Chapter 3

Human Security and Flow Security in Dutch Security Policy

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3.1 Introduction

The expansion of the concept of security has also had an impact on security policy in the Netherlands, where security now encompasses far more than the military defence of the country's own territory against hostile armies. The concern for human security in fragile situations elsewhere in the world and the economic relevance of flow security are relatively new focus areas in Dutch security policy. Accordingly, this chapter provides a further analysis of the integrated approach to security and development on the one hand, and security and the economy on the other, with an emphasis on the relevant policy efforts of the Netherlands.

Security policy in the Netherlands has gradually departed from the view that security is a question of protecting the national territory against external forces. After the Second World War – in the context of the 'Pax Americana' – the policy of neutrality was abandoned and the Netherlands joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whose purpose was the *collective* defence of the alliance's entire territory against the external threat from the Soviet Union. When the Cold War ended – and it was assumed that the threat had passed – targeted interventions and preventive actions in other parts of the world also entered the realm of security policy. The focus of thinking about security shifted from the Cold War dynamic to crisis management in fragile states, human rights and development (human security). The agenda for development cooperation was bound up with operations involving deployment of the armed forces. That shift is illustrated by the addition, in 2000, of 'the maintenance and promotion of the international legal order' to the constitutional tasks of the armed forces, not only as an expression of international solidarity, but also as a matter of enlightened self-interest. Particularly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we felt less safe and there was a growing

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realisation that our own security was closely entwined with the consequences of *human insecurity* elsewhere in the world.

This integrated approach to security and development was in fact introduced in the context of a substantial reduction in government spending on defence. Following the end of the Cold War the optimistic view prevailed that military conflicts would pass this country by, and after the financial and economic crisis of 2008 there was a need to cut government spending, which also had a negative effect on spending on – conflict prevention through – development cooperation (Sect. 3.2).

Today, in 2017, the realisation of the international interconnectedness of our security situation is stronger than ever and not just because of the escalating streams of migrants in recent years, which have also led to border security assuming a central place in the national and European security agenda. We live in a network society in which production, consumption and circulation are organised on a global scale. Capital, energy, raw materials and information flows are organised in continental and intercontinental networks and transcend traditional location-bound connections. The ‘space of flows’¹ creates a new international division of labour and capital which affects the entire planet, but does so asymmetrically through either inclusion in or exclusion from the global economy. Not in the simplistic form of a centre and a periphery or in the distinction between ‘North’ and ‘South’, because there are multiple centres and multiple peripheries. Furthermore, North and South are internally so differentiated that categorising according to those concepts is pointless.

Within the global web, nation states or associations of states (such as the EU) compete with each other to protect the interests of their enterprises and citizens. Their security is closely connected with the worldwide networks and any disruptions to them. States are therefore increasingly active in addressing issues relating to economic security (flow security). Energy and climate, raw materials and the cyber domain have therefore also become part of a socialised security agenda in the Netherlands. In other words, security is also a question of the variety of connections on which our economy depends (Sect. 3.3).

3.2 Human Security: The Integrated Approach to Security and Development

3.2.1 Policy Towards Fragile States

The number of intra-state conflicts has grown since 1990, particularly in the least developed countries.² In the course of that decade a wider consensus emerged that international action in the form of external intervention in fragile – or failing – states was justified, provided it was backed by a UN mandate. Definitions of what constitutes a fragile state varied³ from countries with ineffective or weak governance or countries whose central government had lost authority over some or all of the territory to countries where the government could no longer guarantee the security of its own citizens. Solidarity with the local population, providing human security, protecting the international legal order and combating terrorism and international crime

could all be grounds for intervention (including military intervention) in fragile states. There were also references to ‘enlightened’ self-interest, since the negative effects of conflicts, such as crime, refugee streams and terrorism, could spill over into neighbouring countries, to an entire region and to the West and also undermine stability there. Civil liberties are curtailed in many fragile states (see Fig. 3.1). The idea is that stabilising fragile states is ultimately also beneficial for civil liberties in those countries, and hence for their development.

Fig. 3.1 Public freedom in the world 2014. (Source: Clingendael, Strategic Monitor 2014, *Een wankele wereldorde* [A shaky world order], 2014: 48)

The growing attention for fragile states had three consequences. The first was that it brought an end to the former philosophy that development aid only really helped if countries had attained a certain degree of stability, security and ‘sound’ – read: efficient and honest – governance. That view had prompted many donor countries to attach great weight to the criterion of good governance in deciding whether to enter into, break off or revise aid relationships – in the same way as they had done earlier with the human rights criterion.⁴ The second consequence was that the complex relationship between security, stability, reconstruction and development rose higher on the agendas of international organisations and Western donor countries. The third was that political, civil and military activities increasingly started to converge in the practice of intervention and crisis management operations.

The emphases of Dutch policy towards fragile states have differed as the policy has evolved since 2005. In the policy document *Wederopbouw na gewapend conflict* [Reconstruction after armed conflict] (2005), reconstruction in fragile states was described as a ‘complex process that demands an integrated approach’ and was said

to have three dimensions: consolidation of peace and security, rehabilitation of public administration and restoration of basic services and employment. At national level, the coherent, integrated approach that was advocated implied that the relevant ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economic Affairs, Justice, and Interior and Kingdom Relations) would select a small number of countries in three priority regions – the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. They would also have to draft joint strategies for specific countries, jointly report on the financial resources they were reserving and coordinate their respective funding. In addition, ‘a consultative structure [would] be created to further improve the cooperation’.⁵

3.2.2 *The Complicated Reality: Uruzgan*

The Dutch military presence during NATO’s Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2010 demonstrated increasingly painfully how complicated interventions and reconstruction operations in fragile states can be in practice. In Uruzgan (2005–2010), what started as a display of solidarity with the allied fight against international terrorism shifted to an operation with the ambition of improving stability and security in the province by winning more support for the Afghan authorities among the local population. A lot was at stake politically with the mission in Uruzgan. The Ministry of Defence, and within it the Operations Directorate, regarded the Netherlands’ occupation of a position as a lead nation as a litmus test for the capacity of the Dutch armed forces to make a visible contribution to complex military operations.⁶ One of the factors in this was the fervent desire to remove the blot on the record of the armed forces caused by ‘Srebrenica’ and to show that despite all the spending cuts the armed forces were actually performing an important public duty.⁷

