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Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics pp 1–31Cite as

Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations

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Abstract

This chapter reviews experimental studies that investigate the effects of communication on behavior in organizational settings. Two main classes of studies are identified: (a) studies on coordination and competition, which include experimental research that tests whether communication can help to overcome coordination failure within organizations and (b) studies that analyze the role of communication in alleviating problems arising from information asymmetries at the workplace. The evidence from these studies indicates that communication is suited to improve efficient coordination within firms and to mitigate information problems in employer–employee relationships. In addition, studies are presented that focus on the interaction between communication and monetary incentive schemes in companies.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, Ecully, France

    Fortuna Casoria

  2. CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Arno Riedl

  3. IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Arno Riedl

  4. Netspar, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Arno Riedl

  5. Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Arno Riedl

  6. Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Peter Werner

Authors
  1. Fortuna Casoria
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  2. Arno Riedl
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  3. Peter Werner
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Arno Riedl .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. UNU-MERIT & Princeton University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Klaus F. Zimmermann

Section Editor information

  1. GATE, CNRS – University of Lyon, Ecully, France

    Marie Claire Villeval

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Casoria, F., Riedl, A., Werner, P. (2020). Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_149-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_149-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-57365-6

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