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Introduction: Applying the Experimental Method to Economic Thought: From Adam Smith to Vernon Smith

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Social Preference, Institution, and Distribution

Part of the book series: Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science ((EESCS,volume 3))

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Abstract

This paper aims to identify the significance of the emergence of experimental methods in economics, by reviewing behavioral theory in the history of economic thought. Economists have adopted numerous approaches in their attempts to resolve what is called das Adam Smith Probleme (the Adam Smith problem)—how to theoretically explain human behaviors driven by social and selfish incentives. For example, Menger separated economic aspects from social aspects, Mises or Weber established a comprehensive concept of purposive behavior, and Keynes strategically avoided micro-foundations for macroanalysis. Moreover, Popper attempted to solve the problem by introducing situational logic that understands human behaviors as appropriate responses to given social conditions. Meanwhile, institutional economists such as Commons attempted to understand humans as acting according to rules in given social institutions. Based on these historical discussions, this paper proposes three meanings of experimental methods: (1) such methods enrich micro-foundations of economics, by enabling the testing of behavioral hypotheses regarding human action under social institutions; (2) such methods serve to create micro-foundations for macro-theory, based on assumptions regarding a “behavioral trend”; and (3) such methods enable the reexamination of the behavioral assumptions of past theories.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The behavioral assumptions associated with homo economicus, according to standard economic theories, can be summarized as follows: “Economic agents are rational”; “Economic agents are motivated by expected utility maximization”; “An agent’s utility is governed by purely selfish concerns, in the narrow sense that it does not take into consideration the utility of others”; “Agents are Bayesian probability operators”; “Agents have consistent time preferences according to the discounted utility model”; “All income and assets are completely fungible” (Wilkinson 2008, p. 5).

  2. 2.

    Camerer and Loenstein (2004) states, “The neoclassical approach is useful because it provides economists with a theoretical framework that can be applied to almost any form of economic (and even noneconomic) behavior, and it makes refutable predictions” (p. 3).

  3. 3.

    For instance, Locke (1689) states, “Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which seem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits” (p. 529).

  4. 4.

    For recent discussions of the Adam Smith problem, see (Paganelli 2008; Lundestad 2014).

  5. 5.

    Regarding the tautological problem of a conceptualization of human action by Mises, see Tokumaru (2009).

  6. 6.

    Smith states that every man “…must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase” (Smith 1776, p. 47).

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Tokumaru, N. (2016). Introduction: Applying the Experimental Method to Economic Thought: From Adam Smith to Vernon Smith. In: Social Preference, Institution, and Distribution. Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, vol 3. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0137-6_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0137-6_1

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