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Optimal Mortgage Contract Choice Decision in the Presence of Pay Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage and the Balloon Mortgage

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Abstract

The unprecedented run-up in global house prices of the 2000s was preceded by a revolution in U.S. mortgage markets in which borrowers faced a plethora of mortgages to choose from collectively known as nontraditional mortgages (NTMs), whose poor performance helped ignite the global financial crisis in 2007. This paper studies the choice of mortgage contracts in an expanded framework where the menu of contracts includes the pay option adjustable rate mortgage (PO-ARM), and the balloon mortgage (BM), alongside the traditional long horizon fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and the short horizon regular ARM. The inclusion of the PO-ARM is based on the fact it is the most controversial and perhaps the riskiest of the NTMs, whereas the BM has not been analyzed in the literature despite its different risk-sharing arrangement and long vintage. Our inclusive model relates the structural differences of these contracts to the horizon risk management problems and affordability constraints faced by the households that differ in terms of expected mobility. The numerical solutions of the model generates a number of interesting results suggesting that households select mortgage contracts to match their horizon, manage horizon risk and mitigate liquidity or affordability constraints they face. From a risk management and welfare perspectives, we find that the optimal contract for households with shorter horizons, specifically households who expect to move house once every 1 to 2 years, is the PO-ARM. Beyond 2 years the welfare advantage of the PO-ARM diminishes and BM becomes the more optimal contract up to 5-year horizon. Overall, the results suggest that households are neither as risk averse as the selection of the FRM would suggest, nor are they as risk-seeking as the selection of PO-ARM or regular ARM would suggest. The results also suggest that the exuberance demonstrated for NTMs by borrowers, especially PO-ARMs, may be both rational and irrational.

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Notes

  1. The transformation in U.S. mortgage market in the 2000s reflects a confluence of factors including innovation in the structure, underwriting and marketing of mortgages, rising house prices, declining affordability, rising mortgage demand to support of homeownership, historically low interest rate, intense lender competition and abundance of capital from mortgage backed securities investors.

  2. The introduction of PO-ARM in U.S. mortgage market dates back to 1981 when thrifts were allowed to originate this mortgage type to help them manage interest rate risk that had contributed to S&L crisis in which taxpayers lost about $140 billion. Back then the PO-ARM was marketed largely to wealthy and sophisticated households as financial management tool to permit such household to manage their monthly cash flows. However, during the 2000s mortgage revolution a new group of households, many of questionable credit risk, entered the home ownership market largely because products such as PO-ARM significantly enhanced their ability (affordability) to buy high-priced homes they could not have qualified for using more traditional mortgages such as FRM and regular ARM. Some observers have likened PO-ARM to “neutron bomb” that will financially kill people but leave their houses standing.

  3. While the demand for balloon mortgages in the US have waned and waxed overtime it is nonetheless an important contract, especially when one takes into account the fact it has been the typical mortgage contract used by our neighbors to the north, Canadians, to lever their investment in housing asset. Typically the balloon mortgage is amortized over a period of say, 15, 20, 25, 30, etc., a period longer than the term of the mortgage, resulting in balloon payment at the end of the contract, which highlights it cash flow and refunding risks

  4. The flexibility and affordability features of PO-ARM made it the dominant contract of the 2000s. These features essentially camouflaged the complexity and riskiness of the contract which may have led to uneducated choices on the part of mortgage borrowers, especially financially unsophisticated households.

  5. Campbell and Cocco (2003) show that households with lower risk aversion are more likely to choose regular ARM over standard FRM, but their analysis did not include the BM and PO-ARM. They also consider inflation-indexed FRM as one solution to household risk management problem. Although the merits of the inflation-indexed FRM have been noted in the academic literature, it has not really been offered as competing alternative contract in U.S. mortgage market. Dunn and Spatt (1988) and Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) suggest that lumping mortgage contracts may limit our understanding of how private information affects optimal mortgage contact choice

  6. See Campbell (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the household finance problem in general and in particular the notion that resolving the so-called investment mistakes is central to advancing household finance

  7. Rising unexpected inflation results in wealth transfer from lenders to borrowers because the inflation premium included in the FRM contract rate only reflects expected inflation.

