Abstract
With a theory as complex and intricate as Merleau-Ponty’s, one has the feeling that any critical remarks he might venture will appear either too sweeping, or too trivial to matter much one way or the other. We have attempted thus far to brave one torrent — explicating the theory itself — only to encounter another, more difficult one.
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References
Cartesian Meditations, op, cit., p. 37.
Formale und transzendentale Logik, op. cit., pp. 187, 221–22; Cartesian Meditations pp. 46–55; Ideen, I, p. 94.
Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 34. And, we contend Merleau-Ponty sees the task of reflection as having of necessity to repeat the process reflected on, thus confusing reflection with the process itself.
Cf. above, pp. 130–35.
Cf. PP, pp. 237ff, 269ff, 275–76, 350–51, 376–77, and passim. 8 Gurwitsch, Théorie du Champ de la Conscience, op. cit., p. 245.
Cf. Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., § 17; these are the lowest levels of ego-activity. See also Ideen, I, op. cit., § 115.
Cf. Cartesian Meditations, pp. 41–44, e.g.
See H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, Netherlands), Volume I, p. 184.
Gurwitsch, ibid., pp. 75, 87.
Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. III.
Gurwitsch, op. cit., p. 87.
Gurwitsch, ibid., pp. 75–76.
Cf. Formale und transzendentale Logik, §§ 3–4. We shall return to this phenomenon later on.
Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 78.
Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., §§ 16–21, and 63.
Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 8, and 109–10. The remark is to the effect that Merleau-Ponty, as opposed to Sartre (Marcel is not even mentioned), accounts for the body qua mine.
A. Schütz, “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” PPR, Vol. xiv, No. 1 (September, 1953), p. 5; also, pp. 3–6. Cf. also his excellent article, “Symbol, Reality and Society,” Symbols and Society (edited by Lyman Bryson et al), 14th Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, 1955), pp. 152–54. And, “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy,” PPR, Vol. xx, No. 2 (December, 1959), pp. 147–65.
Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., §§ 39 and 51.
Ibid., p. 113.
This is one of the much-debated topics in phenomenology. Cf. Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego, op. cit., directed against Husserl; Gurwitsch, “A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness,” PPR, Vol. I (March, 1941), pp. 325–38; and Natanson, “The Empirical and Transcendental Ego,” in: For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, pp. 42–53, esp. 48–50.
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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Zaner, R.M. (1971). Critical Remarks. In: The Problem of Embodiment. Phaenomenologica, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4_9
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