Grandia shows in her thesis that the context in which the Netherlands decided to send troops to Uruzgan was determined to a large extent by the political considerations of membership of the alliance. However, the initiative for the mission, the initial exploratory negotiations with the British and the Canadians, and even the planning, preconditions and location of the Dutch mission initially came exclusively from the military and were not primarily dictated by pressure from the NATO partners.⁸ It was the Defence Staff itself that proposed to the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their own minister that a 1000 troops should be deployed, in the expectation that a proposal for a larger force would not be politically feasible. Once that number began circulating in political circles, there was no turning back, even when it became clear that the security situation in Uruzgan was deteriorating.⁹ Accordingly, the so-called Article 100 letter to parliament referred to a stabilisation operation for 2 years with a maximum of 1200 troops and a budget of 320 million euro. The so-called Assessment Framework and the Article 100 procedure for the decision on deployment of Dutch troops proved to be no guarantee of a diligent decision-making process by the cabinet or of the timely provision of information to

the House of Representatives. After the military planners had already anticipated the politicians, the military and political decision-making processes then quietly converged, with the result that the political primacy was weakened and the deployment of troops came to appear inevitable to those involved. Nor had the Steering Group formulated a strategy for the deployment of troops with predetermined goals and resources and a further interpretation of the integrated approach of defence, development and governance as promised to the House of Representatives. The Ministry of Defence finally drafted a master plan, but it was only published just before the first troops arrived in Afghanistan, while an estimate of the situation of civilians in Uruzgan prepared by the Dutch embassy in Kabul was only published after the troops were already in the country.

Neither document was incorporated into an overarching strategic document so the goal of the mission remained diffuse.¹⁰ According to Amersfoort, 'on balance' the Uruzgan Task Force was deployed 'without any underlying military strategy or campaign plan'. He referred to 'the demise of military strategy'.¹¹

Under pressure from the House of Representatives, the media and public opinion, the Dutch government was anxious to distance itself from the actions of the Americans, and to a lesser extent the British and the French, because of their focus on 'counterinsurgency': the suppression of insurgencies and the military elimination of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.¹² The government carefully avoided using the term counterinsurgency, or the term war. The Netherlands would make a 'unique contribution' in the form of the 'Dutch Approach'.¹³ Later, following the Canadian example, this approach was rechristened the '3D approach' (for diplomacy, development and defence) and the 'integrated approach', in which the prevention of conflicts is also an important facet. The aim was 'to act with respect for the population, knowledge of religion, local habits and customs and with as little aggression as possible'.¹⁴ The Netherlands would address the underlying causes of instability, for example by rooting out the cultivation and trafficking of drugs, offering alternative means of subsistence, reforming the security sector and combating poverty.¹⁵ The civil- and development-oriented dimensions of the mission thus attracted more and more of parliament's attention and the pressure increased to involve NGOs in the mission from an early stage. An example of how remote the reality of the mission was from the political discussion in the Netherlands was the debate that was conducted about whether Uruzgan was a 'reconstruction mission' or a 'combat mission' when the complex reality on the ground meant that in various places reconstruction and fighting were proceeding simultaneously.¹⁶

In the run-up to the extension of the mission at the end of 2007 initially optimistic reports about the progress being made in finding the optimal combination of military resources, development aid and political and diplomatic instruments steadily made way for more nuanced views and revisions because of 'the complicated reality [which] compels realism and pragmatism and an increasingly nuanced and more complex view of the conflict in Uruzgan'.¹⁷ There was every reason for this change. Maintaining security and stability, specified as a prerequisite for establishing good governance and socio-economic development, proved impossible to realise with the limited number of Dutch troops. There were not enough transport

helicopters and engineers and medical personnel to provide support. The mobility of the troops was also severely hampered by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It was therefore gradually decided that the Dutch troops would secure stable zones ('ink stains') around three major population centres in the province. Within these areas, roughly half of the civilian population of Uruzgan could count on – temporary – protection. Outside them the rebels had free rein, which meant there was no chance of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population.¹⁸ Nor was any progress made in achieving the ambition of training the Afghan army and police to assume some tasks themselves, for example taking charge of anti-drug operations. The limited capabilities of the Afghans was a factor in this, but also divisions among the ISAF partners about how to deal with the local tribal leaders and an unwillingness on the part of the government in Kabul and the local authorities to tackle corruption, incompetence and nepotism.¹⁹

With hindsight it was observed that the mission's objectives as set out in the original Article 100 letters were 'ambitious and impressionistic'.²⁰ Until October 2007, the policy documents sent to the House of Representatives reflected an optimistic belief in the malleability of the situation, despite the worrying developments that were occurring in terms of security. The Netherlands was said to be contributing to the reconstruction and transition of a failing state into a functioning constitutional parliamentary democracy on the basis of lengthy joint efforts by the international community. The more successful the Afghan government was in strengthening its own authority, the more the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would become redundant. At the same time, no realistic and concrete objectives had been formulated in advance and there were no indicators to measure results nor was there any underpinning of the integrated approach. Nor was careful thought given in advance to how the UN's call for civilians to be protected would be translated into guidelines for strategies, mandates and reports concerning their protection.²¹

Despite – or perhaps because of – these flaws, the Dutch actors on the ground developed a flexible, pragmatic and practical approach in which the various ministries, civil and military actors and NGOs achieved a steadily greater level of coherence in their actions at operational level in a constantly changing environment. The Uruzgan Task Force made 'progress in finding the best combination of military resources, development cooperation and political and diplomatic instruments'.²² At the same time, however, it became increasingly clear that numerous developments were occurring over which the Netherlands, as a small actor facing problems of capacity in the province of Uruzgan, had no control whatsoever.²³

3.2.3 *Adjustment of the Policy*

Against the backdrop of the dramatic Dutch experiences in Uruzgan and the continuing debate about the characteristics, causes and consequences of fragility, Dutch policy towards fragile states was revised and given a better strategic underpinning.

Veiligheid en ontwikkeling in fragiele staten [Security and development in fragile states] (2008), a document that fleshed out the policy letter *Een zaak van iedereen* [Our common concern] (2007), outlined the multidimensional nature of the problems of fragile states and the need to focus on civil operations and to form multilateral coalitions wherever possible. The report stated that conflict prevention through diplomacy and political efforts coordinated by the UN would occupy a prominent position in the strategy, for example via early warning and mediation. The Netherlands should raise simmering conflicts in multilateral forums and would assist civil-society organisations in securing independent information about developments in countries and in carrying out projects designed to address the underlying causes of fragility. ‘Islands of stability’ could also receive assistance in preventing the expansion of conflicts. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would also enhance its own policymaking capacities by creating a flexible Fragility and Peacebuilding Unit to operationalise the policy towards fragile states. The unit would work closely with embassies, other ministries, NGOs, international organisations and experts.²⁴

Meanwhile, prompted by a debate about the 3D approach in the Senate and ahead of the publication of the so-called *Strategische Verkenningen* [Strategic Defence Review] by the Ministry of Defence, the government asked the AIV to write an advisory report on the policy on fragile states. The request reflected the struggle with the experiences in Afghanistan. The AIV was asked to say how the political, military and development objectives of crisis management operations relate to each other in theory and practice, to what extent those objectives can be integrated in a single coherent approach and how an integrated approach should ideally be put into practice.²⁵

In its report published in March 2009, the AIV analysed the many dilemmas posed by crisis interventions and reconstruction. The Council warned the government to display ‘sobriety and moderation’ by formulating limited, attainable objectives, which should also be discussed more thoroughly in advance at the political level. The Council argued that the chance of success and the quantifiability of successes are crucial for preserving the essential political and public support for missions. It was understandable that the government is mainly inclined to highlight the positive aspects of peacekeeping operations and is keen to ‘keep the public’s spirits up’, said the Council, but, it warned, “all this can have a fatal impact on society’s indispensable faith in a good outcome and erode public support if reality proves to be more intractable”.²⁶ The AIV also observed that the limited capacity to deploy civil servants, the limited capabilities of the armed forces and a lack of knowledge of the situation on the ground are major obstacles.

