Abstract
In this paper, I defend a reasons-first view of epistemic justification, according to which the justification of our beliefs arises entirely in virtue of the epistemic reasons we possess. I remove three obstacles for this view, which result from its presupposition that epistemic reasons have to be possessed by the subject: (1) the problem that reasons-first accounts of justification are necessarily circular; (2) the problem that they cannot give special epistemic significance to perceptual experience; (3) the problem that they have to say that implicit biases provide epistemic. The first problem will be overcome by introducing presentational attitudes that are not in need of justification as basic ways of possessing epistemic reasons. The latter two problems will be solved by introducing epistemic rational capacities of two different kinds, which are exercised in mental states that are ways of possessing epistemic reasons, and by distinguishing these from mental states that are not exercises of epistemic rational capacities .
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09 January 2018
In the original publication of the article, the last sentence in footnote 16 was incorrectly published as “Thanks to—for raising this issue.” The corrected sentence should read as “Thanks to Daniel Star for raising this issue.”
Notes
To test my claim, do a Google search for these phrases. The search for ‘justified belief’ and cognates turns up philosophical articles; the search for ‘reason to believe’ turns up pop songs.
What’s at stake here is propositional justification—to get to doxastic justification, the belief in question would have to be based on the possessed reasons.
The entailment holds given that the biconditional expresses not a conceptual, but at most a metaphysical necessity. For grounding is standardly taken to involve metaphysical necessity. (So, necessarily, if S has reason to believe that q, S has pro tanto justification to believe that q.) Moreover, the claim is that all justification can be traced back to reasons. (So, necessarily, if S has pro tanto justification to believe that q, then S has a reason to believe that q).
I don’t have the space to give a full argument for the priority claim, but do so in (Schmidt n.d.). A brief statement of my motivation: In other areas, such as philosophy of action, the normative status of actions or attitudes is accounted for by appeal to reasons that count in favor of so acting, or of having the attitude in question. I believe it is theoretically desirable to give a unified theory of the normative status of actions and attitudes including belief in terms of normative reasons. Such a theory further allows us to give an account of what is involved in having propositional justification for belief.
Similarly, see Dancy (2004, chapter 2) on contributory oughts. More on this issue below.
Beddor’s concern is evidence, not epistemic reasons. I transfer his argument to epistemic reasons. Why not stick with evidence? Again, setting things up in terms of reasons puts a promising unified picture of actions and attitudes (including belief) and their normative status in our reach. Additionally, reasons talk makes room for the possibility that the fact that p itself may be a normative reason to believe that p, where this seems problematic when we conceive of that p as evidence that p. So the reasons-first view can give an account of apparently groundless belief that is unavailable to the evidence-first view; it is not just a notational variant of the latter. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. Also cf. my (2017).
The term “presentational attitude” is from Schroeder (2011).
Philosophers distinguish episodic memories and propositional memories. Assume that in the example, I have direct, experience-like (i.e., episodic) memories of all those times my parents visited me and of their telling me they’ll come again this weekend.
I take this to exclude imagining and supposing, which, as Anscombe (1963, 4) might say, are not “impugned” if they don’t match the facts. To the extent that some emotions have a mind-to-world direction of fit, they are included in the presentational attitudes.
(Possessed Reasons) is supposed to be neutral between the factoring account and Schroeder’s (2008) two-relations account, for that p is not required to be a fact, but may also be a state of affairs.
The acronym “PANINI” alludes to the, originally Italian, word “panino”, referring to sandwiches or bread rolls. Since my “PANINI” is the singular form, I will unfortunately have to ignore the qualms of linguistically sensitive readers and use “PANINIs” as the plural form.
But don’t we first have to figure out which of our beliefs are (all things considered) justified before we can make any definite claims about whether any of them constitute possession of an epistemic reason? (Beddor 2016) Here, my answer is that PANINIs are ways of possessing reasons simpliciter. If that p is a reason for a subject to believe that q and she has a PANINI with the content that p, then she possesses this reason. From this starting point, the belief that q will be pro tanto justified for her, so she will, in this light, also possess that q as a reason via her belief. If, however, her reason that p is rebutted by another reason she has, then she does not have all-things-considered justification for her belief that q. So, in light of her whole body of PANINIs and beliefs, she doesn’t have that q as a reason either. Depending on whether the belief that constitutes possession of the reason in question is pro tanto or all-things-considered justified, then, it will constitute mere pro tanto or all-things-considered possession. Again, though, what determines whether the subject has reason or justification for any of her beliefs is what PANINIs she has; as long as the content of a PANINI is indeed a reason, the subject has this reason. All possession of reasons, no matter whether pro tanto or all-things-considered, will in the end have to be cashed out by reference to the PANINIs backing it, whose status as ways of possessing reasons simpliciter is prior to any question of justification.
