*$ . Since  $m$  and  $m^*$  are the same up to Step  $t-1$ , the two paths  $\text{DP}_m$  and  $\text{DP}_{m^*}$  are the same until this step. For Step  $t$ , let  $B_{t+1}^*$  be the newly computed register by replacing  $m_t$  with  $m_t^* = m_t + \Delta$ . We know that  $B_{t+1}^*$  will be different from  $B_{t+1}$ . A key observation is that if  $\text{MSB}(B_{t+1}^*)$  changes from 0 to 1, then the path  $\text{DP}_{m^*}$  will *drift away* from the collision differential path, and hence the chance of it producing a collision after 64 steps is negligible. More precisely, we have the following lemma.

**Lemma 1.** *Let  $m^*$  be a message defined as in Equation (6), and let  $p^*$  be the probability that  $m^*$  causes a collision  $F_{k_2}(m^*) = F_{k_2'}(m^*)$ . If  $\text{MSB}(B_{t+1}^*) = 0$ , then  $p^* = 2^{t-45}$  when averaged over all random  $m_j^*$  ( $j > t$ ). If  $\text{MSB}(B_{t+1}^*) = 1$ , then  $p^* \approx 2^{-128}$ .*

For a given value  $\Delta$ , Lemma 1 can be used to detect the MSB of  $B_{t+1}^*$  as follows: generate about  $2^{45-t}$  messages satisfying Equation (6) and query both NMAC oracles on these messages. If a collision is observed, then the MSB of  $B_{t+1}^*$  is 0; otherwise, the bit is 1.

In what follows, we show how to use the above collision information to recover  $B_{t+1}$ . To better illustrate the intuition, we consider a simplified step function where the rotate is *eliminated*. Hence Step  $t$  becomes  $B_{t+1} = m_t + T$  and  $B_{t+1}^* = m_t^* + T$ , where the value  $T$  has been determined before Step  $t$ . To detect bit  $i$  of  $B_{t+1}$ , we set  $m_t^* = m_t + 2^i$ . This implies that

$$B_{t+1}^* = B_{t+1} + 2^i. \quad (7)$$

We consider the effect of the above increment, depending on whether bit  $i$  of  $B_{t+1}$  is 0 or 1:

- If bit  $i$  of  $B_{t+1}$  is 0, then the increment will not cause a carry. In this case,  $\text{MSB}(B_{t+1}^*) = \text{MSB}(B_{t+1}) = 0$ , and we will observe a collision in the expected number of queries.
- If bit  $i$  of  $B_{t+1}$  is 1, then the increment causes a carry. Furthermore, if we can set bits  $[(i+1)..30]$  of  $B_{t+1}^*$  to be all 1, then the carry will go all the way to the MSB of  $B_{t+1}^*$ . In this case,  $\text{MSB}(B_{t+1}^*) = \text{MSB}(B_{t+1}) + 1 = 1$ , and we will *not* observe a collision.

To ensure carry propagates to the MSB, we set  $m_t^* = m_t + 2^i + d$ , for an appropriate choice of  $d$ . So Equation (7) becomes  $B_{t+1}^* = B_{t+1} + 2^i + d$ .

The above analysis yields an algorithm for determining  $B_{t+1}$  one bit at a time, from bit 30 to bit 0. (Note that we already know bit 31 of  $B_{t+1}$  is 0 by assumption.) We refer to this algorithm as the *bit flipping algorithm*, and the complete description is given in Appendix A.

**Detailed analysis.** The main idea described above generally applies to any register  $B_t$  for  $0 \leq t < 15$ . In Phase 2, the registers to be recovered are

$$(B_{11}, B_{12}, B_{13}, B_{14}) = (A_{14}, D_{14}, C_{14}, B_{14}).$$

The reason why we choose later registers rather than earlier ones is to minimize the number of oracle queries, which is  $2^{45-t}$  per oracle per bit computed of register  $B_{t+1}$ . We leave  $B_{15}, B_{16}$  free so that there is enough randomness for generating new collisions.

