Chapter 18

a) Switzerland: Extreme Positive Case Study (Worldwide)

“In the name of God Almighty” (Preamble to the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 2018)
“Protestants value rationality and hard work, and see wealth as a reward from God, an ethos which helped lay the foundations of modern Swiss prosperity”. [...]
“Due to the influx of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese workers, Catholics have outnumbered Protestants in Switzerland since the 1970s” (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs—FDFA Presence Switzerland, 2018).

These passages from official Swiss government sources reflect the obvious historical importance of Christian religion in institutional affairs in Switzerland. This case study seeks to briefly describe the possible impacts of the two major historical religions (Protestants and Catholics) on Switzerland’s institutions, and thus on the country’s prosperity.

Switzerland is the world’s oldest democratic nation-state, the oldest federal state in Europe and the world’s most competitive country (World Economic Forum, 2016, 2017). By international standards, its institutional structure is exceptionally well-organised. Such outstanding characteristics are worthy of admiration considering the challenges facing an ethnically, linguistically, socioeconomically, and religiously diverse society. Moreover, such social divisions do not necessarily all cluster territorially (Gruner as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). The following sections consider the roots of prosperity and Christian religion in Switzerland.

Supplementary Information The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78498-0_18) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

18.1 Religious Roots of Swiss Prosperity

Obinger's (2009) detailed historical study concludes "that religion is indeed important for explaining the developmental trajectory of the Swiss welfare state ..." (p. 177). It also extends significantly beyond Weber's (1905) understanding of Protestant rationality and hard work suggested by the FDFA (2018) (see citation at the beginning of this chapter). For Obinger (2009), religion has impacted Swiss social policy in complex and indirect ways. He identifies at least two channels of influence: first, the country's heterogeneous religious make-up, and thus its denominational divide, which has profoundly impacted state and institution building in Swiss society. Secondly, Switzerland's party system reflects the impact of religion on public policy in the "complexion of the federal government" (Obinger, 2009, p. 177). Both channels concern the strong religious tensions that dominated the modern Swiss state and nation-building from the outset. In this light, the next sections analyse some historical institutional changes and several variations concerning the country's religious distribution.

18.2 Roman Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland

While Switzerland has traditionally been religiously diverse, Reformed Protestantism has predominated since the Protestant Reformation (Baumann & Stolz, 2009). However, since the 1970s Roman Catholicism has been the predominant religious denomination (see initial FDFA citation). Figure 18.1 maps Switzerland's denominations nearly two centuries after the beginning of the Protestant Reformation (sixteenth century).

The dark grey areas represent those regions where Roman Catholicism persisted after the Protestant Reformation. Notably, they correspond mainly to the central cantons of Lucerne and its environs, Fribourg, north-western Bern (present-day Jura), and the southern cantons of Valais and Ticino. The bright grey areas represent the Reformed cantons. These are Zürich, Bern, and Basel (i.e. today's German-speaking region), and Lausanne and Geneva in the French-speaking part. The striped and mid-grey areas represent mixed regions, some more Roman Catholic, others more Protestant. Today's cantons of St. Gallen and Grisons were fairly diverse.

This religious landscape was the result of successive wars between Roman Catholics and Protestants during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Until the nineteenth century, religion meant state religion. Changing denomination or marrying across denominational boundaries involved losing one's citizenship and led to banishment. Therefore, Protestants and Catholics lived as "clearly defined political entities" (Head-König, 2017, p. 24). Moreover, such traditional denominational divides have determined the major trends and cultural characteristics of Switzerland's cantons to this day (Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 49).

Fig. 18.1 Denominations in Switzerland (1700) (adapted from Montandon, Gilbert, & Altermatt 1991 as cited in Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 100); used with permission. Author's translation of the French original

18.3 Federalism and Liberalism

In political terms, Catholic-Conservatives have traditionally been federalist. This antecedent originated in the same founding document of the Confederacy, the Federal Charter of 1291 between the communes of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (Catholic cantons until today) (Comité pour une Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse, 2006). Liberals have been anti-clerical and centralist-oriented, and sided with the Protestant endeavour to overthrow the ancient order from the 1830s onward (Gould as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Liberal ideology inherently involved an attack on the Roman Catholic Church-State and its preponderant role in education and other areas of society (p. 180).

In 1848, the Swiss Federal State resulted from a late religious war (Gruner, 1977; Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Protestants emerged victorious from this denominational inter-cantonal civil war (*Sonderbund*), which meant that Protestants and non-denominational liberals were largely responsible for writing the Federal Constitution of 1848 (Obinger, 2009). Moreover, they have also dominated federal power until recently. By contrast, Roman Catholics have mostly been a political minority (not numerically) (Campiche & De Rham, 1977, p. 86; Girod, 1977). Social Democrats and Christian (Catholics) Democrats together held the government majority from 1959 to 2004. However, the existence of a significant and robust Catholic Democracy is barely evident (Linder as cited in Haenni, 2009).

According to Obinger (2009), the 1848 Constitution, whose liberal principles were largely preserved up until the introduction of the revised federal constitution of 1999), was imposed by the liberals (*Freisinn*) against the will of Catholic-Conservative forces. Federalism “was a compromise between the more centralist-oriented Liberals and the federalist Catholic-Conservatives” (Kölz as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Consequently, the Federal Constitution realises core liberal ideas such as “people’s sovereignty, secularism, and the creation of a national market through the removal of trade barriers between the cantons” (Obinger, 2009, p. 180). Also, the creation of the Swiss Federal Constitution and state organisation involved a bottom-up process influenced chiefly by and borrowing from the “liberal constitutions that emerged at the cantonal level from 1830 onward” (Kölz as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180).

Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Constitution used United States federalism as a blueprint (p. 180). This circumstance is linked to American Protestantism. In the USA, a minority dissenting Protestant view of a separated church and state became dominant in the Constitution and federalism (Miller, 2012). Similarly, in Switzerland, the demand for a strict separation of church and state was also rooted in Protestantism (Haenni, 2009). In the Swiss Confederation, “the free, reformed, nonconformist, dissenting currents of Protestantism have played an influential role” in the country’s institutions (Manow, 2004, p. 5; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009).

Swiss liberalism for its part forced the transition from a loose confederation to a federal state and also sought to impose various ideas of the French Revolution (Rosenberg as cited in Haenni, 2009). However, liberal religious ideals (mainly Protestant) have also shaped the freedoms consecrated in the Swiss Federal Constitution. The Constitutional preamble invoking God (cited above) indicates an obviously religious influence rather than a secular (*laïque*) one (Zeugin, 2006, p. 14).

18.4 Economic Backwardness of the Roman Catholic Periphery

Following the 1848 Constitution, Swiss Roman Catholics perceived the liberal centralist government as a threat to traditional Catholic norms and way of life. Federalism provided local autonomy and an institutional shelter, and thus enabled preserving the privileges and influence of the Roman Church-State in Catholic regions. As a result, Catholics concentrated in rural areas where they maintained their traditions, created a Catholic counterculture at the cantonal level against modernisation, industrialisation, government centralisation, and secularisation. They mostly remained firmly attached to the ancient order and opposed developments in science and technology (Obinger, 2009, p. 190). Moreover, the Catholic periphery “reinforced antimodernist and anti-centralist attitudes” due to its economic

backwardness and dependency on the more industrialised liberal centres (Altermatt as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 190).

