Erratum to: Global economic crisis and corruption

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Due to a processing error, specification/column numbers, referring to Table 4 in the article text, were replaced with bibliographic references. In reference to Table 4, the following three paragraphs should be read instead of the three paragraphs in the print version of the article (Table 4 has also been reproduced below):

In Table 4, the dummy variables capturing general effects of crisis on the household welfare are replaced with dummy variables capturing the eight specific adverse effects on the households' income streams. In specification [1], each household is allowed to report

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Table 4 Crisis impacts on household income streams and expenditures and bribery

	Probability of bribery, binary probit marginal effects			The number of different public officials bribed, OLS coefficients		
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Effects on income streams						
Head of household lost job	0.030***	0.064***	–	0.137***	0.212***	–
Other household member lost job	0.045***	0.076***	–	0.083**	0.172***	–
Family business closed	0.043***	0.081***	–	0.207***	0.261***	–
Working hours reduced	0.045***	0.075***	–	0.080**	0.130**	–
Wages delayed or suspended	0.040***	0.078***	–	0.077***	0.092**	–
Wages reduced	0.036***	0.054***	–	0.120***	0.120***	–
Reduced flow of remittances	0.046***	0.072***	–	0.081**	0.084**	–
Migrant returned home from abroad	0.058***	0.092***	–	0.179***	0.115	–
Effects on expenditures						
Reduced staple goods	–	–	–0.001	–	–	–0.007
Reduced luxuries	–	–	0.027***	–	–	–0.016
Reduced car	–	–	0.030***	–	–	0.160***
Reduced vacations	–	–	0.037***	–	–	0.024
Reduced alcohol/smoking	–	–	–0.005	–	–	0.047*
Effects on education	–	–	0.040***	–	–	0.196***
Effects on medical expenditures	–	–	0.063***	–	–	0.074***
Effects on utilities	–	–	0.040***	–	–	0.042
Effects on assets/loans/move	–	–	0.052***	–	–	0.094***
Observations	26,486	26,486	26,486	7,570	7,570	7,570
Pseudo R ²	0.171	0.168	0.176	–	–	–
Prob > Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	–	–	–
R ²	–	–	–	0.141	0.131	0.139
Prob > F	–	–	–	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. Marginal effects in columns [1]–[3] are estimated at regressor means. All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3

multiple effects of the crisis on its income streams. The results suggest that crisis-related job losses, closures of family businesses, reduced working hours, as well as delayed, suspended or reduced wages, are associated with a 3.0–4.5 percentage points higher probability of bribing public officials. Migration-related variables are also important predictors of bribery: the reduced flow of remittances and the return of a migrant are associated with 4.6 and 5.8 percentage points higher probabilities of bribery.

Specification [2] of Table 4 replaces the variables capturing *various* effects of the crisis on household income streams with the variables capturing *the most important* effects. We obtain statistically significant coefficients for all crisis-related dummies, which have larger, ranging from 5.4 to 9.2 percentage points, marginal effects than specification [1]. The smaller marginal effects in specification [1] are to be expected, as it uses overlapping variables to capture the effects of the crisis. Specification [3] of Table 4 replaces the income effects of the crisis with the expenditure effects. With the exception of reduction in the purchases of staple goods, alcohol and tobacco, the coefficients of all variables are statistically significant, with the marginal effects ranging from 2.7 to 6.3 percentage points.

The crisis-related correlates of the number of public officials bribed are reported in columns [4]–[6] of Table 4. With the exception of returned migrants in column [5], all crisis-related effects on income streams are associated with bribing a wider range of public officials. The coefficients of the crisis effects on several expenditure categories are also significant (column [6]). The estimate is the largest for the education variable (households whose education activities were affected by crisis bribed, on average, 0.196 more public officials). This is not surprising, as withdrawal from university, training or enrollment in further education implies a change in one's activity status and necessitates contact with a broader range of public officials.