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Language and Extra-linguistic Reality in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya

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Abstract

Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhartṛhari’s linguistic philosophy. In the ‘Vākyapadīya,’ this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual viewpoints expressed in the kārikās are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: (A1) Language is coextensive with external reality. (A2a) Language, designated as kalpanā/vikalpa, is distinct from reality. (A2b) Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality (upacārasattā/aupacārikī sattā). (A3) Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity (vyavahāra) would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist Pramāṇavāda) are examined. Approach (A3), according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti’s concept of arthakriyā. This approach accords with Bhartṛhari’s perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions.

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Notes

  1. For the first time in the studies of Indian philosophy, this term was introduced by W. Halbfass, but mainly with respect to the Jainas and the Vedāntins (Halbfass 1988, pp. 268–269, 414).

  2. It should be noted, however, that perspectivism is not an explicitly formulated doctrine in VP, but a conceptual means introduced for a study of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy in terms of Western philosophical discourse. Therefore, the concept of perspectivism can be criticized or elaborated further. Halbfass in his response to Houben’s paper noted that the question remains, whether Bhartṛhari’s ‘doctrinal tolerance’ was ‘simply part of an inclusivistic strategy to uphold and promote his own basic ideas and systematic commitment?’ (Halbfass 1997, p. 474–475). Cardona in the extensive review criticized Houben for exaggerating the role of perspectivism and neglecting the opinion of the commentators (Cardona 1999). Though this is not the proper place to discuss this argument in detail, it should be noted that Cardona constantly refers to Bhartṛhari as ‘Pāṇinīya,’ basing his arguments on the implication that there was a single successive ‘Pāṇinīyadarśana’ (a philosophical school of grammatical philosophy) to which ancient grammarians, Bhartṛhari, and his commentators must have belonged. Being the traditional view of late doxographers, this implication evidently needs to be justified in historical terms (cf. Todeschini 2010, fn. 14). In any case, the emic approach, according to which the answer to every question must be found in later commentaries, and the etic approach, based on the study of traditional texts in terms of modern philosophy, are obviously complementary and do not necessarily exclude each other.

  3. For the latter idea and its origin in Herder’s philosophy, cf. (Forster 2010, p. 16, 51).

  4. On the meaning of these terms, see below, section (A2a).

  5. I will not discuss this point in this paper. For the general exposition of the problem, cf. (Raja 1963).

  6. The most obvious example of this can be found in the ‘Jātisamuddeśa’ (‘Chapter on Universal’) and the ‘Dravyasamuddeśa’ (‘Chapter on Substance’) of VP, where two mutually exclusive doctrines occasionally appear to be isomorphic. In VP III.1.6 and III.2.2-5, Bhartṛhari comes to the conclusion that every word has its own referent, be it universal (jāti) or substance (dravya), whereas in VP III.1.33 and III.2.11, he considers all universals and material objects (dravya) as manifestations of the unique principle (sat or sattā).

  7. On the latter view and its affinity with Mādhyamaka, cf. (Ogawa 2017).

  8. As Aklujkar put it: ‘…some of the ancient systems of thought can be models rather than direct enumerations of certain entities. One can, for example, look upon Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika as attempts to create models made of what must be minimally assumed if the world is to be explained—a kind of creation of ideal language’ (Aklujkar 2001, p. 455).

  9. Viz. dravya, guṇa, kriyā; and the fourth—ākṛti (form)—corresponding to sāmānya.

  10. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī, both were considered subanta, i.e., word with a case-ending (suP). Yāska and ancient grammarians classified them as nāman ‘name’ (Abhyankar 1961, p. 201).

  11. Though Praśastapāda lived after Bhartṛhari, he formulated and justified the trends in the attitude towards language and reality which can be traced in the earlier Vaiśeṣika. Having this in view, it seems relevant to rely on his work while discussing VP.

  12. Śrīdhara explains abhidheyatva as abhidhānapratipādanayogyatvaṃ and specifies its close relation with jñeyatva: bhāvasvarūpam evāvasthabhedena jñeyatvam abhidheyatvaṃ cocyate (Pbh 1895, p. 16).

  13. According to Potter’s general interpretation undertaken in the broad context of Nyāya, Praśastapāda’s thesis deals not with ordinary language and common sense, but with an ‘ideal language,’ the formulation of which was the part and parcel of Naiyāyikas’ philosophy. It is with concern to this language that Praśastapāda’s thesis is ‘fully reversible: whatever exists (in the broadest sense) can be known and can be spoken of, named; furthermore, if something is known or if it is named, then it exists. Likewise, if something is nameable, it is knowable, and vice versa.’ (Potter 1968, p. 275–277)

  14. prāk saṃjñinābhisaṃbandhāt saṃjñā rūpapadārthikā |

    ṣaṣṭhyāṃ ca prathamāyāṃ ca nimittatvāya kalpate ||

    tatrārthavattvāt prathamā saṃjñā śabdād vidhīyate |

    asyeti vyatirekaś ca tadarthād eva jāyate (VP I.67–68)

  15. Cf. (Bronkhorst 1996, p. 128). On possible affinities of this view with Mīmāṃsā, cf. (Bronkhorst 2012).

  16. On the other hand, in the ‘Mahābhāṣyadīpikā’ on A 2.1.1. vt. 5, Bhartṛhari claims explicitly that on the basis of these words, the existence of their referents can be inferred (Bronkhorst 2011, p. 33).

