Abstract
When Husserl’s various “introductions to phenomenology” are looked at together in order to discern the structure (or what I have called the “schema”) of the line of thought which runs through them all, one finds after a discussion of the motivating problem an attempt by Husserl to demonstrate that conscious-ness constitutes the world, i.e., that the being there for us of the world and of what is in it is an achievement of consciousness. This demonstration is a general argument whose premises are supplied by non-transcendental, phenomenological analyses, phenomenological analyses carried out in the natural attitude. This aspect of the “one” introduction to phenomenology which I am constructing from Husserl’s texts has two main sections. In the first, the “natural attitude” is descriptively analyzed in order to disclose its “general thesis,” the belief in the being “on hand” (Vorhandenheit) and in the “actuality” (Wirklichkeit) of the world. Once this is achieved, the possibility of suspending this belief is raised, a procedure which is called the “transcendental phenomenological epoche.” This is followed by the second main section, which is a psychological investigation of consciousness. The purpose of this investigation is to yield those premises needed for the conclusion that consciousness constitutes the world.
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Notes
Ideas, section 117, p. 329. On what is posited in cases of non-doxic positings, see Crisis, p. 237 and Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgement, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 80 (hereafter cited asEJ).
For examples of these, see Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana VI, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 145 (hereafter cited as Krisis). See Crisis, p. 142.
See Dorion Cairns, “The Many Senses and Denotations of the Word Bewusstsein (‘Consciousness’) in Edmund Husserl’s Writings,” in Life World and Consiousness, ed. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 22–23. Emphasis mine.
See Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol.1, p. 137.
See H. Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), pp. 51ff, and H. von Helmholtz, Popular Scientific Lectures (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp. 223ff.
See H. Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), pp. 51ff, and H. von Helmholtz, Popular Scientific Lectures (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp. 223ff.
LI, p. 741. See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. 2, part 2 (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), sixth investigation, section 26, p. 91. Hereafter, this work will be cited as LUt followed by a roman numeral and an arabic numeral designating the particular investigation and the section of that investigation, respectively, to which reference is made, and then the page reference of the edition cited here. Thus, the reference just given would be LU, VI/26, p. 91. See also LI, pp. 589, 652.
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McKenna, W.R. (1982). Acquiring the Idea of Pure Transcendental Consciousness. In: Husserl’s “Introductions to Phenomenology”. Phaenomenologica, vol 89. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7573-6_4
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