18.4.1 Education in Roman Catholic Cantons

Under the Federal Constitution of 1848, the cantons enjoyed almost exclusive jurisdiction in education and welfare, among other matters. Catholics exploited such local policies of autonomy to protect the strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church-State on education and marital affairs (Obinger, 2009, pp. 190–191).

Stadler (as cited in Head-König, 2017) mentions the difference between a conservative and a more liberal-radical Catholicism in what he calls “Catholic dualism”. Conservative Catholicism was prevalent in rural regions where the first sector (agriculture and livestock) was predominant (most Catholic cantons such as Valais, Ticino, Jura, and Schwyz). In contrast, liberal Catholicism emerged “in regions whose population tended to emancipate itself partially from the stronghold of the Church” (p. 28; e.g. in Lucerne, where counter-Reformation Jesuits had influenced the educational system).

Concerning the principal type of Catholicism in most Catholic cantons (conservative), Head-König (2017) refers to the socio-economic power of the Roman Church-State:

... rural Catholic societies were governed by and virtually saturated with religious precepts. The Church not only controlled church attendance, the observation of the numerous religious holidays, the obligation to participate in religious processions (Joris 1973, 94) and to receive Holy Communion at Easter, but also instructed adults not only on their moral shortcomings and sexual disorders, but also in respect of evening gatherings and evening schools (p. 45).

Head-König further dedicates a section of her discussion to “The Maintenance of Ignorance”. This term describes the strategies for keeping people ignorant as one of the most potent tools used by the Catholic Church-State to influence social behaviour. Such strategies were widely deployed in Catholic enclaves, at least until during the interwar period, and included: limiting contact with the outside world, both physically and intellectually; limiting access to information and to authorised literature; influencing the education system; overseeing emigration (Head-König, 2017, pp. 46–47).

18.5 Cultural Struggle (*Kulturkampf*)

The cultural struggle between Catholic-conservative and liberal anti-clerical forces erupted in Europe with the declaration of papal infallibility in 1870 and with the First Vatican Council of 1871. The Council opposed the separation of church and state,

secularisation, and scientific progress (Linder, 2005, p. 37; Haenni, 2009, p. 38; Obinger, 2009, p. 181). At the time, the total revision of the 1874 Federal Constitution constituted a response to the strictures of the Vatican Council. It included denominational exemptions, which were directed particularly against the authoritarianism of the Roman Catholic Church. Among others, *Kulturkampf* measures sought to control Catholic religious education, Church appointments and properties. Consequently, the Catholic Church no longer enjoyed undisputed influence, not even in Catholic cantons (Head-König, 2017, p. 27). According to Gérard Pfulg, a Catholic author, amidst the *Kulturkampf*, Catholics were presented as civilisation enemies; they were reproached for their blind attachment to the Roman See, and their Swiss patriotism was, therefore doubted (Pfulg as cited in Schmid, 1981, p. 70).

The *Kulturkampf* was strongly felt in the Bernese Jura and in the region of Geneva (Hafner as cited in Schmid, 1981, p. 70). At the federal level, a critical example of the *Kulturkampf* was the banning of the—consistently loyal to the pope—Jesuit order in article 51 of the 1874 Constitution:

The order of the Jesuits and its affiliated societies shall not be accepted in any part of Switzerland. Their members are prohibited from exercising any office in the Church or at schools.¹

Historically, the Jesuit order has been associated with the Counter-Reformation and political intrigues (O'Malley, 1993). Several European and other countries (including Catholic Spain and Portugal) forced them into exile. Even Pope Clement XIV suppressed the Jesuit order from the Roman Catholic Church just before the French Revolution. However, the Jesuits managed to gradually re-establish themselves in the Church and in those countries from which they had been expelled. Switzerland lifted their ban in 1973 via a national referendum (Gilles-Attinger, 2002).

18.6 Diplomatic Relations Between the Swiss Confederation and the Roman See

The Protestant Reformation had a lasting influence on Swiss politics, at home and abroad. Therefore, Swiss diplomatic relations with the Roman See have been fraught by tensions since the Protestant Reformation (Python, 1994, p. 478). The Swiss Federal Council ordered the papal nuncio in Lucerne to leave Switzerland in the *Kulturkampf* in 1873. A nuncio returned to Bern 50 years later. However, the Swiss Confederation remained without a diplomatic mission in the Vatican (Roman See) until 1991, when a non-resident special envoy was appointed. Then, since 2004, the Swiss government promoted this special envoy to a non-resident Ambassador to the

¹ Author's translation of the German original: “Der Orden der Jesuiten und die ihm affilierten (angeschlossenen) Gesellschaften dürfen in keinem Teile der Schweiz Aufnahme finden, und es ist ihren Gliedern jede Wirksamkeit in Kirche und Schule untersagt” (*Schweiz – Bundesverfassung 1874*).

Vatican (Roman See) (currently the Ambassador of Switzerland in Ljubljana, Slovenia) (Amrein, 2012; FDFA, 2018).

18.6.1 Cantonal Concordats

As the diplomatic relations between the Swiss Confederation and the Roman See were consistently fragile, the possibility of a Concordat at the federal level would have been inconceivable. However, valid agreements with the Roman Catholic Church-State exist at the cantonal level, especially on administrative matters concerning dioceses, bishops, and parishes. The following cantons and municipalities have such agreements: *Cantons*: Aargau (1828); Bern (1828, 1864); Fribourg (1924); St. Gallen (1845); Lucerne (1926); Thurgau (1828); Ticino (1884); *Municipalities*: Chur (1870); Basel (1884, 1968, 1978) (Corral & Petschen, 2004); (Corral, 2014).

18.6.2 Pontifical Swiss Guard

The pontifical Swiss Guard has existed since the Protestant Reformation (1506). It participated in military combats during the Italian wars and was briefly disbanded during the French Revolution. The current 100–110 “Defenders of the [Catholic] Church freedom” (according to their papal title of 1512) must be Swiss Catholic soldiers. Some even descend from Guard families (Python, 1994).

18.7 Current Confessional Ties in the Swiss Population

In Swiss politics, religion still plays a role at the institutional level. Examples include (1) the involvement of ecclesiastical institutions in education and social aspects, (2) the consultation of constitutional articles to the Churches before voting, (3) the military chaplaincy in the army (Campiche & De Rham, 1977, p. 85).

Regarding population distribution, the distribution of Roman Catholics and Protestants in the Swiss Confederation has long persisted. The mainly Protestant enclaves of 1700 (Fig. 18.1) have largely remained Protestant as Fig. 18.2 shows. The same generally applies to Roman Catholic enclaves.

Nevertheless, analysing data trends during the twentieth century reveals drastic changes in population distribution. Table 18.1 shows demographic changes in the last two centuries for both Roman Catholics and Protestants. A sustained decrease in the Protestant population, a sustained increase of Roman Catholics, and particularly an increase of “other” (religions and non-religions) are evident.

