Moral Psychology in Plato’s Apology

Abstract

In this essay, we argue that several passages in Plato’s Apology, cannot be appropriately understood by what has come to be the most widely accepted interpretation of what is called “Socratic intellectualism.” According to this view, Socrates saw no role in the explanation of human behavior for such psychological factors as appetites or passions/emotions. We claim, on the contrary, that the passages we consider in Plato’s Apology, actually reveal that Socrates was quite ready to explain human behavior in precisely the way this interpretation claims he would not (or could not) do. We then provide an understanding of what Socrates is saying in these passages that makes much better sense of them but also continues to depict Socratic moral psychology as intellectualist, insofar as it remains true in our account that all human agents always act in ways that reflect their beliefs about what is best for them at the time of action.

We began reading the works of David Keyt early in our academic careers, and each of us feels deeply indebted to him and his work for our own engagement in the field—particularly in our thinking and teaching on the topic of Aristotle’s Politics,. Smith also had the wonderful opportunity to take an NEH Summer Seminar on Aristotle with Keyt in the summer of 1979 and has from that time onward regarded Keyt as a special mentor and friend.