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Survey of leader-follower concepts in hierarchical decision-making

  • Games, Theory And Applications
  • Conference paper
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Analysis and Optimization of Systems

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences ((LNCIS,volume 28))

Abstract

This presentation will summarize the leader-follower concepts in hierarchical decision-making, with particular emphasis on continuous-time dynamic systems with two decision-makers. Open-loop, state-feedback, and dynamic feedback control structures are discussed, consistent with initial state, instantaneous state, or output trajectory information available, as the case may be. Necessary conditions for leader-follower optimality are summarized.

This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECS-79-19396, the U.S. Air Force under Grant AFOSR-78-3633, and the Joint Services Electronics Program under Contract N00014-79-C-0424.

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A. Bensoussan J. L. Lions

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Cruz, J.B. (1980). Survey of leader-follower concepts in hierarchical decision-making. In: Bensoussan, A., Lions, J.L. (eds) Analysis and Optimization of Systems. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 28. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004055

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004055

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-10472-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-38489-2

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