Fig. 18.2 Denominations by Cantons (2000) (Stapferhaus Lenzburg 2006 as cited in Baumann & Stolz, 2007, p. 44). © 2007 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License (Author’s translation of this figure’s legend: *Protestantisch* = Protestants; *Römisch-katholisch* = Roman Catholics; *Andere Religionen* = Other religions; *Keine Zugehörigkeit* = No affiliation; *Absolute Zahlen* = Absolute numbers; *exklusive «Ohne Angabe»* = excluding “not specified”)

Table 18.1 Changes in the demographic distribution of Protestants and Roman Catholics in Switzerland in the last two centuries (adapted from Head-König, 2017; FDFA, 2018; Federal Statistical Office, 2017)

Percentage of (%)	1837	1900	1960	2017
Protestants	59.4	57.8	52.7	24.9
Roman Catholics	40.5	41.6	45.9	37.3
Other	0.1	0.6	1.4	37.8

Although the majority of the Swiss population officially belonged to the two main churches (Catholic or Protestant) until 1960, early signs of secularisation had already manifested in 1900 in larger Swiss towns. Besides, secularisation affected both Catholics (in Basel, around only one third were practising members of the faith) and Protestants (in Zürich, only one in ten attended church on Sundays) (Head-König, 2017).

Subsequently, after the 1970s, not only did Roman Catholics outstrip Protestants in numbers, but the most important historical change in the last half-century was the profound “de-Christianisation” of Swiss society. Characteristic of this shift is a profound decrease in the proportion of both Catholics and Protestants in relation to the total number of inhabitants. This transformation was countered by an essential increase in secular groups (agnosticism and atheism), non-membership, as well as by

Evolution of religious landscape

Sources: FSO – FPC (1970–2000), Structural Survey (2010–2019)

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Fig. 18.3 Evolution of religious landscape in Switzerland (1970–2000) (Federal Statistical Office, 2020)

other religious groups (see Fig. 18.3, and Tables 18.1 and 18.2). This pattern is observable both in Switzerland and across other Western European countries (Berger, 1999; Todd & Zurlo, 2016).

Roman Catholics are currently in the majority in most of the cantons and cities, as well as in the entire Swiss Confederation. To compare the urban-rural divide in Switzerland, Table 18.2 presents the proportion of religious adherents in some of the main Swiss cities and cantons in 2018.

However, the current proportions of religious adherents alone do not speak of the religiosity of the population, and even less, of the social effects of religion (Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Barro & McCleary, 2003; McCleary & Barro, 2006), (see Sect. 5.3). In turn, “current social norms” are the “legacy of prior religious beliefs” (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998, p. 431) and owe more to the historical and institutional weight of religion than to its contemporary influence (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Arruñada, 2010; Chaves & Cann, 1992; Wilde et al., 2010). Therefore, regardless of the higher proportion of Roman Catholics or the secularisation of the society, the Swiss institutional structure still responds to a traditional Protestant and liberal influence (Obinger, 2009; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Python, 1994.; Campiche & De Rham, 1977). Moreover, Protestant churches have traditionally been entangled with the political structure of

Table 18.2 Proportions of religious adherents in different Swiss cantons and cities in 2018 (adapted from Federal Statistical Office, 2020)

Cantons and cities	Protestants	Catholics	Other Christians	Other religious communities (e.g. Muslims, Jews)	No religion
Bern (canton)	49.0	15.4	6.4	5.6	22.3
Bern (city)	33.5	19.2	5.1	7.6	33.5
Zurich (canton)	27.2	25.6	6.3	8.4	31.2
Zurich (city)	19.1	26.5	5.4	8.6	39.0
Geneva (canton)	8.9	32.2	5.4	8.2	42.7
Geneva (city)	7.2	31.4	5.9	9.2	43.5
Basel (canton)	29.3	24.9	5.3	6.9	32.2
Basel (city)	14.4	15.5	5.8	11.6	51.4
Vaud (canton)	22.3	28.7	6.1	6.6	34.4
Lausanne (city)	12.7	29.1	6.5	10.1	39.6
St Gallen (canton)	20.4	42.4	6.2	8.7	20.9
St Gallen (city)	18.7	34.0	8.3	10.2	27.0
Lucerne (canton)	9.9	59.2	4.5	5.8	19.6
Lucerne (city)	10.9	48.3	5.4	6.7	27.6
Ticino (canton)	3.9	63.5	5.2	3.0	22.8
Lugano (city)	3.2	59.1	6.6	4.5	24.9
Total in Switzerland	23.0	35.0	6.0	7.0	28.0

the cantons, as they are, in fact, “canton churches” (Gould, 1999 and Cattacin et al., 2003 as cited in Obinger, 2009, p. 180).

18.8 Competitiveness of the Swiss Cantons and Religion

High competitiveness in Switzerland might be associated with the federal model of government. Among other aspects, Swiss federalism is empirically related to sustainable growth, business development, efficient government, and increasing social

capital. The federal system also encourages the cantons to compete over tax rates and other business conditions (Feld et al., 2017).

The USA, which also has a federal government, is the second most competitive country in the world (World Economic Forum, 2016). However, such an argument cannot be generalised. Sudan, Iraq, India, and Mexico, among others, also have federal-type governments and are not as competitive as the USA or Switzerland. Likewise, federalism (although important) alone does not explain the significant differences in competitiveness between Swiss cantons.

The previous maps (Figs. 18.1 and 18.2) show the predominant Protestant or Roman Catholic historical enclaves that have existed in the Swiss Confederation over the last few centuries until the present (2000). Compared in terms of current competitiveness among Swiss cantons, Protestant Cantons are as a rule most competitive, Roman Catholic ones least competitive.

Swiss competitiveness concentrates in the northern, central, and western regions. The southern and eastern territories are the least competitive (see Fig. 18.4). According to UBS Switzerland AG (2016), mountainous topography limits the competitiveness of the large low-competitive southern cantons (Valais, Ticino, Grisons) and other small mountainous cantons. Nonetheless, when compared internationally, even the least competitive cantons in Switzerland, achieve higher values in innovation per capita than France, Italy, or Austria. Exceptionally, Uri, the least innovative canton in Switzerland with the highest proportion of Roman Catholics, attains similar innovation values per capita than Italy (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016; Federal Office of Statistics, 2017).

Fig. 18.4 Cantonal competitiveness indicator (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016; used by permission of the authors)

The dark green areas show the most competitive regions (Fig. 18.4). They correspond to Protestant cantons (e.g. Zürich, Geneva, Lausanne, Basel, Bern) or mixed ones (e.g. Thurgau and St. Gallen). Decreasing to bright green, competitiveness drops to the dark red territories, the least competitive ones. These are Roman Catholic cantons (e.g. Valais, Jura, and Ticino) or mixed ones (e.g. Grisons). Exceptions are Lucerne and Zug, which, although predominantly Roman Catholic, are also highly competitive.

This review suggests that various factors in combination explain the roots of competitiveness in Switzerland. Two factors seem crucial for competitiveness. First, environment and geography: Generally, a canton located in the mountains has more difficulties in developing infrastructure and services than cantons in flat areas.