  17. On possible translations of the terms, the difference between them and their synonyms cf. (Matilal 1986, p. 309–355; Urban and Griffiths 1994)

  18. śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ. YS I.9.

  19. Initially, this view could have been introduced due to the willingness to explain the possibility of perceptual experience after the attainment of awakening (bodhi) (cf. Urban and Griffiths 1994; Griffiths 1994, p. 154)

  20. PS I.3d: nāmajātyādiyojanā. Transl. by E. Franco. On universals in Dignāga’s definition (cf. Franco 1984; Herzberger 1986, p. 120–124)

  21. On the concept of vikalpa in the ‘Laṅkāvatāravṛtti’ cf. (Unebe 2000).

  22. Cf. fn. 11.

  23. akṛtsnaviṣayābhāsaṃ śabdaḥ pratyayam āśritaḥ (VP III.3.54).

  24. Cf. (Bronkhorst 2011, p. 113).

  25. Though, Bhartṛhari’s monistic approach could have been not completely alien to Buddhist Pramāṇavādins. In the ‘Traikālyaparīkṣā,’ there is a verse borrowed from the Vṛtti on VP I.1 (or according to Frauwallner, initially from Bhartṛhari’s lost ‘Śabdadhātusamīkṣā’), in which the original ‘(amṛtam) brahma’ (imperishable Brahman) is replaced with Tibetan rnam shes (vijñāna), with the quite distinct tendency to understand vijñāna (consciousness) as the monistic principle (Lindtner 1993, p. 201). On Buddhist monistic approach, cf. also (Wayman 1999).

  26. Comparing Bhartṛhari’s and Jñānaśrībhadra’s views on vikalpa, Unebe comes to similar conclusion (Unebe 2000).

  27. vyapadeśe padārthānām anyasattaupacārikī |

    sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣām ātmarūpasya darśikā (VP III.3.39)

  28. As an alternative view on upacāra, Tzohar also considers VP II. 285–297, which elaborates an analogy between figurative meaning (referred to with the term gauṇa) and perceptual error (Tzohar 2011: 51–85). However, this passage in VP is evidently pragmatically oriented and deals with a distinct epistemic problem, not with the problem of reference in general. So, in the frames of the classification of approaches to the problem of language and reality presented in my paper, the passage VP II. 285–297 can be rather considered an example of Bhartṛhari’s approach (A3).

  29. For an exhaustive study of upacāra in Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, VP, and different Buddhist schools, cf. (Tzohar 2011). On upacāra in poetics (alaṃkāraśāstra), cf. (Raja 1963, p. 231–274).

  30. Cf. (Bronkhorst 2011, p. 112).

  31. Cf. Houben, ‘the value of the theory of Secondary Existence in Bhartṛhari’s thought… should not be overrated. It is a theoretical solution for problems which arise if certain theoretical choices are made (emphasis on individual word instead of sentence as a whole, and on word meaning as substance instead of universal). At other places in VP different choices are made, and the problems asking for a solution as the postulation of Secondary Existence do not even arise (or they arise in a different form)’ (Houben 1995, p. 272).

  32. indriyāṇāṃ svaviśayeṣv anādir yogyatā yathā |

    anādir arthaiḥ śabdānāṃ saṃbandho yogyatā tathā (VP III.3.29)

  33. In a similar sense this term was used in VP I.100.

  34. Kaiyaṭa in his commentary on Mbh designated these two kinds of permanence as pravāhanityatā and kūṭasthanityatā (Mbh, PA 1986, pp. XX, XXIV).

  35. sati pratyayahetutvaṃ saṃbandha upapadyate |

    śabdasyārthe yatas tatra saṃbandho ‘stīti gamyate (VP III.3.37)

  36. vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ (VP III.1.11)

  37. vyavahāro na kalpate (VP III.1.95)

  38. bhedenāvagṛhītau dvau śabdadharmāv apoddhātau

    bhedakāryeṣu hetutvam avirodhena gacchataḥ (VP I.59)

  39. On ontological and epistemological trends in VP, cf. (Desnitskaya 2016).

  40. For a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s ideas on perception with respect to arthakriyā cf. (Katsura 1984).

  41. In the Vṛtti on VP I.135, arthakriyā is glossed as lokavyavahāra.

  42. In the Vṛtti on VP I.75 vyavahāra is glossed as śāstravyavahāra (‘śāstric talk’), which can be considered the most general case of purposeful activity for an Indian philosopher.

  43. bhinnadarśanam āśritya vyavahāro ‘nugamyate |

    tatra yan mukhyam ekeṣāṃ tatrānyeṣāṃ viparyayaḥ (VP I.75)

  44. On possible affinities of Dharmakīrti’s arthakriyā with philosophy of Nyāya cf. (Kanō 1991).

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Acknowledgements

I thank Professor A. Aklujkar for his valuable comments on the early version of this paper, the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions, and Nicolai Vorobjev for language support.

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This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (RSF) under Grant 16-18-10427.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, St. Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russia

    Evgeniya Desnitskaya

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Desnitskaya, E. Language and Extra-linguistic Reality in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya. SOPHIA 57, 643–659 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0645-x

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