Correction to: Ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations

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Correction to: Synthese

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In Hommen (2017), I refer to the work of Garcia in Garcia (2015a, b). In this addendum, I would like to supplement additional references to these papers.

In the second paragraph of Section 2.2 of Hommen (2017, pp. 6–7), I describe the doctrine of property realism with reference to Garcia (2015a, p. 141). The last sentence of that paragraph on page 7 should repeat that reference without “cf.”

The first sentence of the last paragraph of Section 2.2 (p. 7) should contain a reference to Garcia (2015a, p. 108).

In Section 4.1 (p. 12), I attribute the Principle of Absolute Determinateness to Campbell (1990, pp. 83–84). However, the qualification “under that determinable” is not present in the formulation of the Principle that Campbell advances. This qualification is found in Armstrong (1997, p. 48), Gillet and Rives (2005, p. 485) and Funkhouser (2006, p. 549)—which are cited in that context—as well as in Garcia (2015a, p. 151).

In the first paragraph of Section 5.1 (pp. 15–16), the “cf.” in the reference to Garcia (2015a, p. 142) should be removed.

In the third paragraph of Section 5.1 (p. 16), I describe the distinction between objects and properties in terms of the notion of (nonmereological) inherence. The idea

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that the object/property distinction “opens a categorical gap” is discussed in Garcia (2015a, pp. 138–144).

In the first paragraphs of Section 5.2 (p. 17) and Section 5.3 (p. 19), I adapt examples from Garcia (2015b, p. 641). While the arguments put forth in these paragraphs are attributed to Garcia, references to Garcia’s (2015b, p. 641) original examples should be included.

The first sentence of the penultimate paragraph on page 17 should contain a reference to Garcia (2015a, p. 152).

In the third and fourth paragraph of Section 5.4 (p. 20), I reproduce arguments from Garcia (2015b, p. 648) and Garcia (2015b, p. 646), respectively. The provided references to these passages should be without “cf.”

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