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Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses

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Abstract

Coase (Journal of Low and Economics 17(2):185–213, 1974) failed to appreciate that the construction and maintenance of nineteenth-century lighthouses were in part financed by British taxpayers. Bertrand (Cambridge Journal of Economics 30:389–402, 2006) rightly calls him to account. While agreeing with Bertrand’s conclusion, we dispute her reasoning and argue that lighthouses nevertheless could have been supplied by the private sector.

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Block, W., Barnett, W. Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses. Public Choice 140, 1–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9375-x

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