  8. See MacDonald and Holloway (1996) for additional discussion on the volume of BMs origination overtime

  9. See Mortgage Bankers Association, Weekly Mortgage Application Survey week ending 10/26/2007. Our guess is that the precipitous decline in the origination of BM may be related to the flat term structure.

  10. On the basis of features of the mortgage two other classes of NTMs that became popular in the 2000s are interest only mortgage (fixed and variable) and hybrid ARMs.

  11. In this context, it is worth noting that PO-ARM and other NTMs are really not new innovations as the popular press seems to imply. They have been in existence as far back as the early1980s when regulators in response to the S&L crisis that cost taxpayers $140 billion encouraged S&Ls to shift to originating various forms of ARMs to mitigate their interest rate exposure. However, back then PO-ARM were issued primarily by financially sophisticated borrowers as a financial management tool.

  12. Effectively, the negative amortization trigger acts as pseudo line of credit which permits the household to automatically borrow additional amount any time the monthly payment made by the borrower is below the accrued interest

  13. Given the complexity and the often confusing features of the PO-ARM a legitimate question is whether borrowers understand the risk associated with this type of mortgage. In a study entitled “Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms, Brian Bucks and Karen Pence, Federal Reserve Board, (2006), show that a significant number of borrowers do not understand the terms of their ARMs, particularly the percent by which the interest rate can change, whether there is a cap on increases and the index to which the rate is tied.

  14. For a review of the literature see for example Brueckner (1993); Follain (1990); Stanton and Wallace (1998).

  15. All PO-ARMs have negative amortization trigger that ranges from 110 % to 125 % of the original loan balance and a loan recast rule. For a borrower who has chosen the minimum payment option the combination of these two features means that the probability of payment shock is greater the larger is the increase in the interest rate index; the larger is the margin and the lower (or deeper) the initial teaser rate that determined the minimum payment.

  16. We exclude interest-rate motivated prepayment from the discussion to focus on the effect of mobility on mortgage choice.

  17. This assumption implies that the interest-rate yield curve is upward sloping. Under this assumption, a borrower with high probability of moving will prefer an ARM and a borrower with low probability of moving will choose an FRM. If the yield curve is downward-sloping, the choice preference will be reversed.

  18. Brueckner (1993) shows that uncapped ARMs can exist in the market even if lenders are risk-neutral, and the interest rate will be α1 + r i

  19. Balloon mortgages are structured such that the borrower can either payoff the remaining balance or re-contract when the loan matures. The re-contracting option allows the borrower to reset the interest rate to the current market rate for the remainder of the amortization period. Two typical balloon mortgages are 5/25, and 7/23. The first number (5 or 7) is balloon maturity date and the second (25 or 23) is the remaining amortization period.

  20. We thank Brueckner for suggesting this idea which simplified and made the model more tractable.

  21. Studies of HWE show that a rise in house price increases the level of wealth which causes household to consume more. In a study that covers 14 western countries, Case et al. (2005) find that aggregate housing wealth has a significant effect on aggregate consumption and that the effect dominates that of financial wealth. Thus it stands to reason that as house price rise, which ceteris paribus reduces affordability, households may gravitate towards relatively more affordable mortgages to enable them to consume more housing. Invariably mortgages that are structured to increase affordability by means of lower initial contract rats such as standard ARMs, PO-ARMs and BM tend to be more risky for the borrower in that the burden of risk-sharing tilts more towards the borrower than the lender to make the reduced interest rate rational

  22. Additionally, Angell and Williams (2005) raised the possibility that post-2003 rise in house prices might be related to the rising share of PO-ARMs and other NTMs.

  23. See Sandra L. Thompson (2006), Statement on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs U.S. Senate

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Acknowledgments

We thank David Barker, Jan Brueckner, James Shilling and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments and suggestions. Yao-Min Chiang thanks the National Science Council of Taiwan for financial support (No. NSC‐101‐2410‐H‐004‐064).

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Correspondence to Jarjisu Sa-Aadu.