We now consider how to apply the bit flipping algorithm in the presence of rotation. We need to do  $B_{t+1}^* = B_{t+1} + 2^i + d$  for  $i = 30, 29, \dots, 0$ . However, we are not able to do so by just setting  $m_t^* = m_t + 2^i + d$  because of the rotation operation  $\lll_{s_t}$ . Instead, we use a *modified* bit flipping algorithm (see Appendix A for details). In this algorithm, we set  $m_t^* = m_t + 2^{i'} + d'$  where

$$i' + s_t = i \bmod 32 \quad \text{and} \quad d' \lll_{s_t} = d.$$

Note that if addition and rotation could commute, then setting  $m_t^*$  as above would have the same effect as  $B_{t+1}^* = B_{t+1} + 2^i + d$ . Since this is not the case, some error might occur when applying the modified algorithm. Fortunately, the error is manageable — we can show that the modified algorithm almost always succeeds for recovering the most significant  $(32 - s_t)$  bits of  $B_{t+1}$ . In other words, if it fails, it is almost always on the least significant  $s_t$  bits. More precisely, we have the following lemma. The proof is omitted due to space limit.

**Lemma 2.** *For step  $t$ , let  $p_t$  be the probability that the modified bit flipping algorithm correctly recovers the most significant  $(32 - s_t)$  bits of  $B_{t+1}$ , when averaged over all possible input messages  $m$ . Then  $p_t \geq 1 - 2^{-s_t} - 2^{-s_t-1}$ .*

For the four steps  $t = 10, 11, 12, 13$ , the rotation amounts are  $s_t = 17, 22, 7, 12$ . Hence, we can use the modified bit flipping algorithm to determine the following bits of the registers:

$$\begin{aligned} A_{14} &= B_{11} : \text{ most significant 15 bits} \\ D_{14} &= B_{12} : \text{ most significant 10 bits} \\ C_{14} &= B_{13} : \text{ most significant 25 bits} \\ B_{14} &= B_{14} : \text{ most significant 20 bits} \end{aligned}$$

In total we already recover 70 bits of the registers. We could proceed to Phase 4 and guess the remaining 58 bits. This would yield a key recovery algorithm with query complexity  $2^{47}$  and time complexity equal to about  $2^{58}$  MD5 operations, which is much less than exhaustive key search.

With refined analysis, we can further reduce the workload by doing an insignificant number of additional queries in Phase 3. We do so by following similar steps as in Phase 2, except recovering bits of earlier registers, namely the most significant  $(32 - s_t)$  bits of  $B_{10}, B_9, B_8$ . Once these bits are known, the interaction between successive steps can be used to determine 10 more bits of the registers  $(A_{14}, D_{14}, C_{14}, B_{14})$  up to a possible small additive error. Due to space limits, specific details are omitted. Together with an early stopping technique in Phase 4, the remaining workload is at most  $2^{45}$  MD5 operations. This can be reduced further, but  $2^{45}$  is already do-able with moderate computing resources. The total number of queries is still dominated by that of Phase 1, which is  $2^{47}$ .

**Implementation results.** We have implemented the key recovery attack on NMAC-MD5. In our implementation, we used a reduced-round version of MD5, in which the last round (16 steps) is omitted. Since the attack only depends on properties of the first round, the reduction in rounds does not affect the analysis except that the query complexity is reduced from  $2^{47}$  to  $2^{31}$ . In our experiment, the algorithm correctly recovered the inner key bits.

**Remarks on message modification techniques.** In the key recovery analysis, we use information about the collision differential paths to derive information about the intermediate registers. To generate useful paths, we developed a new message modification technique that works even when the internal hash computation is unknown due to the presence of the *secret key*.

It is worth comparing our modification techniques with Wang’s original message modification techniques [21,22], which deals with the situation where the entire hash computation is known since there is no secret for a keyless hash function. Note that the objective of the modification is also different for collision attacks and our key recovery attacks: the goal for the former is to modify messages so that collisions can occur with high probability; the goal for the latter is to modify messages so that certain collisions may or may *not* occur, depending upon the value of the secret key.

