liberties. "CAIR can only shout over individual discrimination or abuses of civil rights but it doesn't have political clout. And if it tries to claim it has political clout, the South Asian and indigenous Muslims will then rise up and say, 'Well, no you don't.'"

Community divisions, however, extend far deeper than a simple lack of organization and diverging interests. Feelings of resentment and bitterness between ethnic groups make the situation far more serious. McCloud said that racism towards African-American Muslims by Arab Muslims has reached "intolerable levels," adding that "the world Muslim community has not helped the indigenous community, so the indigenous community doesn't feel any allegiance to the immigrants at all."

Mohammad Nimer, a spokesman for the Council on American Islamic Relations, dismissed such allegations, telling the *Weekly* that they were "rhetorical."

The South Asian Muslim community's relations with other Muslim groups in the US are also problematic. McCloud points to a recent example of a fundraising dinner for a Radio Islam initiative designed to create a radio show in Chicago for Muslims. According to McCloud, the event was a disaster due to sparse attendance. She said that because the impetus for Radio Islam came solely from the South Asian Muslim community, very few Arab Muslims and no African-American Muslims attended, "despite the fact that this is precisely the way to gain political clout in the US."

All parties acknowledge that steps must be taken in order to rectify the situation. McCloud suggests that "risk-takers" from all sides should come together and try to hammer out a united front. Al-Amoudi told *Islam Online*, "The challenge is to establish common ground," adding that the end goal was "not necessarily to unite the Muslim community—we're too diverse for such idealism—but to achieve results

through coordination. Harmony is much more important than unity."

Unity—or at least a greater degree of harmony—within the American Muslim community would make it easier to consolidate each group's strengths and put them to good use. The African-American Muslim population, for instance, is politically well organized and enjoys considerable grassroots support among its members. The Arab Muslim community enjoys a per capita income that is well above the US average and the South Asian Muslim community has shown innovation in launching projects like Radio Islam. Muslim activists believe these various strengths would be more effective under a coherent lobby.

For instance, greater unity would allow Muslims to gain more clout in the political arena. Muslims took a tentative first step towards unity in the 2000 presidential elections when several groups tried to persuade the approximately 1 million eligible Muslim voters in the US to vote as a block. Organizations like CAIR and the American Muslim Council called on Muslims to support Republican candidate George W. Bush, a choice many later came to regret. With Bush running for re-election this year in what is shaping up to be a tight race, a more unified Muslim vote and organized political strategy could be an important factor in deciding the winner.

Despite the obvious benefits a united Muslim community would provide, there seems to be very little being done to encourage it. McCloud said that efforts by individuals from various groups to find common ground have "only created more division within the community."

While she hoped the situation would improve, she admitted that she was pessimistic about short-term prospects. Nimer agreed, saying that divisions within the community were "a fact of life" and that little could be done to put an end to them. □

Erratum

Several sentences were misprinted in Edward Alexander's "Academics Against Israel" (*Society*, November/December 2003) regarding Albert Lindemann's treatment of European anti-Semitism (p. 5). The text should have read as follows:

According to Lindemann, the Romanians had been subjected to "mean-spirited denigration" of their country by Jews, and so it was reasonable for Romania's elite to conclude that "making life difficult" for the country's Jewish inhabitants, "legally or otherwise," was "a justifiable policy." His abstruse research into Russian history also revealed to him that whatever anti-Semitism existed there was "hardly a hatred without palpable or understandable cause."

The 1903 Kishinev pogrom, Lindemann grudgingly admitted, did occur but was a relatively minor affair in numbers killed and wounded, which the Jews, with typical "hyperbole and mendacity," exaggerated in order to attract sympathy and money; it was a major affair only because it revealed "a rising Jewish combativeness." (As for the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, Lindemann apparently never heard of it, for it goes unmentioned in his nearly 50 pages on Russia.)

In Germany, Jews (especially Heinrich Graetz) were guilty of a "steady stream of insults and withering criticism ... directed at Germans"; by contrast, Hitler (who published *Mein Kampf* in 1925-27) was a "moderate" on the Jewish question prior to the mid-1930s; besides, "nearly everywhere Hitler looked at the end of the war, there were Jews who corresponded to anti-Semitic imagery."

The end note (#6) on Lindemann's *Esau's Tears* should have cited the following pages: 308, 311, 291, 140-41, 496, 54.