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We thank David Barker, Jan Brueckner, James Shilling and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 7 Volume of Non-Traditional Mortgages (NTMs)

Appendix 2

Table 8 Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages

Appendix 3

Table 9 Mortgage payment schedule

Appendix 4

We assume the utility function as: \( \mathrm{V}\left( {\mathrm{Z}-\mathrm{x}} \right)=1-{e^{{-\left( {1-\lambda } \right)R\left( {Z-x} \right)}}} \)

Z is income, x is payment, λ is the probability of moving and R is a constant

We now solve

\( \int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\left\{ {1-\exp \left( - \right.\left( {1-\lambda } \right)R\left[ {Z-B\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}} \right]} \right\}f(r)dr} \) Where r ~ N (μ,σ 2), B is the mortgage outstanding.

$$ =\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {f(r)dr} -\exp \left( {-\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RZ} \right)\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left[ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}} \right]f(r)dr} $$
(12)

and

\( \int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left[ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}} \right]f(r)dr} \) in Eq. (12).

We define \( g(r)=\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}} \), and use Taylor Expansion around r = k to the second differentiation to approximately estimate the function.

\( g(r)=g(k)+g\prime (k)\left( {r-k} \right)+\frac{{g\prime \prime (k)}}{2}{{\left( {r-k} \right)}^2} \). This equation is then substituted into \( \int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left[ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}} \right]f(r)dr} \).

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {\approx \int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left\{ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\left[ {g(k)+g\prime (k)\left( {r-k} \right)+\frac{{g\prime \prime (k)}}{2}{{{\left( {r-k} \right)}}^2}} \right]} \right\}f(r)dr} } \hfill \\ {=\exp \left( {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\left[ {g(k)-\frac{{g\prime {(k)^2}}}{{2g\prime \prime (k)}}} \right]} \right.\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left\{ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{{g\prime \prime (k)}}{2}{{{\left[ {r-\left( {k-\frac{{g\prime (k)}}{{g\prime \prime (k)}}} \right)} \right]}}^2}} \right\}f(r)dr} } \hfill \\ \end{array} $$
(13)

To solve for \( \int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left\{ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{{g\prime \prime (k)}}{2}{{{\left( {r-\left( {k-\frac{{g\prime (k)}}{{g\prime \prime (k)}}} \right)} \right)}}^2}} \right\}f(r)dr} \) in Eq. (13), we define \( v=k-\frac{{g\prime (k)}}{{g\prime \prime (k)}} \) and \( t=\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{{g\prime \prime (k)}}{2} \). We also have \( f(r)=\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{{{{\left( {r-\mu } \right)}}^2}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}} \)

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {{e^{{t{{{\left( {r-v} \right)}}^2}}}}\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{{{{\left( {r-\mu } \right)}}^2}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}dr} } \hfill \\ {=\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {{e^{{t{r^2}-2trv+t{v^2}}}}\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{{r^2}-2r\mu +{\mu^2}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}dr} } \hfill \\ {=\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right){r^2}-2\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)r+\left( {{\mu^2}-2t{v^2}{\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}dr} } \hfill \\ {={e^{{-\frac{{\left( {{\mu^2}-2t{v^2}{\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right){r^2}-2\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)r+\frac{{{{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}^2}}}{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right)}}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}{e^{{\frac{{\frac{{{{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}^2}}}{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right)}}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}dr} } \hfill \\ {={e^{{-\frac{{\left( {{\mu^2}-2t{v^2}{\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}{e^{{\frac{{\frac{{{{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}^2}}}{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right)}}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{{{{\left[ {\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}r-\frac{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}}}} \right]}}^2}}}{{2{\sigma^3}}}}}}dr} } \hfill \\ \end{array} $$
$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {\mathrm{Let}=y=\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}r,\;\mathrm{then}\;dy=\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}dr} \hfill \\ {={e^{{-\frac{{\left( {{\mu^2}-2t{v^2}{\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}{e^{{\frac{{\frac{{{{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}^2}}}{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right)}}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{2\pi }}\sigma }}{e^{{-\frac{{{{{\left[ {y-\frac{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}}}} \right]}}^2}}}{{2{\sigma^3}}}}}}\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}}}dy} } \hfill \\ {=\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}}}{e^{{-\frac{{\left( {{\mu^2}-2t{v^2}{\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}{e^{{\frac{{\frac{{{{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}^2}}}{{\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right)}}}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}}}}} \hfill \\ {\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\left\{ {1-\exp \left( - \right.\left( {1-\lambda } \right)R\left[ {Z-B\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}} \right]} \right\}f(r)dr} } \hfill \\ {=1-\exp \left( {-\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RZ} \right)\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\exp \left[ {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}} \right]f(r)dr} } \hfill \\ {=1-\exp \left( {-\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RZ} \right)\exp \left( {\left( {1-\lambda } \right)} \right.RB\left[ {g(k)-\frac{{g\prime {(k)^2}}}{{2g\prime \prime (k)}}} \right]\frac{1}{{\sqrt{{1-2t{\sigma^2}}}}}\exp \left( {-\frac{{\left( {{\mu^2}-2t{v^2}{\sigma^2}} \right)}}{{2{\sigma^2}}}} \right)\exp \left( {\frac{{{{{\left( {\mu -2tv > {\sigma^2}} \right)}}^2}}}{{2{\sigma^2}\left( {1-2t{\sigma^2}} \right)}}} \right)} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$