The second reason adds an important aspect to the first. Before the Protestant Reformation (sixteenth century), even flat areas, where competitiveness is concentrated today (e.g. Zürich), had a mainly rural economy with no tendency towards economic expansion. However, subsequent industrialisation increased literacy and human capital, two of the principal contributions of the Protestant Reformation (Cantoni, 2015; Becker et al., 2016; Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Comité pour une Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse, 2006).

Moreover, both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism persisted in Switzerland after the Protestant Reformation (Figs. 18.1 and 18.2). Although the number of adherents is not as significant as six decades ago, the longstanding consequences of liberal and conservative ideologies are still evident in institutions. Conservative Catholicism retreated to the mountains, thus preserving the privileges of the Church-State and serving “The Maintenance of Ignorance” (Head-König, 2017). Consequently, mountainous Catholic Cantons such as Uri, Jura, Valais, and Appenzell Innerrhoden have, even to date, the lowest human capital (i.e. education) in the Swiss Confederation (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016, p. 13). Still, most of these cantons are even more innovative per inhabitant than surrounding Catholic countries with diverse geographical conditions (flat and mountainous). The influence of liberal federal institutions may have nuanced the effect of low human capital, thus making Catholic cantons more innovative.

On the other hand, liberal Catholicism mainly remained in the flat regions and cities (e.g. Lucerne) and benefitted from educational centres, infrastructure, and services (Clark & Kaiser, 2003). In this respect, both Catholic and Protestant regions in Switzerland profited from the Reformation and its influence on federal institutions.

More importantly, the long-term effect of the Reformation is still evident in Switzerland today, culturally and institutionally (regardless of the current low religiosity). Volonté (2015)’s empirical study of 753 firm-years found that Protestants and Swiss-Germans tend to prevent concentrations of power (i.e. two-tiered board structures in corporate management). Conversely, Roman Catholics and the Swiss-French tend to tolerate strong leadership and hierarchical structures (i.e. single-tier boards) in Switzerland.

The following subsections (18.9–18.11) synthesise and analyse the empirical information collected for Switzerland in terms of CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis).

18.9 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland (1. Prosperity)

18.9.1 *Textual Analysis (Theological)*

The Christian (i.e. biblical) principle of prosperity is associated with obeying the Commandments (set of moral laws). A fairly harmonious discourse exists among Protestant stakeholders regarding this principle. This might be due to conformity to the original *Sola Scriptura* principle of the Protestant Reformation.

Among the below stakeholders (Table 18.3), the Protestant Free Pastor (g) refers to the Old Testament and to more recent examples of disobedience wreaking havoc on civilisations, whereas obedience to the biblical principles ensured prosperity. Similarly, the Independent Protestant Believer (n) links Swiss precision and perfection with the New Testament principle of achieving perfection for a perfect God, rather than for imperfect humans. On the other hand, Roman Catholic stakeholders prefer a somewhat more secular (non-theological) approach to prosperity in Switzerland. None of the Catholic interviews referred to a biblical principle. The Catholic Church-Government Stakeholder intermediary (q) is skeptical about a possible religious (or biblical) relationship between prosperity and industrialisation. Nonetheless, (q) mentions “Catholic piety” and “Sacramental theology” as possible explanations of the rural trend in Catholic cantons and cites other material reasons. Protestantism has heavily criticised sacramental theology for lacking an entirely biblical basis (Witte, 2002).

18.9.2 *Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation)*

Like Fukuyama (1995), the Free Church Pastor (f) links Swiss people’s trustworthiness with high productivity and quality, and with a possible religious (Protestant) influence *à la* Weber. The Protestant Free Pastor (g) mentions that the elite controls education in hierarchical (e.g. Roman Catholic or Orthodox) societies. This argument is in line with Head-König’s (2017, p. 45) analysis of Swiss Catholic cantons (Sect. 18.4.) Likewise, the Free Protestant Believer (n) establishes an explicit theoretical relation with Fukuyama (1995). Lastly, for the non-practising Catholic Academic (l) “Protestant chauvinism [...] perverts Max Weber’s original line of reasoning”, which is frequently used to explain the prosperity of nations. After

Table 18.3 Principles of prosperity according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source: Author's figure)

Prosperity	
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible	"Keep therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may <i>prosper</i> in all that ye do" (King James Bible, 1769, Deuteronomy 29:9).
f) Protestant Free Church Pastor 1	"The Swiss mentality is to stick to what is right. We stick to what we say [...] and this] lead us to <i>trust</i> in ourselves. Then we are proud of [...] the high quality of what we produce". "[...] Protestants are hard-working. [...] Catholic Cantons tend to be agri-cultural and livestock-oriented partly because they are in mountainous areas where it is not easy to develop economically".
g) Protestant Free Church Pastor 2.	"There is absolutely a relationship between occultism and development. The more a culture is involved in occultism, the faster it is destroyed. [...] That was the 'cyclical' history of the Jews [book of Judges]. [...] [C]ivilisations that live with [according to] the Bible all manage very well. They have prospered successfully such as the USA and Germany with Protestantism. Using the Bible, they have become world powers. [...] [T]he economies of Catholic countries are less well developed because the Catholic elites manipulate the power to keep people low and poor in general (e.g. education). They do not want people to know too much. Protestantism strengthens education and culture attains high moral standards. European countries and cultures like Spain, Italy, and Poland [mainly Catholics] or Romania or Greece [mainly Orthodox] are influenced by <i>corrupt</i> ethical codes. The Catholic elite keeps people poor and dominated by mystics and superstition".
l) Non-practising (Catholic) (Academic)	"The [Protestant] Reformation is a major reason for development. At the bottom of everything lies Protestant chauvinism, which perverts Max Weber's original line of reasoning. To some extent, religion is not constant. Sometimes religiosity strengthens and weakens in a cyclical development and runs in parallel cycles to the economy".
m) Independent, Catholic believer (Employee)	"Catholics tend to be more conservative here in Switzerland. [...] In Schwyz [...], where Catholics are a majority, people tend to be more helpful than in the large cities of other Cantons. [...] [P]erhaps [...] the conservative mindset has kept them [Catholics] in a medieval economy".
n) Independent, free Protestant believer (Academic)	"Francis Fukuyama says that trust, culture, and religion can explain development. In Switzerland, 85% of industrialisation occurred in Protestant Cantons. [...] Huguenots [...] established the high-precision industry like watch-making. The perfection evident in this work comes from the idea of doing any work for God's glory and not for men's glory; as we must be perfect as God is perfect [Matthew 5,48]".
q) Catholic Church-State-Government intermediary	"I am not so sure if the religious history of this country can really explain this [Swiss prosperity]. [...] There might be a relation [between denomination] and industrialisation. There must be a connection. But the influence might come from both directions. [...] [I]n Zürich, it was more interesting for the government [...] and also for the people to become Protestants than [...] in Central Switzerland, because of the <i>liberties; the distance they could maintain from being ruled by the hierarchical [Catholic] Church. They could have more freedom.</i> [...] I do not think that Catholics are less intelligent or less likely to work than others. It is more about interaction. Catholic piety, which relates everything in everyday life to faith, asserts that it is easier to live on a farm than in a city. It is less rational and more about nature, and perhaps also about establishing greater affinity with sacramental theology".

harshly criticising Weber's theory of the Protestant work ethic, stakeholder (l) refers implicitly to the theory of existential security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). The latter explains why society becomes more secularised when enough freedom and security exist. Stakeholder (l) was most critical of a possible relationship between religion and prosperity.

