South-South Development Cooperation as a Modality: Brazil's Cooperation with Mozambique

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25.1 INTRODUCTION

Countries such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa (the BICS countries) have enhanced their cooperation programmes significantly and present their development cooperation as a different modality¹ that takes place between countries of the “Global South” (UN General Assembly [UNGA] 2018). Both scholars and Southern cooperation providers ascribe a notion of solidarity and horizontality to South-South development cooperation (SSDC), which ostensibly distinguishes it from the relationship patterns commonly associated with North-South cooperation. They frame SSDC as being normatively different from its Northern counterpart, since it claims to only attend to the recipient's demand, to create win-win situations for both cooperation partners, and to be based on the exchange of specific, “Southern” knowledge, which is better suited for overcoming development challenges (Bergamaschi and Tickner 2017; Mawdsley 2012, p. 153; Piefer 2014).

The international development cooperation (IDC) community has come to understand SSDC as a separate, complementary cooperation modality that is different from its Northern *pendant*, as consolidated, for instance, through the Busan Outcome Document of the Fourth High Level Forum in 2011 or, more recently, the Second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation (BAPA+40) in Buenos Aires in March 2019 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee [OECD-DAC] 2011; UNGA 2019). Historically, SSDC, as a

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common endeavour of developing countries, can be traced back to the 1950s. The ever more important role of emerging economies such as the BICS countries, however, has led to a significant increase in the scope, quantity, and importance of Southern cooperation since the end of the 1990s.

As a re-emerging modality in the context of a changing development landscape, SSDC is a challenge to the cooperation provided by the so-called traditional donors: The “new development partners” claim that cooperation can be delivered differently, that is, in a horizontal manner, implying that their cooperation is morally—and to some extent practically—superior. The re-emergence of SSDC has given rise to new institutions such as the Development Cooperation Forum of the United Nations (UN DCF) (Bracho 2015; Esteves 2018; Verschaeve and Orbie 2015). As a consequence, some question whether the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) will continue to be the predominant institution for setting norms and standards in IDC and whether its standards for official development assistance (ODA) will define development cooperation in a post-2015 world (Janus et al. 2015; Mawdsley et al. 2014).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development mirrors this shift, among others, in the landscape of international cooperation and among multilateral development institutions. To implement the agenda, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17 promotes new, inclusive partnerships that bring various stakeholders and their different approaches together. SSDC providers will play a crucial role in implementing the agenda (Renzio et al. 2015; United Nations 2013). However, the cooperation practices of new development partners such as the BICS countries, Mexico, Indonesia, and others have only been investigated to a comparatively small degree (Fejerskov et al. 2016). This makes it difficult to determine what *de facto* characterises SSDC as a cooperation modality, how the claims made for the characteristics of this modality are reflected in practice, and in how far it can be understood as a modality that contests practices commonly ascribed to “traditional” North-South cooperation.

This chapter tackles these questions by investigating the technical cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique. Brazil was one of the most prominent SSDC providers under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) and was the first mandate of his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2014)—although Brazil’s enthusiasms decreased during this second period. Although official cooperation volumes increased from around \$2 million in 2003 to almost \$38 million in 2010 (and were then gradually cut back to \$7.1 million in 2014) (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação [ABC] 2015b), figures—including contributions from sectoral institutions and Brazil’s contributions to international organisation—reached an estimated total cooperation volume of around \$4 billion between 2005 and 2016 (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada [IPEA] 2018) and of \$1.5 billion between 2011 and 2013 (IPEA 2016). The country has foregrounded its role as an SSDC provider and explicitly pointed

out the differentness of its cooperation from what is being offered by Northern donors. Due to the heterogeneity of SSDC providers, Brazil cannot be seen as a representative example. However, investigating the country's approach to SSDC serves to illustrate the extent that the characteristics ascribed above to the modality are reflected in cooperation practices.

As with the other BICS countries, Brazil has been strongly engaged in SSDC with partner countries in Africa (ABC 2015a; Burges 2012). Here, Mozambique has been one of Brazil's most important cooperation partners, receiving a significant share of Brazil's cooperation provided to the region (around \$32 million in 2011; ABC 2015c). Therefore, the case of the cooperation between the two countries provides insights into the dynamics of SSDC practices and the narrative around it, helping to better understand how established forms of cooperation are being challenged.

The analysis of the case focusses on the central sectors of Brazilian–Mozambican cooperation—health, agriculture, and education/food security (ABC 2013, 2015c), as explained below. It shows the varying degree to which the characteristics alleged by Southern cooperation are “institutionalised” in Brazil's approach, such as the extent to which the characteristics ascribed to SSDC are embedded in cooperation practices through binding principles and guidelines, monitoring, and evaluation.² By investigating cooperation practices and asking in how far the narrative constructed around the differentness of Southern cooperation is perceived by its practitioners and reflected in its implementation, this chapter shows that SSDC does not always hold up to its claim to be a different, horizontal cooperation modality.

The following section briefly looks at the discussion on SSDC in international development cooperation. Subsequently, the characteristics ascribed to SSDC are explained before presenting the case study. The conclusive section analyses to what degree the characteristics of SSDC can be found in Brazilian–Mozambican cooperation and what this implies regarding the relevance of SSDC for implementing the 2030 Agenda.

