Abstract
The phenomenological approach in both philosophy and psychiatry has often been characterized as a descriptive rather than an explanatory enterprise. One can understand this statement in various ways. The general idea, however, is that the purpose of phenomenology is to describe and define the nature and varieties of human experience rather than to give an account of the causal mechanisms or efficacious processes that bring it about.
At an early phase of his work, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) - phenomenology’s founder - did indeed present phenomenology as a purely descriptive approach that excludes all concern with both genesis and causation (Bernet et al. 1993, p. 195). In the classic preface to his Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, pp. vii-viii) characterizes phenomenology as “a matter of describing, not of explaining or analyzing … (as an attempt) to give a direct description of experience as it is without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the scientist, the historian, or the sociologist may be able to provide.” Similar views are common in phenomenological psychiatry and psychopathology. The phenomenological psychiatrist, Wolfgang Blankenburg (1971/1991, p. 4, 27), e.g., explicitly denies that his account of the “basic disorder” (Grundstörung) in schizophrenia is intended to have any etiologic significance; he aims, he says, only to capture the “essence” of typically schizophrenic abnormalities (see also Buytendijk 1987, p. 130).
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Notes
- 1.
See, e.g., Simon (2000, p. 25): “The line between descriptive and explanatory laws is not a sharp one, for we may find all kinds of intermediate cases - especially for qualitative explanations.” As Simon points out, both “causal” and “explanation” are terms “gravid with implications” and highly “problematic” (p. 22). See Michotte (1963) for an experimental demonstration of the difficulty of separating perceptual observation from causal attribution.
- 2.
The present chapter overlaps considerably with another, rather longer paper: Sass and Parnas (2007).
- 3.
- 4.
Motivation can operate through associative and other links among the contents of awareness. These would have some analogies with the kinds of links emphasized by analytic philosophers who speak of “mental causation” or the “practical syllogism” - see Section on Explanatory Relevance of the Mental or Subjective Domain: Preliminary Considerations below. Motivation (in Husserl’s sense) can, however, also operate through formal or structural aspects of the (noetic) act of consciousness itself - as, e.g., when inner time consciousness serves as a necessary condition for the unity of the flux of experiences, or when a distorted mode of self-experience is expressed in specific kinds of delusional beliefs (see Section on Expressive Relationships below) (Husserl 1989, p. 238).
- 5.
I am aware that, according to many philosophers, a cause can be simultaneous with its effect (Mackie 1974, p. 161). A future, more fully adequate taxonomy will doubtless need to take this into account.
- 6.
The term “affection” in the phrase “self-affection” is intended to suggest a quality of passivity and also affinity with the affects; this contrasts with mental processes or events that have a more active and purely cognitive nature. To be affected by something means to be touched, moved, or motivated by it - a process that is primordially linked to emotionality (Henry 1973; Parnas 2003).
- 7.
Maximal “grip” or “hold” on the world requires a “certain balance between the inner and outer horizon.” If seen from too close, a living body, now divorced from its background, can seem an outlandish “mass of matter”; if seen from too far away, it may lose its “living value” and appear as a puppet or automaton (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 302).
- 8.
Contrast this with the kind of awareness we normally have of our bodies: “not … knowledge in thematized form. [Rather] an inarticulate and indistinct familiarity completely devoid of positional and disclosing consciousness” (Gurwitsch 1964, p. 302, describing Merleau-Ponty’s views).
- 9.
- 10.
Actually, Davidson’s position on the causal efficacy of mental contents is very difficult to pin down, as various commentators have remarked (see Sass 2001b, pp. 287-290, for discussion and various references, including Kim 1985). Wakefield and Eagle (1997) offer a clear example of a reading that interprets Davidson as ascribing real causal efficacy to “mental representations” existing “in the head” (p. 323). Sass (2001b) criticizes the coherence of Davidson’s position and questions its actual relevance for psychological explanation.
- 11.
Griffiths (1997, p. 244) argues that “many problems in the philosophy of mind have been occasioned by the loss of … flexibility in our thought about mental contents” that was occasioned by adoption of the philosophical “propositional attitude” theory. As Griffiths points out, the latter approach (exemplified by Donald Davidson) derives from Aristotle’s formalized model of action explanation via the “practical syllogism.”
- 12.
Jaspers (1963, p. 59): “… from the phenomenological point of view, it is only the form that interests us.”
- 13.
See Sass (1998b) for an introduction to hermeneutic phenomenology, where the emphasis is on background or “horizonal” aspects of existence.
- 14.
This distinction between synchronic and diachronic dimensions is a simplifying abstraction, not meant to be taken too literally. All conscious processes are, in some sense, intrinsically temporal in nature.
There is at least a rough correspondence between my synchronic-diachronic distinction and Husserl’s distinction between static and genetic phenomenology (see Husserl 1999, pp. 144, 319).
Philosophers have debated the question of the relationship between causation and temporal sequence, with some pointing out that a cause can sometimes be simultaneous with its effect. In this paper, however, I focus on possible causal sequences.
- 15.
Obviously, I am not using “causal” here in the narrow sense of mechanical efficient causality.
- 16.
The term “equiprimordial” is taken from Heidegger (1962).
- 17.
In this respect, I follow Husserl rather than Heidegger. Heidegger conceived of human existence as a condition of being there (Dasein) and questioned what he saw as his mentor, Husserl’s, overly subjectivist and Cartesian conception of mind as constituting the experiential world. Although Husserl fully recognized there is no noesis (act of consciousness) without a correlative noema (object of consciousness), he nevertheless gives a special status to the noetic acts, which he describes as “animating construals” or “apprehensions” that are responsible for the transcendental constituting of the objects and field of our awareness (Husserl 1983, pp. 226, 238, 277). One may certainly debate the merits of a Heideggerian versus a Husserlian approach (Tatossian 1997, p.12). It is worth noting, however, that the Husserlian interest in constituting mental processes and the genesis of experiential worlds is more obviously congruent with the aspirations of contemporary psychology and cognitive science, which seek to identify mental processes that underlie and in this sense account for the experiential abnormalities.
- 18.
See Dworkin et al (1998, pp. 390, 412) re role of the individual’s “concerns” in determining the emotional meaning and general significance of events.
- 19.
Other types also fall outside this dualism of explanatory types; see below.
- 20.
Merleau-Ponty (1962) uses the concept of “reciprocal expression” in a broad way - to refer to “internal links” between whole modes of experience: “Thus sexuality is not an autonomous cycle. It has internal links with the whole of active and cognitive being, these three sectors of behavior [sexuality, action, cognition] display one typical structure, and stand in a relationship to each other of reciprocal expression” (p. 157).
- 21.
McClamrock (1995) describes “the characterizations of the world under which behavior is systematic with respect to it” (p. 4) as “distal causes”, and states that, in causal analysis, these may “screen off” (i.e., render less relevant) more proximal causes (p. 54). See also pp. 45-53, 178, 187 and passim for arguments from philosophy and cognitive science. For related discussion, see Searle (1983), espec. pp. 112-140.
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Sass, L.A. (2010). Phenomenology as Description and as Explanation: The Case of Schizophrenia. In: Schmicking, D., Gallagher, S. (eds) Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_31
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