18.9.3 Analysis of Social Practice

The Roman Catholic Believer (m) positively associates a more conservative Catholic mindset with examples of helpfulness. However, stakeholder (m) links a conservative mentality with a “medieval economy”, and thus partly explains the fact that most Catholic cantons are not as industrialised as Protestant ones. Catholic Church-Government intermediary Stakeholder (q) partly agrees with the relationship established between a conservative mentality and a medieval economy, when referring to “a less rational ... Catholic piety”. Various authors, for instance, Obinger (2009) and Head-König (2017) have provided evidence that the connection between Catholicism and a medieval economy extends beyond an intuitive link (see also Sects. 18.3–18.4). Likewise, the Protestant Free Pastor (f) states that most Catholic cantons are located in the mountains, which also partly explains why they are less competitive. This view concurs with a recent analysis of cantonal competitiveness (UBS Switzerland AG, 2016). As such, this evidence shows that the combination of at least two factors—geography AND religion, instead of one OR the other—greatly determines cantonal competitiveness.

18.9.3.1 Law and Institutions

The Catholic Church-Government intermediary Stakeholder (q) recognises a mutual relationship between denomination and industrialisation. Stakeholder (q) also provides relevant examples, including the causes of the Reformation in Zürich and in Basel and the desire to free oneself “*from the control of the hierarchical [Catholic] Church*”.

18.10 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland (2. Corruption)

18.10.1 Textual Analysis (Theological)

The Scriptures explicitly encourage believers to refrain from accepting bribes (Table 18.4). In addition, the three last Commandments of the Decalogue (8. *Thou shalt not steal*; 9. *Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor*; and 10.

Table 18.4 Principles of corruption according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source: Author's figure)

Corruption	
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible	"Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not: for I will not justify the wicked. And thou shalt take no gift: for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous" (King James Bible, 1769, Exodus 23: 7–8).
a) Roman Catholic Priest 1.	"We are a small country with a very dense population. Very developed civil societies work through associations. [...] That system works well in civil society to organise citizens as well as in politics. [...] That keeps everyone accountable to others [...]. .the State was against Catholicism because the Church was not democratic. [...] <i>In the 19th century, we [Swiss] created a Church law that is parallel to the canonical law of the Catholic Church.</i> This happened only within Catholicism because it was not acting according to legal principles. For this reason, the Church, along with the state, had to create a law according to democratic principles. This means that we now have a dual legal structure that is unique in the world. [...] [Now] lay members who are in associations, according to democratic law, manage the Church's finances. The money does not land in the hands of bishops but in those of lay people and Church associations, which are responsible for financial affairs. [...] This is the case in Switzerland, not because of Liberation Theology, but because <i>the State forced the Church to be more democratic</i> in order to be accepted as a public juridical body. [...] Rome was not very happy with the case of Switzerland".
e) Roman Catholic Theologian	"I think it is true that there is a much stricter discourse on responsibility and honesty [in a Reformed context]. [...] I believe that in Switzerland, which is very Reformed [Protestant], there is a dual discourse. [...] Corruption [in Switzerland] is lived in another way. [...] many things do not meet the eye and are not spoken about".
h) Protestant Pastor (Reformed Evangelical)	"In the Protestant tradition, it's very important that your life and principles are the same [coherent]. In Catholic traditions [there] are double standards: You have principles for monks, and for the poor, and [for] lay people. In Catholicism, you have the doctrine on one side and reality on another. These things [doctrine and reality] are always different, and the difference is accepted in Catholicism. [...] In the Protestant tradition, you have lower standards, but you are expected to meet them. Not, though, in Roman Catholicism [where matters are the other way around]". [...] "Rabbinic Judaism has similarities with Protestantism [as] for both; the Scriptures come first and occupy a central role. [...] When Jesus, a Jew, spoke about the truth to Pilate, a Roman, Pilate asked Jesus, what is truth? [John 18, 37–38]. This shows how incompatible Roman philosophy can be with Jewish culture. . ."
l) Non-practising Catholic (Academic)	"I don't know why Catholics should be corrupt or shouldn't. I'm Catholic, but I'm not especially associated with it. I'm Catholic. . . [because] family enforces this when you grow up. This is also true in other countries. ... <i>As a Swiss Catholic, I have more in common with a Nordic Protestant than with an Italian Catholic.</i> [...] The Church is there, but might not be the cause of corruption".
m) Independent, Catholic believer (Employee)	"Here in Switzerland, direct democracy and our type of government [Federal] might mean more accountability and less corruption. It's always better to share decisions with a lot of people rather than to concentrate them [decisions] on a few [people]. Perhaps, in a monarchy or a Republic, power is concentrated, which increases the risk of a totalitarian regime and corruption".

(continued)

Table 18.4 (continued)

Corruption	
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
n) Independent free Protestant believer (Academic)	“For us in the German-Swiss tradition truth and facts are perhaps more important than relations, and it seems that in Latin contexts it is the other way around. The Bible is our source of truth [Protestants]. Latin contexts are influenced by Roman and Greek philosophy, where truth is relative. [...] The indulgences were just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the Catholic Church. They allowed one to do as one pleased. If you repent, for instance, contribute either money or say some Hail Mary prayers, you are completely absolved by a priest. You could have even killed or abused people. [...] That [corruption] is what Luther also fought in the Reformation as the Bible clearly states that only God can forgive sins. [...] Pope Francis still offers indulgences to his followers on Twitter”.
q) Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary	“I think the whole system of Switzerland is such that everything next to your town has a strong impact. Every unit has its own police, its own prison, etc. [...] Social control is quite efficient because we have no big cities. [...] We shouldn’t forget that our banks have money that shouldn’t have been there, so we are not 100% clean. It was not illegal, but it was not very moral either. [...] The state does not allow church taxes to flow directly into our hierarchical structure, but to those who organise themselves to collect this source of income. This idea also exists in the United States, where there is no taxation without representation, and it is applied to the Church as well. This is a unique case in the world. [...] The bishop formally proposes a priest, but if the local Catholics do not elect him, he will receive no pay. This is quite a special tradition. It goes back to medieval times in Switzerland, and was strengthened by the Reformation. This led to the elimination of hierarchical thinking. And then the state organised church life to a certain degree”.

Thou shalt not covet (...) any thing that is thy neighbor’s) should provide the conscious Christian believer to abstain from corrupt activities.

Similar to the above prosperity analysis for Switzerland (Sect. 18.9), Protestant stakeholders refer to guiding biblical principles. Stakeholder (n) (i.e. Independent Free Protestant Believer) asserts that the Bible is the source of truth. This recalls the *Sola Scriptura* principle of Protestantism and contrasts with the relative truth characteristic of the Greco-Roman background. The Protestant Reformed Evangelical Pastor (h) also reflects on the discussion of “truth” by drawing attention to the biblical dialogue between Jesus, a Jew, and Pilate, a Roman. For stakeholder (h), both Protestantism and Rabbinic Judaism consider the Scriptures the source of truth, which is incompatible with relativistic Roman philosophy. Therefore, in line with the previous prosperity analysis, Roman Catholic stakeholders do not refer to a consolidated Scriptural basis, but instead to a variegated one, specifically associating corruption with secular issues. Such variegated associations of Roman Catholic stakeholders concur more with the Aristotelian “non-absolute” and “mean” relative points that Selling (2018) considers typical of Roman Catholic ethics.