25.2 SOUTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

South-South cooperation refers to various dimensions of cooperation—for instance political, financial, economic, and even cultural cooperation. These dimensions often overlap in practice and are sometimes used differently by Southern cooperation providers (Amanor 2013a; Kornegay 2013). This chapter understands SSDC as a *pendant* of Northern cooperation (i.e. cooperation provided by the OECD-DAC members) that can be delimited from these dimensions (Bracho 2015; Milani 2014) and comprises *technical cooperation among developing countries* (UN Development Programme [UNDP] UNDP 2016a). Within international cooperation, SSDC has increasingly gained importance. Particularly the High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi in 2009 (UN Office for South-South Cooperation

[UNOSSC] 2010) and the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 contributed to the recognition and consolidation of SSDC as a modality in international cooperation (Eyben and Savage 2012; Mawdsley et al. 2014). This chapter focusses on technical SSDC to investigate the specific characteristics of the modality.

Many of the Southern cooperation providers have made a point of foregrounding the difference of their cooperation from “traditional” development cooperation and rejected being labelled as “donors” (Mawdsley 2011). They claim that (i) their cooperation is part of the historical solidary efforts among developing countries that aim to join forces against the “Global North”, and that (ii) the relationship with their respective partner countries is different, since SSDC occurs between equal partners and is horizontal.

The rhetoric that frames the (re-)emergence of the new development partners is based on the historical trajectory of SSDC and presents it as a political endeavour to improve the common standing of the developing countries vis-à-vis the Global North. In this sense, the notion that SSDC is “different” is highly political. As Muhr (2015, p. 3) points out, in the discussion about the (renewed) relevance of SSDC, the argument is often put forth that it occurs merely on a rhetorical level, implying that this would reduce the de facto relevance of SSDC. However, what is called “rhetoric” is an important element of SSDC and should not be considered marginal. According to Mawdsley (2011, p. 10):

The discourses mobilised by Southern donors around their development cooperation activities are not mere window-dressing, a gloss over the geostrategic and commercial ambitions that “truly” motivate such ties. Rather, they serve as a means of persuading, symbolising and euphemising claims to particular identities and social relations.

In this sense, a Southern identity is created through discourse by delimiting a community of countries, a “we” in the sense of a collective self from the “other”, in this case, the Global North. Hence, as Cabral (2015, p. 1) puts it, “discourse is an expression of the political”.

On a practical level, the efforts of Southern providers to establish their cooperation as a separate modality led to the founding in 2007 of the UN DCF, which holds biennial meetings to foster various modalities of development cooperation. The founding of the DCF has been interpreted as a challenge to the DAC as the central institution for IDC processes and has raised the question of who defines approaches such as *effectiveness* (Eyben 2012, p. 85; Glennie 2014). Several years after its founding, the relevance of the DCF and its relationship with the DAC have yet to be defined. However, the DCF can be perceived as a counterpart to the DAC and shows the (renewed) relevance of Southern cooperation. The effort of Southern providers to establish such an institution under the roof of the UN further illustrates a continuation of the historical trajectory of SSDC (Bergamaschi

and Tickner 2017). With the establishment of the DCF, Southern providers emphasised that they do not want to participate in DAC processes and that they aim to establish alternative fora for a more balanced interaction of development partners (Besharati 2013; Bracho 2015; Verschaeve and Orbie 2015).

In an attempt to institutionalise the dialogue between Northern donors and Southern development partners, and as a follow-up to the Busan Forum, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) was founded in 2012 (Abdel-Malek 2015; Kharas 2012; OECD-DAC 2011). It consists of a Secretariat led by the DAC and the UN Development Programme and three Co-Chairs from the country groups of “donors”, “recipients”, and “providers/recipients” (Fues 2012). However, the responses to the GPEDC among Southern providers were heterogeneous. The BICS countries have been either reluctant towards the partnership initiative or have explicitly renounced it as a “Northern”—that is, OEDC-driven—initiative (Constantine et al. 2014; Fejerskov et al. 2016, p. 13). On the other hand, countries such as

Colombia, Egypt and Thailand keep a distance from the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and seek proximity to the DAC [i.e. the GPEDC]. Emerging market countries like Mexico, South Korea and Chile, who have joined the OECD, also do not have issues with the DAC. (Fues 2012, p. 301)

Against this background of ongoing shifts in IDC, the question arises as to what constitutes the “Southernness” of SSDC.

25.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The concept of SSDC and the question of what constitutes its differentness from “traditional” cooperation from the DAC donors remain disputed. Referring to the historical evolution of both cooperation modalities, the discourse around SSDC uses different symbolic regimes for framing each modality. Accordingly, the DAC donors would provide cooperation as a form of “charity” and based on a “moral obligation” to the less fortunate as well as their “expertise based on superior knowledge, institutions, science and technology”. This also implies that this form of cooperation is not reciprocal (Mawdsley 2012, p. 153). SSDC providers claim that, in contrast to “Northern cooperation”, their cooperation is a solidary endeavour between developing countries. Therefore, the main characteristics they attribute to their modality are that SSDC is (i) based on horizontality, (ii) non-interventionist and demand-driven, (iii) creating mutual benefits for cooperating partners, (iv) based on cultural proximity, and (v) focussing on knowledge exchange (Bracho 2015; Mawdsley 2012, p. 162; Piefer 2014).

