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What’s Wrong with Forensic Uses of Biobanks?

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Book cover Biobanks and Tissue Research

Part of the book series: The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology ((ELTE,volume 8))

Abstract

Privacy is increasingly becoming a more and more serious concern in the context of biobanking. For that reason, the anonymization and pseudonymization of samples donors’ data have lately attracted much research work. The concern with privacy is particularly evident in the area of forensic uses of biobanks data. More concretely, opponents have argued that forensic data bases (i) discriminate against certain social groups, particularly when the data are kept even after the suspect has been dismissed from the investigation or acquitted in trial; (ii) lead to miscarriages of justice, as it is shown by some cases where innocents were found guilty because of errors committed in genetic data analysis; (iii) can be misused by governments to control citizens through information storage that might be used against them in the future; (iv) violate donors’ privacy, particularly as genetic data banks imply that confidential information about donors’ – as well as their relatives’ – propensity to develop certain diseases is collected and put at researchers’ – or State authorities’ – disposal. Finally, it is also argued that all these problematic aspects of forensic biobanking, as they were expressed in the objections above, (v) can be conducive to the discredit of genetic biobanks in general, thus weakening people’s willingness to contribute their samples to the repositories. Common to all these objections is however a remarkable lack of conceptual accuracy regarding both the nature and the content of the so called right to privacy. Obviously, this has a direct bearing on how the other objections should be judged.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Terminology discrepancies are particularly salient between common law and continental traditions. For a thorough account of these discrepancies, see Elger and Caplan (2006).

  2. 2.

    Some of the documents in which this terminology can be found are, for instance, CDBI (2006), Draft explanatory memorandum to the draft recommendation on research on biological materials of human origin. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Steering Committee on Bioethics; COE (2006), Recommendation Rec (2006)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on research on biological materials of human origin. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.

  3. 3.

    Something similar applies to the notion of consent, as a criminal can be sent to prison in spite of her not accepting the punishment. However, this might be different in other areas in which consent also is a relevant notion. Think, for instance, of a practice that implied that imprisoned criminals are compulsory made to donate biological samples to a biobanking or, where capital punishment still is enforced, to donate their organs without their consent. It is therefore far from obvious that privacy, consent and other basic rights can without problem be set aside, even in criminal contexts. As this aspect exceeds the scope of this article, it will not be further discussed.

  4. 4.

    Beckman (2005, quotation on p. 98). This reference has been gathered from Teetzel (2009, quotation on p. 43).

  5. 5.

    DeCew (1999, quotation on pp. 249). This reference has been gathered from Teetzel (2009, quotation on pp. 43–44).

  6. 6.

    In Von Hannover v Germany (2004).

  7. 7.

    I abstain here from stating where the distinction should be drawn between serious and non-serious criminality, as that is related to complicated value issues. Crimes against persons seem at first sight to be a proper candidate to be included in the first of these two groups. However this delimitation should not be seen as conclusive, as other types of criminal conduct usually not conducive to great personal damage might, in particular circumstances, have devastating effects for the victims.

  8. 8.

    Apparently, this is also acknowledged in the European legislation. Art. 8, 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right [to privacy] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or (…) for the prevention of disorder or crime (…) or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

  9. 9.

    In that sense, it might be said that the right to privacy is a (at least partially) self-annulling right. Unlike other absolute rights that are overridden by other, competing absolute rights, privacy is sometimes overridden by itself: some of its aspects have to be set aside to further another aspects of the same right.

  10. 10.

    In Barsby and Ormerod (2003, quotation on p. 41).

  11. 11.

    This point might be illustrated by the US statistics on murder victims. According to a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, most murder is intra-racial, not interracial. That means among other things that African-Americans are disproportionately victims of homicide, and that their murderers are also mostly African-Americans. See Cole and Smith (2007).

  12. 12.

    See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (accessed 15 March 2011).

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    The problematic aspects of the storage of biological material from suspects were actualized in 2008 by S. and Marper v The United Kingdom. The case involved two claimants from Sheffield, England: Mr. S. and Michael Marper. Mr. S’s fingerprints and DNA samples were taken when he was arrested at the age of eleven and charged with attempted robbery, but he was later acquitted. Michael Marper was instead charged with harassment of his partner. As both suspects became reconciled, they claimed that their previously taken samples were destroyed. The case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), whose decision overturned previous judgements favourable to the government from the United Kingdom’s House of Lords, Court of Appeal and High Court. The ECHR held that holding DNA samples of individuals arrested but who are later acquitted or have the charges against them dropped is a violation of the right to privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights.

  15. 15.

    In Simoncelli and Wallace (2006).

  16. 16.

    For instance, according to the Punishment Sentencing Commission of the state of Minnesota, racial factors are banned in sentencing repeat offenders.

  17. 17.

    Another example of forensic use of clinical biobanks in Sweden was the identification of deceased Swedish citizens after the Tsunami 2004. For that purpose, a temporary law was passed stating that samples from the PKU-biobank could be used for the identification process. This use of biobanks material did not cause however resistance among the public.

  18. 18.

    This formulation is obviously not totally accurate, as some donors will certainly also become crime victims in the future. For reasons of simplicity, however, I choose to keep this formulation.

References

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Tamburrini, C. (2011). What’s Wrong with Forensic Uses of Biobanks?. In: Lenk, C., Sándor, J., Gordijn, B. (eds) Biobanks and Tissue Research. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1673-5_9

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