18.10.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation)

For the Roman Catholic Priest (a), Switzerland is a small country where citizens can organise themselves in associations in which they can participate and are accountable for their actions. These characteristics, among others, distinguish Switzerland (i.e. make the country more competitive and less corrupt) from other countries, according to a Catholic priest (a). This argument concurs with Ostrom (2015), who explains the mechanisms underlying participatory institutions (e.g. Swiss alpine pastures management).

18.10.3 Analysis of Social Practice

The Roman Catholic Theologian (e) believes that corruption is concealed in Switzerland. He mentions the dual Protestant discourse in this respect, but admits that Protestantism has stricter honesty and responsibility principles. The Protestant Reformed Evangelical Pastor (h) makes a similar observation on double standards, which he identifies in Roman Catholicism, where doctrine and lived reality are opposed or different, while in Protestantism lower standards are expected to be fulfilled.

On the other hand, the Non-practising Catholic Academic (l) identifies with *Nordic Protestants* rather than with *Italian Catholics*. This exemplifies McSweeney's (2015) argument about the impossibility of Roman Catholicism constituting a self-contained cultural unit. Furthermore, in Switzerland, as in other Protestant countries, the Reformation secularised both the state and local Roman Catholicism (Becker et al., 2016; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Thus, the self-identification of a Catholic stakeholder (l) with a Nordic Protestant is somewhat foreseeable.

Stakeholder (n) (i.e. Independent Free Protestant Believer) mentions a duality of truth relations in the German-Swiss cultural context as opposed to a Latin context. This view is linked to the concepts developed by Hall (1990) (low-context for German-Swiss and high-context for Latin societies). Stakeholder (n) also refers to the roots of corruption in Roman Catholic doctrines. These include the concept of indulgences used by Jorge Bergoglio, also known as "Pope Francis", to promote events like the Catholic World Youth Day in 2013 (Kington, 2013).

18.10.3.1 Law and Institutions

Among the interviewed stakeholders, the Catholic priest (a) mentions that the Swiss government forced the Roman Catholic Church-State to adopt democratic practices on Swiss territory from the nineteenth century. He further asserts that the Swiss

managed to create a parallel church law to Catholic canon law. This argument concurs with the legal principles and Protestant revolutions explained in Sect. 8.3.4. Here, the Catholic Church-Government Stakeholder (q) explains that the current Swiss mechanisms of participation and transparency in the fiscal management and elections of priests and bishops in the Swiss Catholic Church are unique worldwide. The Catholic Stakeholder (q) links this to the Protestant Reformation. Such notions complement Obinger's (2009) and Python's (1994) observations on the profound influence of the Protestant Reformation on Swiss politics and institutions (Sects. 18.2–18.6).

Similarly, the Independent Catholic Believer (m) relates two essential factors to the prevalence of high transparency in Switzerland: federalism and direct democracy. Both factors have positively affected transparency (and prosperity) (Obinger, 2009) (Sect. 18.3). Democracy is also related to Protestantism (Woodberry, 2012). Conversely, the Roman Catholic Church-State has a monarchic structure, which historically has opposed democratic systems (Cook, 2012).

The Catholic Church-Government intermediary (Stakeholder q) points to the efficiency of social control in small Swiss towns (in line with the Roman Catholic priest (a). Also, similarly to the Roman Catholic Theologian (e), Stakeholder (q) challenges the reputation of Swiss transparency with specific examples such as the morality of the banks.

18.11 Empirical Analysis and CDA for Switzerland (3. Church-State Relations)

18.11.1 *Textual Analysis (Theological)*

The New Testament clearly distinguishes between earthly (government) and spiritual (heavenly) powers, which are and should maintain separated (Table 18.5). According to the biblical principle of the separation of powers, the Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (f) asserts that the attitude of the Swiss federal government is secular. Similarly, the Ecumenical Pastor (i) explains that the non-hierarchical organisation of the federal government and the Protestant Church even influence Roman Catholicism in Switzerland.

Table 18.5 Principles of church-state relations according to stakeholders interviewed in Switzerland (Source: Author's figure)

	Church-State relations
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
The Holy Bible	“Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world: [...]” (King James Bible, 1769, John 18: 36). “[...] Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (King James Bible, 1769, Matthew 22: 21).
a) Roman Catholic Priest 1.	“Catholic Churches within Switzerland are not organised on a national level but on the cantonal level, as all Catholic affairs are organised this way. There are, however, organisations that coordinate the different Catholic parishes”.
b) Roman Catholic Priest 2. (Ecclesiastical office of the Catholic Church)	<p>“Switzerland and the Holy See do have a bilateral agenda, but compared to a regular sovereign nation, this cannot be considered a priority. [...]”</p> <p>The Holy See’s main interests would not go beyond keeping channels of communication open and cultivating good relations with the [Swiss] Confederation. [...]”</p> <p>The specific character of Swiss democracy leaves little room for development [of a new agreement with the Holy See (i.e. Concordat)]. Only some kind of state crisis at the cantonal level might provoke discussion and perhaps facilitate negotiating some international agreement.</p> <p>The principal work of the Nunciature in Bern has to do with the Catholic Church in Switzerland. The Holy See is unique among embassies because it represents a unique entity among sovereign entities in our world”.</p>
f) Protestant Free Church Pastor 1	“The general attitude of the [Swiss Federal] government is secular. The relation between the state and the churches is getting weaker and weaker, except for the Roman Catholic Church. Catholic [political] parties are strong and the embassy of the Vatican in Bern has a far greater influence than the Protestant churches, which have no embassy. Also, the Protestant population is decreasing, and Protestant leaders have, in general, inferior feelings of themselves and admire the Catholic Church very much”.
h) Protestant Pastor (Reformed Evangelical)	“Until 1970, living together without being legally married (cohabitation) was forbidden in Switzerland. Uri was the last canton to accept cohabitation. In the past, only the first son could inherit the parents’ land in Switzerland, perhaps also due to the biblical tradition”.
i) Ecumenical Pastor	“The Swiss Protestant Church is in many ways like the Swiss federal government. For example, there is not a single head but a multi-party system. Here in Switzerland, even the Catholic Church is different because this is not a hierarchical society. But Catholics are subject to the Vatican anyway. This is why there is a branch of Catholics (<i>Christkatholisch</i>) that doesn’t accept the Pope’s authority. Protestants and Catholics are not united here just because Protestants refuse to accept the Pope’s authority in Switzerland”.
k) Academic expert-lawyer	“Religious law has strongly influenced the Swiss legal system for many centuries. [...] The influence of the Church was mostly dominant until the mid eighteenth century. ... [until] a significant change occurred in 1798 with the French Revolution. However, its influence [i.e. the French Revolution’s] did not last because the Helvetic Republic ended already in 1803. [...] There is a large gap between Protestant and Catholic cantons, most of which have their own tradition of how religion influenced their laws. [...] Religion has distinctively influenced inheritance law, Protestant marriage, natural law, canon law, and others depending on denomination, area, period, and fields. [...]”