First, the claim of SSDC being based on horizontality points at a central difference between Northern and Southern cooperation. To be horizontal, the relationship between cooperation partners would have to be equal in terms of political and economic power—despite possibly existing asymmetries between the two countries (Cesarino 2012, p. 522; De Morais 2005, p. 13)—or, if this is not possible, the cooperation would have to explicitly address and intend to overcome power disparities. From the notion of horizontality, the other, aforementioned characteristics ascribed to SSDC can be deduced.

The narrative around SSDC most often does not define clearly what is meant by horizontality but implies that it refers to power (im)balances between the cooperation partners. However, similar to North-South cooperation, power constellations between many Southern providers—such as the BICS—and their partner countries are often asymmetric. Therefore, when looking at the claim of *horizontality*, SSDC can be considered to be horizontal if an equal relationship *in spite of* possibly (or probably) existing power asymmetries between the cooperation partners is guaranteed. The providing party would have to transfer a degree of control to the recipient, make sure that the recipient's interests are reflected in the conceptualisation and implementation of the cooperation, and agree to establish mechanisms to monitor the horizontality of the cooperation.

SSDC would be less horizontal when SSDC providers explicitly adopt a position of superiority towards their counterparts in other countries, in the sense that they present themselves as more powerful and superior and do not take into account their partners' interests. Corrêa (2010, pp. 95–96) admits that, because of these power asymmetries in SSDC, there is a risk for Southern providers to reproduce similar asymmetries or paternalist patterns, as in North-South cooperation in asymmetric constellations. This would lead to a vertical relationship, which would, in turn, be the negation of the very concept of SSDC itself. Thus, political will on the provider's side would not be enough to guarantee a power equilibrium in the cooperation relationship.

SSDC providers thus face the same challenges as DAC donors when operating in partner countries with a significant lack of technical and institutional capacities. For instance, the question arises of how the process cycle of a cooperation project would have to be designed to maintain a power equilibrium between the cooperating parties if the recipient's intermediating agencies do not have the same capacities as the providing country. A lack of horizontality during the implementation could lead to "delicate situations" (Corrêa 2010, p. 96) on the political level (Secretaría General Iberoamericana 2008, p. 22).

Second, SSDC providers claim that their cooperation is *non-interventionist and demand-driven* (Bracho 2015, p. 7; Milani 2014, pp. 6–7). This means that it is based on mutual respect for the sovereignty of both countries and that, therefore, the provider does not interfere with the domestic politics of the recipient. SSDC claims to only focus on needs articulated by the recipient and to be free of any conditions. However, it is important that the discourse around SSDC often fails to specify which types of conditions are

avoided: Northern cooperation has been making significant efforts to untie aid from economic strings, but it often strives to achieve political changes (e.g. democratisation, gender, decentralisation) (Chung et al. 2015; Dijkstra 2004). To provide demand-driven cooperation, SSDC providers do not “intervene” on the political level, but often attach economic conditions to their cooperation in praxis (Quadir 2013, p. 333), with China being a prominent example of this approach (Aidoo and Hess 2015). This can make SSDC an attractive option for recipient countries and challenge the model of “traditional” donors (Hernandez 2016).

The claim of non-interventionism helps promote SSDC as normatively “better” than the development cooperation provided by the OECD-DAC by referring to the idea of “collective self-reliance”. This idea gained importance for the cooperation among developing countries in the context of the Non-Alignment Movement as a means to achieve independence from former colonisers through Southern solidarity (Alden et al. 2010, p. 60; Mawdsley 2012, p. 62). It also denounces—rather implicitly—“traditional” development cooperation as a form of illegitimate intervention in the developing countries that have fought (sometimes until recently) for their independence. “Traditional” North-South cooperation is hereby often ascribed a notion of paternalism and depicted as an instrument for influencing and maintaining continued control over the recipient country. DAC donors are presented as former colonising powers that continue to intrude in the domestic politics of the sovereign recipients, whereas SSDC providers highlight that their cooperation is to be seen as a continuation of historical South-South solidarity (Amanor 2013b, p. 3).

On a practical level, the concept of non-interventionism translates into *demand-driven* cooperation. SSDC providers argue that their cooperation is not pre-designed and driven by what the provider determines the recipient’s needs to be, but rather that it is based on the demand for cooperation that the recipient articulates. The demand-driven approach is not only linked with the idea of non-interventionism and an emphasis on respect for recipient sovereignty. It can also be seen as an indirect critique of North-South cooperation, which has often been criticised for promoting a “one size fits all” approach towards its recipients (Africa Renewal 2015; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2014), including by the movements of the Global South (Deen 2007). More recently, SSDC providers have also used the term “ownership”, which is used in North-South cooperation to point out the importance of the active engagement of the recipient party (Buffardi 2013; Piefer 2014).

Third, SSDC is presented as a modality that creates *mutual benefits* for both cooperating parties, that is, “win-win” situations (Elsinger 2011; Lundskaar 2011; Mawdsley 2012, p. 145). By emphasising mutual benefits in SSDC, cooperation provided by the OECD-DAC is presented as an altruistic form of cooperation (and therefore as aid or assistance) that is given to the recipient without expecting anything in return (Kragelund 2015),

implying that the benefits of Northern cooperation are not mutual. By emphasising that North-South cooperation is altruistic and non-reciprocal whereas Southern cooperation is mutually beneficial, Southern development partners imply that the former establishes a relationship of superiority and inferiority between the party providing the cooperation and the receiver. In SSDC, both parties “give and take”, thus cooperation takes place on the same level (De la Fontaine et al. 2014; Naylor 2011). However, the questions of what is meant by “win-win”, whether obtained benefits are actually mutual, and whether they occur at different levels or at the same level for both partners (e.g. gaining technical knowledge vs. international reputation) are seldom explicitly addressed in SSDC. In addition, it is important to note that, during recent years, the agencies of many DAC donors have openly assumed the importance of their national interests in development cooperation (e.g. market access) (Browne 2006, p. 113; Lancaster 2007, p. 21). Mawdsley explains that although both Southern cooperation providers and Northern donors will primarily follow their respective interests when providing cooperation, both use different symbolic regimes to present their cooperation,

[w]hereas the West deploys a symbolic regime of charity and benevolence to obscure this truism [of national interests], the Southern donors invoke a rhetoric of solidarity, mutual benefit and shared identities. Moreover, assertions of “win-win” outcomes are founded on a simplistic construction of “national interest” (of both partners). (Mawdsley 2011, p. 11)

Fourth, some providers emphasise that SSDC is a common endeavour that is based on cultural proximity and a shared colonial past of both cooperating parties. *Cultural proximity* is emphasised to a varying degree by SSDC providers as a facilitating factor for cooperation. Brazil, for instance, has close ties to some countries in South America and has emphasised the historical bonds with Africa that stem from extensive slave trade during colonial times (Ferreira 2016; Milhorance de Castro 2013; Saraiva 2010). Where it applies, the notion of speaking a *common language* is also foregrounded (as in, for instance, the case of Brazil and its lusophone partners). India points out historical relations with countries in East Africa and highlights the importance of its diaspora to the continent (De la Fontaine 2009; Reddy 2008). China, however, puts less emphasis on cultural similarities in South-South cooperation—at least with its African partner countries—as there are fewer historical ties to refer to. South Africa holds a special position within its own region, since it mostly provides cooperation to other countries on the continent.

Despite often being highlighted on a rhetorical level, cultural proximity remains vaguer than most other aspects that allegedly distinguish SSDC from its Northern counterparts when it comes to the question of how this proximity translates into advantages over North-South cooperation in concrete cooperation practices. Sharing the same language might be considered an “obvious”

advantage, but it will seldom be acknowledged officially as a strategic advantage of a cooperation modality. In addition, the claim of cultural similarities refers mostly to informal, subtle codes and nuances of human interaction (Alves 2013; Burges 2012). Thus, it can hardly be proven to be the cause of a better relationship, nor can it be measured. Nevertheless, it holds a prominent position in the SSDC narrative.

For constructing the notion of solidarity and horizontality in SSDC, references to the common position during colonial times and the ensuing development state are crucial (Burges 2012). By highlighting that their historical past puts them closer to the recipients of cooperation than the Northern donors, SSDC providers are also capable of underpinning the claim to non-interventionist and demand-driven cooperation, as described above.

Fifth, Southern development partners often foreground that their cooperation focusses on *knowledge exchange*. Sometimes, this implies that the understanding of how development should be conceptualised is different (Quadir 2013). Even if the notion of a different path to development is not explicitly foregrounded, it is often argued that new development partners face similar development challenges as their partners. They would therefore have more specific or more adequate knowledge on these challenges and could approach them with more consideration of their recipients' needs. Their expertise with regard to specific socio-economic developments would be "closer" to the problems that their cooperation partners face (Bilal 2012). The focus on knowledge exchange is often owed to the fact that, although many agencies of Southern providers have only small budgets, they have access to a high level of expertise from sectoral institutions in their countries. In the case of Brazil, the country's agricultural research cooperation, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), which conducts healthcare research and projects, are well-known examples of high-profile institutions with a strong focus on knowledge exchange in SSDC (Esteves et al. 2015). Although the claim of providing more adequate knowledge is prominent in South-South cooperation and has led the World Bank to foster High Level Meetings on the issue (UNOSSC 2016; World Bank 2016), it has to be asked to what extent "different" knowledge translates into different cooperation practices.

25.4 BRAZIL'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

The claims made about the characteristics of Southern cooperation point, on the one hand, to a modality that is conceptually different from "traditional" development cooperation. On the other, these claims often refer to a rather abstract level of cooperation and remain vague in how far they translate into different cooperation practices between Southern providers and their partners.