At the end of 2011, the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2012–2015)* was adopted in Busan under the chairmanship of the Netherlands. The agreement underscored the need to strengthen the policy on fragile states. An updating of Dutch policy on fragile states followed,²⁷ in which the government specified five priorities: (1) human security, (2) a functioning legal order, (3) inclusive political processes, (4) a legitimate and capable government and (5) peace dividend: employment and basic services.²⁸

The Department for Stability and Humanitarian Aid (DSH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant embassies drew up Multi-year Strategic Plans for

fragile states such as Rwanda, Afghanistan and South Sudan.²⁹ However, they did not do the same for the ring of unstable countries in Eastern Europe and in North and West Africa, despite these countries' strategic importance for the Netherlands and Europe. The DSH provides funding to five organisations (International Alert, Interpeace, International Crisis Group, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, International Centre for Transitional Justice) for activities relating to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Some of these activities involve early warning, some mediation and some peacebuilding. The organisations are strategic partners of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have been receiving non-earmarked grants since 2009 (some since 2011).³⁰

3.2.4 *An Integrated Approach?*

Since 2008 the Dutch government has frequently referred to 'the integrated approach' in policy documents such as *Wederopbouw na gewapend conflict* [Reconstruction after armed conflict] (2005), *Security and development in fragile states* [Veiligheid en ontwikkeling in fragiele states] (2008), *Focusbrief Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* [Focus letter on Development Cooperation] (2011), *Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie* [International Security Strategy] (2013) and *Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering* [Guidelines for the Operationalisation of the Integrated Approach] (2014). The integrated approach is one of the six priorities in the International Security Strategy. In January 2014, for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to the House of Representatives, with reference to the Coalition Agreement (2012), that the government supported proposals to develop a joint integrated approach at EU level: 'the Netherlands is seen within the EU as one of the drivers of the integrated approach, particularly because of the experience the Netherlands has gained with that approach in Afghanistan and which has been translated into policy within organisations such as NATO.' But, according to the minister, the EU's ambitions did not go far enough. Opportunities are being missed to genuinely end the compartmentalisation of the relationship between security and development on the basis of joint civil-military planning and financial programming and in combination with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.³¹ The letter to the House of Representatives in November 2014 concerning the International Security Strategy also refers to the desire 'to maintain and further expand the Netherlands' progressive role in relation to the integrated approach'.^{32,33} The integrated approach had in fact already been embraced in the context of the UN, EU and NATO.³⁴ The establishment of the international Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (based in the Netherlands) testifies to the growing interest in civil-military cooperation in complex crisis situations and the realisation that conventional kinetic operations (with the use of force) – particularly in urbanised environments – increasingly interfere with non-kinetic measures intended to win the support of the population, for example.³⁵

The references to an integrated approach to fragile states and zones of conflict and the desire to further strengthen it are inseparable from the mixed experiences during the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. The relevant players on the ground increasingly came to realise that the objectives of the mission left a lot of room for different interpretations. The military initially regarded the primary goal of the mission as being to defeat the Taliban and create security with a strategy of counterinsurgency.³⁶ The civil actors, including many diplomats and representatives of national and international NGOs on the spot, were principally concerned with improving the security of the local population as part of a wider development strategy. The NGOs in particular distanced themselves from military operations against the insurgents, since those operations not only harmed their credibility as neutral aid workers, but could also stand in the way of longer-term political solutions. After all, the best chance of them succeeding was if the grievances of the widest possible section of the population, including those of the insurgents and the (former) rulers, were removed. Particularly in the last 2 years of the mission in Uruzgan (2008–2010), this realisation of the complexity of the situation and the diverse viewpoints, goals and interests prompted those concerned to intensify their efforts to bring greater coherence and synergy to their joint operations. Mutual trust grew and there was tighter coordination and a sharper focus and greater consensus on the goals of the mission. This is a process that creates opportunities for a longer-term approach that takes greater account of the underlying causes of conflicts and of the wider range of civil as well as military instruments and actors. It also offers opportunities to gain wider public support and improve cooperation at international level.³⁷

There were, however, a number of weaknesses in the implementation of the integrated approach by the Netherlands. First, improved coordination and closer cooperation between the actors are not enough if their objectives for the mission vary too greatly and there is no overarching analysis that is properly underpinned and enjoys political support. What are the goals to be achieved and the resources to be used in the specific context? What dilemmas are expected to arise? How can the civilian population best be protected, and at what cost? These analytical and substantive questions have to be explored first, before the added value of improved coordination and closer cooperation is considered, because the answers to them determine whether, and if so, which of the various instruments and actors in the extensive toolbox (defence, development aid, diplomacy, police, justice, trade) should be used. The authors of the *Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering* recognised the importance of an overarching analysis, customisation and the proper embedding of the 3D approach in international frameworks, but at the same time seemed to regard the approach primarily as an organisational process of coordination at senior civil-service level in the Missions and Operations Steering Group and of ‘communication policy’ by ministerial spokespersons rather than as a political task.³⁸ It is significant that in an international comparative survey interested German officials described the Dutch version of the integrated approach as being based on the polder model, in which consensus, cooperation and pragmatic experimentation are central features. “Assessments that things could run better quickly translate into a ‘let’s organize it’ attitude rather than the initiation of lengthy strategic discussions”.³⁹

With the pragmatic polder model, material and bureaucratic interests of the individual ministries quickly gain the upper hand during negotiations. The result can then be that political decision-making is confined to the modalities of the military contribution to the missions via the Assessment Framework and the Article 100 letters.⁴⁰ The real political and public debates about the feasibility of the specific goals, the risks, the public support, the modalities and the available (civil) resources then come too late and are not exhaustive. What then remains for parliament is little more than ‘micromanagement’ of the military operations. Ministers then depend mainly on civil servants and military officers in the field for day-to-day decision-making and implementation and cannot fall back on guidelines concerning risks and the attainment of goals.⁴¹

