Book Reviews

UTTAL, WILLIAM R. *The War Between Mentalism and Behaviorism: On the Accessibility of Mental Processes*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000. Pp. xviii + 205. ISBN 0-8058-3361-7.

For some time it has been *au courant* to proclaim that behaviorism was dead and that a far more sophisticated cognitive psychology had superseded the simplistic approach to psychology. This book is part of a growing literature calling for a reconsideration of behaviorism caused by shortcomings and fallacies of cognitivism. As such, those who stuck with behaviorism through the lean years have reason to be encouraged by Uttal's contribution. However, any who maintained a radically naturalistic form of behaviorism will find their enthusiasm dampened by this book's major premise. The author presupposes that an inner world of private experience and awareness, the mark of mentality, is not knowable by anyone other than the possessor. In other words, mentality, so defined, is an existent in the world but is not accessible in a way that makes it subject to scientific understanding. All experimental psychologists can do is describe the relations between manipulatable stimuli and subjects' overt responses. Any resulting functional relations are completely uninformative regarding the alleged forever hidden mental processes.

A key unrecognized, hence unexamined, assumption ensures that this book will not present behaviorism in one of its more advanced forms. The author does not shed the centuries old internalistic view that mental or cognitive processes are in a different category from behavior and that the referents to mentality are under the skin. In this way, Uttal's psychology fails to treat behavior as do other sciences. Outside of psychological science, the main singular categorical alternative to behavior is structure, for example, does one study the behavior of various components of the body (physiology) or structure (anatomy)? This book's internalistic view of mentality contrasts behavior with uniquely inaccessible mentality instead of with perfectly knowable structural components of psychological events. Uttal frequently insists that, through inaccessible to others, mental processes and states such as consciousness are existences that, if scientifically accessible, would be described in the same way as are other worldly events. The book does not recognize the possibility advanced by a growing number of noninternalists that consciousness and awareness refer to only adjustmental acts of behaving not to preexisting places or processes.

This book is recommended as a source for some thoughtful and empirical considerations that are counter to cognitivism. Yet, with its demonstration of the lure of a conjoined antimentalism and mentalism, it may well illustrate why behaviorism as an authentic science of psychological behavior remains elusive.

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