### 5.3 Attacks on the KDF in HMAC-MD5

Given our related-key attacks on NMAC-MD5, an immediate question is whether they are applicable to HMAC-MD5. Since the difference between HMAC and NMAC is the extra key derivation function KDF, we analyze properties of KDF in HMAC-MD5, which consists of two functions of the form  $k_i = f(IV, k \oplus \text{const}_i)$ . Here the MD5 compression function  $f$  is used as  $f(x, K)$ , where  $x \in \{0, 1\}^{128}$  and the key  $K \in \{0, 1\}^{512}$ . For ease of reference, we denote  $f(x, K)$  by  $g_K(x)$ . So  $\{g_K\}_{K \in \{0, 1\}^{512}}$  is a family of functions indexed by  $K$ .

As noted in Section 5.4 of [1], Rijmen observed that it seems possible to extend the pseudo-collision of MD5 [9] to a distinguishing attack on  $\{g_K\}$ . Here, we describe the details of such an attack: The adversary generates  $2^{46}$  random pairs  $(x, x')$  such that  $x \oplus x' = \Delta^{\text{msb}}$ , and queries an oracle, which is either  $g_K$  or a truly random function. If the adversary observes a collision for any pair, then

it identifies the oracle as  $g_K$ ; otherwise, it identifies the oracle as a truly random function. The complexity of the attack is  $2^{47}$  queries.

Recall that the HMAC security proofs [1,2] require KDF to be a PRF. However, the above distinguishing attack implies that the KDF in HMAC-MD5 is *not* a PRF. Despite the non-pseudorandomness, its presence does help HMAC-MD5 to resist our related-key attacks for the following reason. In order to apply the attacks to HMAC-MD5, we would need to set appropriate differences in the single key  $k$  and hope that  $(k_1, k_2) = \text{KDF}(k)$  would yield the required difference for  $k_2$  while keeping  $k_1$  the same (see Equation (5)). However, this appears to be very difficult, since any differences in  $k$  would almost certainly cause differences in both  $k_1$  and  $k_2$ , thus making the attacks impossible.

Of independent interest, we present a *second preimage attack* on  $g_K$ , also based on [9]. Here the key  $K$  can be either secret or known. The attack works as follows: For a given random input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^{128}$ , the adversary sets  $x'$  such that  $x \oplus x' = \Delta^{\text{msb}}$ , and outputs  $x'$  as a second preimage of  $x$ . The success probability is about  $2^{-48}$ , since the probability that  $x$  satisfies Equation (4) is  $2^{-2}$ , and the probability that the pair  $(x, x')$  then follows the differential path to produce a collision is  $2^{-46}$  (meaning  $x'$  is a second preimage of  $x$ ). Hence, the above attack requires  $O(1)$  workload, no queries, and succeeds with probability  $2^{-48}$ , which is much higher than the  $2^{-128}$  theoretical bound.

## 6 Attacks on HMAC/NMAC with Other Hash Functions

The basis for our attacks on NMAC-MD5 is a collision differential path for the keyed MD5 compression function that holds with *relatively large* probability. The same ideas and techniques also apply to other underlying hash functions such as MD4, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. In this section, we present three types of attacks on HMAC and NMAC for these underlying hash functions, all in the *standard* setting.

### 6.1 Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4

MD4 has long been known to be insecure, but it was an open question whether HMAC-MD4 can still be used as a PRF or a secure MAC. We answer the question in the negative by presenting attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4.

Our attacks are based upon the second preimage attack on MD4 by Yu *et al.* [25]. Table 3 of [25] gives a differential path that leads to a collision with probability  $2^{-62}$ . The details that are most relevant to our attacks are the message difference: there is only a one-bit difference in one of the message words, namely,  $m_4 \oplus m'_4 = 2^i$ , and the path holds for any  $i$  ( $0 \leq i < 32$ ), for a total of 32 possible paths. Given the paths, we can mount a distinguishing attack on the keyed MD4 compression function, implying that the function is *not* a PRF.

For our distinguish attack on HMAC-MD4, there is only a *single* oracle  $O$ , which can be either  $\text{HMAC}_k$  or a truly random function. The adversary generates about  $2^{62}$  message pairs  $(m, m')$  such that  $m_4 \oplus m'_4 = 2^i$  for some  $i$ , queries the oracle, and observes whether a collision  $O(m) = O(m')$  occurs. If so, it identifies

the oracle as HMAC; otherwise, it identifies it as a truly random function. The expected query complexity is  $2^{63}$ , and the success probability is one. From the collision, a forgery attack easily follows (similar to Section 5.1) which requires an additional chosen query.