(continued)

Table 18.5 (continued)

	Church-State relations
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
	Between 1840 and 1880, the Catholic and Protestant traditions even strengthened their differences due to the <i>Kulturkampf</i> . [...] The influence of the Catholic Church was strictly reduced at the federal level after the establishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1848. However, several Catholic cantons continued to uphold canonical ideals, and the clergy was actively involved in political processes. [...] Also, people's religious beliefs strongly influenced the political process of creating law via direct democracy. A certain impact is still evident today".
l) Non-practising Catholic (Academic)	"There are several cases of [state–church] separations and mixtures. [...] Nordic countries have high levels of trust in the state, which largely explains why no conflict between church and state occurs. The contrary happens in France, where the Church convinces people not to trust the state and vice versa. In Switzerland, Protestants have maintained that the Catholic Church is evil and creates distrust".
m) Independent, Catholic believer (Employee)	"In Switzerland, if you are Catholic, you have to pay much higher taxes than if you belong to the Reformed Protestant Church. If you are an atheist or belong to a Protestant Free Church, you do not even have to pay any Church taxes. I think Catholic taxes are a lot higher because it [Catholicism] is like a 'mafia Church.' Indeed, Catholics have huge cathedrals, frescoes, and lots of gold icons and that, of course, costs much more to buy and maintain than having a simple wooden cross in a Protestant Church. In Valais, if you want to build a house, you have to sign up to the municipality (<i>Gemeinde</i>) and then you have to go to the Catholic Priest who has the final say [...] (if you have given enough money to the Church or have attended Sunday mass often enough). In Italy, mafia members confess their sins in church and information is exchanged in the confession box".
n) Independent free Protestant believer (Academic)	"The Roman Catholic Church was very corrupt at that time [Reformation time], and Reformers wanted to reform the Church, but not to separate it from the state. But they [the Reformers] and Luther realised that this [reforming the Church from within] was impossible. Therefore, Zwingli advocated the separation of church and state, but that was much later. [...] The separation between church and state has never been complete here. Now, for example, we have taxes [for Catholics and Reformed Protestants]. And we have the issue of empty Protestant Church buildings being managed by the government".
p) Swiss Federal Government officer	"According to international diplomatic law, nothing regulates the relations between the Holy See and the Swiss Confederation, except for the Vienna Convention. The main interest of the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See is to have diplomatic relations, as is normally the case with sovereign states. Second, to regulate bilateral issues, such as the Swiss pontifical guard at the Holy See. There are also other issues, like the status of bishops in Switzerland. There are no plans for the Swiss Confederation and the Holy See to sign a new agreement [i.e. Concordat]. Switzerland used to have diplomatic relations but did not appoint an ambassador to the Holy See. [...] And then, until 2004, we started having an ambassador to the Holy See, but this official did not reside in Rome. [...] The present Ambassador of Switzerland to the Holy See resides in

(continued)

Table 18.5 (continued)

	Church-State relations
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
	Slovenia. He also accredited as the ambassador to another country. Other than Italy, Switzerland has the largest colony in the Vatican”.
q) Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary	<p>“Legally and officially, there is a clear separation between the state and the churches. Their relations are governed by the cantons [...] and] are very important for the financing and self-organisation of the churches. There are twenty-six different [church taxes] systems. Even though they have some similarities, especially in the German-speaking cantons, the French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland have very different systems. [...] Geneva and Neuchâtel work mainly under a French system. They receive no state funds and have no church taxes. They [...] live especially on the contributions of [...] their congregations.</p> <p>[...] The bishop does not need to call the President of Switzerland to tell him what to do [...]. The distance here is quite large and both sides respect it. [...] In some cases, Church representatives offer their congregation voting advice. Normally, this concerns religious aspects that are fundamental to life, like abortion, suicide, etc. [...] I think Switzerland has a culture that is strongly influenced by the Christian tradition, but nowadays secularisation and the separation of church and state are plainly evident, [...] The [Christian] tendency still exists, but it is less notorious [...] in the context of our direct democracy.</p> <p>[...] there was a time when Protestants strongly dominated the Swiss government [...]. The Swiss constitution of 1848 (and beyond) is a liberal construct. [...] even within the Catholic Church, there were strong rivalries between liberal and conservative Catholics as was the case in Ticino and Lucerne. [...] Internally, the situation in the Catholic Church became more difficult after the first Vatican Council in 1870, where the bishops defined the infallibility of the pope. This led to polarisation. [...] We said that we would not accept this new dogma about the infallibility of the pope. Thus we separated. . . . [Katholisch / Christkatholisch]. Ultramontane thought [beyond the Alps heading to Rome] [...] was difficult for the young Swiss State. [...] A Church-State had existed for a long time. [...] [Christkatholisch] reached some agreements with the liberal Protestants over political questions. [...] though they were quite a small group, they were influential. [...] Their philosophy is, “We do not want to have the pope, and we have no celibacy among our priests; they can marry” [...]</p> <p>I would mention three important causes for the emergence of this special [democratic] legal system for the Catholic Church in Switzerland. <i>The first is the [cooperative] corporations.</i> [...] For example, if you go to [...] the Alps, you will see that cattle farmers organise themselves in [cooperative] corporations [...]. <i>The second cause is the Reformation</i>, which strongly promoted participation among its followers in taking church decisions. This practice goes quite well together with democratic feelings in Switzerland. <i>The third influence stems from the time when the Reformed [and] Catholic denominations in Switzerland opposed each other.</i> [...] [for example] in Cantons St. Gallen and Grisons. [...] For decisions concerning religious affairs, Parliament was divided Protestant deputies [...] decided on proceedings relevant to Protestants, while Catholic members of Parliament decided Catholic issues. In St. Gallen, this is called ‘Katholischer Konfessionsteil’ [Catholic section of the Canton St. Gallen]. Or in Grisons, <i>Corpus Catolico</i> [body</p>

(continued)

Table 18.5 (continued)

	Church-State relations
Stakeholder	Fundamental principles identified (interviews)
	of Catholics], and [on another group] the body of Protestants. They agreed to have peace because [...] they would decide in favour of their church[es] [...] instead of interfering] with the other denomination. You cannot understand the relation between church and state in Switzerland without understanding the political system. This is the most important aspect to understand. [...] Direct democracy has a very high influence on this system, and this does not exist in other countries. The pronounced form of federalism, which enables every town to set its taxes, makes this organisation unique”.
s) Swiss Diplomatic Officer (non-official communication)	“No plans for possible future bilateral agreements with the Holy See, at the federal or cantonal level, have been announced. [Education, Lands and Properties, Religious Freedom, and Ecumenism issues] are discussed and treated bilaterally [with the Holy See] in a similar way as with every other state: diplomatic dialogue and channels (ambassador to the Holy See, with the State Secretariat, or other authorities and services; nuncio or his deputy, with the DFA or other authorities and services), or at the political level on the occasion of bilateral visits, or between experts/persons or services in charge of specific issues”.

