Abstract
We investigate the concepts of past, present, and future that build upon a modal distinction between the settled past and the open future. The concepts are defined in terms of a pre-causal ordering and of qualitative differences between alternative histories. Finally, we look what an event’s past, present, and future look like in the so-called Minkowskian Branching Structures, in which histories are isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime.
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Placek, T. (2011). A Locus for “Now”. In: Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_27
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