In the second place, the integrated approach also ignores the reality of the dilemmas and conflicting values that can arise from differing ideological or political visions of the underlying causes of fragility and the potential for change. In other words, there are limits to how coherent action can be. De Coning and Friis refer to an analysis of no fewer than 336 peacekeeping operations that were undertaken by Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom in the 1990s. Every one of them suffered from a lack of coherence (a ‘strategic deficit’). In 55% of cases there was no connection whatsoever to an overriding strategy for the country concerned. If the underlying values, interests and mandates are inherently contradictory, there are limits to the benefits that can be generated by strengthening the procedural coherence. It is then better to recognise the impossibility of achieving complete coherence or to aim for limited coherence by accepting sub-optimal solutions. As De Coning and Friis demonstrate, there are inherent tensions between the long-term impact and the short-term results of interventions, between the values and mandates of the various actors and between the interests of the intervening actors and the local population. In practice, therefore, there is also far less room for coherence than is assumed by many civil servants and politicians who advocate the integrated approach. That realisation imposes a need for realism and moderation.⁴²

A third weakness is that the substantive ambitions of the integrated approach (addressing the underlying causes of instability, preventing new conflicts and contributing to lasting solutions that are supported by the local population) conflict with the public and political support at home. Effective contributions demand a commitment for decades, but in the post-Afghanistan era the public support for ‘open-ended’ military interventions has greatly diminished. There is also less political support for such complex operations than there used to be.⁴³

3.3 Flow Security: The Integrated Approach to Security and the Economy

The global network society is characterised by worldwide flows of capital, labour and information. That introduces economic security as a relatively new concept in the Dutch policy context.⁴⁴ In the narrow sense of security as the possession of the economic resources needed to guarantee national security, however, it has never

been absent. Foreign and security policy are permeated with the realisation that the survival of a country like the Netherlands, with an open economy oriented towards trade and distribution, stands or falls with a safe and predictable environment. Economic security has therefore traditionally been connected with the desire for a stable international legal order, free trade, open transport routes and guaranteed access to European markets.

Economic security was explicitly incorporated in policy for the first time in the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) in 2007 as one of the five ‘vital national interests’: territorial, ecological and physical security, and social and political stability.⁴⁵ In the *National Security Strategy*, economic security turns mainly on ‘the ability of the Netherlands to function without disruption as an efficient and effective economy. Economic security could be impaired, for example, if trade with an important foreign partner were to disappear’.⁴⁶ Examples of specific threats to economic security that are mentioned are extreme scarcity of energy and raw materials.

The *International Security Strategy* (ISS) in 2013 and the policy letter *International Security. Turbulent Times in Unstable Surroundings* in 2014 reflected a growing awareness of the interconnectedness of internal and external security and the vulnerability of the Dutch economy to external threats. Economic security is regarded as a separate security interest, in addition to the defence of allied territory and a properly functioning legal order. In contrast to the *National Security Strategy*, the *International Security Strategy* does not give a definition of economic security, but explicitly opts for an interpretation that – without explicitly using the term – corresponds with the broader concept of flow security. On the one hand, it refers to the importance of preventing undesirable interruptions of flows and production chains. On the other, it discusses the need to protect strategic economic sectors and vital infrastructure. Threats referred to include piracy, cyber attacks, (cyber) espionage, fraud, corruption and all forms of organised crime, but also territorial conflicts and blockades that threaten the Netherlands’ strategic position as a transit hub and the security of supply of raw materials and energy. The *International Security Strategy* refers to climate security as a ‘new’ but increasingly topical theme.⁴⁷

Although most of these themes are recognised as threats or risks, they have not been substantively addressed in specific domains of security or defence policy such as the raw materials policy or energy and climate policy. There are no references in defence policy to tasks or targets for deployability in relation to economic security, with the exception of cyber security (see Sect. 3.3.2 below).

Nevertheless, an indication has been given of the course to be taken. In *Houvast in een onzekere wereld. Lijnen van ontwikkeling in het meerjarig perspectief voor een duurzaam gerede en snel inzetbare krijgsmacht* [Maintaining a grip in an uncertain world. Lines of development in the multi-year perspective for sustainably ready and rapidly deployable armed forces] (14 January 2017), various aspects of flow security are discussed under the heading ‘secure connections’ (2017: 17) ‘The Netherlands is a global hub’, the report states, a ‘system country’ for which ‘connectedness’ and the ‘hub function’ are of the utmost importance. Protecting this vital infrastructure is crucial for preventing serious economic damage, threats to physical safety and social stability being undermined.

This hub function, whether it is ‘gas roundabouts’, the internet infrastructure or the Dutch ideal of economic security based on free trade and transparency, has already been challenged for some time by external developments. Russia and China, for example, have developed Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capacities in key regions. Russia has invested heavily in A2/AD capacities in areas extending from the North Pole to Syria, with concentrations in Kaliningrad and around the Crimea. China has created ‘anti-access environments’ in the seas of East Asia. These capacities (which include air defence, maritime activities, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles) could not only effectively deny access to certain regions for an enemy’s armed forces, but also its merchant fleet.

The takeovers of a number of large Dutch companies by state-owned companies and so-called sovereign wealth funds from Asia and the Gulf region in 2009 and 2010 sparked a debate about the tension between economic openness and economic security. There was an even greater shock when, in September 2013, América Móvil – which owned more than 30% of the shares in telecom company KPN – attempted to buy the remaining 70%. KPN owned a substantial portion of the fixed communication networks in the Netherlands, on which, in the absence of substitutes, vital government services and the networks of other telecom providers relied entirely, at least in the short term. If KPN were to fall into its hands, América Móvil would be able to exert pressure on the Dutch government, for example by threatening to shut down telecom services. It could also endanger the confidentiality of electronic data traffic.⁴⁸ To what extent could and should the Netherlands arm itself against such acquisitions and direct interventions in the interests of national security? Should it create a special framework for assessing investments or institute an investment review as Canada and the US have done? Similar discussions are being conducted in South European countries, where Chinese companies own large positions (but not majority shareholdings) in the electricity networks.⁴⁹

In 2010, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations observed that there was little the Dutch government could do, even if such acquisitions were potentially harmful to national security interests. The AIVD pointed out that the Netherlands faced increased risks to national security because of its relative vulnerability to economic and technological espionage. Vital sectors of the infrastructure, such as telecommunication, energy and the aerospace industry, are increasingly exposed to spying activities by foreign intelligence services with an interest in gathering sensitive (commercial) know-how and information.⁵⁰ However, the ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance and representatives of the business community countered with the argument that foreign direct investment makes an unparalleled contribution to the Netherlands’ economic security in the form of growth, prosperity and jobs. According to them, existing legislation was more than adequate in those rare instances where foreign investments could harm national security interests.⁵¹

