Abstract
In the Meno Socrates is inquiring into the nature of virtue as such, thereby carrying out the task he set himself at the end of the Protagoras. Having been presented with men, women, and old men,26 he explains to Meno what he is after by introducing the analogous problem of the nature (ousia) of a bee. It will not do to reply that there are many bees and many kinds of bees. As bees they do not differ. They all have (echousin) one identical character (hen ti eidos tauton) by virtue of which (d’ho) they are bees. One ought to “look away” (apoblepsanta) at this, telling what it is (72). It may not be too difficult to tell what a bee is, but it seems rather more obscure what virtue is. Meno’s second (and third) attempt begs the question by introducing part (meros) of virtue in the definition (79). He fails to see the single virtue that permeates all (dia or kata pantōn 74ab) the parts and embraces (katechei 74d) them. Meno is reduced to silence, unable to find out what virtue is as a whole (kata holou 77a). He chops virtue up into fragments (79a).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1982 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ostenfeld, E.N. (1982). Transcendent Simples. In: Forms, Matter and Mind. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7681-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7681-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-7683-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7681-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive