



## Editorial preface

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The thesis advanced by Kevin Vandergriff in our first essay is that even an omnipotent God could not have created biological species by any means other than evolution. The reason for this is that the ultimate explanation of the causal characteristics of biological organisms is that they are irreducibly tied to their temporally developed origins. The concept of creation via evolution, rather than via instantaneous special creation, is a view that is consistent with the dominant explanatory paradigm in evolutionary biology. More specifically, special creation presupposes that biological organisms and species are spatiotemporally unrestricted entities. Again, this is at odds with the dominant paradigm in evolutionary biology regarding the origin of species, and perhaps is unintelligible. Evolutionary theory assumes that organisms are spatiotemporally restricted entities. For Vandergriff, this weighs in favor of the idea that God created via evolution (in time) rather than instantaneously. As such, he thinks that this is reason enough to think that the fact of biological evolution is not, as naturalists claim, evidence against theism.

The Euthyphro dilemma first appears in Plato when Socrates asks something like this: do the gods love what is good because it is intrinsically good, or do the gods make good things good by loving them? Ben Page offers a solution to this dilemma based on a dispositionalist analogy between God's creative relation to natural laws and moral laws. Dispositionalists adopt a type of property essentialism according to which natural laws embody an essential dispositional teleology. By analogy, moral laws are intrinsically good because God created them with a similar built-in teleology. Therefore, moral laws are good because God determines them to be so by creating them with intrinsic good ends.

Is sin possible in Heaven? One might think not. If it were not possible to sin in heaven, then the redeemed can no longer enjoy the freedom that they once had on earth. Benjamin Matheson takes this question on. He argues against Pawl and Timpe's claim that the redeemed in heaven have only 'derivative' free will. He argues, rather, that the redeemed retain their freedom in heaven and hence that sin is possible there. Of course, possibility does not entail actuality; but it does not preclude it

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either. If sin did occur, then the sinner would find that unlike hell, there is an exit in heaven. Presumably, the sinner would be shown the door.

In our next article, Joshua Mugg casts his main argument as a response to two questions: (1) could I exist without my body? (2) Why would God resurrect my very same, perhaps transformed, body? (Resurrection, I presume, is not resuscitation). Modal arguments answer the first question in the affirmative. Mugg argues that embracing the modal argument's affirmative answer to the first question precludes the possibility of providing a satisfactory answer to the second question, the resurrection question. Providing a satisfactory answer to the resurrection question forces a rejection of the modal argument for a contingent relation to our body and forces instead an acceptance of the earthly body as constitutive of our existence as persons. I might add here that this essay provides a rich discussion of the various positions in the literature on this topic.

Anthony Flew is famous for holding that discussions of theism ought to begin with the preemption of atheism. In our next essay, Keith Burgess-Jackson revisits this claim and concludes that Flew's arguments for the presumption of atheism fail.

The final two papers in this issue focus on the role of logic and probability in the philosophy of religion. They are a bit technical, but contribute richly to contemporary discussions in our field. The first paper by Piotr Balcerowicz develops a definition of religion that serves clearly to distinguish it from non-religious worldviews and ideologies. The last article, by Richard Brian Bosse, takes up a dispute between Plantinga and Draper on probability and the plausibility of naturalism. Bosse is responding to an article by Tyler Andrew Wunder entitled "Alvin Plantinga on Paul Draper's evolutionary atheology: implications of theism's non-contingency". Bosse argues that Plantinga's argument is finally incoherent.