Nevertheless, the case of KPN led directly to economic security climbing higher on the policy agenda. Two months later, an interdepartmental Economic Security

Working Group was established, chaired by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and including representatives of the employers' organisation VNO-NCW. In April 2014, the working group produced a report entitled *Tussen naïviteit en paranoia* [Between naivety and paranoia], which contained a number of specific recommendations for safeguarding national security in the event of foreign takeovers and investments in vital sectors. The report stressed the undiminished importance of foreign acquisitions and investments for the Dutch economy, but was at the same time more insistent than earlier policy documents about the importance of weighing up general security interests in the event of foreign investments and takeovers. Assessments of that nature are 'unusual' in the Netherlands and 'take place on an ad-hoc basis' without 'ex-ante analysis to identify the risks to national security', the report said. In addition to ex-ante analyses, the authors called on the government to delegate ownership of the issue so that warnings from public and private security partners could be addressed and for a structural alliance of economic and security partners. The working group also said there was a need for expertise in the domain of economic security throughout central government.

The Minister of Justice and Security was adopting the recommendations to commission ex-ante analyses in two or three 'vital sectors' and to promote public-private cooperation, he said in a letter to the House of Representatives in June 2014.⁵² But the minister also called for delineation of the theme of economic security. In addition to foreign takeovers and investments in vital sectors, the other 'priority topics' at that time were access to raw materials, protection of trade routes and (digital) espionage. At the same time, the Minister of Economic Affairs promised the House of Representatives that he would formulate additional powers, on the basis of advice from the ministers of Justice and Security, the Interior and Kingdom Relations and Defence, to allow him to evaluate the national security implications of changes of control of vital telecommunications infrastructure.⁵³

In the *Voortgangsbrief nationale veiligheid* [Progress report on national security] in May 2015, however, the main emphasis was on formulating a uniform definition of vital infrastructure and identifying what constituted the Netherlands' vital infrastructure, partly with a view to promoting closer cooperation with the security regions and the business sector. Despite the growing attention to transnational cascade effects and external threats to economic security from espionage or acquisitions in vital economic sectors, there was still no question of economic security being firmly anchored in Dutch security policy as the Minister of Defence had hinted it would be in her reaction to the report *No Blood for Oil?* (2014) by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).⁵⁴ At the beginning of 2017, a draft of a bill to prevent undesirable changes of control in the telecommunications sector was published for consultation. Under the proposed law, control over a telecommunication company may not fall into the hands of a party that is not or not exclusively acting on the basis of legitimate commercial interests, but (also) acting on the basis of geopolitical or criminal motives.

3.3.1 *Energy and Climate Security*

The policy letter *International Security. Turbulent Times in Unstable Surroundings* (14 November 2014) bears the traces of the Ukraine crisis. In it the government underlined the interconnectedness of security and the economy and referred to the implications of that crisis for energy policy. According to the government, the Russian intervention in Ukraine was prompted in part by the approaches that country was making towards the EU and which were obstructing Russia's plans for a Euro-Asian Union. Moreover, the annexation of the Crimea was accompanied by 'hybrid warfare', involving the use of unannounced, large-scale military exercises and rapid troop movements and secret support of separatist groups, as well as economic pressure. Since then, security of energy supply in Europe has been seen as an 'acute issue' that compels a review of the energy relationship with Russia.

The connection between Dutch energy policy and the international security situation was only made to a limited extent. In the policy letter, the government did not mention any specific steps the Netherlands would take to address what it had described as an urgent issue. It appeared to be leaving it to the EU to take the lead, although the EU had made little progress on the energy question up to that time because of the conflicting interests of the member states. The AIV's advisory report *De EU-gasafhankelijkheid van Rusland* [The EU's dependence on Russian gas] (June 2014) can therefore also be read as an appeal for a more active Dutch approach. The AIV observes in the report that geopolitical and security considerations receive far too little attention in European policy, but also in Dutch policy. The Netherlands allows its own trade and investment interests to prevail, so that too little consideration is given to reducing the dependence on Russia for energy. 'Energy policy in the Netherlands is determined primarily by economics', according to the AIV. 'Primary responsibility for it lies with the Minister of Economic Affairs. To a large extent, however, energy policy is also a matter of foreign policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs should have a prominent voice in strategic investment decisions.'⁵⁵

This applies to an even greater extent now that the shale gas revolution in the US is not only having a direct impact on the competitive position of energy-intensive industries in Europe, but also indirectly has major long-term geopolitical implications. As analyses by organisations like the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) and the HCSS have shown, in time the diminishing American dependence on oil from the Middle East will translate into lower oil prices and a further shift of attention in American security policy from the Middle East and Europe to Asia and the Pacific region. As a result, the Pax Americana could also become a thing of the past without any new stabilisers appearing to replace it. Add to this the potentially disruptive effects of falling oil prices on economic and social stability in the southern EU member states and Russia and it is clear that a strategic energy policy for the Netherlands and Europe must take greater account of Dutch and European security policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy.⁵⁶

It is not clear from the policy documents sent to the House of Representatives whether Prime Minister Mark Rutte's previous government was fully aware of the

potential consequences of such shifts. In its reaction to the AIV report on the dependence on Russian gas, the government referred mainly to Europe. It said it supported the AIV's proposal to give the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS) a greater say in energy policy. The government also promised to consider energy policy more explicitly in the European Neighbourhood Policy and to give the Minister of Foreign Affairs a voice in national decisions on strategic investments (Government Reaction of 7 October 2014). However, it remains to be seen what effect these statements will have in practice.

The International Security Strategy describes climate change as a driver of existing tensions and conflicts and goes on to advocate the introduction of early warning systems for problems relating to climate, water, food and other (scarce) resources.

The climate issue has been significantly higher on the Dutch security agenda than the energy issue, and for far longer. At international level, it has been the subject of widespread attention in the context of security policy since 2007 when it was raised in rapid succession in the UN Security Council, in *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (2007) by the American CNA Corporation, in the International Institute for Security Studies' *Strategic Survey 2007* and by the German *Wissenschaftlicher Beirat für Globale Umweltveränderungen*. The tenor of all of these reports was that the effects of climate change are manifested primarily in a decline in sources of fresh water and food production and an increase in extreme weather events, problems that threaten international stability and security because they exacerbate existing problems and conflicts. They could, for example, lead to a rise in the number of fragile states, cause economic growth to stagnate in certain regions, intensify the competition for scarcer resources and lead to growth in the number of (environmental) refugees and migrants.⁵⁷ Since then, climate change has also appeared in EU and NATO documents as a 'multiplier' of existing international threats.⁵⁸

The National Security Strategy in 2007 referred to the rising sea level as a security risk. The document spoke of 'ecological security'. It also referred to extreme weather conditions such as drought, heat and flooding as potential risks to national security. Climate change, and above all the rising sea level, were described as global issues that demanded a global response and were therefore not discussed any further.⁵⁹ In 2013, however, the National Risk Assessment included a scenario for flooding caused by the bursting of dikes tailored to the situation in the Netherlands.⁶⁰ The International Security Strategy in 2013 described climate change as part of a new 'complex security situation'. The government referred to the relationship between climate change, the 'conflicts over water, food, energy and raw materials', growing instability and an increase in the number of migrants. Conflict zones and fragile states are 'a breeding ground for terrorism, extremism and cross-border organised crime', particularly in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region, North Africa and the Middle East. According to the International Security Strategy, 'preventive action' is essential 'in the face of new challenges resulting from climate change'. The urgency of the climate problems was further underlined in the policy letter *Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving* [Turbulent Times in Unstable

Surroundings], as was the importance of global action, legally binding agreements and global early warning systems. Climate change is expected to lead to growing demands on the armed forces to undertake missions in a steadily expanding range of circumstances and roles. The ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs realise that this will also require internal changes in terms of infrastructure, facilities, training and testing environments and materiel. However, the climate perspective has still not been fully embedded in international security policy. The vast majority of steps that have taken up to now have been in the policy on development cooperation.⁶¹

In addition to pushing for integration of climate change in the formulation of national policy, the Netherlands recently took the initiative to establish an international forum to address issues at the intersection of climate change and security. The first international conference on Planetary Security (Peace and Cooperation in Times of Climate Change and Global Environmental Challenges) was organised at the Peace Palace in The Hague on 2 and 3 November 2015. A second conference followed on 5 and 6 December 2016. The Netherlands will act as facilitator of the new forum as the initiative is expanded and deepened in the coming years.⁶²

3.3.2 Security of Supply of Raw Materials

Like energy and climate, raw materials have become part of the extended concept of security in the Netherlands. Figure 3.2 shows the growing mutual dependency between Russia and the EU in terms of raw materials. Dutch policy on raw materials was formulated against the background of the growing realisation that guaranteeing the security of supply of raw materials also represents an economic security interest

Fig. 3.2 Russia's share of EU imports of coal, crude oil and natural gas, as percentages of total European imports (Source: Clingendael, Strategic Monitor 2016, *Grootmachten en mondiale stabiliteit* [Great powers and global stability], 2016: 25)

for the Netherlands.⁶³ The Netherlands is an important transit country for commodities, has a large agro sector that depends on imported biotic raw materials, and a small but technologically advanced industrial sector which relies on flows of imported abiotic raw materials. A large number of multinationals with ties to commodity producers are also based in the Netherlands, and the country has a dense network of trade and diplomatic missions with which it occupies a powerful position in the force field of commodity flows.⁶⁴ The Dutch 'top sectors' of logistics, agrofood and chemicals in particular can profit from Europe's scarcity of raw materials thanks to their innovative capacity.⁶⁵ In 2011, the government of the time drew up a Policy Document on Raw Materials [*Grondstoffennotitie*] setting out an 'integrated strategy' for reducing the vulnerability of the Dutch economy.

Dutch policy represents a balancing act. On the one hand, it conveys the familiar aim of achieving the maximum possible in terms of open markets and free enterprise. On the other, it refers to the challenges posed by the climate and a geopolitical reality of protectionist state capitalism and market strength aimed at guaranteeing access to knowledge, technology and supplies of energy and raw materials. Security of supply is regarded as primarily the responsibility of the business community. The government can 'facilitate, stimulate, establish frameworks and coordinate'. Where 'the market does not work properly' the Netherlands must intervene via the WTO and the EU as far as possible.⁶⁶ The credo is 'European where possible, national where it creates opportunities'.⁶⁷ At the same time, the pursuit of sustainability is an explicit prerequisite for security of supply in the longer term. The use of raw materials must not be accompanied by violations of human rights or damage to the environment.⁶⁸

According to the progress reports to the House of Representatives, the government has facilitated various small-scale initiatives since 2011. A Special Envoy for Natural Resources has been appointed to actively promote cooperation with suppliers of vital raw materials. Platforms have been established to raise awareness of the problems and to promote knowledge sharing and technological cooperation, and Green Deals have been concluded with the business community with a view to removing obstructive laws and regulations.⁶⁹ However, researchers at institutes including the HCSS, TNO, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, the Council for the Environment and Infrastructure and the Rathenau Institute have found that there is still no integrated strategy for raw materials. In the first place, that requires a long-term perspective that provides the business community and research institutes with the certainty they need to make major investments. Secondly, it calls for more substantive coordination with the broader foreign and security policy, including economic diplomacy and development cooperation. And finally, the government needs to actively encourage companies and other actors in society to generate green growth and create a circular economy.⁷⁰

At the beginning of 2017, the National Raw Materials Agreement was signed by 180 parties. They are now preparing plans to accelerate the transition to a fully circular economy by 2050. The transition from a linear economy (in which raw materials are ultimately converted into waste) to a circular economy (in which waste is re-used as a raw material) will have a positive effect on global public goods such as

the climate and biodiversity. It will also yield competitive advantages and is therefore also important for the country's economic position. However, the policy on raw materials is still not adequately geared to the context of an extended security policy. Geopolitics and this country's security are also at stake here via the (negative) impact on commodity-rich countries, including developing countries.⁷¹

3.3.3 *Cyber Security*

As in other countries in Europe, the expansion of the Dutch security agenda to the cyber domain is now well advanced. Furthermore, cyber security encompasses all of the 'objects' of security: the state, the relevant actors in society and the individual.⁷² All of the vital interests that the Dutch government should protect (territorial, physical, economic and ecological security, political and social stability, and the international legal order) are so deeply permeated by digital systems that the digital domain itself can be regarded as a vital interest.⁷³ In 2011, the NCTV drafted the first National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS1) for the government. The strategy referred to the international sources of insecurity, but like the National Security Strategy, it was primarily concerned with preventing disruption in the Netherlands itself. The government explicitly sought to achieve that through cooperation with companies, institutions and citizens, since precaution is a shared responsibility. The second National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS2) in 2013 bore all the hallmarks of a fully-fledged strategy. It explicitly made the connection with the international domain. Taking inspiration from the integrated 3D approach, the authors said that capacity-building was needed to guarantee cyber security against both national and international threats. In an accompanying Action Programme 2014–2016, the strategic orientation was translated into specific objectives and actions to be taken by the relevant actors. The Netherlands wishes to be in the vanguard of international efforts to combat cyber crime, for example through further harmonisation of legislation relating to the investigation of that form of crime and by strengthening Europol's European Cybercrime Centre.⁷⁴ The Netherlands also played an important role in the establishment of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (2017). In 2012, an integrated Defence Cyber Strategy was drawn up focusing on internal and external cyber security. The Defence Cyber Command was established in 2014 to provide the necessary capabilities for the defence of digital systems.⁷⁵

