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The Principal Agent Model and the European Union pp 1–34Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

Abstract

Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a popular analytical framework to study the design and effects of delegation and control. Yet, with the ascendance of governance as a mode of decision-making, the contemporary relevance of the principal–agent model became contested. We argue that the model still retains its relevance to study contemporary EU politics, but it requires researchers to follow a two-step approach. First, the hierarchical, dyadic relationship under study has to be clearly defined amidst a complex web of relations. Second, the conditions that have led to the observed pattern of delegation and/or the consequences of this pattern on the distribution of power between the principals and the agent can be inquired.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Tom Delreux

  2. Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

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  1. Tom Delreux
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  1. Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), Universite catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Tom Delreux

  2. Centre for European Research in Maastricht, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

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Delreux, T., Adriaensen, J. (2017). Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union. In: Delreux, T., Adriaensen, J. (eds) The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_1

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