Editorial preface

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Published online: 19 October 2014
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In the first article in this issue, Jonathan Jong and Aku Visala give us a fresh look at what has come to be called evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) against theism. Their explicit concern is with the justification for beliefs as opposed to truth. After spending a good part of the essay debunking the claim that EDAs necessarily commit the genetic fallacy, they propose that this fallacy can be avoided if we focus on reasons rather than causes. But if EDAs do not necessarily commit this fallacy, are they nevertheless successful arguments against theism? What will be of interest to many of our readers is the way the authors deal with Plantinga's argument against the success of EDAs. Plantinga thinks that EDAs debunk all of our cognitive faculties and bring science down along with religious and moral beliefs. Against this, the authors accept as plausible the claim that a Milvian Bridge (based on appeal to commonsense thinking) can be built to rescue science from this skepticism. But if this is plausible, then perhaps some forms of religious beliefs can also be rescued from Plantinga's promiscuous evolutionary skepticism. The authors conclude that even though EDAs may have a limited value as arguments against theism, they deny that they have no value and that philosophy of religion cannot easily escape the challenge of such arguments.

Philosophers rightly dread dilemmas, knowing full well that one way or another they are going to be impaled. This is precisely what Jordan Wessling says awaits Nicholas Wolterstorff's claim that even though dignity and rights are not intrinsic they are nevertheless qualities that *inhere* in human beings. Wolterstorff claims this is so because these qualities are bestowed by God. As Wessling sees it, either God thought that it was necessary to bestow dignity/rights to his/her creatures because he/she loved and valued them as inherently worthy of this bestowal or else God thought that humans did not have inherent dignity/rights and would not have them apart from his bestowal.

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But if humans are already inherently worthy of this bestowal, then they do not need it to be bestowed. That is, these qualities must have a source independent of God's bestowal. On the other hand, if human beings are not inherently worthy of this bestowal then God's bestowal seems contingent, or optional. But if humans are inherently vested with dignity and rights only if God bestows them, that is, if dignity and rights do not already inhere in human beings, then we are faced the moral question of who is and who is not worthy of this bestowal, or who is and who is not the bearer of these inherent qualities.

In the next article, Plantinga's name surfaces once again. Samuel R. Lebens defends a version of negative theology against Plantinga's attack on apophaticism. His aim is to articulate what he calls a Plantinga-proof form of apophaticism. Finding versions of negative theology proposed by Kant, Hick and Jonathan Jacobs, to fail at being Plantinga-proof, Lebens suggests a version that takes the notion of an *illuminating falsehood* seriously. In explaining this notion, Lebens considers Putnam's brain in a vat argument. As I read him, Lebens seems to have an overarching concern to reject those views of religious language (Plantinga's included) that see no fundamental difference between "God is transcendent" and "trees are green." As I might put this, perhaps a central aim of apophatic theology is to redirect our attention away from the semantics of religious language (which tends to eclipse its mystery) and toward issues of its concrete use in religious practices and experiences (where mystery abounds).

In our last two articles, other-worldly issues are at play. James T. Turner discusses resurrection and Luke Henderson deals with heaven. Turner finds fault with Lynne Baker's constitution theory of personal identity. She uses this view of identity as a way of defending the Christian claim of bodily resurrection. On her account, the human person is constituted by what she calls a "first-person perspective." Turner, however, is troubled by the fact that her view provides nothing to carry this perspective. Finally, Luke Henderson raises questions about the moral character of the blessed in heaven. He argues that the moral impeccability of the blessed in heaven is not achieved via a process of character-development carried out by the blessed themselves. He argues rather that it is more likely that it is in virtue of God's activity in heaven that the blessed remain morally impeccable.