Brazil has been one of the most prominent *emerging powers* and has amplified its SSDC with developing countries. Under former President Lula

da Silva (2003–2010) and during the first mandate of his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2014), Brazil has framed its cooperation explicitly as “Southern” and as an endeavour that is based on the solidarity among developing countries (Cervo and Lessa 2014; Fellet 2013). Brazil has also been turning towards Africa as an important partner region throughout this period (Cabral et al. 2014; Esteves et al. 2015). The rise of Brazil was based on impressive economic growth, an even greater ascribed further potential, a comparatively high degree of political stability, and a significant decrease in external debt (Mineiro 2014, p. 25), rather than on “hard power” such as military strength (Lustig 2016). The main institution for carrying out technical SSDC projects is the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but sectoral institutions—namely Embrapa in agriculture and Fiocruz in health—participate significantly in Brazil’s cooperation.

In contrast to Brazil, Mozambique is one of the poorest and least-developed countries in the world that suffered from being a “playground” for the East and West during the Cold War. The country is highly dependent on external aid. As the UN pointed out, Mozambique is one of the countries with the strongest donor presence in Africa, with ODA financing a significant share of government expenditure (UNDP Mozambique 2010, p. 7). Since the devastating civil war (1975–1992) that followed its independence from Portugal, Mozambique has received development aid/cooperation, and its political actors have made an effort to implement the various policies and to abide by the rules brought on by the donors. This rather high degree of “compliance” has led to the country being called a “donor’s darling” (Hanlon and Smart 2008, p. 122; Monge Roffarello 2015).

With Brazil being an emerging power with significant regional and international weight, and with Mozambique being a recipient country that, to a large extent, depends on external support, the relationship between the two is strongly asymmetric in terms of economic and political power. The case is therefore helpful to investigate the characteristics ascribed to SSDC, since these claims are based on the notion of horizontality, as outlined above. It is assumed here that in an asymmetrical constellation, there will be little or no necessity for Brazil, as the providing party, to adhere to the principle of horizontality in order to pursue its interests in cooperation or in the case of conflicts during the interaction. Therefore, due to the existing asymmetries between both countries, Brazil is very unlikely to conduct its SSDC in a horizontal manner in the case of Mozambique. In this sense, the case serves as a “hard test”—a *least likely case* (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 231)—for the horizontality of Brazilian cooperation, as it will depend on Brazil’s political will to put the characteristics it claims to be present in its cooperation into practice.

In Mozambique, Brazil has conducted cooperation in a variety of fields that range from strengthening institutional capacities to urban development to improving labour standards, based on an official cooperation agreement that was signed as early as 1981 (ABC 2013). For the sake of limiting its scope, this chapter focusses on the main areas of the cooperation between

the two countries: health, agriculture, education, and food security (ABC 2015c). The cooperation portfolio is difficult to track over the course of time because ABC's database does not allow for a search structured via time period. A 2010 publication listed 16 planned projects (with a strong focus on health and agriculture), but it provided no information about implemented or concluded activities (ABC 2010, p. 108). According to a 2013 retrieval from ABC's database (ABC 2013), the agencies administered 16 bilateral projects in Mozambique in that year (5 in health, 5 in education, 1 in agriculture, and 5 cross-sector projects: food security, social development, capacity-building). Mozambique was the main recipient of Brazilian cooperation between 2005 and 2010, when counting the number of projects—16 per cent of all programmes were conducted in Mozambique (Marcondes de Souza Neto 2013, p. 9), and it received the biggest share of all Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (Cabral and Shankland 2012, p. 8).

In the health sector, Brazil's health foundation Fiocruz has developed a structural approach that it applies in Mozambique with the objective of strengthening the national health system rather than targeting specific issues or diseases (Esteves et al. 2015). The foundation's structural approach explicitly builds on the notion of horizontality in SSDC. Fiocruz explains that it aims to strengthen institutional capacities through knowledge exchange, with the objective of improving the recipient's health system rather than focussing on specific health issues (Almeida et al. 2010, pp. 27–28).

The health cooperation portfolio between the two countries included projects such as the creation of a maternal milk bank in Maputo, capacity-building for oral health care, cancer prevention, communal therapy, HIV prevention, and health care for women (ABC 2010, pp. 108–114; 2013). One project that stands out as an example of Brazil's structural approach to health cooperation is the creation of an antiretroviral drug plant in Matola, close to the capital, Maputo. The plant is prominent in Brazilian health cooperation (beyond bilateral cooperation with Mozambique), as HIV/aids is one of Mozambique's most serious health problems. The project was presented with direct support from former President Lula da Silva in 2003 and has largely been financed by Brazil, but Mozambique has provided a counterpart (BBC Brasil 2008; Cabral et al. 2014, p. 192). The importance of the drug plant is also based on the fact that, by providing a means for medicament production, Brazilian cooperation would contribute to the increased structural independence of Mozambique's health system. The project was originally designed to expand production to a regional (eastern African) market, but production was delayed because of administrative challenges (Marcondes de Souza Neto 2013, p. 10; Esteves et al. 2015, pp. 25–26).

In agriculture, Brazil's cooperation portfolio covers a variety of agricultural issues, “such as support to production, training of extension agents, development of value chains, strengthening of public sector institutions, support to rural associations and cooperatives, sanitary and phytosanitary regulation, amongst others” (Cabral and Shankland 2012, p. 9). In Mozambique, the

portfolio consists of projects such as support for establishing a seed bank, capacity-building in the use of seeds, support for the use of traditional seeds in small-scale agriculture (*agricultura familiar*) (ABC 2013), support for the development of small-scale agriculture and fishing, and technical support for food security in schools (ABC 2010). Additionally, Brazil has promoted a regional project for the production of cotton in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo, which led Mozambique's National Cotton Institute to procure expertise and capacity-building measures from Embrapa's cotton research unit in 2006 (Embrapa 2006). Brazil's agricultural research cooperation Embrapa has been central to turning large areas in the centre and the north of Brazil into productive agricultural regions (Embrapa 2015b), and it often grounds its cooperation in Mozambique on these domestic experiences. One prominent example here is ProSavana, a trilateral project with Japan that aims to transfer the experiences from developing Brazil's *cerrado* regions to Mozambique by scaling-up Brazil's experiences with Northern cooperation partners and making use of the acquired knowledge in its own cooperation (Funada Classen 2013; Japan International Cooperation Agency 2013; Mello 2013; ONGs Mozambicanas 2013).

In education, cooperation projects with universities have been at the forefront. Brazil has carried out projects with Brazilian professors teaching in Mozambique and Mozambican professors attending courses in Brazil so that Mozambican students can be taught at home and via online courses. Food security is a cooperation sector that often overlaps with education, since many projects are carried out in Mozambican schools. This sector is important in Brazil's cooperation portfolio due to the country's own socio-economic structure and the historic challenge of supplying its own population with sufficient amounts of food (Costa Leite et al. 2013, p. 19). In accordance with the ascent of South-South cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy, the transfer of knowledge and expertise in food security became an important factor for the country's SSDC. Former President Lula's Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) programme—with its famous conditional cash-transfer component, Bolsa Família—strongly contributed to his popularity at home and his reputation abroad. It is often mentioned as an example of knowledge sharing when analysing Brazil's increased level of engagement in international cooperation (Bartelt 2005; Seitenfuß 2007). Another important programme in this context is the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Purchase Programme), which is also integrated into the Fome Zero programme (Bruyn 2013, p. 18; Costa Leite et al. 2013, pp. 19–20) and has achieved significant success in Brazil by involving the most relevant stakeholders in the multifaceted questions surrounding food security and purchasing power. In addition, Brazil's portfolio in Mozambique included a project to maintain a centre for professional capacity-building in Maputo; a project for capacity-building for work safety and work relation inspectors; the above-mentioned programme for food security and nutrition in schools; the cooperation with Eduardo Mondlane

University in Maputo on long-distance teaching; a project for capacity-building in the judicial sector; and a programme for capacity-building for diplomats (ABC 2013).

Throughout this portfolio, Brazil's approach to SSDC foregrounded the concept of horizontality and the ensuing characteristics of Southern cooperation. ABC, for instance, explicitly stated that Brazilian cooperation should (i) use joint "diplomacy based on solidarity", (ii) use "action in response to demands from developing countries", (iii) acknowledge "local experience" and "adapt Brazilian experience", (iv) not impose conditions, (v) not be associated with commercial interests, and (vi) not interfere with domestic issues of the recipient (ABC 2011, p. 6). Embrapa subscribed to the same principles and points out the necessity for a formal agreement under the auspices of ABC for conducting cooperation. In addition, the company highlighted its structural approach to cooperation and its focus on institutional development and capacity-building (Embrapa 2015a). The same principles can be found in the concept of "structural cooperation" in health developed by Fiocruz (Almeida et al. 2010). In this sense, the discourse that Brazil promoted on the foreign policy level is strongly reflected in its cooperation. However, the practitioners involved in the interaction evaluated the practices rather differently. Based on data from field research conducted between 2012 and 2014 in Brazil and Mozambique with high-ranking representatives from the Mozambican and Brazilian governments and experts from sectoral institutions and civil society³ on the specific characteristics of SSDC, a rather mixed picture can be found.

First, to be horizontal, the cooperation design and the implementation would have to address which actors are involved on both sides, who exerts control over cooperation projects and to which degree, whether the procedures of decision-making and conflict resolution involve both sides equally, and whether the achieved objectives are in line with the interests of both sides. The field research showed that some practitioners highlighted the trustful atmosphere and perceived the cooperation to be horizontal (or at least that honest efforts were made towards horizontality). Others were clearly disappointed with Brazilian cooperation in this regard. In health, for example, Brazil's structural approach was perceived positively and as a differential to most "traditional" donors in the country. In agriculture, Mozambican respondents recognised Brazil's effort to conduct horizontal cooperation but stated that the notion of who provided cooperation to whom was still present. In education, respondents from both sides agreed that the relevant actors were involved in the cooperation, but Mozambicans felt that their interests were not being considered sufficiently, both during project planning and implementation.