I’ve adapted Kornblith’s problem to my purposes. His objection concerns only constitutivist view of epistemic reasons.
Real subjects afflicted with blindsight have a blind spot in their visual fields, but are able to guess reliably, for some things present in their blind spot, what is there. The imaginary superblindsighters form genuine beliefs in direct response to visual processing that never leads to conscious visual experience.
To be precise, Byrne makes this claim for a much broader family of epistemological views, even including standard reliabilist views. I apply his challenge to reasons-first views here.
On Schroeder’s own low bar view, non-doxastic presentational attitudes are also ways to possess reasons. However, what is relevant to my discussion is a view that limits attitudes that constitute reasons possession to mere belief.
Another reaction to the superblindsighter case would be to claim that her subpersonal states that lead to her perceptual belief count as ways of possessing reasons. This reaction leaves the second problem raised by Byrne in place. Additionally, as suggested above, a subject cannot possess a reason by means of an unconscious and introspectively inaccessible subpersonal state. After all, it is the subject who is said to possess the reason, and how can that be the case if there’s not even a blip on her radar indicating to her that she does? We further get the problem of which subpersonal states count as possessing a reason and which don’t: For instance, it seems that I don’t possess an epistemic reason in virtue of the stimulation of my retina by light waves, but this is no less a subpersonal presentational state of mine than the subpersonal state preceding my perceptual belief. Thanks to—for raising this issue.
Why accept that S here has conclusive reason not believe that p? According to Schroeder (2011, 210), not having sufficient reason to believe that p just is having conclusive reason not to believe that p. Think about it this way: If I have no reason, or barely any reason to believe that something is the case, I had better not form any positive belief on the issue. S then has conclusive reason not to believe that p in virtue of the insufficiency of the reasons she has to believe that p.
An anonymous reviewer suggests that the low bar theorist might try to appeal to reliabilism to respond to my objection. For instance, she might say that S possesses a reason in believing that p only if this belief is reliably caused. (See Goldman 2011.) In the example, Sam’s post-hoc beliefs are not reliably caused, for their production is guided by his bias. While this is a departure from the low bar view, it is certainly an available option.
This argument doesn’t immediately affect Schroeder’s original low bar view, since he includes non-doxastic presentational attitudes as ways of possessing reasons. However, if we strengthen the example by including that Sam’s perceptual experience of the applications is also warped, for instance in virtue of selection bias or cognitive penetration, Schroeder’s view is in trouble. For then Sam’s doxastic and non-doxastic presentational attitudes taken together constitute possession of undefeated reasons to believe that Ludwig is more qualified for the job than Louise.
Does this characterization fit for perceptual belief? Imagine I am wearing high-end virtual reality glasses and it looks to me just like I’m under water, facing a manta ray, even though (I know that) I’m in my living room, which contains no marine life. Can I really shake the belief that there’s water around me or that there’s a manta ray? It may seem that my basic perceptual beliefs are gut-reactions that I cannot revise in response to reasons I possess. One plausible reply here is to appeal to Gendler’s (2008) distinction between alief and belief: I have aliefs about the water and the manta ray that are not reasons-responsive, but I am indeed able to refrain from believing that I am under water facing a manta ray, because I know that I’m not.
This goes for remembering, intuiting, etc. that p generally, in cases where there is no conscious non-doxastic attitude that comes before the subject’s believing from memory, intuitively, etc. that p. In these cases, the subject is introspectively aware at least of the source of her belief, and able to understand her believing as a rational response to memory, intuition, etc., which in turn are her rational capacities to take up unpossessed reasons. This doesn’t require her to have a prior fully conscious mental state of remembering, intuiting, etc. that p. It does plausibly involve a preceding mental state that has the epistemic reason as its content, of which the subject is minimally conscious. For this is the best explanation of why she doesn’t know just about anything from memory, by intuition, etc., but comes to possess very specific epistemic reasons from these sources. As I will argue below, not even this much is given in the cases of superblindsight and implicit bias.
This is compatible with conceding that these possessed reasons can be defeated, for instance when I learn that I have taken drugs which cause hallucinations.
