Abstract
This chapter explains when and how interest groups are influential in the European Parliament (EP), which has become one of the most important lobbying venues in the European Union (EU). The chapter shows that lobbying success depends on a number of factors, most notably the degree of counter-lobbying, issue salience, and committee receptiveness. These factors are brought together in the framework of “Triple-I”—interests, issues, and institutions—to determine the success or failure of lobbying. The chapter shows that business is likely to prevail over EP policy outcomes in instances when there is unity within the business community, business groups are faced with low salience issues, and mainstream committees are in charge of dossiers. There are also instances where the EP takes up its traditional role as a policy entrepreneur of diffuse interests at the expense of business. This is most likely to happen when European business federations are divided, they lobby on highly salient and politicized issues, and they are faced with periphery committees with little co-decision experience. Business often finds itself battling not labor unions or NGOs but itself.
Parts of this chapter have also been published in: Dionigi, M.K. 2017. Lobbying in the European Parliament. The Battle for Influence. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Notes
- 1.
(1) Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 on setting emission performance standards for new light commercial vehicles as part of the Union’s integrated approach to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) from light-duty vehicles (the vans regulation), (2) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers (food information to consumers’ regulation, (3) Directive 2002/15/EC on the organization of the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities (the road transport working time directive), and (4) the attempted, but failed, revision of Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (the pregnant workers directive).
- 2.
For a detailed account of each of the four cases, please see Dionigi (2017).
- 3.
Interview, EP policy advisor, 1 September 2010.
- 4.
The rapporteur is the MEP who is nominated in an internal procedure in a parliamentary committee as the draftsperson for the EP’s position (“report”) to a Commission proposal. Political groups—other than the rapporteur’s—nominate so-called shadow rapporteurs to work jointly with the rapporteur on the respective file, to, e.g., negotiate compromise amendments with the other political groups and to participate in possible negotiations (“trilogues”) with Council and Commission on behalf of their groups.
- 5.
Interview, representative from a European beverage industry, 13 April 2011.
- 6.
Interview, UEAPME, 15 March 2011.
- 7.
Interview, the Social Platform, 20 April 2010.
- 8.
Interview, Hill Knowlton, 18 May 2011.
- 9.
The co-decision II procedure was introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty and states that the Council cannot reaffirm its common position following a breakdown of the conciliation committee.
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Dionigi, M.K. (2019). Lobbying in the European Parliament: Who Tips the Scales?. In: Dialer, D., Richter, M. (eds) Lobbying in the European Union. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9_10
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