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Madison's constitutional political economy: Principles for a liberal order

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Abstract

When persons are modelled as self-interested in politics ... the constitutional challenge becomes one of constructing and designing framework institutions or rules that will, to the maximum extent possible, limit the exercise of such interest in exploitative ways and direct such interest to furtherance of the general interest. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover the roots of a public choice perspective ... in the writings of the American Founders, and most notably in James Madison's contributions toThe Federalist Papers.

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This paper draws on my earlier work covering Madison's political and economic thought (Dorn 1988, 1990). I wish to thank Thomas M. Humphrey and an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier version of the paper, and William A. Niskanen and Roger Pilon for fruitful discussions of the general topic. The usual caveat applies.

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Dorn, J.A. Madison's constitutional political economy: Principles for a liberal order. Constit Polit Econ 2, 163–186 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02404426

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