writers at different times. No product of a specified date which is inevitable produced under certain intellectual and general cultural conditions marks the invariant traits of particular writers. The rule of individual differences applies equally well to the different performances of individual persons as to the behavior of different persons. Thus it is interesting to note that one of Dewey's articles of a much later date might be regarded as his own stringent criticism of the reflex-arc paper.

In that article (Dewey, 1925), entitled "The Naturalistic Theory of Perception by the Senses," there is powerful evidence that the author recognizes the proper role of stimuli and responses as they occur in behavioral events. Dewey goes so far, indeed, as to write of event fields instead of the neural counterpart of a spirit bloated with the plenum that it carries within itself. He wrote,

Whenever there is an event, there is interaction, and interaction entails the conception of a field [p. 603].

To Dewey belongs the merit that while he never freed himself completely from the shackles of Hegelianism, he was at times influenced by circumstances to waver in his faith and to write naturalistically about psychological events.

OBSERVER

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RESPONSE TO BOOK REVIEW

In the review (*The Psychological Record*, 25, 150-151) of my book *THE EVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY: A UNIFIED THEORY*, it was stated that it . . . "reflect(s) the functionalistic bias that all behavior has a purpose and that purpose relates to survival". The notion of evolution as reflecting a teleological design I believe to be incorrect and feel that the above assertion does an injustice to the view of Darwin, to functionalistic theory, and incidentally to my own book. To state that some attribute may be considered in terms of its adaptive function does not imply that the attribute came into being to fulfill some purpose. I deal with this problem of purpose and teleology in some detail on pages 13 and 31. Perhaps a simple example will help. Teeth make the adaptive contribution of helping prepare food for digestion but the different kinds of teeth came into being slowly as certain variations were "naturally selected in" while others were "naturally selected out". Purpose is simply not involved. (*Felix E. Goodson, DePauw University*)