Across the sectors, the practitioners involved pointed out that the fact that Brazil does not directly transfer financial means (budget support) and does not attach political conditionalities to its cooperation contributed strongly to the cooperation being perceived as rather horizontal by both sides. On the

other hand, both Brazilian and Mozambican respondents pointed out that the importance of horizontality in the cooperation depended in most cases on the individuals involved rather than on the institutional guidelines and policies. In addition, the asymmetric setting between the two countries was perceived to be present in the cooperation in spite of the efforts to achieve horizontality.

Second, the notion of demand-driven cooperation features prominently between Brazil and Mozambique both in conceptualisation and praxis (ABC 2014). For Brazil, the idea of attending to the officially and formally articulated demands of the recipient is important throughout the cooperation. Brazilian practitioners indicated that they need to adhere to this as a political requirement in praxis. Mozambican respondents had the impression that they were able to articulate their demand for structural approaches in health through negotiations between Fiocruz and Mozambique's Ministry of Health. This resulted in cooperation projects that were aimed at strengthening the country's institutions rather than being subject to current trends focussing on single issues—a challenge that is sometimes perceived in Northern cooperation. Practitioners from Mozambican cooperation institutions saw these opportunities as adding to the sustainability of the cooperation, enabling the recipient to maintain control over the cooperation. It can therefore be assumed that the possibility to adapt the cooperation in accordance with Mozambican demands added significantly to the trustful atmosphere between the cooperation partners, according to respondents from both the Brazilian and Mozambican sides of the cooperation.

However, the data collected indicates that Brazilian cooperation tends to not be concerned with whether all relevant stakeholders are involved in the articulation of the demand. Beyond the necessity of a formal request from the partner government to initiate the cooperation, no mechanisms were established to guarantee the inclusion of the partner's demands—for instance from civil society—throughout the course of the cooperation. It is important that Brazil does not claim to have an inclusive approach to cooperation, but instead explicitly aims to cooperate with the partner government. However, namely Mozambican practitioners criticised this as a lack of participation and pointed at the risk of the cooperation attending (primarily) to the demands of elites and not necessarily to the target groups of the cooperation.

Third, when looking at the principle of mutual benefits, responses from both sides indicated—rather surprisingly—that these tend to be of minor relevance when conceptualising and implementing projects. Both cooperating parties were aware of the fact that while benefits were created for each respective partner, these often occurred on different levels of the cooperation. Respondents stated that additional gains, such as the international reputation that Brazil would gain by presenting itself as a provider of cooperation, were not included in the conceptualisation of the project. These benefits were not linked to the practical level of cooperation and were therefore not reflected in project conceptualisations. The project design instead put a focus on gains in technical knowledge.

However, respondents pointed out that programmes were designed to create imminent benefits for Mozambique, but not for Brazil. In this sense, the data suggests that the dyad of a cooperation provider and a recipient was maintained with one main beneficiary, and not with a horizontal partnership from which both sides profit. Respondents indicated that the benefits resulting from the cooperation for Brazil were not included in the programme design. It can be argued that this is understandable for the benefits outside of the scope and objective of a particular project, but not for benefits on a technical level if the notion of mutual benefits was to be a central aspect of the cooperation.

Fourth, and rather unexpectedly, despite being rather “soft” indicators that, at first glance, appear to have little influence on the power structures of cooperation, Brazilians and Mozambicans foregrounded both a common language and cultural similarities as relevant factors for creating a trustful atmosphere and a better understanding between cooperation partners, which, in turn, was decisive in the cooperation being perceived as (more) horizontal. For almost all respondents, both *cultural proximity* and a *common colonial past* influenced the perception of Brazil being a “Southern” provider and *not* a member of the Global North. The fact that Brazil was seen to be an emerging or middle country (between Mozambique and the Global North) was perceived to be an advantage, as Brazil could offer more adequate solutions (for instance in agriculture) and, according to Mozambicans, often showed a better understanding of development challenges. However, respondents also pointed out that a common language and cultural similarities do not eradicate all cultural differences between the cooperation partners. On the contrary, practitioners from cooperation agencies, ministries, and sectoral institutions highlighted that it was still necessary to adapt to different cultural settings and understandings, and to be aware of—and sensitive to—different social codes. As a result, even with both sides sharing a common language and similar cultural backgrounds, trust between cooperation partners still had to be built up over time. Conclusions drawn from the data on the importance of language and culture in SSDC are, however, case-specific, since most SSDC providers do not speak the same primary language as most of their cooperation partners. This also holds for many cases of Brazilian cooperation—and it can also be seen as one factor that potentially contributed to Brazil’s focus on the luso-phone countries (the PALOP community). It also has to be noted that both aspects of SSDC were not included in the project design or conceptualisation.

Fifth, the idea of knowledge exchange—often in the context of mutual benefits and cultural proximity—is prominent in Brazil’s cooperation with Mozambique. Mozambican practitioners positively highlighted this aspect. In the health sector, knowledge exchange contributed towards attending to the recipient’s demand, since capacity-building strengthens the recipient’s sectoral institutions rather than addressing a specific issue. In this sense, capacity-building is a rather structural approach. In agriculture, knowledge previously obtained and adapted in Brazil—in some cases through North-South cooperation—proved useful for Mozambique’s demand. Practitioners from both sides

perceived the focus on knowledge exchange (or transfer) as a differential from Northern cooperation. Horizontal knowledge exchange and mutual learning were noted to be a *responsibility* for providers in SSDC.