Where, \( v=k-\frac{{g\prime (k)}}{{g\prime {\prime} (k)}} \), and \( t=\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB\frac{{g\prime {\prime} (k)}}{2} \), \( \left| t \right|<1 \).

Note,

Where

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {g(r)=\frac{r}{{1-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{-T }}}}=\frac{{r{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}}}{{{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1}},} \hfill \\ {g\prime (r)=\left( {\frac{{{H_1}(r)}}{{{H_2}(r)}}} \right)\prime =\frac{{\left( {{H_1}(r)} \right)\prime {H_2}(r)-{H_1}(r)\left( {{H_2}(r)} \right)\prime }}{{{{{\left( {{H_2}(r)} \right)}}^2}}}} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$

Where

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {{H_1}(r)=r{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}} \hfill \\ {{H_2}(r)={{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \hfill \\ {{H_1}\prime (r)={{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}+Tr{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \hfill \\ {{H_2}\prime (r)=T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$
$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {g\prime (r)=\frac{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}+Tr{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \right]\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]-\left[ {r{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}} \right]\left[ {T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \right]}}{{{{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]}}^2}}}} \hfill \\ {=\frac{{\left[ {{(1+r)^{2T }}-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-rT{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \right]}}{{{{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]}}^2}}}} \hfill \\ {g\prime \prime (r)=\left( {\frac{{{H_3}(r)}}{{{H_4}(r)}}} \right)\prime =\frac{{\left( {{H_3}(r)} \right)\prime {H_4}(r)-{H_3}(r)\left( {{H_4}(r)} \right)\prime }}{{{{{\left( {{H_4}(r)} \right)}}^2}}}} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$

Where

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {{H_3}(r)=\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{2T }}-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-rT{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \right]} \hfill \\ {{H_4}(r)={{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]}}^2}} \hfill \\ {{H_3}\prime (r)=2T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{2T-1 }}-T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}-T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}-rT\left( {T-1} \right){{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-2 }}} \hfill \\ {{H_4}\prime (r)=2T\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$
$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {g\prime \prime (r)=\frac{{\left[ {2T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{2T-1 }}-T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}-T{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}-rT\left( {T-1} \right){{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-2 }}} \right]{{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]}}^2}}}{{{{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]}}^2}}}} \hfill \\ {-\frac{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{2T }}-{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-rT{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \right]2T\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]\left. {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^{T-1 }}} \right]}}{{{{{\left[ {{{{\left( {1+r} \right)}}^T}-1} \right]}}^2}}}} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$

(II)

We also need to solve for the following expected utility when borrowers prepay.

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {\int\limits_{{-\infty}}^{\infty } {\left\{ {1-\exp \left( - \right.\left( {1-\lambda } \right)R\left[ {Z-B\left( {1+r} \right)} \right]} \right\}f(r)dr} } \hfill \\ {=1-\exp \left[ {-\left( {1-\lambda } \right)R\left( {Z-B} \right)} \right]\exp \left( {\mu t+\frac{{{t^2}{\sigma^2}}}{2}} \right)} \hfill \\ \end{array} $$

Where \( t=\left( {1-\lambda } \right)RB \), and \( \left| t \right|<1 \).

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Chiang, YM., Sa-Aadu, J. Optimal Mortgage Contract Choice Decision in the Presence of Pay Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage and the Balloon Mortgage. J Real Estate Finan Econ 48, 709–753 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-012-9397-5

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