If, on the other hand, we conceive of the superblindsighter as having immediate awareness that the source of her belief is what is in front of her, I think we should say that her belief is a way of possessing a reason. I would then classify the (subpersonal?) state or process in virtue of which she is aware of the source of her belief as the relevant PANINI. But this is not how the superblindsighter is typically conceived.
This account is similar to that defended by Sylvan and Sosa (forthcoming), and I am sympathetic to much of what they say. However, as I will argue at the end of this article, I disagree with their claim that epistemic competence is more fundamental than reasons. Further, as I understand them, they think that justified belief gets its positive status partly from fit with epistemic reasons, but that epistemic reasons play no role in determining the epistemic standing of “attractions to assent” (PANINIs). By contrast, I hold that beliefs and PANINIs both are ways of possessing reasons in virtue of being appropriate responses to epistemic reasons, the only difference being whether these are possessed or unpossessed reasons.
But what about the intuition shared by philosophers such as Byrne or Block (1995) that the superblindsighter’s belief is justified? How is my claim not an ad hoc denial of the intuition? On the one hand, I have tried to show that there is good reason to reject it. From the superblindsighter’s perspective, her visual belief is completely arbitrary and still in need of justification; we should agree with her. On the other hand, it seems to me that my opponents and I are at an impasse involving internalist and externalist intuitions (where I have tried to support the internalist side, whereas my opponents point to the intuition that reliability is enough for the superblindsighter to have justification). In light of this, I don’t believe that intuitions alone can carry much weight here when it comes to deciding the debate. I say more on this issue in my (n.d.).
Part of the reasoning behind this might be: Often enough, implicit biases lead to true beliefs. So, they are able to provide epistemic justification even on the occasions where things go wrong.
Thanks to—for raising this problem.
Elsewhere, I defend a version of epistemological disjunctivism which is compatible with my claims here about possession of epistemic reasons. (See Schmidt forthcoming). My view has an advantage over Williamson’s (2000) view (that only known propositions count as possessed evidence/reasons) in that it is more liberal. So for instance, it can do some justice to the intuition behind the new evil demon problem.
I take it that implicit attitudes are dispositions that are activated, or become occurrent, in relevant situations.
Cf. Lai et al. (2016) for a very discouraging study regarding our ability to overcome implicit biases.
For detailed discussion, see Holroyd (2012). She points to evidence that conscious attempts to control the effects of implicit bias on behavior may even increase its influence, but argues in the end that if we commit ourselves to non-prejudiced behavior for its own sake, we may reduce its influence.
Feasible strategies to insulate our belief and behavior-guiding systems from the influence of implicit bias are typically indirect: For instance, the activation of relevant implicit biases can be prevented by requiring anonymized applications for a position.
This leaves it open that implicit biases are rational from an evolutionary standpoint, as competences to deal quickly with new, demanding situations.
The response that Sylvan and Sosa might give to the implicit bias problem cannot differ much from mine. Just like me, they will have to argue that implicit biases are not epistemically competent attractions to assent, and do not manifest epistemic abilities or virtues. (Cf. Sosa 2007, 61.).
I concede that we don’t have perfect introspective access to our PANINIs. It may happen that I hear a faint creak in the floorboards, which causes me to believe that someone is standing right behind me. But since I wasn’t paying attention to my auditory perception, instead of properly introspecting my way of possessing a reason for my belief, I merely think that I can somehow sense that someone is staring at me from behind. In response, note that the fallibility of our capacity to introspect PANINIs doesn’t undermine my point that we are generally in a position to use reasons we possess via PANINIs in deliberation because they are introspectively available to us. Moreover, the more difficult it is for the subject to determine in which way she possesses a reason, and even worse, whether she possesses any reason for her belief, the more we should worry about whether she has a reason for her belief at all. At some point, she will be in the situation that it is completely up in the air, from her perspective, whether it is rational for her to believe one way or another, so that plausibly, she does not possess a reason.
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Acknowledgements
I’d like to thank participants of the conference on rational capacities at the University of Luxembourg for extremely helpful comments, in particular Alex Gregory, David Löwenstein, Susanne Mantel, and Daniel Star. I'm grateful for feedback on the manuscript to Hanjo Glock, Susanne Mantel (again), Anne Meylan, Oliver Petersen, Peter Schulte, and Daniel Whiting. Finally, I wish to thank an anonymous referee for this journal, who did an exemplary job.
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Schmidt, E. Possessing epistemic reasons: the role of rational capacities. Philos Stud 176, 483–501 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1025-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1025-z