The commander of the Defence Cyber Command, Hans Folmer, has expressed concerns about the existence of advanced capabilities to manipulate information, for example with real-time editing of video images in order to mislead citizens, military personnel and politicians. The 80 person-strong Cyber Command that he leads prepares for defence in the event of various scenarios, such as a cyber attack on the energy supply, payment systems or flood barriers. Since recently the Command has also been developing its own offensive capabilities designed to eliminate hostile communication systems.⁷⁶

The Netherlands' 'digital delta' is highly developed, but it is vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyberspace is increasingly the setting for geopolitical and terrorist threats and the development of the Internet of Things is greatly increasing the number of potential targets.⁷⁷

3.4 Integrated Approach Needed More Than Ever

The expansion of the security agenda and the greater interconnectedness of internal and external security in an interdependent network society are having an evident impact on Dutch security policy. Two developments stand out. The first is the focus on stabilising fragile states and the integrated approach to security and development during missions outside Dutch territory. The second is the emergence of flow security, or economic security, as an area of concern in strategic documents and instruments. Both developments contribute to the expansion of the role of the armed forces as a structural security partner for civil actors.

The main points of the policy on fragile states have not changed since 2008, despite various indications that the approach taken has produced very limited results up to now. What is lacking is a detailed analysis of the underlying causes and an approach geared to prevention and the long term.

Economic security and flow security have only appeared higher on the security agenda fairly recently and are consequently not yet truly embedded in government policy. This is undoubtedly due to the Netherlands' free-trade orientation and traditional aversion to geopolitics. The attention to (cyber) espionage and foreign take-overs of companies that could be of strategic importance, for example, really only came to the forefront of political attention with the América Móvil affair, despite earlier warnings from the AIVD and NCTV. The policies on energy, climate and raw materials have also only received serious attention in discussions of security policy in the last few years. On the other hand, the Netherlands, partly due to its own high internet density and vulnerability to cyber attacks, has for some time had a comprehensive, future-proof cyber strategy that embraces both the national and international domain, as well as a Defence Cyber Strategy and a Defence Cyber Command specifically for the defence forces.

With the recent deterioration in the international security situation, an integrated approach to security – with a defence policy derived from it as one of the instruments – is needed more than ever. In the immediate vicinity of Europe, the 'new reality' of a ring of instability⁷⁸ calls for a policy that goes beyond a re-evaluation of (collective) defence and repressive treatment of symptoms. The integrated use of a variety of instruments (diplomacy, development cooperation, strategic economic policy, defence, intelligence, etc.) is also necessary to structurally address the underlying causes of instability and insecurity along the eastern and southern borders of Europe. In the process, it is essential to take account of equally integrated or hybrid threats from actors that use both conventional and non-conventional, both military and paramilitary and civil, and both open and secret means, to strike at vulnerabilities and to serve their strategic interests.

Endnotes

- 1 Castells, M. (1996); Goede, P.J.M. de et al. (2001).
- 2 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program makes a distinction between ‘state-based’ and ‘non-state’ conflicts. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program: <http://ucdp.uu.se/>
- 3 Pilbeam, B. (2015a, b).
- 4 WRR (2001: 164–5).
- 5 Parliamentary Documents II 30,075, no. 1, 2004–2005, 22 March 2005.
- 6 Korteweg, A.R. (2011, 284–290); Klep, C. (2012); Grandia, M. (2015, 115).
- 7 Grandia, M. (2015, 119–120).
- 8 Between August 2004 and January 2005 only informal talks were conducted between the small group of Dutch troops and their British and Canadian colleagues. It was the end of January before the Military Operations Steering Group was informed of these talks. Grandia notes that General Jim Jones, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was surprised by the dynamic of the bilateral talks: “They hammered out the whole thing without NATO assistance, behind closed doors...We were not aware of the details” (Grandia 2015: 116). The head of military affairs and the head of diplomacy at the Dutch mission to NATO also had scarcely any involvement in the initial planning of the mission. The House of Representatives was informed about the plans for the mission in June 2005.
- 9 Grandia, M. (2015: 121).
- 10 Grandia, M. (2015: 139–150); Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IOB (2013).
- 11 Amersfoort, H. (2016: 219).
- 12 Dimitriu and De Graaf observe that the concept of counterinsurgency – with the accompanying offensive operations – figures in all ISAF documents and also played a role in the parliamentary debates in France and Britain. The Dutch government avoided the use of this term (Dimitriu & De Graaf 2011).
- 13 Brocades Zaalberg, T.W. (2008: 121).
- 14 IOB. (2013: 109); Korteweg, A.R. (2011: 292–6); AIV. (2009).
- 15 IOB. (2013: 94).
- 16 Lijn, J. van der (2011: 32–35).
- 17 IOB (2013: 111–115).
- 18 Gruiters, J. (2011: 3); IOB (2013: 112); Dimitriu, G. & Graaf, B. de (2011).
- 19 Gruiters, J. (2011: 4); IOB (2013: 113).
- 20 Gruiters, J. (2011: 6); IOB (2013: 93–95).
- 21 Gruiters, J. (2011: 6).
- 22 IOB. (2013: 95).
- 23 Lijn, J. van der (2011: 34–44).
- 24 Parliamentary Documents II 2008–2009, 31,787, no. 1, 7 November 2008.

- 25 AIV. (2009).
- 26 AIV. (2009: 53).
- 27 Parliamentary Documents II 2011–2012, 32,605, no. 94, May 2012.
- 28 For an evaluation of progress with the New Deal, see International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building (2014) and Van Veen and Dudouet (2017). On 5 April 2016, the parties to the dialogue renewed their commitment to the principles of the New Deal in the *Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World*.
- 29 Multi-year Strategic Plans 2014–2017: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2014/02/05/meerjarige-strategische-plannen-mjssp-2014-2017>
- 30 The focus of each organisation is as follows: (1) Interpeace: operates in complex conflict zones (early peace-building) where the UN has less expertise and/or access and is able to link peace-building at local level (track 3) and at civil-society level (track 2) with peace negotiations at political level (track 1); (2) International Crisis Group: an international watchdog operating in many (potential) conflict zones in almost 100 countries in all; (3) International Alert: is engaged in developing and influencing policy and capacity building in relation to peace-building. A leading actor in the area of gender in conflict, conflict analyses and conflict sensitivity; (4) Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: a leading actor in track 1 and track 2 mediation. Its most important activities involve strictly confidential mediation; (5) International Centre for Transitional Justice: sets the international standard for the development and application of Transitional Justice. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not put these activities out to public tender and does not ask the partners to concentrate explicitly on one or more conflicts, but does hold talks with each of the five organisations every year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also commissions research by the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, mainly for the purpose of analysis and formulation of policy options. It also collaborates with EU delegations in the context of EU Joint Programming. Joint programming between the EU and member states encompasses (1) joint analysis, (2) joint identification of priorities and (3) allocation of work.
- 31 Parliamentary Documents II 2013–2014, 22,112, no. 1778, 17 January 2014.
- 32 Parliamentary Documents II 2014–2015, 33,694, no. 7, 17 November 2014.
- 33 Letters to the House of Representatives regularly contained references to the ‘successful 3D approach’ (Development, Diplomacy and Defence) which deserved to be continued: “The building and strengthening of the legal order in developing countries is crucial for safeguarding our interests. The Netherlands has, via an integrated and innovative approach (think of the 3D approach in Afghanistan), achieved results in the past that can be built on” (Parliamentary Documents II 2010–2011, 32,500 v, no. 15). The 3D or integrated approach is not a Dutch invention, despite repeated references to the ‘Dutch approach’ and the Netherlands’ pioneering role. The British version was originally developed

