Abstract
‘Non-cognitivism’, a creature of the twentieth century, is nevertheless associated with David Hume and George Berkeley, two figures of the eighteenth, often in relation to their ethical theories. I am not here concerned with the history of this association, nor with the application (or misapplication) of ‘non-cognitivism’ to Hume’s or Berkeley’s views on ethical thought and talk. Instead I want to compare their treatments of the causal relation, and probe the extent to which each can be understood as offering, albeit in embryonic form, a non-cognitivist account of it. The purpose of this exercise, however, is not taxonomic. It is questionable whether such an exercise would be of much weight or interest, even if we were to ignore the obvious problem of anachronism. For the identity of ‘non-cognitivism’ is itself contested in contemporary philosophy, and so there is, in fact, no settled way to determine what exactly is ‘non-cognitivism’. Because any definition of ‘non-cognivism’ would, of necessity, foreclose on a host of difficult matters I shall not offer any such definition. I shall instead examine the accounts of Hume and Berkeley with an eye to what kinds of considerations might invite the label ‘non-cognitivism’ and in what senses that label might be appropriate.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For my first attempt and understanding this connection, see my (2007b).
- 3.
The emergence of minimalism makes this a questionable ‘therefore’. Recall, as I said in the introduction, that the identity of ‘non-cognitivism’ is contested, and so it is dangerous to begin with too rigid a conception of it.
- 4.
Austin (1962).
- 5.
I argued this in connection with Berkeley and natural causation in my (2007a), but I am no longer committed to the semantic thesis.
- 6.
See, for example, the contributions to Kalderon (2005).
- 7.
See Stanley (2001).
- 8.
See e.g. Árdal (1966).
- 9.
E.g. Bricke (1996).
- 10.
For my own position, see Kail (2007a).
- 11.
Contiguity, which figures in two ‘definitions’ of ‘cause’ in T.1.3.14 is dropped not only in the first Enquiry but even within the body of the Treatise.
- 12.
References to Hume’s Treatise follow the convention of book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by a page number to the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
See e.g. Stroud (1977).
- 16.
References to Hume’s Treatise follow the convention of book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by a page number to the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions.
- 17.
For more sustained discussion, see my (2007a) and my ‘Hume, Realism and Quasi-realism’, forthcoming.
- 18.
Thanks to Olivia Bailey, SMS Pearsall, and EMP Kail.
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Kail, P.J.E. (2010). Causation, Fictionalism and Non-Cognitivism: Berkeley and Hume. In: Parigi, S. (eds) George Berkeley: Religion and Science in the Age of Enlightenment. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 201. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9243-4_3
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