We can reduce the query complexity to  $2^{58}$  by using a structure, which is a common trick in differential cryptanalysis. The idea is to take advantage of the multiple differential paths by generating input pairs  $(m, m')$  in a more compact way as follows: First, generate  $2^{26}$  random  $m_3$  (it can actually be any message word  $m_j$  as long as  $j \neq 4$ ). Second, for each  $m_3$ , generate all  $2^{32}$  possible values for  $m_4$ . Hence, the total number of messages is  $2^{58}$ . It is easy to show that the  $2^{58}$  messages collectively create  $2^{62}$  pairs of  $(m, m')$  for which  $m_4 \oplus m'_4 = 2^i$  for some  $i$ . One of the pairs is expected to produce a collision.

We can construct a partial key recovery attack on HMAC-MD4 following similar phases as that of NMAC-MD5. Given the form of the 32 differential paths and their associated conditions, it is better to use only one path ( $i = 22$ ) for key recovery. Our analysis shows that the query complexity is roughly  $2^{63}$  and the remaining computation is order  $2^{40}$  MD4 operations.

## 6.2 Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-SHA0

Chabaud and Joux [10] presented the first collision attack on SHA-0 with complexity  $2^{61}$ . Their analysis also introduced important concepts such as local collisions and disturbance vectors, which prove to be the basis for all subsequent attacks on SHA-0 and SHA-1. The differential path used in their attack holds with probability  $p = 2^{-83}$  (see Table 4 in [10] for detailed calculation). We can use the differential path to construct distinguish and forgery attack on HMAC-SHA0 with query complexity  $2^{84}$ . One subtle issue for SHA-0 (and SHA-1) is that we should generate message pairs so that they not only satisfy the required message difference but also extra conditions on certain message bits.

A partial key recovery attack on HMAC-SHA0 can also be constructed. In fact, the analysis would be much simpler than that of NMAC-MD5 due to the particular form of the SHA-0 (and SHA-1) step function, which is  $A_i = (A_{i-1} \lll 5) + f_i(B_{i-1}, C_{i-1}, D_{i-1}) + E_{i-1} + m_{i-1} + k_i$ . Since there is no rotation associated with the message word, we can use the bit flipping algorithm directly (rather than the modified version) to recover the register  $A_i$ . Our analysis shows that the query complexity is about  $2^{84}$ , and the time complexity is about  $2^{60}$ .

## 6.3 Attacks on Reduced-Round Variants of HMAC/NMAC-SHA1

Biham *et al.* [7] presented collision attacks on several reduced-round variants of SHA-1. Their attack on 34-round SHA-1 used a disturbance vector with very low Hamming weight (see Table 1 of [7]). Based on this vector, we calculated the probability of the differential path to be  $2^{-33}$ , and it holds for half of the randomly chosen IVs. This path implies that 34-round SHA-1 is not a PRF. Using our techniques developed earlier, we can construct all three types of attacks on HMAC-SHA1 when the inner function is reduced to 34 rounds. The query complexity is about  $2^{34}$  and the success probability is  $1/2$  for a random key.

## 6.4 Further Improvements

It is possible to further improve the complexity of our attacks. Krawczyk [16] pointed out a useful tradeoff between query complexity and the success probability of the attacks. More specifically, we can construct new attacks with  $2^t$  queries and success probability  $2^{t-q}$ , where  $2^q$  is the number of queries in our original attacks and  $1 \leq t \leq q$ . Biham [6] suggested that attacks on HMAC can be extended to 40-round SHA-1 using results in [7].