by the Ministry of Defence on the basis of experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, where development-oriented, humanitarian and political activities were combined. The ministry formulated four basic principles:

- proactive involvement prior to the crisis in order to properly assess the situation on the spot, to be able to interpret early warning signs and to start planning as soon as possible in order to have a timely presence;
- a shared understanding of the situation in order to operate as effectively as possible;
- thinking in terms of results and what is needed to achieve them. The planning and activities must therefore be concentrated on a single goal and success must be measured against shared benchmarks of effectiveness;
- joint action: familiarity with each other's institutions and networks and personal trust, in addition to integrated information management, help enhance the sharing of information and the joint performance of activities (House of Commons 2010).

In order to strengthen interdepartmental operations, in 2004 the British government introduced a budget for conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping jointly controlled by the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. A joint Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (since renamed the Stabilisation Unit) was also created to facilitate the drafting of joint analyses and plans. This unit was also given responsibility for establishing a so-called Civilian Stabilisation Group, a pool of more than a 1000 citizens and police officers from which at least 200 people could be deployed for missions at any one time. The integrated approach is also included in the British Defence Doctrine and the first National Security Strategy (House of Commons 2009).

34 House of Commons (2010a, b).

35 Kasselmann, H.J. (2012); Kitzen, M. (2008).

36 The term 'counterinsurgency' sounds militaristic, but, according to the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide, strictly speaking it involves a 'blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes'. Cited in B. de Graaf (2010) The Dutch mission in Uruzgan. Political and military lessons, *Atlantisch Perspectief* 2010 (34), no. 7.

37 Lijn, J. van der (2011: 27–28; 50–56); Matthijsen, C.J. (2014); Homan, C. (2014: 57).

38 *Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering* (2014: 11–14).

39 Wittkowsky, A. & Wittkamp, U. (2013: 2).

40 As De Spiegeleire puts it: "It then immediately becomes the subject of a number of political bargains between these players. At the same time, this domestic bargaining process is also thrown in a number of multilateral consultations where similar political horse-trading takes place between different countries.

The political games that ensue in the best case yield a political ‘decision’ that specifies a set of fairly vague political objectives. In case a military contribution is requested, the military is tasked to come up with an operational plan based on this political guidance.” (Spiegeleire 2014: 47).

- 41 Lijn, J. van der (2011: 60).
- 42 Coning, C. de & Friis, K. (2011); IOB. (2013); AIV. (2009).
- 43 Spiegeleire, S. de et al. (2014: 1).
- 44 Esch, J. van, Jong, S. de & Ridder, M. de (2014: 29).
- 45 Esch, J. van, Jong, S. de & Ridder, M. de (2014).
- 46 NSS. (2007: 10).
- 47 ISS. (2013: 10).
- 48 Parliamentary Documents II 2013–2014, 24,095, no. 368, 10 June 2014.
- 49 *Infrastructuren als wegbereiders van duurzaamheid*, WRR Working Paper no. 12.
- 50 Parliamentary Documents II 2009–2010, 30,821, no. 11, 2 April 2010; Esch, J. van, Jong, S. de & Ridder, M. de (2014: 33–360).
- 51 Esch, J. van, Jong, S. de & Ridder, M. de (2014: 35).
- 52 Parliamentary Documents II 2013–2014, 30,821, no. 22, 10 June 2014.
- 53 Parliamentary Documents II 2013–2014, 24,095, no. 368, 10 June 2014.
- 54 Parliamentary Documents II 2013–2014, 33,763, no. 44, 28 May 2014.
- 55 AIV. (2014: 19).
- 56 HCSS & TNO (2014b).
- 57 Homan, C. (2005).
- 58 Schaik, L. van et al. (2015: 34).
- 59 National Security Strategy (2007).
- 60 National Risk Assessment (2013).
- 61 The Dutch policy on development cooperation links the problem of climate change to two of the four so-called spearheads, namely water and food. In practice, this means that attention will be devoted to the implications of potential climate risks for food and water projects in each of the partner countries named in the multi-year security plans. There is also a review of the opportunities for investment in future projects that will contribute to strengthening the resilience of the countries against climate change.
- 62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016).
- 63 Parliamentary Documents II 2010–2011, 32,852, no. 1, 15 July 2011.
- 64 HCSS. (2011: 12).
- 65 Weterings, R. et al. (2013: 65).
- 66 Parliamentary Documents II 2010–2011, 32,852, no. 1, 15 July 2011.
- 67 Parliamentary Documents II 2010–2011, 32,852, no. 1, 15 July 2011.

- 68 Krom, A. et al. (2015: 91).
- 69 Parliamentary Documents II 2012–2013, 32,851, no. 15, 4 July 2013; Krom, A. et al. (2015: 91).
- 70 HCSS. (2011); Weterings, R. et al. (2013); Krom, A. et al. (2015); Buijze, G. (2013); Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2014).
- 71 Ridder, M. de (2017).
- 72 Recent research carried out for the HCSS on the basis of recent indices showed that the Netherlands, together with the UK and the US, are regarded as being best prepared for threats to cyber security (Gehem et al. 2015: 71–72).
- 73 Ducheine, P. (2016).
- 74 Ministry of Justice and Security (2013).
- 75 Parliamentary Documents II 2014–2015, 33,321, no. 5, 23 February 2015.
- 76 “‘Cybergeneraal’ bezorgd over videomanipulatie’ [“Cyber general” concerned about video manipulation], *NRC* 28 February 2017.
- 77 National Cyber Security Centre (2016); Rathenau Institute (2017).
- 78 AIV. (2015, 2016).

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