18.11.2 Analysis of Discourse Practice (Theoretical Triangulation)

The Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) describes the Reformation and the liberal influence on the separation of church and state in terms of the democratic scheme of the Swiss Catholic Church, which is unique worldwide. Such historical analyses concur with Obinger’s (2009) review, while the Protestant influence on the separation of church and state is consistent with Miller’s (2012) framework.

18.11.3 Analysis of Social Practice

18.11.3.1 Law and Institutions

Although the Swiss federal state is laic, church and state have never been totally separate in Switzerland. Moreover, the influence of religion on institutions is evident at the following levels:

a) *Supranational*: The Roman Catholic Church-State has gained ever greater political influence through its embassy in Bern (Nunciature) that no other church has. At the same time, the federal government increasingly acknowledges the state sovereignty and legitimacy of the Roman Catholic Church-State (e.g. by strengthening diplomatic channels and by appointing an ambassador to the Holy See). (Stakeholders: Roman Catholic Priest 2 (b); Protestant Free Church Pastor 1 (f); Swiss Federal Government Officer (p); s) Swiss Diplomatic Officer). These findings substantiate Obinger (2009) and Python (1994).

b) National: The Independent, Catholic Believer (m, employee) and the Independent Free Protestant Believer (n, academic) both mention church taxes and cathedral administration as two examples of a non-complete separation of church and state. The Academic Expert-Lawyer (k) outlines a possible way of religious influence taking effect, namely by people's beliefs directly influencing laws and policies through direct democracy. Both Stakeholder (k) and the Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) acknowledge that the former Protestant and liberal influence diminished the power of the Catholic Church-State at the federal level; this is in line with Obinger (2009).

c) Cantonal/regional/local: The Catholic Church-Swiss Government intermediary (q) explains pronounced differences between German-speaking, French and Italian-speaking, and mixed-denomination cantons. The Academic Expert-Lawyer (k) explains that the clergy has long been very present in the political process in several Catholic cantons. Moreover, the Catholic Church (Roman See) has signed Concordats with several cantons (Corral & Petschen, 2004). The Independent, Catholic Believer (m, employee) provides an example of Church interference in state affairs in the Catholic canton of Valais.

18.12 Conclusions

18.12.1 General

The strong religious tensions between Protestants and Catholics have shaped the Swiss model of government and the country's institutions. While Catholics have defended a federalist, decentralised approach to escape modernisation, Protestants and liberals successfully pushed for a predominantly liberal, anti-clerical constitution and for a federal state. As Obinger (2009) observed:

The retreat of Catholics from the federal arena in the wake of the events of the 1840s was a strategic response to the secular Federal Constitution imposed by the Liberals. A federal polity strongly based on the idea of local autonomy and the associated devolution of power provided the institutional shelter that allowed Catholics to maintain their traditions, to preserve the influence of the Roman Church in Catholic areas, and to create a Catholic counterculture at the cantonal level. More specifically, Catholics considered the cantons as bulwarks against modernization and its concomitants such as big government, bureaucratization, and secularization. Because they were mostly concentrated in rural areas and showed strong leanings to the ancient order with its enshrined privileges of the Roman Church, Catholics opposed industrialization and were highly sceptical of new developments in science and technology. [...] Catholics therefore sought to gain political control at the cantonal level in order to protect the Catholic subsociety from the intrusion by the Liberals who then controlled the federal arena. Because the cantons enjoyed almost exclusive jurisdiction in affairs such as education and welfare under the Federal Constitution of 1848, Catholics exploited local policy autonomy to protect the strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church on education and marital affairs, at least until the constitutional revision in 1874 (pp. 190–191).

Later, following the *Kulturkampf*, the Catholic Church-State could no longer exercise its previously undisputed influence, not even in Catholic cantons.

As a result, the Swiss Confederation has had weak diplomatic relations with the Roman See. The absence of a Concordat at the federal level and the absence of a Swiss resident ambassador in the Vatican still suggest that diplomatic relations continue to be weak. However, Concordats with some Cantons exist. Moreover, from 2004, the federal government has appointed a non-resident ambassador to the Vatican, thus creating closer ties with the Roman Catholic Church-State. On the other hand, although Catholic and Protestant enclaves persisted for a long time, the Protestant share of the total population has decreased by more than half since the nineteenth century. The greatest decline has occurred over the last 60 years, during which other religious denominations and non-religions have sharply increased. Today, Swiss society is highly secularised.

18.12.2 Competitiveness and Transparency

As a general rule, Protestant cantons are more competitive than the mountainous Roman Catholic cantons. However, even these “low” competitive cantons score higher on innovation/inhabitant values than the traditionally Catholic neighbouring countries (e.g. Austria, Italy, or France).

The historical retreat to the mountains and the anti-modernising reaction against the majoritarian liberal-Protestant federal government might partially explain the lower competitiveness of most Roman Catholic cantons. Nevertheless, the liberal-Protestant federal government seems to have influenced institutions in Catholic cantons by decreasing the pervasive power of the Roman Church-State and by forcing the hierarchical non-democratic Church to democratise. Switzerland’s unique democratising of Catholicism may well be related to the principles of accountability and transparency. Besides, such an influence may also partially explain the relatively higher score on the innovation-per-habitant parameter attained by “low-competitive mountain Catholic cantons” compared to Italy, Austria, or France.

18.12.3 Prosperity (Competitiveness and Transparency) and Biblical Moral Principles

Analysing the primary information shows that most Protestant stakeholders consistently mention biblical concepts as the moral foundation of prosperity. The original Protestant principle of the *Sola Scriptura* might lie at the heart of such consistency.

In contrast, Roman Catholic stakeholders do not consistently refer to the Scriptures as a moral foundation. Instead, they tend to refer to diverse theories and philosophical influences from secular sources. This would seem to corroborate

McSweeney's (2015) argument that several kinds of Roman Catholicism might exist as philosophical currents and cultural backgrounds.

Accepting biblical principles as the truth might create a uniform moral standard for enhancing trust, as argued by Stakeholder (f) in the prosperity analysis. On the contrary, in the absence of a moral standard, corrupt ethical codes (see Stakeholder (g)) might lead to a vast range of "negative" socially accepted norms, low productivity (Mockus et al., 2012), and low "spontaneous sociability" (low trust) (Fukuyama, 1995). Furthermore, individuals not only respond to the coercive power of the law, but obey their own moral principles (Mockus et al., 2012, p. 7). This might explain, perhaps even crucially, why the Protestant Reformation—based on the *Sola Scriptura* principle—contributed, among other factors, to creating trust in Swiss society.

18.12.4 Recommendations for Future Research

This case study has identified two promising fields on which little or no systematic research exists and that would help better understand religion and prosperity in Switzerland: a) the influence of religion on law and institutions at the cantonal level; and b) the relevance and impact of the Concordats signed between several Swiss cantons and the Roman Catholic Church-State.

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Korreferent: Prof. Dr. James W. Davis Verfasser. St. Gallen, Switzerland: University of St. Gallen Graduate School of Business, Economics, Law and Social Sciences.

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