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Upconversion-based receivers for quantum hacking-resistant quantum key distribution

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Abstract

We propose a novel upconversion (sum frequency generation)-based quantum-optical system design that can be employed as a receiver (Bob) in practical quantum key distribution systems. The pump governing the upconversion process is produced and utilized inside the physical receiver, making its access or control unrealistic for an external adversary (Eve). This pump facilitates several properties which permit Bob to define and control the modes that can participate in the quantum measurement. Furthermore, by manipulating and monitoring the characteristics of the pump pulses, Bob can detect a wide range of quantum hacking attacks launched by Eve.

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Notes

  1. Security concerns arising from nonlinear interactions in the waveguide, especially the conversion of photons injected by Eve at the signal wavelength after interacting with Bob’s pump, will be examined in the next subsections.

  2. Alternatively, an appropriate filter can be used, but a coiled fiber offers a lower loss and cost-effective solution.

  3. We assume that the optical fibers in front of the receiver would readily fuse, disconnecting the receiver from the quantum channel, for \(\gtrsim \)10 W average input powers [43].

  4. In fact, using the formula for conversion efficiency [2, 3], the actual \(\eta _c < 1\,\%\) and with propagation losses around 3 dB, the peak power on the detectors would be \(<1\,\upmu \hbox {W}\).

  5. In Fig. 3, the basis choice is implemented by a phase modulator (PM) in the pump arm. An optical path that allows reflection(s), carrying an imprint of the modulation, to propagate out of the system at least physically exists if we assume a fiber-optical wavelength division multiplexer (WDM) instead of the free-space dichroic mirror (DM).

  6. The detector is in linear mode after the gate and displays superlinear characteristics at the falling edge, i.e., when it is making a transition from the Geiger mode to the linear mode.

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Acknowledgments

This research was supported in part by the DARPA Quiness program (Grant Number: W31P4Q-13-1-0004).

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  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University, 2145 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208-3118, USA

    Nitin Jain & Gregory S. Kanter

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  1. Nitin Jain
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Jain, N., Kanter, G.S. Upconversion-based receivers for quantum hacking-resistant quantum key distribution. Quantum Inf Process 15, 2863–2879 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-016-1315-y

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