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The impact of section 78 of the law of property act 1925

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Conclusion

While recognising the desire to simplify and clarify law, and while the actual decision can be justified in the instant case, it is submitted that neither precedent nor principle supported the reasoning adopted and, moreover, it could result in a less objective examination of control of land use than is justified in this area of law. It is sincerely hoped that this case is the spur Parliament needs to reconsider the policies underlying the present private law on the regulation of land use, and that serious attention will finally be given to the concept of Land Obligations. As a starting point one would recommend the Law Commission’s working paper61 published as long ago as 1971.

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References

  1. See particularly the comments of Denning L. J. (as he then was) inSeaford Court Estates Ltd. v Asher [1949] 2 K.B. 481, 498–9. For an interesting article on the roles of judges see Lord Devlin, “Judges and Lawmakers”,39 Modern Law Review (1976), 1.

  2. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594.

  3. See for example, D. Hayton, “Revolution in Restrictive Covenants Law?”,43 Modern Law Review (1980), 445; and G. H. Newsom, “Annexation of Restrictive Covenants”,Journal of Planning and En vironmental Law (1980), 371.

  4. There are only three methods by which the benefit of a restrictive covenant can be transferred — per Wynn-Parry J. inRe Pinewood Estate [1958] Ch. 280, 284.

  5. For further detail on annexation see R. H. Maudsley & E. H. Bum,Land Law, Cases & Materials, 4th Edition, London, Butterworths, 1980, 717–730.

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  6. See Brightman L. J.’s judgment,supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 606G and H.

  7. See Working Paper No. 36, (1971),Transfer of Land: Rights Appurtenant to Land, paragraph 9.

  8. Development Schemes are governed by separate rules — see C. H. S. Preston and G. H. Newsom,Restrictive Covenants Affecting Freehold Land, 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1971, 39-50.

  9. [1900] 2 Ch. 388, 395, adopting the definition of Bayley J. inCongleton Corporation v Pattison (1808) 10 East 130, 135.

  10. See for example,The Prior’s Case (1368) 1 Sm.L.C. 10th edition 56, 73; and Resolutions 1 and 2 inSpencer’s Case (1583) 5 Co.Rep. 16(a) and (b) (K.B.).

  11. See F. H. Lawson,Introduction to the Law of Property, Oxford University Press (Clarendon Series), 1958, 1. The terms are used to connote the difference in legal relations between persons and things and between persons and persons.

  12. For further information on this point see Preston and Newsom,op. cit. C. H. S. Preston and G. H. Newsom,Restrictive Covenants Affecting Freehold Land, 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1971, 24et seq.

  13. SeeLondon County Council v Allen [1914] 3 K.B. 642, and Lord Jessel M. R. inLondon and South Western Rail Co. v Gonun (1882) 20 Ch. D. 562, 583.

  14. Delivering the main judgment of the court,supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. .

  15. Ibid. supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. , 602A and B. Emphasis added.

  16. Ibid. supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. , 602C.

  17. Infra. P. V. Baker, “TheBenefit of Restrictive Covenants”,84 Law Quarterly Review (1968), 22, 31-32.

  18. P. V. Baker, “TheBenefit of Restrictive Covenants”,84 Law Quarterly Review (1968), 22, 31–32.

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  19. Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 602D.

  20. This is the basis of the reasoning (though not the decision) inOsborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch. 446, 450.

  21. It is significant that the court inSpencer’s Case, dealing with covenants in leases, had no such difficulties —supra note 11The Prior’s Case (1368) 1 Sm.L.C. 10th edition 56, 73.

  22. Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 607C.

  23. Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 605A and B.

  24. Which he considered had the same meaning as the “old-fashioned expression” of touching and concerning the land —ibid.Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. , 604F.

  25. Most notablyNewton Abbot Co-operative Society v Williamson & Treadgold [1952] Ch. 286 andMarten v Flight Refuelling Ltd. [1962] Ch. 115. See also P. McAuslan,Land,La w and Planning, Weiden feld and Nicolson, 1975, 246et seq.

  26. Cf. to the same effect, Hayton,supra note 4 D. Hayton, “Revolution in Restrictive Covenants Law?”,43 Modern Law Review (1980) at 448.

  27. Supra note 3Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 604F and G.

  28. Seesupra note 10 [1900] 2 Ch. 388, 395, adopting the definition of Bayley J. inCongleton Corporation v Pattison (1808) 10 East 130, 135.

  29. Ibid., Rending the judgment of the court. 404.

  30. Ibid., Rending the judgment of the court. 405.

  31. ibid., Rending the judgment of the court. 408.

  32. See per Hall V-C inRenals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125, 130.

  33. On this point see Romer L. J. inDrake v Gray [l936] Ch. 451, 465.

  34. See Baker,supra note 19 at 23–24.

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  35. Per Collins L. J. inRogers v Hosegood,supra note 10 at 404–406 [1900] 2 Ch. 388, 395.

  36. See for example, per Viscount Simonds inAttorney General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] A.C. 436, 465, that “It is the merest commonplace to say that words abstracted from context may be meaningless or misleading”.

  37. Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 606B.

  38. Since the sections arein pari materia.

  39. [1967] 1 A.C. 50.

  40. Ibid., 45 [1967] 1 A.C. 50. 73.

  41. Ibid., 45 [1967] 1 A.C. 50. 81.

  42. Preston and Newsom,op. cit. C. H. S. Preston and G. H. Newsom,Restrictive Covenants Affecting Freehold Land, 5th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1971, 78–79.

  43. As required underRenals v Cowlishaw, supra note 37Renals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125, andRogers v Hosegood,supra note 10 [1900] 2 Ch. 388, 395.

  44. [1964] Ch. 38.

  45. Based upon a different clause in the deed —supra note 3Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 599E.

  46. See the cases citedsupra, note 28Newton Abbot Co-operative Society v Williamson & Treadgold [1952] Ch. 286.

  47. It is quite clear fromRenals v Cowlishaw,supra note 37 See per Hall V-C inRenals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125, at 130, and per Romer L. J. inMiles v Easter [1933] Ch. 611, 631, that the object is only relevant to express assignment, where it is considered for the purpose of deciding whether a covenant not annexed is, nevertheless, assignable, with the result that the court can allow the benefit to be assignedat the time of transfer of the relevant land.

  48. See Baker,supra note 19 at 30–32.

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  49. Supra note 3 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 594. at 603H.

  50. Supra note 37 See per Hall V-C inRenals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125, at 130–131. It was impliedly rejected inStil well v Blackman [196l] 3 W.L.R. 1397.

  51. Op. cit.Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd. [1962] Ch. 115, 35 note 28.

  52. Supra note 53Renals v Cowlishaw supra note 37 See per Hall V-C inRenals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125, at 631.

  53. See alsosupra note 53Renals v Cowlishaw supra note 37 See per Hall V-C inRenals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125.

  54. Thus it must be possible for the court to infer that the object of the covenant “was to enablethe vendor to dispose of his land to greater advantage”. —supra note 53Renals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125, at 631.

  55. Supra note 8 See Working Paper No. 36, (1971),Transfer of Land: Rights Appurtenant to Land, paragraph 9.

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  1. Liverpool Polytechnic, Liverpool, UK

    Paul Kent LL.M. (Senior Lecturer in Law)

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Kent, P. The impact of section 78 of the law of property act 1925. Liverpool Law Rev 3, 53–61 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03185289

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