Abstract
In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation fallacies are defined as violations of rules for critical discussion that further the resolution of differences of opinion on the merits. Viewed within this perspective, fallacies are wrong discussion moves. Such moves can occur in every stage of the resolution process and they can be made by both parties. Among the wrong moves that may occur in the argumentation stage are the fallacies of composition and division.
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Notes
- 1.
This contribution is based on an article by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1999), which was recently republished as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2009). We extended van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s approach by putting it in the newly-developed perspective of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, to be published).
- 2.
In an argument scheme based on a symptomatic relation the starting point is that what is asserted in the standpoint is a symptom, expression or other sign of what is said in the argument or the other way around. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 94–102, 158–168).
- 3.
Our distinction between unstructured wholes or non-ordered collections on the one hand and structured wholes on the other hand resembles Hamblin’s distinction between physical and functional collections (1970, 21).
- 4.
In connection with the non-transferability of properties of parts to wholes or the other way around, Woods and Walton speak of compositionally and divisionally hereditary properties respectively (1982, 206–207). For determining the transferability of properties they make use of Burge's theory of aggregates. See for an extensive exposition of this theory in relation to the composition and division fallacy Woods and Walton (1982).
- 5.
The same applies when instead of the average norm a functional norm is applied. If the property of being light is interpreted as ‘easy to carry’, a light agricultural machine is still heavy.
- 6.
The relative terms in the examples of composition and division fallacies are all the same not ambiguous in the ordinary linguistic sense. That is the reason why we do not regard them as fallacies of ambiguity. Textbooks in which a different approach is taken are Copi (1982, 124–128), Engel (1982, 93–95), and Rescher (1964, 76). Much earlier, Rowe (1962) argued already emphatically that these fallacies are not fallacies of ambiguity.
- 7.
An additional source of confusion is that there are cases in which the terms that are used to refer to a property are applicable both to the whole and the parts. Another complication in identifying the composition and division fallacy is that this fallacy can also be committed in combination with one or more other fallacies. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).
References
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van Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B. (2015). Linguistic Criteria for Judging Composition and Division Fallacies. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_31
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