25.5 CONCLUSIONS—THE “INSTITUTIONALISATION” OF SOUTHERN COOPERATION

The characteristics that constitute Southern cooperation are strongly present in Brazil’s discourse around its cooperation with Mozambique and often in the conceptualisation of the cooperation projects. However, the case indicates that the relevance of these characteristics in cooperation practices tends to vary, depending to a significant degree on the individual practitioners. In this sense, Brazil, under the presidencies of Lula da Silva and Rousseff, “institutionalised” the notion of horizontality and the incurring characteristics that are so prominently foregrounded in the country’s approach to cooperation only to a low degree: the policy appears to be implemented rather less rigidly than the solidarity rhetoric would imply, according to the experts of both countries.

The case study presented is not representative of Brazilian cooperation in general, and even to a lesser degree for SSDC provided by other emerging powers. On the one hand, Mozambique is a country that is highly dependent on external aid and highly accustomed to adopting policies from cooperation providers. This is likely to influence the perception of horizontality and further characteristics of SSDC, whereas cooperation with a partner that holds more bargaining power might be structured differently. On the other hand, other SSDC providers choose different approaches in their cooperation. For instance, China does not distinguish as clearly as Brazil between economic and technical cooperation (Bräutigam 2011). As a result, the importance of the SSDC characteristics investigated here will most likely vary.

In addition, the dynamics of *emerging powers* with strong influence on the international agenda have changed in recent years. Cooperation among the BICS has been less prominent and has received far less attention due to—among other factors—domestic reasons that have led some of these countries (such as Brazil, India, and South Africa) to focus more on internal affairs, or to pursue their international ambitions either unilaterally or in the context of other alliances, as China has done. On the other hand, emerging powers such as Turkey and Mexico continue to strive for international influence while putting less emphasis on their “Southern identity”.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the discourse around SSDC and the cooperation practices deserves attention: the low degree of “institutionalisation” raises the matter of common standards, which would have to be established in SSDC if the modality continues to be presented as a cooperation that challenges and contests “traditional” development cooperation. Otherwise, Southern cooperation runs the risk of maintaining a dyad of a “provider” and a “recipient” (or beneficiary) (Esteves 2018). It can be assumed that if SSDC does not overcome the separation between provider and recipient,

structures similar to the ones between DAC donors and their partner countries might either be established or consolidated, and recipients would have to continue to strive for greater independence and more bargaining power.

The question of whether the OECD's DAC will continue to be the central institution that sets the most important standards for development cooperation, or whether institutions such as the UN DCF will become more important in the arena where development cooperation agendas are defined, is still ongoing (Gulrajani and Swiss 2017). There is, however, no doubt that efforts from both "traditional" donors and new development partners will be necessary to implement the 2030 Agenda (UNGA 2018). Most importantly, the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda have been accompanied by different understandings of the relation between donors or providers of cooperation on the one hand, and recipients and beneficiaries on the other. The fact that not only Southern cooperation providers but also private foundations, the private sector, and civil society have become increasingly important actors in international development cooperation has added to the complexity of the IDC landscape (Esteves 2017).

Nevertheless, the engagement of Northern and Southern cooperation providers is far from being aligned, and the different framing of the cooperation modalities continues to hold its political connotation. For instance, the BICS have not joined the GPEDC but decided to discuss matters of effectiveness in the UN context. It is likely that the question that will become ever more central to the difference between Northern and Southern cooperation modalities and the relationship between donors and providers is the one concerning the effectiveness of cooperation and whether SSDC can make a relevant contribution here. Southern development partners such as the BICS continue to present their cooperation as being different from North-South cooperation, and the allocation of their cooperation follows different criteria. In this sense, SSDC continues to contest the established paradigm of cooperation being provided by the Global North. There is, however, little reason to doubt that the contributions from the South will be crucial for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Against this background, it is important to note that significant advances have been made in how SSDC can be monitored and evaluated (Esteves 2018; UNDP 2016b, c), and it is here that further development is most likely to be expected.

NOTES

1. The term "modality" is often used differently and is sometimes controversial. Both the UN and the OEDC, however, have come to use the term to distinguish between North-South and South-South cooperation in the context of international development, emphasising the complementarity between both modalities (UNGA 2018).
2. This chapter is based on the author's PhD thesis, *Power and Horizontality in South-South Development Cooperation—The Case of Brazil and Mozambique*,

University of Duisburg-Essen (Logos, Berlin, 2020). The final version of the chapter was sent to the editors in November 2019.

3. A total of 38 qualitative, semi-structured interviews served to examine whether the cooperation projects were designed in accordance with the SSDC characteristics. In addition, they contained questions on the perceptions of these experts on the horizontality of the cooperation and the practical relevance of the characteristics of SSDC described above. In order to secure a high level of confidentiality with the interview partners and to take into account the political sensitiveness of some of the issues discussed in the interviews, the interviewees were granted anonymity.

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