From the Editors

A. W. Musschenga¹ • F. R. Heeger²

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Last year, 2015, was a good year for our journal, at least in terms of the number of submissions which was the highest since its start in 1998: 282. Since our publisher is, again and again, willing to increase the page budget, we are able to keep our acceptance rate at 20%. A natural consequence of the increase of the number of submissions is that the workload of the two Editors-in-Chief and the four Associate Editors becomes heavier, and that we need more reviewers. An academic journal cannot flourish without competent reviewers. The least we can do to honour their work is to publish their names. Lisa Bortolotti had to give up her job as Associate Editor. We regret her leaving us and thank her for what she did for the journal in the past two years, and for how she did it: with accuracy and dedication. We welcome her successor, Lubomira Radoilska of the University of Kent.

This issue has two parts: a special issue, and a regular issue. The special issue contains papers presented at a symposium on Martin Peterson's recent book *The Dimensions of Consequentialism* which took place in November 2013 in Konstanz, Germany. Guest-editors are Attila Tanyi of the University of Liverpool, and Martin van Hees of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. In his book Peterson introduces a new type of consequentialist theory: multi-dimensional consequentialism. According to this theory, an act's moral rightness depends on several separate dimensions, including well-being, equality, and risk. Peterson aims to show that moral views about equality and risk that were previously thought to be mutually incompatible can be rendered compatible. In this context, Peterson argues for there being degrees of rightness rather than rightness being an all-or-nothing property.

Six authors comment on Peterson's book. *Thomas Schmidt* states that Peterson's claim that an ethical theory not built around a gradualist conception of moral rightness and wrongness is unable to account adequately for the phenomenon of moral conflicts, is unconvincing. *Campbell Brown* argues that, though Peterson makes a compelling case for rightness being a matter of degree, it does

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✉ A. W. Musschenga
a.w.musschenga@vu.nl

F. R. Heeger
f.r.heeger@uu.nl

¹ Department of Philosophy, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

² Ethics Institute, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands

not follow that we should abandon all-or-nothing rightness. We can, says Brown, have both, and we need both. *Frances Howard-Snyder* argues against Peterson's claims that degrees of rightness or wrongness arise only because there are multi-dimensions as well as against his claim that an act cannot be entirely right if it is wrong on some dimension. *Roger Crisp* defends against Peterson the 'standard view' of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees, and claims that greater conceptual parsimony would allow Peterson to avoid certain problems involving equality and related matters that arise out of his conception of moral value. *Vuko Andrić & Attila Tanyi* contend that Peterson's treatment of risk, which is one among several dimensions of moral rightness, is unsatisfactory. *Jan Gertken* criticises Peterson's solution of the so-called *numbers problem* that concerns the question of what is the right thing to do in trade-off cases where one can save different non-overlapping groups of persons, but not everyone. Peterson proposes a version of the *mixed solutions* approach that argues that both saving the many and holding a lottery to determine whom to save can each be morally right in such cases, depending on the relative sizes of the groups involved. In the last contribution to the special issue Peterson replies to his commentators.

The regular issue opens with an article by *Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar* on equality in education. She defends a highly demanding principle of all-the-way-equality justice which requires nothing short of equal educational outcome between all individual students. *Simon P. James* criticises the standard practice of the US Environmental Protection Agency, the World Wide Fund for Nature and many other environmental organisations, to evaluate particular woods, wetlands and other such places on the basis of the 'ecosystem services' they are thought to provide. James argues that this practice cannot account for the kind of value places have when they play integral roles in persons' lives. *Krista K. Thomason* calls for attention to the moral responsibility of child soldiers. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Thomason argues in her article that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate because they reaffirm their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness. *Dominic Martin* examines Thomas Pogge's argument that adversarial schemes like auctions, public tendering, sports competitions, elections or trials differ from other schemes with incentives in that they force agents to reveal their full performance, but also incentivise agents to manipulate the rules. *Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell* argue that Kwame Appiah is right about the psychological, social, and historical role honour has played in three notable moral revolutions, but wrong about the moral nature of honour. In their view, honour is an emotional and moral form of recognition respect that can hinder or aid moral progress. and can also play a rational role in progressive moral change.

Two articles deal with the Problem of Dirty Hands. *Demetris Tillyris* locates the problem of dirty hands (DH) within virtue ethics. He argues that, *contra* contemporary expositions of this problem, Alasdair MacIntyre's virtue ethics provides us with a more nuanced account of tragedy and DH in ordinary life, in its conventional understanding as a stark, rare and momentary conflict in which moral wrongdoing is inescapable. According to Tillyris, DH in politics, conceived as a distinct practice and way of life, with its own demands and standards of excellence involves a *paradox of character*, not just a *paradox of action* as the standard DH thesis suggests. *Daniel Tigard* discusses DH in legal decision-making. He argues that the so-called 'open texture' of law calls for the exercise of judicial discretion, which renders judges susceptible to the problem of dirty hands. In resolving borderline cases. where they must do wrong in order to do right, judges might be left with a unique sense of guilt..

What we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by moral error theory? According to *François Jaquet & Hichem Naar*; until recently, this question

had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to replace them with attitudes that resemble to some extent the attitudes we have towards pieces of fiction. But there is now a third theory on the market: conservationism, the view that we should keep holding moral beliefs, even though we know them to be false. Jaquet & Naar argue that conservationism fails to constitute a plausible alternative to fictionalism, at least insofar as it purports to be an alternative view as to what we should do with our moral thoughts. The next article deals with targeted killings that have traditionally been viewed as a dirty tactic, even within war. However, argues *Crystal Allen Gunasekera*, just combatants actually have a prima facie duty to use targeted strikes against military and political leadership rather than conventional methods of fighting. This is because the leaders of a military engaging in aggression are typically responsible for the wrongful harms they threaten, whereas significant numbers of their soldiers usually will not be. *Jessica Flanigan's* subject is women's rights to make risky choices during childbirth. She argues that women's rights to make treatment decisions ought to be respected even if their decisions expose their unborn children to unnecessary risks, and even if it is wrong to put unborn children at risk. Women have rights to do wrong in these cases. The next article, by *Henrik Andersson*, criticises Ruth Chang's argument for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, "parity," besides the three standard positive value relations: "better than", "worse than" and "equally good."

The last two contributions contain replies to articles published in the journal. *Kevin Vallier* defends the asymmetric convergence model of public justification against James Boettcher's critique (vol. 18:1). Vallier maintains both that Boettcher's critique of asymmetric convergence fails and that his alternative view, Weak Public Justification, faces a number of serious challenges. *Robert B. Talisse* replies to Karin Jønch-Clausen and Klemens Kappel's criticism (vol. 18:2) against his social-epistemic conception of liberal democracy. He concedes to his critics that a philosophical justification of liberal democracy must be acceptable from all reasonable perspectives.