## 7 A General Framework for Analyzing HMAC/NMAC

In this section we extend the approach in our attacks to provide a general framework for analyzing HMAC/NMAC. Let DP be a collision differential path for the compression function  $f$ , and let  $\Delta = (\Delta cv, \Delta m)$  be the required input difference for the path. Suppose that the path holds with probability at least  $P_0 = 2^{-w}$  for a fraction  $q$  of all randomly chosen inputs  $(cv, cv')$  and  $(m, m')$  satisfying  $\Delta$ . We consider two cases depending on  $\Delta cv$ :

- $\Delta cv = 0$ . In this case, the path DP yields a real collision. The attacks to be considered are in the standard setting and apply to both HMAC and NMAC.
- $\Delta cv \neq 0$ . In this case, the path DP yields a pseudo-collision. The attacks to be considered are in the related-key setting and apply only to NMAC.

There are three types of possible attacks, all having success probability  $q$ .

1. *Distinguishing attack*. The complexity is about  $O(2^{w+1})$  queries.
2. *Forgery attack*. If the hash function  $F$  is iterative, the distinguishing attack implies a forgery attack with one additional chosen query.
3. *Key recovery attack*. If  $F$  has similar step functions as MDx, the collision path may allow the recovery of the inner key in HMAC and NMAC. The query complexity is  $O(2^{w+1})$ , and the time complexity depends on the form of the collision path.

To beat the generic birthday-type forgery attack, we need to find a collision differential path such that  $P_0 > 2^{-n/2}$ , and to beat the exhaustive key search attack, we need  $P_0 > 2^{-n}$ . Hence, the above general framework reduces the problem of attacking HMAC/NMAC to the problem of finding a “good” collision differential path for the underlying compression function.

**Finding suitable differential paths.** There have been many collision attacks on hash functions, each relying on a specific differential path. One important point is that a differential path that works best for finding collisions may not be the best for the purpose of attacking HMAC and NMAC. To better explain this, we introduce a variable  $P_r$ , which is the probability of the differential path from Step  $r$  to the last step.

- For collision attacks, we should select a path such that  $P_r$  is minimized, assuming message modification techniques can apply up to Step  $r-1$  of the hash function.
- For attacks on HMAC and NMAC, we should select a path such that  $P_0$  is minimized.

For example, for the purpose of analyzing HMAC-SHA0, Chabaud and Joux's attack offers a better differential path than the improved collision attack in [23], since the probability  $P_0$  associated with the differential path in the former attack is much larger than the latter.

To break HMAC-MD5, we would need to find differential paths that hold with large enough probability  $P_0$  and lead to real collisions. The differential path in Wang's MD5 attack [21] was constructed to minimize  $P_{17}$  ( $\approx 2^{-37}$ ) so that it works best with modification techniques. The total probability  $P_0$  of the path is only about  $2^{-300}$ . So far, improvements to the MD5 attack were all due to refined modification techniques: nobody has discovered new differential paths. An open question is whether differential paths for MD5 with  $P_0 > 2^{-128}$  can be found. New automated search methods may provide promising ways for finding such differential paths.

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## A The Bit Flipping Algorithms

We first give the bit flipping algorithm in Figure 1. This is for the simplified MD5 step function where the rotation is eliminated.

```

For  $j = 0, \dots, t-1$ , set  $m_j^* = m_j$ 
Set  $d = 0$  (a)
For  $i = 30$  downto 0 do (b)
{
  Set  $m_t^* = m_t + 2^i + d$  (c)
  Repeat order  $2^{46-t}$  times
  {
    Choose  $m_{t+1}^*, \dots, m_{15}^*$  at random.
    /* now all 16 words of  $m^*$  have been set */
    Query the two nmac oracles on  $m^*$ 
    If there is a collision, then
    {
      Bit  $i$  of  $B_{t+1}$  is 0
      Set  $d = d + 2^i$  (d)
      break;
    }
  }
}
If no collision found, then bit  $i$  of  $B_{t+1}$  is 1
}

```

**Fig. 1.** Bit flipping algorithm for computing  $B_{t+1}$



The modified bit flipping algorithm is similar, except the following four steps:

- Step (a)  $\Rightarrow$  **Set**  $d' = 0$
- Step (b)  $\Rightarrow$  **For**  $i' = 30 - s_t$  **downto** 0 **do**
- Step (c)  $\Rightarrow$  **Set**  $m_t^* = m_t + 2^{i'} + d'$
- Step (d)  $\Rightarrow$  **Set**  $d' = d' + 2^{i'}$